

BRAZIL

essays on history and politics

Leslie Bethell



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LATIN AMERICAN
STUDIES

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Preface

Leslie Bethell is one of the few great Brazilianists, as foreign scholars of Brazil are called, of his and subsequent generations. Brazilianists engage in scholarship that has breadth and depth; illuminate Brazil as an object of study, asking the most important questions that can be asked about the country; and give voice to Brazilian experiences and perspectives. Leslie has done these things during his long career, and he continues to do so, as this collection of his recent essays on Brazilian history and politics demonstrates.

When Leslie first arrived in Brazil, he travelled by ship. And that is fitting, because at that time he was immersed in the Atlantic world of the 19th century, doing the research for what was to become his first and perhaps still his most famous book, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). In this work, Leslie shows how the Brazilian slave trade came to be declared illegal in 1826, in the Anglo-Brazilian anti-slave trade treaty. But this was a *de jure*, not a *de facto* abolition; it was *para inglês ver* (for the English to see), as the Brazilians say. Leslie shows why it was impossible to suppress the trade once it had been declared illegal, at least for the first 20 years between 1826 and 1845. And finally, in the last part of the book, he analyses how the trade was finally abolished in the years 1850 and 1851. Leslie is particularly persuasive in showing the combination of domestic and international factors that led the Brazilian government finally to suppress the slave trade – these include Brazil's international isolation, its fear of a possible war with Argentina in which it would need the benevolent neutrality of Great Britain, and the beginnings of the realisation that European immigration would be the ultimate solution to Brazil's labour problem. It was large-scale European immigration in the 1880s that made the final abolition of slavery in 1888 politically manageable.

The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade is the cornerstone of Leslie's scholarship on Brazil, and the 19th century is probably still the era in which he feels most at home intellectually. He continues to research and publish on the 19th century: see, for example, his several publications on the abolitionist and diplomat Joaquim Nabuco (1849–1910), including *Joaquim Nabuco, British Abolitionists and the End of Slavery in Brazil* (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2009), edited with José Murilo de Carvalho, and most recently *Joaquim Nabuco no Mundo* (Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias,

2016). He could have limited his publications to the confines of a particular period, as many historians do.

But he did not. Instead, he ventured back into the colonial period, as in his chapters in *The Cambridge History of Latin America* on literature and intellectual life in colonial Brazil and the independence of Brazil. He also ventured forward in time, writing about politics in Brazil under President Getúlio Vargas from 1930 to 1945 and politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic of 1945 to 1964 (both of these chapters, again, in *The Cambridge History of Latin America* which Leslie edited in 12 volumes, 1984–2008).

Social scientists are likely to find Leslie's work on the post-Second World War period especially interesting. Much of his work on that period has been done in partnership with social scientists. For example, with the sociologist Ian Roxborough he produced an important edited volume *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). In the introductory essay, Leslie and his co-editor analyse how a brief period of democratisation after the Second World War in Latin America was quickly followed by a period of repression. They show how domestic class conflict was fused with Cold War politics so that by 1948 the window of democracy was closing almost everywhere in the region, with the United States recognising and supporting military regimes in Peru and Venezuela, the first two of many more military regimes that were to come.

In Leslie's chapters in *The Cambridge History on Latin America* on Brazil from 1964 to 1985, and from 1985 to 2002, he teamed up with the political scientists Celso Castro and Jairo Nicolau, respectively. And in a provocative and much cited article on Brazil's intellectual, cultural and political relationship with Spanish America in the 19th and 20th centuries in the *Journal of Latin American Studies* (2010), he combined his long-standing interests in the history of ideas and international relations. 'Is Brazil part of Latin America?', he asks. I will leave it to the reader to discover Leslie's answer, which is contained in the present volume.

By drawing on sociology, political science, international relations, and sometimes economics, Leslie shows us the benefit of combining history with social science. At this point a sceptic might ask if that is really possible. Do historians and social scientists have anything to say to each other? And are there any real affinities at all between them? The stereotypes about each side of this disciplinary divide suggest that they have nothing in common. History tries to rescue the lives and thoughts and beliefs of people who are no longer around from the condescension of posterity, in the words of E.P. Thompson, while social science, with its models, data and statistical manipulations seeks generalisations about human behaviour. Social science is abstract and reaches for conclusions that lack proper names – it is nomothetic, in the jargon of

David and Ruth Collier (*Shaping the Political Arena*, 2002), while history grounds itself in an understanding of specific times, people and places, and is ideographic.

But these stereotypes are misleading. The craft of the historian and the social scientist are not so different. The historian needs to ask interesting questions about his – or her – material. In that sense, history can never be just about the past, because it will reflect the concerns and questions of the present, and some of those questions will come from social science. That is the sense in which I mean that Leslie borrows from social science – the borrowing is not explicit, but sometimes the questions come from social scientific debates. The social scientist, on the other hand, needs to think about the applicability, in time and space, of his – or her – generalisations, and so often engages in analysis in which the work of historians is crucial. The questions that Leslie asks in this book are urgent, compelling questions about one of the largest democracies in the world. And in answering them in the way that he has, Leslie has shown us the relevance of both social science and history to our understanding of the world.

In his essay on the independence of Brazil in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, Leslie makes an amusing aside. In describing how Brazilians were influenced by liberal ideas in the second half of the 18th century, he writes, ‘despite the efforts of the Board of Censorship in Lisbon more books were imported into Brazil from Europe (and from North America) and found their way to private libraries; *some may even have been read*’. I am not sure what he was thinking when he wrote that, but I do not think that Leslie should fear that his books will not be read. He has written work that is important, and will remain important, for everyone who cares about Brazil. The present volume of essays is additional evidence of that.

Anthony Pereira
Director
Brazil Institute, King's College London

Introduction

Why Brazil? An autobiographical fragment*

I have been frequently asked over the years how – from the most unlikely of backgrounds – I became a historian of Brazil and how I came to devote the greater part of my academic career to the promotion and development of Brazilian studies in the UK (and, to a lesser extent, in the US).

I was born in Leeds in the north of England in 1937. I spent my entire childhood in Hunslet, a grim working-class neighbourhood in south Leeds dominated by heavy industry. My paternal grandfather was a steelworker, my maternal grandfather a coalminer. My father was a welder/boilermaker at the Hunslet Engine company, which manufactured steam-powered railway locomotives (some of which were exported to South America, but not, as far as I know, to Brazil). My mother was a housewife and a dinner-lady at Hunslet Moor, the local primary school, which I attended until I was 11. I had a sister, Linda, four years younger. We lived in what was called a back-to-back terrace house with no bathroom and an outside lavatory, in a cobbled street crossed by washing lines.

I failed the entrance exam for Leeds Grammar school and instead went to Cockburn High school, the local secondary modern school (which had in the recent past been a grammar school).¹ I managed to reach the sixth form and had the good fortune to be taught by an outstanding history teacher who persuaded me that I should read history at university. The headmaster suggested that I should try for a scholarship to Cambridge, which would have been a first for the school. I rejected this on the grounds that I was not sufficiently prepared and in any case Cambridge was too ‘posh’ for a working

* The somewhat pretentious title of this Introduction is a modest homage to Professor R.A. (Robin) Humphreys (1907–99), who more than anyone was responsible for my becoming a historian of Brazil. His account of how he became a historian of Latin America and the central figure in the development of Latin American studies in the UK is entitled *Latin American Studies in Great Britain: An Autobiographical Fragment*, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1978.

1 Cockburn High School’s only alumnus of note was Richard Hoggart, who had gone there 20 years earlier. In his classic *The Uses of Literacy. Aspects of Working Class Life* (1957) and in the first volume of his three-volume autobiography *A Local Habitation. Life and Times: 1918–1940* (1988) he vividly describes his childhood in Hunslet where, after the loss of both his parents, he lived with his grandmother from the age of eight until he went, from Cockburn, to the University of Leeds.

class boy like me. I opted instead to go to London, and applied to University College London (UCL). After being *interviewed* (unthinkable these days) by a committee of three chaired by Alfred Cobban, the great British historian of the French Revolution, I was offered a place in the department of history. Looking back, this is surprising. At that time only five per cent of 18 year olds went to university. I had attended neither a public school nor a grammar school. My parents were totally supportive, but relatively poor and uneducated. I cannot remember ever seeing a book in the house. For books I went to the Hunslet public library.

University College London had a distinguished department of history: Sir John Neale, Alfred Cobban, Arnaldo Momigliano, Joel Hurstfield, G.W.S. Barrow, F.M.L. Thompson, I.R. Christie, etc. The first-year intake was 30 students and 'freshers' were divided into groups of four or five and taught by the senior professors in what were called 'essay classes'. In my first week I was allocated to R.A. (Robin) Humphreys, who was the only professor of Latin American history in Great Britain, indeed in Europe, I think.² I wrote half a dozen essays for him on Latin American topics, which sadly I cannot recall, during my first term at UCL. And I was sufficiently engaged to take as my 'optional subject' in my second year Humphreys' course 'The history of Latin America since independence' and as my 'special subject' in the second and third years Humphreys' course on 'The Independence of Latin America, 1808–1826', which required me to learn Spanish and which introduced me to printed primary sources as well as the secondary literature. I was becoming a 'Latin Americanist'.

I was fortunate to get a first class degree, relatively rare in those days and one of only four in history in the entire federal University of London. As a result I was offered a scholarship to do research for a PhD at UCL. Two potential supervisors approached me: Tom Reddaway, professor of London history, suggested I might like to study the history of the sewers of Marylebone in the 19th century, and Robin Humphreys proposed that I might think about a topic linking the history of Africa with the history of either Cuba or Brazil. It took me ten seconds to decide. I don't recollect why in the end I chose Africa and Brazil rather than Africa and Cuba. It was 1958. If it had been 1959 I

2 Robin Humphreys had been appointed assistant lecturer in American history at UCL in 1932 by Hale Bellot, the only professor of American history in the UK at the time, on the understanding that he would eventually be responsible for Latin American history as well as the history of the United States. During the following years he developed an interest in Latin American history but had not begun to teach it when the War intervened. During the War he was responsible for Latin America in the Research Department of the Foreign Office directed by Arnold Toynbee. He began lecturing on Latin American history at UCL, where he was now reader in American History, in 1946. He was appointed to the newly established University of London Chair in Latin American History at UCL in 1948. See Humphreys, *Latin American Studies in Great Britain*, pp. 4–17.

would have undoubtedly chosen Cuba. And my entire career (and my life) would have been completely different.

I was no doubt influenced in my decision by the strong links which had existed between Britain and Brazil in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Travel funds for research outside the UK were extremely rare and it was important to choose a research topic for which there would be adequate British sources available. I finally decided to explore the decisive role played by Britain in the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade to Brazil during the first half of the 19th century. It meant that I would, of course, have to learn Portuguese. I was on my way to becoming a 'Brazilianist'.

At the end of my second year of research, thanks as in all things to the support of my supervisor Robin Humphreys, I was able to go to Brazil for the first time – for three months (July–September 1960). I travelled by ship, third class, steerage, with Spanish and Portuguese immigrants picked up in Vigo and Lisbon respectively. Fifteen days at sea – a truly horrible experience. But my arrival, past the Sugar Loaf mountain into Guanabara Bay and Rio de Janeiro, the most beautiful city in the world, in its physical setting at least, was unforgettable. On disembarking, the first thing I saw was a banner announcing *Jânio vem aí* [Here comes Jânio]. I had arrived in the middle of the presidential election campaign which was won in October by Jânio Quadros, the enigmatic and erratic populist former mayor of the city of São Paulo and governor of São Paulo state. His resignation after only seven months in office initiated a period of political crisis which culminated in the military coup of March/April 1964 and the end of Brazil's post-war Liberal Republic (1946–64).

I took with me to Brazil a letter of introduction from Robin Humphreys to José Honório Rodrigues, one of Brazil's leading historians, a former director of the National Library and director of the National Archive at the time. I presented myself at his apartment in Leblon. Four things surprised (and impressed) me: first, the door was opened by a black *empregada* [female domestic servant]; secondly, she told me *o professor* was on the beach; thirdly, I found *o professor* on the beach playing football; fourthly, he immediately invited me to a dinner for prominent politicians and intellectuals at his home that evening. I had entered another world. It was a long way from Hunslet and, for that matter, Bloomsbury. There was a tropical storm during dinner and as I was leaving Jose Honório's wife Lêda offered me an umbrella. She claimed (and she loved to tell this story) that I replied: 'I come from the working class in the North of England, my father is a factory worker, and I am a member of the British Labour Party. I don't use an umbrella'. I can't believe I really said that.

José Honório was the non-official *orientador* [supervisor] and intellectual inspiration of the first generation of US *brasilianistas*, young professors and post-graduate students mainly from the United States researching on the

history of Brazil: Stanley Stein was the first, followed by E. Bradford Burns, Thomas Skidmore, John Wirth, Richard Graham, Stuart Schwarz, Robert Levine, Stanley Hilton and many others. I was the only English student.

Under José Honório's guidance I worked on my thesis in the Biblioteca Nacional, the Arquivo Nacional, the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro and the the Arquivo Histórico do Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Itamaraty). José Honório and Lêda became great friends. They came to regard me as the son they never had. I was a frequent visitor to their *cobertura* [penthouse apartment] in Rua Paul Redfern, Ipanema – and to José Honório's library of almost 30,000 books. What I knew about Brazil and Brazilian history I mostly learned from him.³

Exploring Rio de Janeiro for the first time and discovering its history and culture was a great pleasure. I found time to travel to Salvador da Bahia and São Paulo. I spent a weekend in Salvador with the great French photographer and ethnographer Pierre Verger, whom I had met in the British Museum (now British Library) and Public Record Office in Chancery Lane, like me researching on the transatlantic slave trade. He had promised to introduce me to the delights of Salvador and apologised for the fact that 'two boring French friends' had turned up and insisted in joining us. We drove to the Hotel da Bahia where Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir were waiting for us. I went to my first Afro-Brazilian *candomblé*, a memorable experience, in distinguished company. The French couple were travelling in South America after visiting post-revolutionary Cuba. They hated Brazil, and never returned. It was in São Paulo that I met Alan Pryce-Jones, the outgoing editor of the *Times Literary Supplement*, who recommended me to his successor as a potential contributor. As a result, for more than a decade I regularly reviewed books on a variety of topics for the *TLS*.

It was on my return to London in October 1960 that I first met Eric Hobsbawm who became a close personal friend, and a great influence on my life. We were both living in Gordon Mansions, Huntley Street, Bloomsbury, close to the university. I was a graduate student in history at University College and a tutor for the London branch of the Workers' Educational Association (WEA). Twenty years older than me, Eric was a reader in history at Birkbeck College. His first book, *Primitive Rebels*, a study of archaic forms of organised social protest, reform and revolution in the 19th and 20th centuries, had just been published, and the *Age of Revolution*, the first of his four-volume history of the modern world from the French Revolution to the end of the Cold War, was about to be published. What impressed me even more at the time, was that he was the jazz critic for the *New Statesman* (under the pseudonym Francis

3 See my *homenagem*, 'José Honório Rodrigues (1913–1987): historiógrafo erudito, historiador combatente', *Revista Brasileira* (Academia Brasileira de Letras), Fase VIII, Ano III, no. 78, janeiro–março de 2014, pp. 153–70.

Newton). He had recently returned from a visit to revolutionary Cuba, and Latin America became and remained one of his principal areas of interest.⁴ Increasingly it was Brazil that most interested him and on which we had endless conversations over the years until his death in 2012.

There were in 1960–1 no posts in Latin American history in British universities for which a postgraduate student could apply. Inconceivable as it must seem today, I was interviewed for, but failed to land, lectureships in early modern English history at the University of Leicester and sociology at the London School of Economics, and was eventually appointed lecturer in European history, with special reference to Germany and the Soviet Union, at the University of Bristol. In October 1961, aged 24, newly married to Valerie Wood, a journalist who also had a degree from UCL (in economics), I moved to Bristol and happily taught there for the following five academic years. After three years I was allowed to add to my teaching a course on modern Latin American history and when I left I was replaced by a US Latin Americanist.

At Bristol I completed my PhD (which was examined in February 1963), and following the strict instructions laid down by Robin Humphreys for establishing the foundations of a successful academic career I submitted articles to leading academic journals – published in the *English Historical Review* (1965), *Journal of African History* (1966) and *Journal of Latin American Studies* (1969) – and prepared my thesis for publication as my first book: *The Abolition of Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the slave trade question, 1807–1869* (Cambridge University Press, 1970).⁵ I was a contributor (on Brazil) to the *Guide to Manuscript Sources for the History of Latin America and the Caribbean in the British Isles* edited by Peter Walne (work on which began in 1961 but which was only finally published in 1973). I also made a second visit to Brazil for three months in the summer of 1965 – again by ship, but this time second class. I found a very different Brazil, one year after the 1964 military coup. The military dictatorship was to last 21 years (1964–85).

In the meantime, as a result of increasing official concern at developments in Latin America in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution and the prevailing ignorance of the region in the UK, the University Grants Committee had established in 1962 a committee under the chairmanship of Sir John Parry to report on the future of Latin American studies in the British universities. The 'Parry Report', published early in 1965, recommended the creation of five university institutes or centres of Latin American studies (London, Oxford, Cambridge, Liverpool and Glasgow), with a number of 'named' posts attached

⁴ See L. Bethell (ed.), *Viva la Revolucion. Eric Hobsbawm on Latin America* (London: Little, Brown, 2016).

⁵ Translated twice into Portuguese: *A Abolição do Tráfico de Escravos no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Expressão e Cultura/Editôra Universidade de São Paulo, 1976); *A Abolição do Comércio Brasileiro de Escravos* (Brasília: Editora do Senado Federal, 2002).

to each. Strictly speaking, I was not appointed to a 'Parry post', although this did not prevent me from claiming, like many of my colleagues who were, that I owed my future academic career to Fidel Castro. The Advisory Committee on Latin American Studies at UCL had already endorsed in 1964 a proposal from Robin Humphreys that the College should create a lectureship in Brazilian history.⁶ In order to relieve Robin of some of his duties at UCL when he became (initially part-time) director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (UoL) the university included a lectureship in Latin American history with special reference to Brazil in its submission to the UGC in June 1965. I was offered and accepted the post in October 1965 (without, I should admit, applying for it or being interviewed for it). After some discussion it was felt best to name my post 'Lecturer in Spanish American and Brazilian History', but it was clear that my main duty would be to promote the study of Brazilian history. It was the first post dedicated to Brazil in any British university.⁷

I returned to the University of London in April 1966. We lived first in St. Albans, outside London, where my two sons, Ben and Daniel, were born, then Elstree and finally from 1973 to 1979 Canonbury, Islington in north London (coincidentally close to where Robin Humphreys lived for many years). For more than 20 years I taught modern Latin American history, with special reference to Brazil, at UCL as lecturer, reader (from 1974) and finally professor (from 1986). At some stage in the early 1970s I decided to teach a separate course on Brazilian history since 1822. In those days all new courses were vetted by the University of London Board of Studies in History. The course was approved – the first to be offered in a British university. After all, Brazil was the fifth largest country in the world in both territory and population with a rich and distinctive history. However, during my presentation of the new course, Allen Brown, professor of English history at King's College, who had devoted his entire academic career to the study of the Norman Conquest, was heard to comment: 'History of Brazil, history of Brazil, next it'll be the history of Bongo-Bongo Land! That's not something you forget.'

At UCL James Cummins, professor of Spanish, was one of my closest friends. And it was through Jim, who spent almost every weekend with him, since his wife, the writer Emily Hahn, lived in New York, that I came to know the great Charles Boxer, former Camões professor of Portuguese at King's College and pre-eminent historian of Portuguese (and Dutch) overseas expansion in Asia, Africa and, above all, America (Brazil) from the 16th to the 18th centuries. Boxer had a great influence on my decision to focus my own research on Brazil. He once declared that he had never written, and had no intention of ever

6 John Lynch had been appointed to a lectureship in Hispanic and Latin American history at UCL in 1961. He was promoted to reader in 1964.

7 On the background to the creation of the lectureship in Brazilian history, see Humphreys, *Latin American Studies in Great Britain*, pp. 25, 36, 38.

writing, a word about Brazil after 1800. I replied that I had not written, and had no intention of ever writing, a word about Brazil *before* 1800.⁸

During my years at UCL I made several visits to Brazil under military rule (1969, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1979, 1982) initially researching for a proposed book on the abolition of slavery in Brazil, a sequel to my book on the abolition of the Brazilian slave trade. In 1979 I was for six months a visiting professor at the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), one of Brazil's leading social science research centres founded in 1969 as a graduate school of the Universidade Cândido Mendes. IUPERJ gave me my first teaching experience in Brazil and brought me into closer contact with the golden generation of Brazilian political scientists (Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, Olavo Brasil de Lima Jr, José Murilo de Carvalho, César Guimarães), sociologists (Simon Schwartzman, Renato Boschi) and specialists on Brazil's international relations (Maria Regina Soares de Lima, Mônica Hirst). At the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC), founded in 1973 as part of the Fundação Getulio Vargas, I met for the first time historians working on contemporary Brazilian history, that is to say, Brazil since 1930 (Celina do Amaral Peixoto, granddaughter of Getúlio Vargas, Aspásia Camargo, Angela Castro Gomes, Alzira Alves de Abreu, Maria Celina Soares d'Araújo, Dulci Chaves Pandolfi – an all-female cast).

The book on the abolition of slavery was never written, in part because I became involved in a major academic project which dominated my life for almost 30 years: the *Cambridge History of Latin America*. In 1973 I was invited to edit a two-volume *History of Latin America* by Patricia Skinner (now Patricia Williams), a commissioning editor at Cambridge University Press (CUP), who became one of my closest friends. I agreed on the understanding that I would need three volumes, which over time became five, then eight and finally twelve, plus more than a dozen spin-off 'Student Editions' (selections of chapters by period, theme, region and country) and translations into Spanish, Portuguese and Chinese. Despite a good deal of time devoted to the planning of the project I did not in fact begin sustained work on it until 1979 because of family problems (ending in divorce and a painful separation from my two sons). I remember seeing a private note written by the senior editor at CUP, in 1976, I think, saying that he had come to the conclusion that I would never deliver and that the Press should abandon the project – or at least abandon me. However, the first five volumes of the *Cambridge History of Latin America* were published in 1984–6: volumes I & II *Colonial Latin America*; volume III *Latin America from Independence to 1870*, including my own contributions on the Independence of Brazil and (with José Murilo de Carvalho, with whom

8 This turned out to be not strictly true. I did contribute a Note on the literature and intellectual life of colonial Brazil to volume II of the *Cambridge History of Latin America* (1984).

I have since collaborated on many projects) Brazil from independence to the middle of the 19th century; volumes IV & V *Latin America 1870–1930*. I was criticised by some of my colleagues, who called themselves historians of Latin America but worked solely on Spanish America, for giving as much space as I did to the history of Brazil (11 chapters in volumes I & II, three in volume III and three in volume V).

It was through the *CHLA* that I became a friend of Richard Morse, author of *Prospero's Mirror: a study in New World Dialectic*, inspired by José Enrique Rodó's *Ariel* (1900) and *El mirador de Próspero* (1913), which was published in Spanish, *El espejo de Próspero* (1982), and later in Portuguese, *O espelho de Próspero: cultura e ideias nas Américas* (1988), but never in the original English. Dick Morse was one of the few US historians of Latin America who knew Brazil as well as Spanish America. We had first met in São Paulo in 1972, and in 1974 Dick invited me to stay with him in Rio de Janeiro in his apartment on Avenida Delfim Moreira overlooking the beach in Leblon. He was at the time on leave from Yale serving as the Ford Foundation's representative in Brazil. Dick and I spent a good part of that summer drinking and discussing the structure of the proposed History, the volumes, the chapters, potential contributors in the United States, the UK, Europe and especially Latin America (although the Oxford historian Raymond Carr, warden of St Antony's College, had strongly advised me not to sign up any Latin Americans!). For the next 20 years Dick and I corresponded on all aspects of the *Cambridge History of Latin America*, but particularly on the chapter I persuaded him to write himself – on the history of ideas in Latin America (Spanish America and Brazil) since 1920 for volume IV (which eventually became volume X). 'The multiverse of Latin American identity, c.1920–c.1970' is an exceptional chapter of more than 100 pages which no other scholar in North America or Europe could have written.⁹ Dick Morse had a great influence on the way I understood Brazil within the context of Latin America.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, alongside my teaching duties at UCL and the editing of the *CHLA* I was an active member of the Anglo-Brazilian Society, Chairman of the Bloomsbury Theatre (1977–86) which introduced a number of Brazilian dance and theatre companies to London, and (1980–91) a close associate of Edna Crepaldi in the development of Brazilian Contemporary Arts (BCA) which promoted all aspects of Brazilian culture in London. And from 1980 to 1986 (and again from 1993–7) I was a consultant on Brazil for Oxford Analytica, a global analysis and advisory firm (now think-tank)

⁹ CHLA volume X was published in 1995. See below, n. 15. On my correspondence with Morse about this chapter over a period of 20 years, see my essay 'Richard Morse e a *Cambridge History of Latin America*', in B.H. Domingues and P. Blasenheimer (eds.), *O Código Morse: ensaios sobre Richard Morse* (Belo Horizonte: Editora da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 2010), pp. 47–67.

founded by David Young in 1975. After several years living alone, from 1984 I lived with my partner Felicity Guinness, a widow with four children, first in Kensington and then for more than ten years in Hampstead.

In October 1987, after spending the academic year 1986–7 at the University of California, San Diego and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C., again with Brazil my main focus, I took leave from UCL to become (full-time) director of the university's Institute of Latin American Studies (in succession to John Lynch, who had himself succeeded Robin Humphreys in 1974). For the next five years I was heavily engaged in restructuring the administration and the library, revitalising the programme of research seminars, conferences and publications, and securing the future of the Institute. And during my first two years as director (1987–9) I was also co-editor of the *Journal of Latin American Studies*, with Victor Bulmer-Thomas. All this slowed down my own research and writing and I was taken back to Latin America in general and away from Brazil in particular. However, in October 1989 I did manage to establish at the Institute a virtual Centre for Contemporary Brazilian Studies to coordinate research on Brazil in social sciences and humanities in the federal University of London and to provide a forum for public discussion of Brazil. And many more Brazilian research fellows and research associates were appointed to the Institute than under the previous administration.¹⁰ With my colleague the sociologist Ian Roxborough at LSE I developed a research project which led to the publication of a jointly edited volume *Latin American between the Second World War and the Cold War 1944–1948* (Cambridge, 1992) to which I contributed the chapter on Brazil.¹¹ Two more volumes of the *CHLA* were published during this period: VII *Latin America since 1930: Mexico, Central America, Caribbean* (1990) and VIII *Spanish South America since 1930* (1991). Also two *CHLA* 'Student Editions' on Brazil: *Colonial Brazil* (1987) and *Brazil: Empire and Republic 1822–1930* (1989).

In 1992, aged 55, after five years as director of ILAS, rather than return to my chair at UCL where I had been undergraduate and graduate student and, after an interval of five years in Bristol, lecturer, reader and professor – and most likely spend the rest of my career there – I took early retirement. It was at this time that Oxford decided to fill its chair of Latin American history (established in 1967) which had been vacant since the early death of Christopher Platt in 1989. I was strongly encouraged (begged even) to apply by my Latin Americanist colleagues in Oxford and by Sir Ralf Dahrendorf, the warden of St Antony's College, to which college the chair was attached. After

10 See ILAS Annual Reports 1987–1992.

11 Portuguese trans., *A América Latina entre a Segunda Guerra Mundial e a Guerra Fria* (São Paulo: Editora Paz e Terra, 1996).

much hesitation, I finally did so. The appointments committee unknowingly did me a great favour by offering the post to Alan Knight, a leading historian of Mexico at the University of Essex. (It was a long and bitter meeting which left Dahrendorf in particular extremely angry. He drove from Oxford to London that evening to explain what had happened. But that's another story.) I could have spent the next 10–15 years teaching Latin American history at Oxford. Instead I accepted an invitation from Friedrich Katz, the distinguished historian of Mexico, to spend a year at the University of Chicago as visiting professor of Latin American history, replacing John Coatsworth, who had moved to Harvard. And it was at a dinner in Chicago in 1993 that Nicholas Baring, a friend of Felicity, whose father had been chairman of Barings bank, indicated that the Baring Foundation was prepared to establish on my behalf a three-year senior research fellowship in Brazilian studies at St Antony's College, Oxford. I had been senior associate member at St Antony's for many years and had close relations with the college's Latin American Centre. It was understood that the Baring Fellowship would provide me with the opportunity to plan for the creation of the Centre for Brazilian Studies at St Antony's independent of the Latin American Centre.

I had long ago come to the conclusion that Brazil had never been an essential part of what was generally considered to be 'Latin America' and would never be given the attention it deserved in university institutes and centres of Latin American studies unless it separated itself from the rest of Latin America, that it is to say, the Spanish-speaking republics. 'Latin American studies' in US universities were overwhelmingly studies of Spanish America, especially Mexico and Central America. In the UK Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and Chile received more attention than Brazil. In most institutes and centres of Latin American studies Brazilian studies were usually to be found, in the words of Walnice Galvão, professor of literature at the University of São Paulo, '*atrás de uma pequena porta no fim do corredor* [behind a small door at the end of the corridor]'. Most 'Latinamericanists' did not speak or read Portuguese, knew little of Brazil's distinctive history and culture, and indeed rarely, if ever, visited Brazil.

The project to establish the Centre for Brazilian Studies in Oxford had the strong and indispensable support of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the Brazilian sociologist who had been elected president of Brazil in October 1994 (he was to serve two terms, 1995–2002) and Rubens Barbosa, the Brazilian ambassador in London (1994–99). At St Antony's College, Ralf Dahrendorf (now Lord Dahrendorf) was on board from the beginning. The Centre was funded for an initial five-year period (and then for a second five-year period) primarily through a partnership between the Brazilian government (Ministry of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Culture), the Brazilian public sector, companies in the

Brazilian and British private sectors, the Brazilian non-profit making 'third sector' and individual benefactors.

My Baring Fellowship having come to an end, I spent most of the academic year 1996–7 as a guest scholar at the Wilson Center in Washington. It was not until February 1997 that the Hebdomadal Council of Oxford University approved the setting up of the Centre. I was appointed director for a five-year term (and in 2002 re-appointed for a further five years) and took up my appointment in June. The University of Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies was officially inaugurated by President Cardoso on 3 December 1997 at a luncheon in Buckingham Palace during the president's state visit to the UK. Those attending included Lord Jenkins, chancellor of the university, Dr Colin Lucas, the university's new vice-chancellor, Sir Marrack Goulding, the new warden of St Antony's College, foreign minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia and other Brazilian ministers, ambassador Rubens Barbosa, Eric Hobsbawm and several of the Centre's founding benefactors, including Joseph Safra (Banco Safra). The Centre began its life in central Oxford in rented rooms above a dentist in Beaumont Street and above the Quaker bookshop in St Giles'. In October 2000 it moved to a house in north Oxford provided by the University: 92 Woodstock Road, close to St Antony's College. Separated from Felicity Guinness, I lived in an apartment in Wytham Abbey just outside Oxford.

For ten years (1997–2007) the University of Oxford was unique among the great universities of the world in maintaining, independent of its Latin American Centre, a centre of advanced interdisciplinary study dedicated to increasing knowledge and understanding of Brazil, Brazil's role in the world and Brazilian perspectives on global issues. The Centre in Oxford acquired an international reputation as the leading centre for the study of Brazil outside Brazil.

The Centre for Brazilian Studies appointed several one- and two-year postdoctoral research fellows. And in 2003 the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and the University Research Development Fund jointly funded a lectureship in Brazilian studies (and fellow of St Cross College) for five years. Some 40 professors, readers, lecturers and research fellows of the University of Oxford (with fellowships in some 20 colleges), engaged in research and graduate teaching and supervision on Brazil in a wide range of disciplines in the social sciences, life and environmental sciences and humanities, were affiliated to the Centre as research associates. The Centre brought to Oxford as visiting research fellows and associates over 100 scholars, intellectuals and policymakers, mainly from Brazil but also from the rest of Europe, the United States and elsewhere in the world, for periods of between two months and one year. The Centre organised over 200 research seminars and over 80 workshops and conferences on Brazil – invariably in comparative, international perspective – which attracted participants from universities and

research centres in Brazil and elsewhere. The Centre published several books, research papers and almost 100 working papers.¹²

My primary focus in these years was on the development of the Centre, not least fundraising, but I was able to assist Stephen Graubard, the Editor of *Daedalus*, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, in preparing a special issue on Brazil: *The Burden of the Past; The Promise of the Future* (vol.129/2, spring 2000);¹³ I produced an extended essay on the British contribution to the study of Brazil;¹⁴ and the Centre published my *Brazil in Books by British and Irish Authors* (University of Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies, 2003). Work on the *Cambridge History of Latin America* had finally come to an end¹⁵ – apart from one volume. Because of my commitment to the Centre for Brazilian Studies *CHLA* volume IX *Brazil since 1930* had never been finished, in the case of my own chapters never even started! The Brazilian economist Marcelo Abreu submitted three substantial chapters on the Brazilian economy (the third with his colleague Rogério Werneck), the Brazilian sociologist Nelson do Valle Silva his chapter on Brazilian society. My own chapters – ‘Politics in Brazil under Vargas 1930–1945’, ‘Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic 1945–1964’, (with the Brazilian political scientist Celso Castro), ‘Politics in Brazil under military rule 1964–1985’ and (with the Brazilian political scientist Jairo Nicolau) ‘Politics in Brazil since 1985’ – were completed during three successive summer vacations hiding from the world in the Pousada de Alcobaça in Petrópolis. The *Cambridge History of Latin America* Vol. IX *Brazil since 1930* was published in 2008.

By the beginning of 2007, however, the future of the Centre in Oxford was in doubt. The Foreign Minister in the government of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers’ Party) which came to power in January 2003 ended official Brazilian support for the Centre. He believed, it seems, that the Centre was a *tucano* centre, that is to say, a centre supporting the policies

12 See CBS Annual Reports 1997–2007, and CBS *Ten Year Report 1997–2017*.

13 Published in Portuguese translation as L. Bethell (ed.), *Brasil: fardo do passado, promessa do futuro. Dez ensaios sobre política e sociedade brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record/Civilização Brasileira, 2002).

14 ‘A contribuição britânico para estudo do Brasil’, in R. Antônio Barbosa, M.C. Eakin and P.R. de Almeida (eds.), *O Brasil dos Brasilianistas. Um guia dos estudos sobre o Brasil nos Estados Unidos, 1945–2000* (São Paulo: Editora Paz e Terra, 2002), published in English as *The British Contribution to the Study of Brazil* (University of Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies, Working paper #37, 2003) and, revised and expanded, in M. Eakin and P.R. de Almeida (eds.), *Envisioning Brazil. A Guide to Brazilian Studies in the United States, 1945–2003* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005).

15 *CHLA* volume VI Part I *Economy and Society since 1930* & Part II *Politics and Society since 1930* had been published in 1994, volume X *Ideas, Culture and Society since 1930* in 1995. And in 1997 the Editora da Universidade de São Paulo (Edusp) began to publish the Cambridge History in Portuguese translation. (Publication in Spanish and Chinese translations was already in progress.)

of the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), the party of former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, hostile to the PT, and reluctant to invite to Oxford intellectuals of the Left. This was very strange because one of the Centre's most successful workshops (in February 1999 after the PT's leader and candidate for president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, had suffered a third successive defeat) had been dedicated to the 'Future of the Left in Brazil' (or how to avoid a fourth defeat). Not only Lula himself, but several prominent PT politicians and intellectuals, together with a number of leading British, European and Brazilian intellectuals of the Left, had participated in the workshop. Tarso Genro, on the Left of the PT, once claimed that it was the 'Oxford seminar' that set the PT on the road to victory in October 2002. I have written elsewhere about how Eric Hobsbawm and I, without illusions, celebrated Lula's election as president.¹⁶ I had known Lula for many years. I remember how moved he was when I told him that my father had been like him a *metalúrgico* [metal worker] and like him had lost the little finger of his left hand in an industrial accident. I was a special guest at Lula's inauguration on 1 January 2003 and at the banquet in Buckingham Palace during his state visit to the UK in March 2006. President Cardoso, I should add, when he came to Oxford to receive an honorary degree in 2002, told me, jokingly (I think), that he himself had always believed that the Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies was a *petista* Centre – funded by his administration!

In Oxford the vice-chancellor Professor Colin Lucas had been a strong supporter of the Centre from the beginning, but his successor in 2004, John Hood, showed little interest. Sir Marrack Goulding, Darhendorf's successor as warden of St Antony's in 1997 (he and I arrived in Oxford together) was never interested. Visiting the Brazil Centre for the first time (after several years), Sir Marrack, who had served as Britain's first ambassador to Angola and had been for 11 years (1986–1997) Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, observed: 'Centre for the study of Brazil, it will be a centre for the study of the Pitcairn Islands next!' Like Bongo-Bongo Land, this is something not easily forgotten or forgiven.

I had secured the promise of funds for a further five years from a benefactor in São Paulo, who had already given generously to Oxford, but the university was now demanding sustainable long-term funding for the Centre. Aged 70, I was due to retire in September 2007, and my only possible successor was unwilling to take on the responsibilities of director. The truth is that, despite its evident success, my colleagues in the Latin American Centre at St Antony's College never believed in the need for an independent centre dedicated to Brazil. The head of the School of Interdisciplinary Area Studies, who was also acting warden of St Antony's that year, was persuaded (too easily persuaded)

16 'Introduction: Eric and Latin America', in L. Bethell (ed.), *Viva la Revolucion*, p. 19.

that the Centre could be adequately replaced by a Brazilian studies programme inside the Latin American Centre. It clearly could not, but the University of Oxford made the decision, inexplicable to everyone engaged with Brazil outside Oxford, to close its Centre for Brazilian Studies.

On retirement from Oxford, I decided to move to Rio de Janeiro to live with my Brazilian partner, Maria Eduarda Marques, a historian of colonial Brazil and of Brazilian art. For the first three years we lived in an apartment near the beach in Ipanema (in Rua Paul Redfern across the street from the building in which Lêda Rodrigues, José Honório's widow, still lived). We then moved to our current apartment on the 13th floor of a high-rise set in the tropical gardens of a gated community on Avenida Aquarela do Brasil in São Conrado, overlooking Oscar Niemeyer's famous cylindrical Hotel Nacional (now Gran Melia) and the Atlantic ocean. Five hundred metres to the rear, on the other side of a congested freeway, lies Rocinha, one of Rio's largest favelas. Occasionally I wake up to the sound of gunfire as rival drug gangs battle each other and the military police. A J.G. Ballard lifestyle, my son Ben calls it.

I continued to spend three months (January–March) each year outside Brazil: from 2008 to 2010 in Washington D.C. as a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center's Brazil Institute; from 2011 to 2017 in London as a visiting professor at the Brazil Institute, King's College, where I taught a master's course on 'Brazil in regional and global history'. KCL had established a Brazil Institute, alongside its China and India Institutes, in 2010 with the clear intention of replacing the recently closed Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies.

In Rio I had been a member of the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro since 1992, and I had been elected a member of the Academia Brasileira de Ciência in 2004. In 2010 I was elected a *sócio* (one of 20 foreign members – the first English member since Herbert Spencer in 1897) of the Academia Brasileira de Letras, occupying the seat left vacant by the death of the Portuguese novelist José Saramago. For several years I was a visiting researcher at CPDOC/Fundação Getulio Vargas; I inaugurated the chair in Latin American history at the Universidade Federal da Integração Latino-americana in Foz do Iguaçu; I taught a course at the Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Universidade de São Paulo; and I became increasingly engaged in the activities of CEBRI, the Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, an independent think-tank in Rio.

In 2010, for the Instituto Moreira Salles, I was the curator of an exhibition of the work of Charles Landseer, the official artist of Sir Charles Stuart's mission to Brazil in 1825–6 to negotiate on behalf of both Portugal and Britain recognition of the independent Brazilian empire. It was shown at the Institute's galleries in Rio de Janeiro, Poços de Caldas (Minas Gerais) and São Paulo and at the Centro Cultural de Cascais in Portugal.¹⁷ But for the most part I was reading and writing

17 See L. Bethell (ed.), *Charles Landseer. Desenhos e Aquarelas de Portugal e do Brasil, 1825–1826* (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Moreira Salles, 2010).

on topics in Brazilian history and politics which had long been of interest to me: the history of the idea of Latin America and Brazil's political, cultural and intellectual relations with Spanish America; Britain's economic and political relations with Brazil during the long 19th century, known in Brazil as *o século inglês* [the English century]; the Paraguayan War or War of the Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) against Paraguay (1864–70), the longest and bloodiest inter-state war in the history of Latin America; slavery, abolition and the roots of social and racial inequality and exclusion in Brazil; political exclusion and the long and winding road to Brazil's current flawed democracy; populism and its manifestations in Brazil; and the failure of the Brazilian Left. The Brazilian abolitionist, journalist, historian and diplomat Joaquim Nabuco (1849–1910) became a new and somewhat obsessive interest.¹⁸

The essays in this volume are for the most part based on book chapters and journal articles published (mainly in Portuguese) and public lectures delivered during the ten years since my retirement from the University of Oxford and my decision to live in Brazil – all substantially revised, expanded and rewritten for publication in English. The idea for the volume – to mark my 80th birthday in 2017 – came originally, I think, from my friend Richard Bourne, senior research fellow at the University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies and biographer of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and found support from Professor Anthony Pereira, director of the Brazil Institute at King's College, who also agreed to write the Preface to the volume, and Professor Linda Newson, director of the University of London Institute of Latin American Studies.

2017 was also the 30th anniversary of my assuming the directorship of the Institute for five years. I am delighted that Professor Newson agreed that this volume of essays on Brazilian history and politics should be published by the Institute of Latin American Studies, at the School of Advanced Study (University of London). And I am grateful to Emily Morrell, Head of Publications at SAS, and her team, especially Jessica Davies Porter, for their work in preparing the essays for publication.

¹⁸ See Editor (with J. Murilo de Carvalho), *Joaquim Nabuco e os abolitionistas britânicos: Correspondência 1880–1905* (Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks and Academia Brasileira de Letras, 2008); *Joaquim Nabuco, British Abolitionists and the End of Slavery in Brazil. Correspondence 1880–1905* (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2009); Editor, J. Nabuco, *My Formative Years* [first English translation of *Minha formação* (1900)] (Oxford: Signal Books and Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias, 2012); Editor (with J. M. de Carvalho and C. Sandroni), *Joaquim Nabuco: correspondente internacional 1882–1891*, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Academia Brasileira de Letras/São Paulo: Global Editora, 2013); and finally *Joaquim Nabuco no mundo: abolitionista, jornalista e diplomata* (Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias, 2016).

I

1. Brazil and Latin America*

I

It has been the conventional wisdom of the past several decades – since the publication of John Leddy Phelan's influential 1968 essay, 'Pan-Latinism, French intervention in Mexico (1861–7) and the genesis of the idea of Latin America'¹ – that 'Latin America' was originally a French concept, 'l'Amérique latine', used by French intellectuals to justify French imperialism in Mexico under Napoleon III. There existed, the French argued, a linguistic and cultural affinity, a unity of 'Latin' peoples for whom France was the natural leader and inspiration (and their defender against Anglo-Saxon, mainly US, influence and, ultimately, domination). The idea of a 'race latine', different from the Anglo-Saxon 'race', was first conceptualised in *Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord* (2 vols., Paris, 1836) by Michel Chevalier (1806–77). After a lengthy stay in the United States (1833–5), following in the footsteps of Alexis de Tocqueville, Chevalier had visited Mexico and Cuba. He later became a prominent member of the Collège de France, the Council of State and the Senate – and a close adviser to Napoleon III. Chevalier was the principal apologist for French intervention in Mexico in 1861 in, for example, the articles he wrote for the *Revue de deux mondes* (1862) and in *Le Mexique ancien et moderne* (1863).² However, the first use of the expression 'l'Amérique latine' known to Phelan was by L.M. Tisserand in an article 'Situation de la latinité', published in the *Revue des races latines* (January 1861).

In fact, a number of Spanish American writers and intellectuals, many of them resident in Paris, had used the expression 'América latina' several years

* This essay is a revised and expanded version of 'Brazil and Latin America', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 42/3, August 2010, pp. 457–85. There is an earlier version in Portuguese: 'O Brasil e a idéia de América Latina em perspectiva histórica', *Estudos Históricos*, 44 (2009), pp. 289–321, and two later versions in Spanish: 'Brasil y 'América Latina'', *Prismas. Revista de historia intelectual*, 16 (2012), pp. 53–78 and *Istor. Revista de Historia Internacional*, 67, 2016, pp. 109–45.

1 J.L. Phelan, 'Pan-Latinism, French intervention in Mexico (1861–7) and the genesis of the idea of Latin America', in J.A. Ortega y Medina (ed.), *Conciencia y autenticidad históricas: escritas en homenaje a Edmundo O'Gorman* (Mexico D.F: UNAM, 1968), pp. 279–98.

2 See G. Martinière, 'Michel Chevalier et la latinité de l'Amérique', *Revista NEIBA. Cadernos Argentina-Brasil III/1*, (2014).

earlier. For its very first use there are three principal candidates: José María Torres Caicedo, a Colombian journalist, poet and critic (1830–89), Francisco Bilbao, a Chilean socialist intellectual (1823–65) and Justo Arosemena, a Panamanian/Colombian jurist, politician, sociologist and diplomat (1817–96).

In 1856 Torres Caicedo wrote a long poem entitled 'Las dos Américas', which appeared in *El Correo de Ultramar*, a Spanish language newspaper published in Paris, in February 1857. Along with several references to 'América del Sur' and 'América Española', and ending with a passionate call for the unity of the 'Pueblos del Sur' against 'América en el Norte', it included the lines:

La raza de la América latina
Al frente tiene la sajona raza,
Enemiga mortal que ja amenaza
Su libertad destruir y su pendón.

Torres Caicedo went on to publish *Bases para la formación de una Liga latinoamericana* (Paris, 1861) and *Unión latinoamericana* (Paris, 1865). It was in Paris in 1866, in an *homenaje* to the Argentine liberator José de San Martín, to whom all 'latinoamericanos' owed a profound debt, Caicedo declared: 'Para mí, colombiano, que amo con entusiasmo mi noble patria, existe una patria más grande – la América latina'.³ In a speech on 22 June 1856 in Paris Bilbao offered his reflections on 'la raza latinoamericana' and 'la unidad latinoamericana'. The speech was later published as a 32-page pamphlet entitled *Iniciativa de la América. Idea de un Congreso Federal de las repúblicas* (Paris, 1856).⁴ A Liberal representative for the state of Panama in the Colombian Senate at the time, Arosemena referred to 'América latina' and 'el interés latinoamericano' in a speech in Bogotá on 20 July 1856 and in articles published in *El Neogranadino* on 15 and 29 July 1856 ('la cuestión americana i su importancia') and later

3 See A. Ardao, 'La idea de Latinoamérica', *Marcha* (Montevideo), 27 November 1965; *Génesis de la idea y el nombre de América Latina* (Caracas, 1980). Since the publication of Ardao's *Génesis* there have been a number of articles on this subject worthy of note: for example, J.C. Torchia Estrada, "América Latina": origen de un nombre y una idea', *Inter-American Review of Bibliography*, 32 (1982) [a lengthy review of Ardao]; Monica Quijada, 'Sobre el origen y difusión del nombre "América Latina". O una variación heterodoxa en torno al tema de la construcción social de la verdad', *Revista de Indias*, 58, (1998); P. Estrade, 'Del invento de "América Latina" en Paris por latinoamericanos (1856–1889)', in J. Maurice and M.-C. Zimmerman (eds.), *Paris y el mundo ibérico e iberoamericano* (Université de Paris X-Nanterre, 1998); H.H. Bruit, 'A invenção da América Latina', in *Anais eletrônicos do V Encontro da Associação Nacional de Pesquisadores e Professores de História das Américas* (Belo Horizonte, 2000). The concepts 'raza latina' and 'América latina', as W. Mignolo has reminded us in *The Idea of Latin America* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), also served the purpose of emphasising the common European roots of the 'white' post-colonial *criollo* elites of Spanish America which separated them from the mass of Indians, mestizos and blacks.

4 See M. Rojas Mix, 'Bilbao y el hallazgo de América latina: unión continental, socialista y libertaria', *Cahiers du Monde Hispanique et Luso-Brasilien – Caravelle*, 46 (1986) and *Los cien nombres de América Latina* (San José, 1991).

in *Estudios sobre la idea de una liga americana* (1864).⁵ A number of Spanish liberal intellectuals, for example, Emilio Castelar (1832–99) and Francisco Pi y Margall (1824–1901), also began to refer to 'América latina' at this time.⁶ Carlos Calvo, an Argentine historian, diplomat and international lawyer (1824–1906), was probably the first to use the expression in scholarly works: *Colección completa de los tratados, convenciones, capitulaciones, armisticios y otros atos diplomáticos de todos los estados de la América Latina* (20 vols., Paris, 1862–64) and *Anales históricos de la revolución de la América Latina desde el año 1808* (3 vols., Paris, 1864–7).

Argentina represents an interesting case in the history of the emergence of the idea of a common Spanish American or Latin American identity in the middle decades of the 19th century. The post-independence generation of writers, political thinkers and liberal intellectuals, the so-called Generation of '37, of whom Esteban Echeverría (1805–51), Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810–84) and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1811–88) were the most prominent, regarded Argentina, and especially Buenos Aires, as the embodiment of European civilisation in a predominantly barbarous Spanish American environment. They were influenced primarily by English, French and North American ideas and believed that Argentina had the potential to become South America's United States. For Alberdi the United States was 'the model of the universe', for Sarmiento 'the highest point of civilization thus far attained'. They had little interest in the rest of Spanish America, except when offering themselves as guides and mentors, and rarely used the term 'América Latina'. Only the early 'nationalists', such as Alberdi (after he distanced himself from Mitre and Sarmiento), Carlos Guido y Spano (for whom Argentina was one 'American state' among many 'sister republics'), José Hernández, and Olegario V. Andrade (author of the poem 'Atlántida: canto al porvenir de la raza latina en América' in the late 1870s), demonstrated what Nicolas Shumway described as 'unabashed – and for Argentina unusual – identification with the other countries of Spanish America'.⁷

The point to be emphasised here is that none of the Spanish American intellectuals and writers who first used the expression 'América Latina' (with the exception of Calvo), nor their French and Spanish counterparts,

5 See A. McGuinness, 'Searching for "Latin America": Race and sovereignty in the Americas in the 1850s', in N.P. Appelbaum, A.S. Macpherson and K.A. Rosemblatt (eds.), *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003) and *Path of Empire. Panama and the California Gold Rush* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 2008), ch. 5, 'U.S. empire and the boundaries of Latin America'.

6 See A. Arda, *España en el origen del nombre América Latina* (Montevideo: Biblioteca de Marcha, 1992).

7 N. Shumway, *The Invention of Argentina* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), p. 244.

thought that it included Brazil. 'América Latina' was simply another name for América Española or Hispanoamérica. For their part, Brazilian writers and intellectuals, while conscious that Brazil shared with Spanish America a common Iberian and Catholic background, were also aware of what separated Brazil from Spanish America: geography, history (Portugal's long struggle to maintain its independence from Spain and the different colonial experiences of Portuguese America and Spanish America), above all language and culture and, not least, political institutions. Unlike Spanish America, Brazil had secured its independence relatively peacefully and had remained united under a monarchy. Brazil was politically stable and 'civilised', in contrast to what Brazilians regarded as the violent, extremely unstable and 'barbarous' Spanish American republics. Brazilian romanticism was different from that of Spanish America, in its literature, whether the poetry of Antônio Gonçalves Dias or the novels of José de Alencar, as well as in its art and music.⁸ Insofar as Brazilian writers and intellectuals thought about the world beyond Brazil it was not to Spanish America they looked – they certainly did not see themselves as part of 'América Latina' – but to Europe, especially France and to a lesser extent Portugal, or in rare cases to America as a whole, including the United States. For example, it was the common Indian heritage of the Americas that captured the imagination of Antônio Carlos Gomes in his opera *Il Guarany* (1870), Joaquim Manuel de Souza Andrade, or Sousândrade (1833–1902) in his dramatic poem about a legendary Colombian Indian, 'O guesa errante', written in New York in the 1870s, and Machado de Assis in *Americanas* (1875), his third published volume of poems.

Republican intellectuals were particularly attracted to the idea of America. The Republican Manifesto of 1870 famously concluded with the declaration: 'We are part of *America* and we wish to be *Americans* ... in democratic solidarity with the *continent* to which we belong [Somos da América e queremos ser Americanos ... em solidariedade democrática com o continente que fazemos parte]'. For Republicans, Brazil was 'um país isolado' separated from both the Spanish American republics and the United States by geography, history, language and culture, but also by slavery and, above all, by its monarchical form of government. Republicans felt that Brazil should become less politically – and culturally – isolated from Spanish America but, more importantly, from the United States.

8 See G. Martin, 'The literature, music and art of Latin America from independence to c. 1870', in L. Bethell (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, III: *From independence to c. 1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

II

During the early part of the 19th century US politicians, in particular President Thomas Jefferson and Senator Henry Clay, had elaborated on the idea of the 'Western Hemisphere'; the idea that America and Europe, the New World and the Old, were different and that there existed a special relationship between the peoples and governments of the Americas, a shared American geography and history and shared American ideas of republicanism, liberty and democracy (*sic*).⁹ In his many conversations with his friend the Abbé Correa da Serra, in 1816 minister of the United Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil, Jefferson included Brazil, not yet independent and not to become a republic until 1889, as a key element in his 'American system'.¹⁰ In December 1823, in what became known as the Monroe Doctrine, President James Monroe declared that the United States would not tolerate any extension of the European political system or any intervention by any European power 'in any portion of this hemisphere'. George Canning, the British foreign secretary, expressed some concern about 'the avowed pretension of the United States to put themselves at the head of a confederacy of all the Americas and to sway that confederation against Europe (Great Britain included)'.¹¹ John Quincy Adams, however, Monroe's Secretary of State and successor as president, while equally opposed to European influence in the Americas, had no interest in any 'American system' which included former Spanish and Portuguese colonies. They were not only Iberian and, worse, Catholic, but inherently unstable and degenerate, not least, he thought, because of their tropical climate. 'As to an American system,' Adams wrote, 'we have it; we constitute the whole of it'. He had 'little expectation of any beneficial result to this country [the United States] from any future connection with them [the newly independent Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries], political or commercial'.¹² For the next 60 years no US president showed much interest in the Western Hemisphere idea or indeed in any part of the hemisphere south of Panama.

9 See the classic study by A.P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1954). On the name 'America' – from Amerigo Vespucci, the Florentine navigator, and its first use in a map of 1507 – to describe the landmass (or two landmasses joined at the isthmus of Panama) 'discovered' by Europeans at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th centuries, the classic work remains E. O'Gorman, *La invención de América* (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1958).

10 See K. Maxwell, *Naked Tropics: Essays on Empire and Other Rogues* (New York: Routledge, 2003), ch. 9 'The odd couple: Jefferson and the Abbé'.

11 Quoted in D.A.G. Waddell, 'International politics and Latin American independence', in Bethell (ed.), *Cambridge History of Latin America*, III, p. 219.

12 Quoted in L. Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 10–11.

Despite the fragmentation of Spanish America into ten republics at the time of independence from Spain (by mid-century there were 16) not only did Spanish American intellectuals and writers, notably Andrés Bello (1781–1865),¹³ sustain the idea of a common Spanish American consciousness and identity that was stronger than local and regional ‘nationalisms’, but Spanish American politicians, notably Simón Bolívar himself (most famously in the Jamaica Letter of 1815), had a vision of a confederation of Spanish American republics, forming a ‘single nation’. In December 1824 Bolívar invited representatives of all the peoples and governments of America, except the United States, Haiti and Brazil, to a Congress in Panama ‘to arrange our American affairs’. Thus, not only the United States, which Bolívar felt should be kept at arm’s length, but also Brazil was not initially invited to Panama.¹⁴ Brazil’s language, history and culture were regarded as entirely foreign. Its economy and society were based on the slave trade and slavery had been repudiated, if not yet entirely abolished, in most of the Spanish American republics. Moreover, Brazil remained part of the Europe Bolívar despised and feared, not least because it had maintained a monarchical system of government. Worse still, it called itself an empire, and had imperialist ambitions in the Río de la Plata (the Banda Oriental of the Río Uruguay, which had been invaded by the Portuguese in 1816, now formed part of the Brazilian empire) and possibly further afield. In Bolívar’s view, Brazil constituted a threat to the sovereignty and independence of the Spanish American republics.

The Panama Congress, June–July 1826, was a failure. Not all Spanish American states sent delegates, and only Gran Colombia ratified the treaty of perpetual alliance. But the idea of a Bolivarian American confederation persisted, especially in view of the territorial expansion of the United States in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. The annexation of Texas in 1845, the Mexican War (1846–8), the Californian gold rush, US interest in an inter-oceanic route across the isthmus of Panama, the constant threats to occupy and annex Cuba and, especially, William Walker’s invasion of Nicaragua in 1855, all confirmed the belief that the United States could only fulfill its ‘Manifest Destiny’ at the expense of ‘América latina’. In the 1860s, as a result of France’s intervention in Mexico in 1861 and Spain’s annexation of Santo Domingo (1861–5) and its wars with Peru (1864–6) and Chile (1865–6), France and Spain joined the United States as enemies of ‘América latina’. The American

13 See I. Jaksic, *Andrés Bello: Scholarship and Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). This excellent book, like Bello himself, chooses to completely ignore Brazil.

14 Brazil was later invited – by Vice-President Santander of Colombia – to send representatives to Panama, and two were eventually appointed. But the first never arrived and the second never even left Brazil. The United States was also invited late, but no US delegates attended the Congress.

conferences held in Lima (1847–8), Santiago de Chile (1856), Lima (1864–5) and Caracas (1883: the centenary of Bolívar's birth), however, have to be counted as failures.¹⁵

Neither the United States nor Brazil were invited to participate in these American conferences. '[Both] are tacitly considered as not belonging to the American community', wrote the Brazilian chargé d'affaires in Santiago in May 1862, 'and consequently excluded from it or, at most, only tolerated'.¹⁶ For their part the Brazilian governments of the Segundo Reinado (1840–89) did not identify with any of the various projects of its neighbours for inter-American unity. Brazil with its immense Atlantic coastline was firmly part of the Atlantic world, and its principal economic and political links were with Great Britain (see Essay 2). Unlike the Spanish American republics Brazil did not feel threatened by the United States, and much less France and Spain.

Bilateral relations between Brazil and its Spanish American neighbours, in what was referred to by Brazilian diplomats as 'América Espanhola', 'América Meridional' or simply 'América do Sul', were extremely limited, except in the Río de la Plata where Brazil fought three wars: the first, in 1825–8, against the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata for control of the Banda Oriental (resulting in the independence of Uruguay); the second, in 1851–2, against the Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas, in alliance with the Argentine province of Entre Ríos and Uruguay; and the third, in 1864–70, against the Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano López, in alliance with Argentina and Uruguay, known as the Paraguayan War (see Essay 3). Paulino Soares de Souza, Minister of Foreign Relations from 1849 to 1853, the first since the abdication of Emperor D. Pedro in 1831 to hold the post for more than a few months, initiated bilateral negotiations with a number of Pacific republics mainly with the aim of confirming existing frontiers based on the principle of *uti possidetis*, that is to say, the boundaries in South America generally recognised by Spain and Portugal under the Treaty of Madrid (1750). Brazil's position was that since it was already so vast it had no wish to expand at the expense of its neighbours; it wanted them simply to accept the status quo. Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro was sent on a mission to Chile, Peru and Bolivia and Miguel María Lisboa to Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Treaties were signed with Peru in 1851 and Colombia in 1853, and later with Venezuela (1859) and Bolivia

15 On the American conferences, see A. Granados García, 'Congresos e intelectuales en los inicios de un proyecto y de una conciencia continental latinoamericana, 1826–1860', in A. Granados García and C. Marichal (eds.), *Construcción de las identidades latinoamericanas. Ensayos de historia intelectual (siglos XIX y XX)* (Mexico, D.F: El Colegio de México, 2004).

16 Quoted in L. C. Villafañe G. Santos, *O Brasil entre a América e a Europa: o Império e o interamericanismo (Do Congresso do Panamá a Conferência de Washington)* (São Paulo: UNESP, 2003), p. 97.

(1867).¹⁷ After the War of the Pacific (1879–83), in which Chile fought and defeated Bolivia and Peru, there was an informal understanding, though not an informal alliance as is sometimes suggested, between Chile and Brazil, which had remained neutral in the war, not least because both saw Argentina as their principal rival. Brazil would dominate the Atlantic coast of South America, including the Río de la Plata and Chile the Pacific coast. Brazil's relations with Mexico were virtually non-existent.¹⁸

When, on the other hand, politicians in the United States during the 1880s rediscovered the concept of the Western Hemisphere and invited the 17 Spanish American republics and the Brazilian empire to join the United States at a conference in Washington with the aim of creating an informal alliance of the 'nations of America', Brazil readily accepted. The opening ceremony of the first International Conference of American States was held on 2 October 1889. On 15 November, three days before the first working session, Brazil proclaimed itself a republic. Marechal Deodoro da Fonseca, the head of the Provisional Government, appointed a prominent Republican, Quintino Bocaiúva, as Minister of Foreign Relations. Bocaiúva immediately replaced the head of the Brazilian delegation to the Washington conference with another prominent Republican, Salvador de Mendonça. Both Bocaiúva and Mendonça, had been signatories of the Republican Manifesto of 1870, with its concluding declaration, 'We are part of America and we wish to be Americans'. At Washington Brazil symbolically separated itself from Europe, the Old World, and finally joined America, the New World.¹⁹

III

The final decade of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century witnessed the emergence of the United States as a regional power. Secretary of State Richard Olney's famous remark during the Venezuelan crisis of 1895 ('The United States is practically sovereign *on this continent* and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition'), US intervention in Cuba's war of independence from Spain in 1898, the annexation of Puerto Rico and the establishment of a US protectorate in Cuba, US involvement

17 See L. C. Villafaña G. Santos, *O Império e as Repúblicas do Pacífico. As relações do Brasil com Chile, Bolívia, Peru, Ecuador e Colômbia (1822–1889)* (Curitiba: Editora da UFPR, 2002).

18 See G. Palacios, *Intimidades, Conflictos e Reconciliaciones. México y Brasil, 1822–1993* (Mexico, D.F: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2008).

19 At the Exposition Universelle held in Paris in 1889, on the centenary of the French Revolution, Brazil, *Le grand empire de l'Amérique du Sud*, presented itself, and was treated, as an important nation, 'civilised' and 'progressive', to be compared with the United States of America. The principal objective of the Brazilian pavilion, and a 700-page book *Le Brésil en 1889*, was to demonstrate that 'pour être Américains du Sud, nous n'en sommes pas moins Américains'.

in Panama's separation from Colombia in 1903 and President Theodore Roosevelt's annual message to Congress in December 1904 all attested to the growing assertion of US hegemony in the region. 'Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society', Roosevelt declared, 'may in *Latin America*, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized power ... In the *Western Hemisphere*, the United States may be forced, however reluctantly, to the exercise of an international police power'. There followed US intervention in the Dominican Republic (1905) and Mexico (1914–5) and US occupation of Nicaragua (1912–33), Haiti (1915–34) and the Dominican Republic (1916–24). At the same time, following the International Conference of American States in Washington (1889–90), the United States promoted a series of what became known as Pan-American Conferences: Mexico (1901–2), Rio de Janeiro (1906), Buenos Aires (1910), Santiago de Chile (1923), Havana (1928), Montevideo (1933) and Lima (1938) before the Second World War. The aim was to promote US trade and investment throughout the region, to create more orderly and predictable political structures in the countries to the South, and peacefully to assert US leadership in the *Western Hemisphere*, while at the same time deterring any lingering European imperialist ambitions there.

The governments of Spanish America generally reacted to this new US interest in the Hemisphere with suspicion and mistrust. They strongly condemned, in particular, the War with Spain and the US take-over of Cuba, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and successive US interventions in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. They feared, with good reason, that Pan-Americanism was simply a weapon with which to assert US economic and political hegemony for the further exploitation of the region, and used the Pan-American conferences to express their opposition to the United States.

Brazilian governments, on the other hand, were not generally critical of US policy in the region, sought to develop closer relations with the United States and gave their full support to the United States at all the Pan-American Conferences.²⁰ For Brazilians there were two giants, though unequal giants no doubt, in the *Western Hemisphere*: the United States and Brazil. Both were continental in size; both had huge natural resources and economic potential; both were stable 'democracies' (*sic*); and both were different from *América Espanhola/América Latina*. Brazil also recognised the great changes – geopolitical, economic and cultural – that were taking place in the world on the eve of the 20th century. US global hegemony would inevitably replace that of Britain and Europe more generally. The United States was regarded not only as offering the best defence against a resurgent European imperialism (which

20 See L. Bethell, 'O Brasil e as Conferências Panamericanas', in Alzira Alves de Abreu (ed.), *Dicionário histórico-biográfico da Primeira República (1889–1930)* (Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC/FGV, 2012).

for Brazil remained a greater threat than US imperialism) but as providing order, peace and stability in Latin America, that is to say, in Spanish America. In a long interview he gave to the correspondent of *La Nación* of Buenos Aires in Rio de Janeiro in July 1906 the barão do Rio Branco, who became Foreign Minister in December 1902 (and remained in post until his death in February 1912), argued that the threat from the United States was 'a fiction', and that the principal nations of South America, which were well-governed and paid their debts (and which were distant from the United States) – Argentina and Chile as well as Brazil – had nothing to fear. On the contrary, the United States provided much needed order, peace and stability in the rest of Spanish America, which was necessary and in the national interest of Brazil. But countries which could not govern themselves, could not pay their debts, could not avoid continuous revolutions and civil wars (as, for example, in Central America), 'have no reason to exist and must give place to another nation stronger, better organized, more progressive, more virile'.²¹ Teddy Roosevelt could not have put it better!

While extending Brazil's diplomatic representation (for example, to Colombia and Ecuador in 1904, Cuba and the Central America republics in 1906) the governments of the First Republic (1889–1930) showed no greater interest in 'os povos da língua espanhola', 'as nações latinoamericanas', than the governments of the empire, except in two respects: firstly, their (generally successful) efforts to resolve the frontier disputes with their immediate neighbours in South America, notably Argentina (over Palmas or Misiones) in 1895 and Bolivia (over Acre) in 1903, but also Colombia, Peru and Uruguay,²² and secondly the (somewhat less successful) efforts of Rio Branco to develop closer relations with two South American neighbours, Argentina and Chile.

In January 1905 Rio Branco was described by the US minister David Thompson as having 'no little ill-feeling' for the other countries in South America, except possibly Chile, and as having remarked privately that 'no Spanish speaking country is good, and no person of Spanish blood can be believed'.²³ At the same time, Brazil had to 'conquer the affection and confidence' of its neighbours because there would always be 'great prejudice

21 *La Nación*, 26 July, reproduced in the *Jornal do Commercio*, 4 August 1906. Cited in C. Bueno, *Política Externa da Primeira República. Os anos de apogeu – de 1902 a 1918* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 2003), p. 152.

22 On the settlement of Brazil's frontier disputes with its neighbours in South America, see S. Sampaio Goes Filho, *Navegantes, bandeirantes, diplomatas: um ensaio sobre a formação da fronteira do Brasil* (São Paulo, 1999) and 'Fronteiras: o estilo negociador do Barão do Rio Branco como paradigma da política exterior do Brasil', in C.H. Cardim and J. Almino (eds.), *Rio Branco, a América do Sul e a modernização do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro/Brasília: EMC – Edições, 2002).

23 Quoted in J. Smith, *Unequal Giants. Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil, 1889–1930* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), pp. 62–3.

and distrust' against Brazil in Spanish America.²⁴ Like Chile, Argentina had begun to make significant economic and political progress, and Argentine president Julio Roca and Brazilian president Campos Sales had exchanged official visits in 1899 and 1900. In 1903 Rio Branco had begun to elaborate the idea of a *Pacto ABC* (Argentina, Brazil and Chile, 'the three great nations of South America'). The signs were good until José Figueroa Alcorta became president of Argentina in January 1906 and appointed Estanislau Zeballos as Foreign Minister for third time. Zeballos had always been hostile to Brazil, and to Rio Branco personally. He distrusted Brazil for its size and population (three times that of Argentina), while at the same time showing contempt for its racial mix and its economic and cultural backwardness. He never accepted the loss of Palmas and he was suspicious of Brazilian influence in Paraguay and Uruguay. Zeballos kept alive the old Argentine dream of reuniting the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata and he became alarmed when Brazil, conscious of its military weakness with respect to Argentina, increased its naval expenditure and began to modernise its navy in 1906–7. Ultimately Zeballos failed to separate Chile from Brazil and relations with Argentina improved with his resignation in June 1908. Only with the election of Roque Sáenz Peña in September 1910, however, was Rio Branco able successfully to revive the idea of the *Pacto ABC*. The Mexican Revolution offered a first opportunity for joint action. At a meeting in Niagara Falls, Canada (May–June 1914) the ABC powers acted as mediators in the conflict between the government of General Huerta and the United States following the US occupation of Vera Cruz. Hostilities ceased, Huerta resigned and, a year later, the United States withdrew its troops. In May 1915 Argentina, Chile and Brazil signed a treaty in Buenos Aires. It was ratified by the Brazilian and Chilean Congresses, but was rejected in 1916 by the newly elected Argentine president Hipólito Yrigoyen.

In 1904 Rio Branco had nominated Joaquim Nabuco, the leader of the movement for the abolition of slavery in Brazil in the 1880s and minister in London since 1899, as Brazil's first ambassador to the United States. (He served in Washington from 1905 until his death in 1910.) Nabuco had long believed that, far from being a threat to the independence of 'our continent', the Monroe Doctrine was the best guarantee that there would be no European recolonisation of America. He was particularly concerned about the future of Amazonia. 'In the end what is Monroism?', he had asked in the postscript to his book *Balmaceda* (1895), 'Monroism would appear to be the promise made to the whole of America by the American Union (*sic*) that Europe

²⁴ Rio Branco to Nabuco, telegram, 22 Nov. 1909, in *Joaquim Nabuco, embaixador* vol. I: 1905–7, vol II: 1908–10 (Rio de Janeiro: Centro da História e Documentação Diplomática/Brasília: Funag, 2011), II, p. 244.

would not acquire any more territory in the New World'.²⁵ There were two pathways [*caminhos*] that Brazil could follow, Nabuco wrote to Rio Branco in December 1905, 'the American or the other, which I don't know whether to call Latin-american, independent or solitary [*solitário*]. For my part, I am frankly Monroist'.²⁶ In a long letter to José Carlos Rodrigues, the owner and editor of the *Jornal do Commercio*, Nabuco wrote: 'For us the choice is between Monroism and European recolonisation ... the only protection for America is *sea-power* which only the United States has. Monroism is thus the affirmation of national independence and integrity by the only system that can guarantee them'.²⁷

Disagreement over Monroism ended Nabuco's friendship with the historian, diplomat and fellow *pernambucano* (born in the state of Pernambuco) Manuel de Oliveira Lima. In his book *Nos Estados Unidos: Impressões políticas e sociais* (1899), written while serving in the Brazilian legation in Washington, Oliveira Lima had expressed his profound admiration for the United States, his belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon over Iberian civilisation and culture, and even a positive attitude towards the Monroe Doctrine which protected Latin America against European imperialism. But a few years later in articles for *O Diário de Pernambuco* and *O Estado de São Paulo*, published in 1907 as *Panamericanismo (Bolívar-Monroe-Roosevelt)*, he described the foreign policy of the United States as 'aggressively imperialistic' and the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine as a serious threat to the sovereignty of the Latin American nations. He accused Nabuco of 'excessive americanism' and promoting an 'entente ultra-cordial' between Brazil and the United States.²⁸

In the interest of Pan-American unity, Nabuco sought to improve relations between the Brazilian, United States and Spanish American republics, but he resented the fact that in the International Bureau of American States the Spanish American members were treated as equals of the United States and Brazil: 'the vote of Nicaragua cancels out that of the United States; the island of Haiti (*sic*) counts for more than Brazil, the votes of two *repúbliketas* cancelling out our vote; Brazil counts for less than any two Central American republics'. Moreover, whereas *América inglesa* [the United States] had one vote and *América portuguesa* [Brazil], which by a miracle of history [*um milagre histórico*] had remained united, one vote; *América espanhola*, because of its historic failure

25 J. Nabuco, *Balmaceda* (1895; São Paulo: Cosac Naify, 2008), J. Almino de Alencar (ed.), *Pós-escrito: A questão da América Latina*, pp. 220–1.

26 J. Nabuco, *Obras Completas de Joaquim Nabuco*, vol. XIV: *Cartas a amigos* vol. II (São Paulo, 1949), p. 238: Nabuco to Rio Branco, 19 Dec. 1905.

27 J. Nabuco, *Diários I 1873–1888, II 1889–1910* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Bem-Te-Vi/Recife: Editora Massangana, 2005), preface and notes by E. Cabral de Mello, vol. II pp. 346–7: Nabuco to Rodrigues, 12 Dec. 1905.

28 See L. Bethell, *Joaquim Nabuco no Mundo. Abolicionista, jornalista e diplomata* (Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias, 2016), pp. 212–4.

[*fracasso histórico*] and fragmentation [*fragmentação*], had 18 votes. The Spanish speaking countries had a natural tendency [*uma tendência natural*] to unite against the United States and Brazil, 'the principal republics of the hemisphere [*os principais repúblicas do hemisfério*]'.²⁹

Nabuco regarded US ascendancy in Spanish America (particularly Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean) as 'natural' and US interventionism in the region as generally beneficial. He was a fierce defender of ever closer relations between Brazil and the United States to the exclusion of all others. 'Between Europe and America', Nabuco wrote to his friend Alexandre Barbosa Lima, in July 1907, 'for better or for worse, no nation in Latin America has a choice ... In America ... we [Brazilians] cannot hesitate between the United States and Spanish America'.³⁰ Rio Branco's 'South American triple alliance', indeed 'any South American alliance', was, for Nabuco, 'absurd', 'fatal', and would have 'disastrous consequences' for the close relationship between 'the principal republics of the Hemisphere', the United States and Brazil, which was the 'alpha and the omega of our foreign policy ... He [Rio Branco] has confidence in Germany, France, Italy, Chile, Argentina, and I don't know who else', Nabuco wrote. 'I believe in the United States'.³¹

In the First World War Brazil alone among the leading countries of the region followed the United States in declaring war on Germany in 1917. (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile and Argentina, for example, remained neutral throughout.) At the Versailles conference Brazil alone, with the support of the United States, was elected a non-permanent member of the Executive Council of the League of Nations for three years. And when in March 1920 the US Senate voted to withdraw the United States from the League Brazil began to consider itself as having an implicit mandate to represent the Americas on the Council.³² Brazil was re-elected to the Council annually from 1922 to 1925, but

29 Nabuco to Rio Branco, 20 Oct. 1907; Nabuco to Rui Barbosa, 22 Oct. 1907: Nabuco, *Cartas a amigos*, vol. II, pp. 291, 294.

30 Nabuco to Barbosa Lima, 7 July 1907, in *Cartas a amigos* vol. II, p. 277.

31 Nabuco to Alexandre Barbosa Lima 7 July 1907, *Cartas a amigos*, vol. II, p. 277; Nabuco to Rio Branco 18 Jan. 1908, *Cartas a amigos*, vol. II, pp. 301–2; Nabuco to Graça Aranha, 18 Aug., 28 Sept. 1908, cited in Anco Márcio Tenório Vieira, 'O abolicionismo, o panamericismo e o valor da experiência empírica em Joaquim Nabuco: Notas para uma correspondência', in H. Cavalcanti and S. Couceiro (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco e nossa formação* (Recife: Fundação Joaquim Nabuco/Editora Massangana, 2012), pp. 83–4; Nabuco to Hilário de Gouveia, 19 Jan. 1909, *cartas a amigos*, Vol. II, p. 330. For further details on Nabuco's thinking on Brazil, the United States and Spanish America, see Bethell, *Joaquim Nabuco no mundo*, ch. 4.

32 See E. Vargas Garcia, *Entre América e Europa: a política externa brasileira na década de 1920* (Brasília: UnB/Funag, 2006), p. 88. See also E. Vargas Garcia, *O Brasil e a Liga das Nações (1919–1926)* (Porto Alegre/Brasília: UFRGS/Funag, 2000).

its authority to speak for Latin America was increasingly challenged, especially by Argentina and Uruguay. The Spanish American republics wanted the non-permanent 'American seat' to rotate, and there was no support for Brazil's bid to become a permanent member of the Council. In 1926 the European powers accepted Germany as a permanent member of the Executive Council, but refused to accept Brazil. When Brazil decided therefore to withdraw from the League of Nations – a decision Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, described as 'Brazil's suicide in international affairs' – Spanish American support for Brazil was conspicuously absent. Indeed, Afrânio de Melo Franco, Brazil's representative in Geneva, accused the other American states, led by Argentina, of 'ill-concealed hostility to Brazil'.³³ (Chamberlain later confessed that had there been unanimous Latin American support a permanent seat for Brazil on the Council would have demanded serious consideration, indeed it would have been difficult to refuse.)³⁴ After the event, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Jose Félix Pacheco, took the view that perhaps it had all been 'providential': Brazil could stop worrying about 'América Latina' and, like the United States, define itself by its own characteristics as 'América Portuguesa', different from 'América Inglesa' and 'América Hispánic sub-dividida'.³⁵

After its withdrawal from the League in 1926, Brazil focussed even more on its relations with the United States, which had by now replaced Britain as Brazil's principal commercial partner (that is to say, the principal supplier of manufactured and capital goods – the United States had always been the major importer of coffee, Brazil's main export) and which was challenging Britain as Brazil's principal source of capital. At the disastrous sixth Pan-American conference in Havana (January–February 1928), the low point in Inter-American relations, the issue of US imperialism in Central America and the Caribbean once again dominated proceedings, with US intervention in Nicaragua almost universally condemned. Honório Pueyrredón, the Argentine ambassador to the United States, championed the idea of a 'hispano-americanismo independente' and was openly hostile to the United States and to Brazil, which, as always, supported the United States. An editorial in the *Washington Star* entitled 'Our friend Brazil' referred to two great nations standing 'shoulder to shoulder' in

33 A. de Melo Franco to J.F. Pacheco, 17 March 1926, quoted in S. Hilton, 'Afrânio de Melo Franco e a diplomacia brasileira, 1917–1943', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* Ano XXIX /1 (1986), p. 21.

34 Austin Chamberlain to Regis de Oliveira 4 June 1926, quoted in E. Vargas Garcia, *Entre América e Europa*, p. 418. A commission of the Assembly of the League in May 1926 increased the number of non-permanent members on the council from six to nine, three for Latin America – to be rotated. Chile, Colombia and El Salvador were admitted at the seventh general assembly in September 1926.

35 Pacheco to Melo Franco, telegram, 12 May 1926, quoted in Garcia, *Entre América e Europa*, pp. 409–10.

Havana. Pan-Americanism was secure if 'Brazil in the South and the United States in the North' remained allies.³⁶

During the 1930s the relationship with the United States remained the central pillar of Brazilian foreign policy. Relations with the Spanish American republics became even more distant, largely 'bureaucratic', apart from Brazilian mediation in the conflict between Colombia and Peru over Leticia in Western Amazonia and between Bolivia and Paraguay (backed by Argentina) in the Chaco War (1932–5). Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha wrote to President Getúlio Vargas in January 1935: 'The Indo-Spanish countries are our natural enemies; they cannot inspire confidence and even today they retain suspicions towards us inherited from Iberian struggles and heightened by continental rivalries'.³⁷ As the situation in Europe deteriorated, with war ever more likely, inter-American solidarity in the interests of hemispheric security and support for the United States in a world-wide ideological struggle for democracy against fascism brought Brazil and Spanish America closer together – at the seventh Pan-American Conference in Montevideo (1933), a special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires (1936) and the eighth Pan-American Conference in Lima (1938), and at meetings of American Foreign Ministers in Panama (September 1939), Havana (July 1940), after the outbreak of war in Europe, and Rio de Janeiro (January 1942), after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany's declaration of war on the United States. One by one the states of Spanish America followed Brazil in first breaking diplomatic relations with and then declaring war on the Axis powers. Only Chile (until 1943) and Argentina (until March 1945) remained neutral.

At the Inter-American Conference on the 'Problems of War and Peace' held in Mexico City (December 1944–March 1945), where Brazil once again was the most vigorous defender of Pan-Americanism (the diplomat and future US ambassador to Brazil, Adolf Berle, wrote in his diary: 'The Brazilians want the Monroe Doctrine lock, stock and barrel and make no secret of it'),³⁸ the concept of 'a closed hemisphere in an open world' was broadly accepted and 'adequate representation' for Latin America in any new international organisation created after the War was demanded. At the San Francisco conference in April 1945, the United States proposed a permanent seat for Brazil on the Security Council of the United Nations, but (decisively) Britain and Russia were opposed – and, significantly, there was no unanimous Spanish American support. Brazil had

36 Quoted in Garcia, *Entre América e Europa*, p. 449.

37 Aranha to Vargas, 15 Jan 1935, quoted in S.E. Hilton, *Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930–1939: The Politics of Trade Rivalry* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1975), p. 14.

38 Berle diary, 20–27 Feb. 1945, quoted in J.A. Schwarz, *Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), p. 262.

to be satisfied with a non-permanent seat on the Security Council, as it had on the Executive Council of the League of Nations.³⁹

IV

In the period from the 1880s to the Second World War, Spanish American intellectuals were generally hostile to the United States, US imperialism, US culture and to Pan-Americanism. The catalyst was undoubtedly Cuba and the Spanish-American War of 1898.⁴⁰ The idea of two Americas – on the one hand, the United States, and on the other, Spanish America, Hispanoamérica, América Latina, now frequently called ‘Nuestra América’, which was different from, and superior to, Anglo-Saxon America was developed further by Spanish Caribbean writers like Eugenio María de Hostos (Puerto Rico, 1839–1903) and, above all, José Martí (Cuba, 1853–95) in his articles from Washington in 1889–90 and from New York in 1891–5, published in *La Revista Ilustrada* (New York), *El Partido Liberal* (Mexico City) and *La Nación* (Buenos Aires).⁴¹ But it is most evident in the writings of the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó (1871–1917), whose *Ariel* (1900) and *Mirador de Próspero* (1913) had an enormous impact on an entire generation, particularly the young, throughout Spanish America. (*Ariel* was dedicated to ‘the youth of America’.) Rodó warned against ‘el perigo ianque’, which was social, cultural and moral even more than economic and political, and what he called ‘nordomanía’, which undermined ‘el espírito dos americanos latinos’.⁴² Also widely read was the Colombian José María Vargas Vila (1860–1933) whose *Ante los bárbaros*, first published in Rome in 1900 had many later, expanded editions with different subtitles (for example, *El yanqui, he ahí el enemigo*) before a definitive edition appeared in Barcelona in 1923.

For some Spanish American intellectuals of this generation it became more common, particularly once slavery had been abolished in Brazil in 1888 followed by the overthrow of the empire in 1889, to point to the similarities between Brazil and Spanish America in, for example, culture, religion, political

39 Ver E. Vargas Garcia, *O Sexto Membro Permanente. O Brasil e a criação da ONU* (Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2012).

40 See M. Quijada, ‘Latinos y anglosajones. El 98 en el fin de siglo sudamericano’, *Hispania* (Madrid) LVII/2, 196 (1997).

41 See J. Martí, *Nuestra América*, various editions. In English, *Inside the Monster by José Martí: Writings on the United States and American Imperialism* ed. with an introduction by P.S. Foner (New York, 1975) and *Our America by José Martí: Writings on Latin America and the Struggle for Cuban Independence* ed. with introduction by P.S. Foner (New York, 1977). Also see J. Lamore, *José Martí et l'Amérique* 2 vols. (Paris, 1986–8).

42 On Rodó and his vision of a Latin American *magna patria*, see R.P. Newcomb, *Nossa and Nuestra América, Inter-American Dialogues* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2012), ch. 2.

structures, law and racial mixture; the term 'Iberoamérica' was frequently used to refer to both Spanish and Portuguese America. But, like their predecessors in the 1850s and 1860s, few showed any real interest in Brazil. A rare exception was Martín García Merou (1862–1905), Argentine minister in Brazil 1894–6, and later in the United States 1896–1905, who in 1897 wrote a series of articles on Brazilian intellectual, cultural and literary life for the journal *La Biblioteca* in Buenos Aires, later published as *El Brasil intellectual: Impresiones y notas literarias* (Buenos Aires, 1900). The great majority of Spanish American intellectuals continued to exclude Brazil from what they thought of as 'Nuestra América' or 'América Latina'. The classic studies of Spanish America/Latin America's deficiencies by those, under the influence of social Darwinism, pessimistic about its future had little if anything to say about Brazil.⁴³

An Argentine, Manuel Baldomero Ugarte (1875–1951), was perhaps the first Spanish American intellectual specifically to make the case for the inclusion of Brazil in 'América Latina', 'la nación latinoamericana', 'la parte superior del continente', united in opposition to US imperialism. In his early writings, for example *El porvenir de América Latina. La raza, la integridad territorial y moral, la organización interior* (Valencia, 1910; 2nd ed. Mexico City, 1918), which in some editions appeared with the title *El porvenir de América Española*, and in his many speeches in Barcelona, Paris, New York, Mexico and throughout South America in the period 1910–17, published as *Mi campaña hispano-americana* (Barcelona, 1922), Ugarte's primary concern was Spanish America. A lecture he gave at Columbia University in July 1912 entitled 'The future of Latin America' (published in Spanish as 'Los pueblos del Sur ante el imperialismo norteamericano'), however, included references to Brazil. And in *El destino de un continente* (1923; Eng. trans. *The Destiny of a Continent*, New York, 1925) Ugarte argued that Brazil, was simply 'a special variant' of 'La Gran España' and must be considered and treated as 'an integral part of our family of nations [América Latina]', all with their roots in the 'península Hispánica'. There could be no such thing, Ugarte insisted, as 'partial Latin Americanism'.⁴⁴

43 See, for example, C. Zumeta (Venezuela, 1860–1955) *El continente enfermo* (1899); F. Bulnes (Mexico, 1847–1924), *El porvenir de las naciones hispanoamericanas* (1899); C.O. Bunge (Argentina, 1875–1918), *Nuestra América* (1903); A. Arguedas (Bolivia, 1879–1946), *Pueblo enfermo* (1909). F. García Calderón (Peru, 1883–1953), *Les democracies latines de l'Amérique* (1912; eng. trans. *Latin America: its rise and progress*, 1918), did include one chapter on Brazil, but a chapter of ten pages only. On García Calderón, see A. Gil Lázaro, 'Las señas de identidad de un escritor "ausente": América Latina y Perú en la pensamiento de Francisco García Calderón', in García and Marichal, *Construcción de las identidades latinoamericanas*.

44 On Ugarte's ideas on 'América Latina', see J. Moyano, 'El concepto de América Latina en el pensamiento de Manuel Ugarte y Deodoro Roca', in García and Marichal, *Construcción de las identidades latinoamericanas*, and Miguel Angel Barrios, *El latinoamericanismo en el pensamiento político de Manuel Ugarte* (Buenos Aires, 2007).

There was no great change in the attitude of most Spanish American intellectuals towards Brazil in the 1920s and 1930s. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (Peru, 1895–1979) promoted the idea of 'Indoamérica' rather than 'América Latina' in, for example, *A donde va Indoamérica?* (1928), so as to include Spanish America's Indian populations as well as its mestizos and blacks. José Carlos Mariátegui (Peru, 1895–1930) wrote about 'América Indo-Ibérica' in *Temas de nuestra América*, a collection of articles published between 1924 and 1928. But whether the preferred expression was Indoamérica, América Indo-Ibérica or América Latina, Brazil for the most part remained excluded.

Again, there were exceptions. José Vasconcelos (Mexico, 1882–1959), for example, in an essay 'El problema del Brasil' (1921), argued for the integration of such a future great country with the other republics of the hemisphere. He headed the Mexican mission to Brazil for the celebration of the centenary of Brazilian independence in 1922, and his major work *La raza cósmica* (Barcelona, 1925) originated as the introduction to his report on his journey to Brazil (and Argentina), which he called, his 'misión de la raza ibero-americana'. The first and most famous chapter, 'El mestizaje', was inspired by what he learned of miscegenation in Brazil. In a later work, *Bolívarismo y Monroismo: temas iberoamericanos* (Santiago de Chile, 1934), however, Vasconcelos promotes *bolívarismo* ('a ideal hispanoamericano de crear una federación con todos los pueblos de cultura española'), advocates 'Méjico para los mexicanos, Hispanoamérica para los hispanoamericanos', and expresses his fear that Brazil was not on the side of Spanish America against the United States and had its own imperialist ambitions about which the countries of Spanish South America should be concerned. Vasconcelos was particularly outraged that Brazil had dedicated a prominent public building in Rio de Janeiro to US President Monroe.⁴⁵

José Vasconcelos had a great influence on another leading Mexican intellectual, Alfonso Reyes (1889–1959), who was named ambassador to Brazil in 1930. During the following six or seven years Reyes wrote more than 50 perceptive essays on Brazilian literature and culture.⁴⁶ Reyes was, however, another exception as Spanish American writers, literary critics and intellectuals in general continued to show little interest in Brazil. Spanish Americans focussed on their own national identities and cultures. Beyond this, their concern was for Hispanic or Latin American culture, that is to say, Spanish American culture, separate and different from that of the United States – and of Brazil. An outstanding example is Pedro Henríquez Ureña (1884–1946), who was born in the Dominican Republic but

45 The Palácio Monroe had been constructed for the third Pan American Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1906. From 1914 to 1922 it temporarily housed the Chamber of Deputies, and from 1922 to 1937 (when it was closed by Getúlio Vargas) and from 1946 to 1960 the Senate. It was demolished in 1976.

46 See F.P. Ellison, *Alfonso Reyes e o Brasil. Um mexicano entre os cariocas* (Rio de Janeiro, 2002) and Newcomb, *Nossa and Nuestra América*, ch. 4.

spent much of his life in Mexico, Cuba and Argentina and whose later works included *Literary Currents in Hispanic America* (Cambridge, MA, 1945), based on the Charles Eliot Norton lectures he delivered at Harvard in 1940–1, and *La historia de la cultura en la América Hispánica* (Mexico, 1947), published after his death. Tellingly, neither included Brazil.

V

Brazilian intellectuals during the First Republic (1889–1930) had markedly different attitudes towards the United States. And those who were predominantly hostile saw some advantage in solidarity and collaboration with Brazil's Spanish American neighbours. They were, ever conscious however that, although Brazil was now a republic, it remained different from Spanish America in culture and, above all, language. Although there was a greater awareness of the economic and political progress achieved by some Spanish American republics, especially Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, most Brazilian intellectuals viewed Spanish America in an overwhelmingly negative light. Few identified with América Latina, Nuestra América, much less Indoamérica.⁴⁷

Joaquim Nabuco (1849–1910), for example, one of Brazil's most distinguished public intellectuals, had shown no interest in Spanish America during the late empire. When he reflected on the relations between Imperial Brazil and the rest of the world, like the majority of educated Brazilians of his generation, the young Nabuco thought above all of Europe: the historic, linguistic and cultural ties of Brazil with Portugal; the influence of France on the art and architecture of Brazil since the arrival in 1816 of the French Artistic Mission in Rio de Janeiro; the influence of France and Great Britain on Brazilian literature and intellectual life; and, not least, Brazil's commercial and

⁴⁷ In 'Brazil into Latin America: the demise of slavery and monarchy as transnational events' (*Luso-Brazilian Review*, 49 (2012), pp. 96–126), Ori Preuss (University of Tel Aviv) argues, unconvincingly, that: 'It was the cumulative effect of these two real and symbolic deaths [the abolition of slavery and the end of the empire] that would finally give birth to a Latin American consciousness in Brazil... The collapse of these twin pillars of Brazil's singularity within the subcontinent can be interpreted as two interrelated ruptures that spiralled into a transformative historical event, disarticulating the existing mental structure'. In *Bridging the Island: Brazilians' Views of Spanish America and Themselves, 1865–1912* (Frankfurt: Iberoamericana, 2011), he writes: 'By the first decade of the 20th century Brazilian elites [political and intellectual] had come to perceive themselves, to one extent or another, willingly or unwillingly, as Latin Americans'. Unfortunately, Preuss gives few examples of what he terms 'outright expressions of Latin Americanism' by either Brazilian politicians or Brazilian intellectuals during the first years of the Republic. A more nuanced view can be found in an unpublished doctoral thesis, K. Gerab Baggio, 'A "outra" América: a América Latina na visão dos intelectuais brasileiros das primeiras décadas republicanas' (Universidade de São Paulo, 1998), Baggio has written a number of articles on this theme. See, for example, 'Brasil e Hispano-América: representações e trocas intelectuais', in E. de Freitas Dutra (ed.), *O Brasil em dois tempos: história, pensamento social e tempo presente* (Belo Horizonte: Autêntica, 2013).

financial dependence on Great Britain. He visited Spanish America (Argentina and Uruguay) for the first time – twice – in 1889. Apart from a couple of weeks in Buenos Aires in August 1891 as a journalist, and a week in Havana in January 1909 as a special ambassador to the restored national government, he made no further visits to Spanish America and maintained no intellectual contacts there.

With the establishment of the Republic in 1889, Nabuco acknowledged that Brazil was now part of 'a broader political system ... [Brazil] in America' and was therefore obliged to take account of 'the march of the Continent (a marcha do continente) ... our continent'.⁴⁸ Nevertheless Spanish America represented a terrible warning to Brazil of all that was wrong with republican government. In an open letter entitled 'Why I remain a monarchist' in the *Diário de Comércio*, 7 September 1890, Nabuco wrote that the republics of Latin America (*sic*) were characterised by *caudilhismo* [strong man rule] and military dictatorship; 'liberty is sacrificed for order'. And in his *Agredimento aos Pernambucanos* (1891), he commented on his generation's obsession with the word 'republic', discredited throughout the world when accompanied with the qualification *Sul-Americanica*.⁴⁹ Nabuco's diaries and correspondence are full of derogatory remarks about Spanish America as he sees Brazil (*sul-americanizado*) brought down to the moral and political level of Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, and even Chile.⁵⁰

Nabuco had always regarded Chile, in view of its political stability, respect for liberty and rejection of militarism and dictatorship, as an exception among the republics of the 'raça espanhola' in South America. Brazil's empire and Chile's parliamentary republic alone had avoided 'o gênio sul-americano da ditadura'. But this had changed with the election of José Manuel Balmaceda in 1886. In the postscript 'A questão da América Latina' to *Balmaceda* (1895), his study of the Balmaceda 'dictatorship' and the Chilean revolution of 1891, Nabuco describes Latin America as 'um vasto continente em estado permanente de desgoverno, de anarquia [a vast continent in a permanent state

48 J. Nabuco, *Balmaceda*, p. 218.

49 Cited in A. Alonso, 'Joaquim Nabuco; Diplomata Americanista', in José Vicente de Sá Pimentel (ed.), *Pensamento Diplomático Brasileiro. Formuladores e Agentes da Política Externa (1750–1964)*, 3 vols. (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 2013), vol. II, p. 364.

50 See Bethell, *Joaquim Nabuco no mundo*, p. 204. On the eve of the republic José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr., the future barão de Rio Branco, also feared that with the introduction of an elected president and a federal system of government Brazil would become like 'todas essas ridículas repúblicas hispano-americanas' [he gave, as examples, Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia]. The Brazilian Empire, 'únido, grande, próspero e livre', was the envy of the 'turbulentas repúblicas da América do Sul', the 'súditos de Gusmões Blancos e Porfírios Dias [dictators of Venezuela and Mexico respectively]'. Rio Branco to barão Homem de Mello, 13 Sept. 1887(?), cited in Clodoaldo Bueno, 'O Barão do Rio Branco e o Projeto da América do Sul', in Cardim and Almino (eds.), *Rio Branco*, p. 359.

of misgovernment, of anarchy]'.⁵¹ As Brazilian ambassador in Washington (1905–10) Nambuco was a strong supporter of Pan-Americanism, as we have seen, but he never identified Brazil with Spanish America/Latin America. Apart from other factors: 'language ... isolates us from the rest of Ibero-America as it separates Portugal from Spain'.⁵² In his final telegram to Rio Branco, two days before his death in January 1910, he insisted that there were not two, but three Americas: the English, the Spanish and the Portuguese.⁵³

In his widely read and influential book *A ilusão americana* (1893; 2nd edn. Paris, 1895), Eduardo Prado (1860–1901) strongly condemned the territorial conquest and economic exploitation of Spanish America, especially Mexico, by the United States, its arrogant diplomacy, its use of military force. Prado however, like Nabuco a monarchist, was contemptuous of the Spanish American republics and skeptical of their capacity to unite against their common enemy. An early exponent of the idea of Brazil as 'uma imensa ilha', a continent in itself, Prado claimed to have been told by geologists that the Río de la Plata and the Amazon were once connected. In any event, Brazil was separated from the Spanish American republics by 'diversidade da origem e da língua', and 'nem o Brasil físico, nem o Brasil moral formam um sistema com aquelas nações'.

The historian Manoel de Oliveira Lima (1867–1928) was one of the few intellectuals of the early republic to represent Brazil in a diplomatic post in Spanish America, spending a year in Venezuela (1905–6) during the dictatorship of Cipriano Castro. In a series of articles, written mainly in Venezuela and Argentina for *O Estado de São Paulo* and published as *Impressões da América espanhola (1904–1906)* (1907) he revealed a somewhat negative (and racist) view of the 'países latinos do continente', with the exception of Argentina and Chile. And in *América latina e América ingleza: a evolução brasileira comparada com a hispano-americana e com a anglo-americana* (Livraria Garnier, s/d [1913]; Eng. trans. *The Evolution of Brazil Compared with that of Spanish and Anglo-Saxon America*, 1914), based on six lectures delivered at Stanford University in October 1912, he elaborated the view that, although they needed to collaborate against the growing power of the United States in the region, Brazil and Spanish America were separate 'and frequently hostile' civilisations. At the same time, Oliveira Lima was one of the very few Brazilian intellectuals to spend much time in Spanish America. He was in Argentina for almost seven months immediately after the First World War and published *Na Argentina (Impressões 1918–19)* in 1920.

51 Nabuco, *Balmaceda*, Pós-escrito: A questão da América Latina, pp. 215–6, 219.

52 Nabuco to Barbosa Lima, 7 July 1907, in *Cartas a amigos*, vol. II, pp. 277.

53 Nabuco to Rio Branco, telegram, 15 Jan. 1910, *Joaquim Nabuco, Embaixador*, vol. II, p. 266. For a more detailed examination of Nabuco's thinking on Spanish America, see Bethell, *Joaquim Nabuco no mundo*, ch. 4.

In *A América Latina: males de origem* (1905), written in Paris in 1903, Manoel Bomfim (1868–1932) criticised the predominantly negative view of Latin America (that is to say, Spanish America) in the United States and Europe. Latin America was generally portrayed as backward and barbarous in order, as he said, to facilitate its domination and exploitation. Bomfim defended the idea of 'fraternidade' and 'solidariedade' between Brazil and Spanish America based on 'uma homogeneidade de sentimentos'.⁵⁴ Twenty years later, however, in *O Brasil na América: caracterização da formação brasileira* (1929), mostly written in 1925, he, too, had become disillusioned with Spanish America. 'América Latina' was no more than 'uma designação geográfica' within which there were unbridgeable historical, cultural and political differences between, on the one hand, Brazil and, on the other, 'os chamados latino-americanos', 'os neo-castelhanos', 'os outros neo-ibéricos'. Significantly, the opening chapter of *O Brasil na América* is entitled 'Portugal heróica', and the final chapter 'Diferenças entre os neo-ibéricos'.

The journalist and literary critic José Veríssimo (1857–1916) was a rare example of a Brazilian intellectual who, while deplored US cultural influence in Spanish America (in this he is often compared with Rodó) and also in Brazil, had a unique awareness and appreciation of Spanish American literature.⁵⁵ He introduced Brazilian readers to the literature not only of Argentina and Uruguay but also Mexico and Venezuela. 'Hispanoamericanos também somos nós [We are also hispanoamericans]', he believed, 'pois Portugal é Espanha [since Portugal is Spain]'. On a visit to the Academia Brasileira de Letras in 1912, the Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío heard José Veríssimo lament the fact that 'filhos do mesmo continente, quase da mesma terra, oriundos de povos em suma da mesma raça ou pelo menos da mesma formação cultural, com grandes interesses comuns, vivemos nós, latinoamericanos, pouco mais que alheios e indiferentes uns aos outros, e nos ignorando quase por completo [children of the same continent, almost of the same land, from people of the same race or at least the same cultural formation, with great common interests, we, we latinamericans, live almost apart and indifferent to each other, and in almost complete ignorance of each other]'.⁵⁶

54 See F. Sussekind, 'Shifting frontiers – Manuel Bonfim and *A América Latina*: an introduction', *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies*, vol. II (2002).

55 See, for example, *A educação nacional* (Belem, 1890; 2nd edn. Rio, 1906) and 'A regeneração da América Latina' (*Jornal do Comércio*, 18 December 1900), a review of Rodó's *Ariel*, later included in *Homens e Coisas Estrangeiras* (Rio de Janeiro, 1902). Also J. Veríssimo, *Cultura, literatura e política na América Latina*, a selection of his essays published for the most part in the years immediately before the First World War, edited and with an introduction by J.A. Barbosa (São Paulo, 1986), and K. Gerab Baggio, 'José Veríssimo: uma visão brasileira sobre as Américas', *Anos Electrónicos do III Encontro da ANPHLAC* (São Paulo, 1998).

56 Quoted in Ellison, *Alfonso Reyes e o Brasil*, p.17.

For a decade from 1903–13 and again in 1916–19, Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations) funded and edited a journal, *Revista Americana*,⁵⁷ whose aim was to deepen political and cultural interchange between Brazil, the United States and Spanish America. It published contributions in Spanish as well as Portuguese, including articles by Spanish Americans critical of both Brazil's close relations with the United States and Pan-Americanism, although the majority of the articles were by Brazilians and sympathetic to both. The first article in the first issue of *Revista Americana* was a translation of Joaquim Nabuco's lecture 'The share of America in civilization' read (by this time he was too ill to deliver it himself) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in June 1909.

After the First World War there was certainly more interest in Spanish-American literature and culture among Brazilian intellectuals and writers and more cultural interchange. Mário de Andrade (1893–1945), for example, maintained a regular correspondence with Jorge Luis Borges in Buenos Aires.⁵⁸ Ronald de Carvalho (1893–1935) welcomed José Vasconcelos on his visit to Rio in 1922 and accepted an invitation to lecture on Brazilian literature in Mexico the following year. Like many of the modernists of the 1920s, however, Carvalho had a stronger sense of belonging to America as a whole (the Americas), than to América Latina. His most famous poem, *Toda a América* (1924) was influenced more by Walt Whitman than any Spanish-American poet.⁵⁹

In the period between the First and Second World Wars Sílvio Júlio de Albuquerque Lima (1895–1984), author of *Estudos hispano-americanos* (1924), *Ideias e combates* (1927), *Cérebro e coração de Bolívar* (1931), *Escritores da Colômbia e Venezuela* (1942), *Escritores antilhanos* (1944) and many other works, was the only true Hispanist in Brazil, dedicated systematically to the

57 See A. M. Ortega, 'A construção de uma ideologia continental no início do século XX: a *Revista Americana* 1909–19' (unpublished PUC-São Paulo thesis, 2003); A. Fernandez Bravo, 'Utópias americanistas: la posición de la *Revista Americana* en Brasil (1909–1919)', in P. Alonso, *Construcciones impresas: panfletas, diárias y revistas en la formación de los estados nacionales en América Latina, 1820–1920* (Buenos Aires, 2004); R. Souza de Carvalho, 'La *Revista Americana* (1909–1919) y el diálogo intelectual en Latinoamérica', *Revista Iberoamericana*, Jul.–Dec. 2004; K. Baggio Gerab, 'La Revista Americana (1909–1919) et les relations entre les Amériques', in E. de Freitas and J.-Y. Mollier (eds.), *L'imprimé dans la construction de la vie politique. Brésil, Europe et Amériques (XVIIIe–XXe siècle)* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015).

58 See Mário de Andrade/Borges: *um diálogo dos anos 20*, ed. E. Rodriguez Monegal (São Paulo, 1975); R. Antelo, *Na Ilha de Marapataí (Mário de Andrade le os hispano-americanos)* (São Paulo, 1986); P. Artundo, *Mário de Andrade e a Argentina* (São Paulo: Edusp, 2004).

59 See K. Gerab Baggio, 'Ronald de Carvalho e Toda a América: diplomacia, ensaísmo, poesia e impressões de viagem na sociabilidade intelectual entre o Brasil e a Hispano-América', in J.L. Bendicho Beired, M.H. Capelato and M.L. Coelho (eds.), *Intercâmbios políticos e mediações culturais nas Américas* (Assis, SP: Unesp, 2010).

promotion of Spanish-American literature and culture.⁶⁰ Years later, Sílvio Júlio wrote: 'I was – if we exclude three or four insignificant predecessors, and one truly respectable one: Oliveira Lima – the pioneer of *bolivarianismo* or *americanismo* in Brazil ... I recall well my titanic, indescribable effort between 1912 and 1930 to convince Brazilian intellectuals to, at the least, read ... *Ariel!* ... What idiotic smiles, what insolent disinterest I had to endure'.⁶¹

Brazilian intellectuals between the world wars, like Spanish American intellectuals, were interested principally in the formation of their own national identity. The idea of Brazil, the roots of Brazil (indigenous peoples, the Portuguese, Africans), Brazil's racial, social and cultural miscegenation, were the main concerns of, for example, José Francisco de Oliveira Viana in *Evolução do povo brasileira* (1923) and *Raça e assimilação* (1932); Manuel Bomfim in *O Brasil na história* (1930) and *O Brasil nação: realidade da soberania brasileira* (2 vols., 1931); Gilberto Freyre in *Casa grande e senzala* (1933) and *Sobrados e mucambos* (1936); Sergio Buarque de Holanda in *Os raízes do Brasil* (1936); and Caio Prado Jr in *Evolução política do Brasil* (1933) and *Formação do Brasil contemporâneo. Colônia* (1942). The government of Getúlio Vargas (1930–45), especially during the authoritarian Estado Novo (1937–45) when Gustavo Capanema was Minister of Education and Public Health, with responsibility also for Culture, used the state and intellectuals linked to the state – for example, Carlos Drummond de Andrade, Mário de Andrade, Heitor Villa-Lobos, Rodrigo Melo Franco de Andrade, Lúcio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer – to promote a Brazilian national identity. Spanish America, 'América Latina', was still seen as 'a outra América'.

At the same time, especially during the Second World War, an increasing emphasis was also placed on Brazil's *American* identity ('brasiliade americanista'). From August 1941 the official newspaper of the Estado Novo, *A Manhã*, published a Sunday supplement with the title *Pensamento da América*, which promoted an interest in contemporary literary, intellectual and cultural currents in 'todos as Américas', including Spanish America and the United States, in a 'espírito pan-americano'. Cassiano Ricardo, the editor of *A Manhã*, regarded the American continent as consisting of 21 'repúblicas irmãs'. (Canada, as always, was excluded.) 'Há vinte e uma maneiras de ser americano, e não uma apenas', Ricardo insisted; Brazil and the United States were 'duas áncoras prendendo um só continente'.⁶² One of Brazil's leading

60 D.S. Wogan, *A Literatura Hispano-americana no Brasil: 1877–1944. Bibliografia de crítica, história literária e traduções* (Baton Rouge, LN: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), pp. 9–10.

61 Sílvio Júlio de Albuquerque Lima, *José Enrique Rodó e o cinquentenário do seu livro 'Ariel'* (Rio de Janeiro, 1954), quoted in Newcomb, *Nossa and Nuestra América*, p. 9.

62 See A.L. Beraba, *América aracnidea. Teias culturais interamericanas* (Rio de Janeiro, 2008), pp. 14, 27. On the 'Americanisation' of Brazilian culture during the Second World War, see,

historians Pedro Calmon, author of *Brasil e América. História de uma política* (1942; 2nd edn., 1944), which celebrated ‘união continental’ to save humanity and civilisation from fascism, was a principal collaborator, along with the US historian William Spence Robertson, in a multi-volume *História de las Américas* (the United States, Spanish America and Brazil) under the general editorship of the Argentine historian Ricardo Levene (14 vols., Buenos Aires, 1940/1942; Portuguese edition, 1945).

VI

As early as the 1890s official US documents can be found referring to reciprocal trade treaties with ‘Latin America’, that is, the countries south of the Rio Grande, usually but not always including Brazil. In his instructions to the US delegates to the second Pan-American Conference in Mexico City in 1901 President Roosevelt expressed the desire of the United States to be the friend of ‘all the Latin American republics’.⁶³ He also referred to ‘Latin America’ in his Annual Message to Congress in 1904 (the Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine), as we have seen. In 1909 President Taft’s Secretary of State, Philander Knox, charged the First Assistant Secretary of State, Francis M. Huntington Wilson, with the task of enlarging and reorganising the State Department. For the first time regional divisions were created, including a ‘Division of Latin American Affairs’, though in practice it dealt only with Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America showing no great interest in South America.⁶⁴ The expression ‘Latin America’ to include Brazil was still not, however, widely used in the United States before the First World War. The research of João Feres Jr. has revealed that neither the Library of Congress nor the New York Public Library has a single book, journal or periodical in English with Latin America in its title published before 1900; only two titles were found in the Library of Congress published between 1900 and 1910, 23 in the decade 1911–20.⁶⁵

In 1916–7 there was an interesting debate among a group of US historians about what name to give the first academic journal devoted to the history of the countries south of the United States due to be launched in January 1918. After both the initial choice, Ibero-America, and Latin America were found unacceptable, the latter in part because at the time it signified Spanish

G. Moura, *Tio Sam chega ao Brasil: a penetração cultural americana* (São Paulo, 1984) and A. Pedro Tota, *O imperialismo sedutor. A americanização do Brasil na época da Segunda Guerra* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000).

63 Quoted in Smith, *Unequal giants*, p. 52

64 See F.M. Huntington Wilson, *Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat* (Boston, 1945); W.V. and M.V. Scholes, *The Foreign Policy of the Taft Administration* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1970), pp. 25–7.

65 See J. Feres Jr, *A história do conceito de ‘Latin America’ nos Estados Unidos* (Bauru, SP: EDUSC, 2004), p. 81 and Appendix 1.

America only, it was finally decided, by six votes to one, to call the journal the *Hispanic American Historical Review*. Hispania (from the Roman), it was argued, referred to the peninsula, and therefore to Spain and Portugal and by extension to both Spanish America and Brazil.⁶⁶ The *HAHR* was virtually the only journal to publish articles on 'Hispanic America' before the Second World War. In 1940 the first article with Latin America in the title was published: 'Some cultural aspects of Latin America' by Herbert Eugene Bolton, author of 'The epic of Greater America', his famous presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1932 calling for the study of the common history of the Americas.

In the first issue of another journal launched in 1918, *Hispania*, devoted to the language and literature of Spain and Portugal, its editor Aurelio M. Espinosa, a Stanford professor, denounced the use of the term 'Latin America' to refer to the region south of the United States, including Brazil, as 'improper, unjust, unscientific'. The only appropriate names were Spanish America (*sic*) or Hispanic America.⁶⁷ In 1926 the American Historical Association established the Conference on Hispanic American History (renamed only in 1938 the Conference on Latin American History). In 1939 Lewis Hanke, creator and editor of *The Handbook of Latin American Studies*, an annual annotated bibliography of books and articles on Spanish America and Brazil, first published in 1935, became the head of a new division of the Library of Congress devoted to Portugal, Spain and Latin America. It was named the Hispanic Foundation (now Hispanic Division).

The first general history of Latin America, including Brazil, in English was by William Spence Robertson, *The History of the Latin-American Nations* (New York, 1922). Robertson was Professor of History at the University of Illinois where he had been teaching the history of Latin America since 1909. In the preface to his *Rise of the Spanish-American Republics as Told in the Lives of their Liberators* (New York, 1918) he had written of the origins, as an undergraduate at the University of Wisconsin, of his desire to study 'the history and politics of Hispanic America, the vast region inhabited by the wayward children of Spain and Portugal'. The purpose of his new book, he wrote, was 'to outline the chief events in the history of Latin America or, as it is sometimes called, Hispanic America' – the history of all the 'nations which sprang from the colonies of Spain and Portugal'. Herman G. James and Percy A. Martin, *The Republics of Latin America: their History, Governments and Economic Conditions* (New York, 1923) included a chapter on Brazil. Martin had been professor of history

66 Feres, *Historia do conceito de 'Latin America'*, pp. 82–4; H. Delpar, *Looking South: The Evolution of Latin Americanist Scholarship in the United States, 1850–1975* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2008), p. 50.

67 A.M. Espinosa, 'The term Latin America', *Hispania*, 1 (September 1918), quoted in Delpar, *Looking South*, p. 29.

at Stanford since 1908. He was, like Robertson, one of the co-founders of the *HAHR*, the translator of Oliveira Lima's Stanford lectures, and considered himself something of a 'Brazilianist'. Another early US 'Latinamericanist' whose interests included Brazil was J. Fred Rippy; editor and author of the introduction to Manuel Ugarte's *Destiny of a Continent* (1925).

In the aftermath of the disastrous Pan-American Conference held in Havana in 1928 the alarmingly poor state of the United States' relations with its neighbours was highlighted. This now included relations in South America where US trade and investments had grown considerably since the First World War. Official thinking in Washington and US foreign policy began to focus more seriously on Latin America, which comprised all 20 republics south of the Rio Grande, including Brazil. This despite warnings from Edwin V. Morgan, the US ambassador in Brazil for more than 20 years (1912–33), that too many in Washington were inclined to group Brazil with the 'South American powers of Spanish origin'. 'This country', he told Secretary of State Kellogg, 'never forgets it is of Portuguese and not Spanish origin', that like the United States it is 'built on non-Spanish foundations' and that it has a 'special political and economic relationship with the United States different from that of the Spanish American republics'.⁶⁸

In the 1930s, with the United States facing an external threat not only to its economic but also to its geo-political interests in Latin America from the emerging fascist powers of Europe (Germany in particular was seen as a threat to Argentina, Chile and, above all, Brazil), the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt responded with the 'Good Neighbor' policy towards Latin America. As the situation in Europe deteriorated, Pan-American or inter-American solidarity, the unity of the Hemisphere, the United States and Latin America standing together in the worldwide struggle of democracy against fascism, became ever more important. From August 1940 and throughout the Second World War the Office for the Coordination of Commerce and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (renamed in 1941 the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, OCIAA), under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller, formulated and executed a programme aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Latin Americans, and especially Brazilians (because of their greater involvement in the war), through cinema, radio, music and the printed word. Many more books were now published on Latin America – over 150 in the 1940s, including Hubert Herring, *Good Neighbors: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Seventeen Other Countries* (1941), *Latin America* (1942) by the geographer Preston James, Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (1943), *The Green Continent: a Comprehensive View of Latin America by its Leading Writers*, edited by the Colombian writer German Arciniegas and translated from the Spanish and Portuguese by Harriet de Onis

68 Quoted in Smith, *Unequal giants*, pp. 175–6, 178.

et al (1944) and the high school text book by Harriet M. Brown & Helen B. Miller, *Our Latin American Neighbors* (New York, 1944). All included Brazil as an integral part of Latin America.⁶⁹ Beginning with Karl Loewenstein's *Brazil Under Vargas* (New York, 1942) and culminating with Samuel Putnam's translations of Jorge Amado, Euclides da Cunha and Gilberto Freyre together with his *Marvellous Journey: a Survey of Four Centuries of Brazilian Writing* (New York, 1948), many more books were published on Brazil itself, which was finally receiving attention as the most important country, and the most important ally of the United States, in Latin America.

The emergence of the United States as a global power during the Second World War led to a demand for more expertise for post-war military and political strategic planning. During the War a so-called Ethno-geographic Board was created, bringing together specialists from the National Research Council, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council and the Smithsonian Institution, to provide a structure around which to organise policy and through which to develop education and research.⁷⁰ The Board began by dividing up the world into *continents* – with one important exception: instead of the Western Hemisphere or the Americas or North and South America there was to be the United States and Latin America. When it later moved to dividing the world into *regions* with a degree of geographic, geopolitical and cultural homogeneity, Latin America presented itself as one of the most cohesive of regions in terms of religion, language and culture, history, and economic, social and political structures. The differences between Spanish America and Brazil in all these respects (except to some extent religion) and the huge disparities in size and population between Brazil and all the other countries in the region were simply ignored.⁷¹

69 The French also discovered, or in their case re-discovered, 'l'Amérique Latine', but it now included Brazil: for example, A. Siegfried, *Amérique Latine* (1934) and V. Tapié, *Histoire de l'Amérique Latine au XIX^e siècle* (1945), although in a famous article 'Ya-t-il une Amérique Latine?', *Annales ESC*, 4 (1948), Fernand Braudel insisted that there were many and various 'l'Amériques Latines'. The English generally preferred the expression 'South America' to 'Latin America' – even when including Mexico and Central America. See, for example, Lord Bryce, *South America: Observations and Impressions* (New York, 1912) and the *South American Handbook*, published annually since 1924.

70 See W.C. Bennett, *The Ethnogeographic Board* (Washington, DC, 1947); M.W. Lewis and K.E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents. A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), p. 163.

71 Also influential in US geo-strategic thinking at this time were two books by N.J. Spykman: *America's Strategy in World Politics* (1942) and *The Geography of Peace* (1944). Spykman emphasised the differences between Anglo-Saxon America and Latin America (which included Brazil): 'the lands below the Rio Grande represent a different world, the world of Latin America. It is perhaps unfortunate that the English and Latin speaking (*sic*) parts of the continent should both be called America, thereby unconsciously evoking an expectation of similarity which does not exist' (Spykman, *America's Strategy*, p. 46). The influence of Isaiah Bowman, Director of the American Geographical Society (1915–35) and 'territorial

In the immediate post-war period and the early years of the Cold War the official US view that the 20 republics south of the Rio Grande, including Brazil, constituted 'Latin America' influenced other governments, multilateral institutions (the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLA/CEPAL, established in 1948 was the first international organisation responsible for 'Latin America'), NGOs, foundations, learned societies and, not least, universities in both the United States and Europe, where 'Latin American Studies' experienced a rapid growth, further accelerating after the Cuban Revolution.⁷² Latin America as a whole (now including Brazil) was not only seen as *different* from the United States but also a problem area, part of what was now referred to as the 'Third World' – viewed as economically, socially and culturally backward, politically violent and unstable. In his theory of the 'clash of civilizations' Samuel P. Huntington was to argue, bizarrely, that Latin America (with Brazil as its 'leading state') was a 'separate civilization', with a 'distinct identity which differentiates it from the West'.⁷³

For the US government, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Latin America was important for both economic (trade and investment) and geopolitical (security) reasons and not least because it initially represented the biggest single voting bloc in the UN Assembly. But, with the onset of the Cold War, hemispheric concerns increasingly gave way to global concerns. Europe, the Middle East and Asia became more important than Latin America, the one region of the world in which the USSR did not apparently pose a significant challenge to US hegemony. The United States could afford to neglect Latin America and the OCIAA was closed in May 1946. There was to be no economic development aid, no Marshall Plan for Latin America, 'There has been a Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere for a century and a half', Truman declared at a press conference in Washington in August 1947. 'It is known as the Monroe Doctrine'.⁷⁴ As early as 1949, Adolf Berle, who had served as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America in the Roosevelt administration and ambassador to Brazil in 1945–6, complained about the

adviser' to President Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference and to President Roosevelt during the Second World War, also deserves attention. See N. Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalisation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003).

72 'Latin American studies', especially in US universities, were, however, overwhelmingly studies of Spanish America, especially Mexico and Central America. Most 'Latinamericanists' did not speak or read Portuguese, knew little of Brazilian history and culture, and indeed rarely, if ever, visited Brazil.

73 S.P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 45, 46, 87.

74 Quoted in Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (eds.), *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 22, n. 15.

'sheer neglect and ignorance' of the region he found in Washington, 'We have simply forgotten about Latin America'.⁷⁵ The Cuban Revolution led directly to President Kennedy's proposal in 1961 for an Alliance for Progress to advance Latin America's economic and social development. However, once the Cuban missile crisis had been peacefully resolved and the immediate external threat to its interests removed, the United States was able, relatively speaking, to neglect Latin America once again, though it remained ready to intervene, directly or indirectly, to deal with any internal threat and to save Latin America from 'communism', as it claimed to do, for example, in Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973 and Central America in the 1980s.

In view of the special relationship, if not unwritten alliance, Brazil had enjoyed with the United States since the beginning of the century and the support it had given during the Second World War, Brazil was disappointed to be treated by the United States after the War as simply one of twenty, albeit the biggest and perhaps the most important, Latin American republics. Brazil was afforded no special role in the post-war global order (in particular, no permanent seat on the UN Security Council) and received no special economic development assistance.⁷⁶ Although in the last analysis Brazil was always on the side of the United States and the 'West' in the Cold War, a more independent foreign policy emerged, first under President Getúlio Vargas, who in 1951 rejected a US request to send Brazilian troops to Korea at the head of an inter-American force.⁷⁷ Under Presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (1961–4), Brazil's *política externa independente* included the restoration of relations with the USSR (broken in 1947) and closer relations with China and the rest of the underdeveloped, 'Third World', including the countries of Africa and Asia in their struggles against colonialism and revolutionary Cuba (though not, significantly, with the other Spanish American countries).⁷⁸

During the 21-year military dictatorship that followed the US-supported military coup of 1964, while the United States regarded Brazil as a 'key country' in world affairs and its preferred partner in the Latin American region, Brazil,

75 Quoted in Jordan A. Schwartz, *Liberal: Adolf A. Berle and the Vision of an American Era* (New York, 1987), pp. 312.

76 See Stanley E. Hilton, 'The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945–1960: end of the special relationship', *Journal of American History*, 68 (1981).

77 See Vagner Camilo Alves, *Da Itália a Coreia. Decisões sobre ir ou não a guerra* (Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro, 2007). It was in 1951 at a meeting of American Foreign Ministers in Washington to discuss the Korean War that the Brazilian Foreign Minister spoke, apparently for the first time, 'em nome de países latinoamericanos'. Itamaraty, *Relatório*, 1951, quoted in Lúis Cláudio Villafañe G. Santos, 'A América do Sul no discurso diplomático brasileiro', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 48 (2005) p. 196.

78 F.C. de San Tiago Dantas, *Política externa independente* (Rio de Janeiro, 1962) is a contemporary account by a key player. Also see P.G. Fagundes Vizentini, *Relações exteriores do Brasil (1945–1964). O nacionalismo e a política externa independente* (Petrópolis, 2004).

especially during the Médici and Geisel administrations (1969–79), was frequently in a state of low-level conflict with the United States, for example over trade and nuclear power. And although it never joined the Non-Aligned Movement (it had observer status only), it pursued independent 'Third World' policies often at odds with US interests and policies in, for example, the Middle East and southern Africa.⁷⁹ In Latin America, however, where it was clearly now the dominant country – between 1940 and 1980 its population had grown from 40 million to 170 million, its economy, at an average rate of seven per cent per annum, had one of the fastest rates of economic growth in the world – Brazil had neither the will nor the resources to play a leadership role, and certainly not the role of regional 'sheriff' the US State Department sometimes envisaged.⁸⁰

Brazil joined the Latin American Free Trade Area (ALALC) in 1960 and the Association for Latin American Integration (ALADI) in 1980. Brazil's relations with its closest neighbour and arch-rival, Argentina, which had reached an historic low in the 1970s over incipient nuclear arms programmes and the Itaipú dam on the river Paraná, improved dramatically after democratisation in both countries in the mid 1980s. This rapprochement eventually led to the Treaty of Asunción (1991) and the creation of the Mercosur trade bloc consisting of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay (to which Chile and Bolivia later associated themselves). It is fanciful, however, to talk of a *latinoamericanização* of Brazilian foreign policy in these years. More than 40 years after the end of the Second World War, during which Brazil had been regarded and treated by the United States and the rest of the world as part of Latin America, during which Brazil's economic and political development had in many ways followed a similar path to that of at least the major Spanish American republics, and during which the beginning of Brazil's *Marcha para Oeste* [March to the West] had brought it in closer contact with many of its neighbours, Brazil could still not be said to have a deep engagement with the rest of the region.

VII

In the years following the Second World War there was greater interchange between Spanish American and Brazilian intellectuals, writers, artists, critics and academics. Those Spanish Americans who thought in terms of Latin America now included Brazil and were more prepared to take note of Brazilian

79 See M. Spektor, *Kissinger e o Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 2009).

80 'The military dictatorship', former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso has written, '... spent far more energy on its relations with countries in Africa and the Middle East than it did on relations with its neighbors. This was due to a rather bizarre formulation of Third World power politics' (F. H. Cardoso, *The Accidental President of Brazil: A Memoir* (New York, 2006), p. 220).

ideas, literature and culture in their own work, but for the most part marginally and without great conviction or enthusiasm. No Spanish American intellectual wrote more about Latin America than Leopoldo Zea (Mexico, 1912–2004). Brazil, however, could hardly be said to have been treated adequately in any of his books.⁸¹ Notable exceptions were Arturo Torres-Riosco (Chile, 1897–1971), Eduardo Galeano (Uruguay, 1940–2015), author of the best-selling *Las venas abiertas de América Latina* (1971), Ángel Rama (Uruguay, 1926–83) and Emir Rodríguez Monegal (Uruguay, 1921–85), who edited the two-volume *Borzoi Anthology of Latin American Literature* (New York, 1977) in which Brazil was well represented.⁸² It is not insignificant that many of those who gave most attention to Brazil taught in departments of Spanish and Portuguese studies at leading universities in the United States – Torres-Riosco, for example, taught for over 40 years at the University of California, Berkeley, Rodríguez Monegal for over 15 years at Yale – and/or belonged to the smaller countries of Latin America (mainly Uruguay, also Brazil's closest neighbour in Spanish America).

In Brazil there were also artists, writers and critics who gave much greater attention to Spanish American culture and ideas than hitherto. One of Brazil's greatest poets Manuel Bandeira, for example, published *Literatura hispano-americana* in 1949. In the period from the 1960s to the 1980s several leading Brazilian intellectuals, mostly on the Left, even began to self-identify with 'Latin America'. This was not merely a question of ideological affinity and solidarity with their colleagues in Spanish America during the Cold War; it was often directly a consequence of years spent in exile in Uruguay (until the coup in June 1973), Chile (until the coup there in September 1973), Mexico and Venezuela, as well as in various European countries and the United States, during the Brazilian military dictatorship. 'It was...in Santiago [immediately after the 1964 golpe]', Fernando Henrique Cardoso has written, 'that I awakened to the concept of "Latin America". It seems quite intuitive now, but the concept of the region as a political and cultural bloc was still not popular back then. We just didn't believe that Brazil, with its Portuguese heritage and continental size,

81 Leopoldo Zea's works include *The Latin American Mind* (1963), *El pensamiento latinoamericano* (1963, 1976), *América Latina y el mundo* (1965; Eng. trans. *Latin America in the World*, 1969), *Latinoamérica, Tercer Mundo* (1977), *Latinoamérica en la encrucijada de la historia* (1981), *América Latina en sus ideas* (1986), *Filosofía latinoamericana* (1987) and *Descubrimiento e identidad latinoamericana* (1990). In the three-volume *Fuentes de la cultura latinoamericana* (Mexico, D. F., 1993) edited by Zea, only three of more than 100 texts were by Brazilians: Darcy Ribeiro, described as a 'brasileño latinoamericano' ('La cultura latinoamericana'), João Cruz Costa ('El pensamiento brasileño') and Gilberto Freyre ('Raíces europeas de la historia brasileña'). But see Luciano dos Santos, 'O Brasil como parte da América Latina: o projeto identitário-integracionista de Leopoldo Zea', *Temporalidades –Revista de História*, 4 (2012).

82 On Rama and Rodríguez Monegal, see P. Rocca, *Angel Rama, Emir Rodríguez Monegal y el Brasil: Dos caras de un proyecto latinoamericano* (Montevideo, 2006).

had much in common with Peru, Venezuela or Mexico.⁸³ Cardoso wrote (with the Chilean Enzo Faletto) the hugely influential *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, first published in Spanish in 1969. Celso Furtado (1920–2004), who had been trained and influenced by the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch at ECLA/CEPAL in Santiago and had therefore already been to some extent ‘Latinamericanised’, wrote *Subdesenvolvimento e estagnação na América Latina* (1966) and *Formação econômica da América Latina* (1969). Ruy Mauro Marini (1932–97) and Theotonio dos Santos (1936–2018), who were greatly influenced by the German-born ‘Latinamericanist’ André Gunder Frank, author of *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (1967), wrote numerous books and articles on the theory of dependency as it related to Latin America. The anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro (1922–97) wrote *As Américas e a civilização: processo de formação e causa do desenvolvimento cultural desigual dos povos americanos* (1970), *O dilema de América Latina – estruturas de poder e forças insurgentes* (1978) and, after his return from exile, an essay entitled ‘América Latina: pátria grande’ (1986). A more surprising example of a Brazilian intellectual identifying with Latin America is Gilberto Freyre, who was perhaps Brazil’s most internationally recognised intellectual at the time and who was well-known for his previous writings on Luso-Brazilian exceptionalism. In an essay ‘Americanidade e latinidade da América Latina’ published in 1963, Freyre declared: ‘O brasileiro é uma gente hispânica, sua cultura é hispânica – no sentido ibérica..... O Brasil é duplamente hispânica (Portugal e a Espanha) [Brazilians are a hispanic people, their culture is hispanic, in the sense of iberian....Brazil is doubly hispanic (Portugal and Spain)]’. For him the Latin American countries were all ‘países americano-tropicais’. There existed ‘uma unidade pan-hispânica.... uma cultura transnacionalmente panhispânica a que o Brasil pertence’.⁸⁴

However, the majority of Brazilian intellectuals, it is probably fair to say, like most Brazilians, continued to think of ‘Latin America’ as signifying Spanish America, of Brazil as not part of ‘Latin America’ and of themselves as not essentially ‘Latin American’.⁸⁵

83 Cardoso, *The Accidental President*, p. 88.

84 ‘Americanidade e latinidade da América Latina: crescente interpenetração e decrescente segregação’ [Diogene, 43 (1963); republished in *Estudos Universitários*, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 6/1 Jan.–March 1966 under the title ‘Americanidade, latinidade e tropicalidade’], in *Americanidade e Latinidade da América Latina e outros textos afins* (ed.) Edson Nery da Fonseca (São Paulo, 2003). See also G. Freyre, *O brasileiro entre os outros hispanos: afinidades, contrastes e posseíveis futuros nas suas inter-relações* (Rio de Janeiro, 1975).

85 The increasing number of Brazilians living in the United States did not, and apparently still do not, think of themselves as ‘Latinos’, though more research could usefully be done on this topic.

VIII

As a result of the end of the Cold War, the profound changes in world politics that followed, the intensification of the process of globalisation and, not least, fundamental political and economic change in Brazil itself, Brazil's presence and influence in the world grew significantly, especially under the presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2003) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010). Brazil began to play an increasingly important role in North–South and South–South relations and was a key player in discussions on a whole range of global issues, including trade, reform of multilateral institutions and climate change. As a result Brazil was considered internationally, along with China and India, as one of the 'emerging global powers' in the first half of the 21st century.

At the same time, there was a major development in Brazil's relations with the other states in its region. Brazil continued to support the work of the Organisation of American States, founded in 1948 at the ninth Pan-American Conference in Bogotá, and its presidents have attended all the Summits of the Americas held since December 1994, while resisting the US agenda for the economic integration of the Western Hemisphere. Brazil attended the annual meetings of the Rio Group of Latin American and Caribbean states, founded in 1986, and gave its support to the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), founded in 2010. But Brazil also, for the first time in its history, actively pursued a policy of engagement, both economic and political, with its immediate neighbours in South America. This was a conscious decision deliberately taken in 1992–3, reinforced by the fact that in 1994 Mexico joined the United States and Canada in 'North America'. President Cardoso hosted the first summit of South American presidents in Brasília in 2000. At the third summit held in Cusco in December 2004, during the Lula administration, a South American Community of Nations was formed. It consisted of 12 nations, including Guyana and Suriname. At the summit held in Brasília in May 2008 the Community became a Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Improved relations with its South American neighbours and, indeed, the economic and political integration of South America, was the principal focus of Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula. Also for the first time, and with a good deal of hesitancy, uncertainty and ambivalence, Brazil began to think of itself as a regional power – not only in its long-term economic and strategic interests but because, it was

argued in Itamaraty, regional power was a necessary condition for global power. The region, however, was South America, not Latin America.⁸⁶

86 *A agenda internacional do Brasil. A política externa brasileira de FHC a Lula* (Rio de Janeiro, 2009), the most comprehensive survey ever undertaken of opinion within the Brazilian 'foreign policy community' (diplomats, senators and deputies, business leaders, academics, researchers, journalists, leaders of NGOs, etc.), commissioned by the Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI) in Rio de Janeiro, conducted by Amaury de Souza and based on almost 100 in-depth interviews and 250 questionnaires carried out in 2001 and 2008, begins with the words: 'In the last 20 years Brazil has expanded significantly its presence in the world and in South America'. The rest of the book has much of interest to say about Brazil's agenda in South America in the first decade of the 21st century, about which, interestingly, opinion had become even more sharply divided in 2008 than it was in 2001. But the book has nothing at all to say about 'América Latina' which does not even merit an entry in the index. On Brazil and South America, see L.C. Villafañe G. Santos, *A América do Sul no Discurso Diplomático Brasileiro* (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 2014).

II

2. Britain and Brazil (1808–1914)*

I

The foundations of British pre-eminence in Brazil in the 19th century – political, commercial and financial – were established in the period between the transfer of the Portuguese Court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1807–8 during the Napoleonic Wars and the abdication of independent Brazil's first emperor in 1831.

There was a long history of close relations, both political and economic, between Great Britain and Portugal. Under treaties signed in 1642, 1654 and 1703, Britain guaranteed to protect the Bragança dynasty and to maintain the territorial integrity of Portugal and its dominions throughout the world, especially Portuguese America (Brazil), against external aggression – a guarantee reaffirmed in 1793 at the outbreak of the war in Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution. During the 17th and 18th centuries British merchants in Lisbon and Oporto established a privileged position in the exports to Brazil as well as the imports from Brazil and the re-exports from Portugal to Europe and the rest of the world. When Napoleon, determined to close the only remaining loophole in the Continental System against British trade with Europe by invading Portugal, Great Britain, for reasons both economic and geo-political, assumed a decisive role in the decision of the Portuguese Prince Regent D. João in November 1807 to transfer the Portuguese court, the entire apparatus of the Portuguese state and large sections of the Portuguese governing class from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro under protection from the British navy. In a secret convention of 22 October 1807 Great Britain had renewed its existing guarantees to preserve the territorial integrity of Portugal and its empire and the continuity of the Bragança dynasty, now specifically to include the protection of the Portuguese court in Brazil and the liberation of Portugal from the French.

* This is a new essay that draws on material in 'A presença britânica no Império nos trópicos', *Acervo. Revista do Arquivo Nacional*, 22 (2009), pp. 53–66; 'O Brasil no século XIX: parte do 'império informal' britânico?', in J. Murilo de Carvalho and A. Pereira Campos (eds.), *Perspectivas da cidadania no Brasil Império* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 2011), pp. 15–35; and 'A presença britânica no Brasil, 1808–1831', *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, forthcoming.

The Prince Regent D. João and the Portuguese government in Rio de Janeiro were dependent on the British army for the liberation of Portugal and the British navy for the defence of Brazil and the rest of Portugal's overseas empire. In Portugal, Sir Arthur Wellesley, the future duke of Wellington, commanded a British expeditionary force; General William Carr Beresford was commander in chief of the Portuguese army; and the British ambassador (first John Charles Villiers, 1808–10, then Sir Charles Stuart, 1810–14) was the most influential figure in the *Conselho dos Governadores* [called the Regents in English publications of the period]. In Rio de Janeiro, the most powerful men in the *Corte* were Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, commander of the British squadron in Guanabara Bay (until July 1809), and the British minister, Percy Clinton Sydney Smythe, the sixth Viscount Strangford, 28 years old, who arrived from Lisbon in July. Strangford declared with his usual exaggeration: 'I have entitled England to establish with the Brazils the relation of sovereign and subject and to require obedience to be paid as the price of protection'.¹

During a brief stopover in Salvador in January, D. João had proclaimed the opening of Brazilian ports to direct trade with all friendly nations, thus formally ending the 300-year-old Portuguese monopoly of colonial trade. In practice, at least until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, this meant direct trade with Great Britain. The number of ships entering Rio de Janeiro in 1808 was more than four times greater than in 1807 and the majority of them British. Already in August 1808 between 150 and 200 merchants formed the beginning of a prosperous British community in Rio de Janeiro. Others were formed in Salvador, Recife, São Luís de Maranhão and Belém.

Nevertheless, Britain was not satisfied with the opening of Brazilian ports to direct trade. George Canning, Foreign Secretary March 1807–October 1809, wanted the same privileged position in Brazil that Britain had enjoyed in Portugal since the middle of the 17th century. After prolonged negotiations between Strangford and Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, conde de Linhares, the Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Relations and War and leader of the so-called 'partido inglês' in the *Corte*, two treaties were signed on 19 February 1810 – and immediately ratified by D. João. The first was a Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, and the second, a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, under which British manufactured goods imported into Brazil would attract a preferential 15 per cent maximum tariff. Moreover, British merchants would not only have the right to reside and own property in Brazil and maintain their own churches, cemeteries and hospitals, but also to nominate special magistrates [*juizes conservadores*] who would be responsible for all cases

1 Cited in A.K. Manchester, *British Pre-eminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline*. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1933), p. 67.

involving British subjects (that is, a parallel system of British justice would be established in Brazil).

Canning had also instructed Strangford that any treaty with Portugal must include the first steps towards the eventual abolition of the transatlantic slave trade. In 1807, after a 20-year struggle, Britain had abolished the slave trade, and immediately adopted a policy of promoting international abolition. Brazil was the world's principal market for slaves. The immediate cessation of the slave trade would be against the interests of Brazilian *fazendeiros* [plantation owners], indeed would signify the ruin of Brazilian agriculture, as well as Portuguese and Brazilian merchants. However, the transfer of the Corte to Brazil and its dependence on Britain offered a rare opportunity to force concessions from Portugal on the slave trade. Under article 10 of a Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, the Portuguese government recognised the injustice of the slave trade, committed itself to limiting the trade to Portuguese territories on the coast of Africa and promised gradually to take effective steps towards its abolition. It was the first agreement between Portugal and Great Britain on the trade. British pressure for the fulfilment of the final commitment would henceforth be unrelenting.²

Resentment in Brazil against Britain grew after 1810. The commercial treaty was much more favourable to English than to Portuguese interests, in both Portugal and Brazil. And as a result of a misinterpretation of article 10 of the Treaty of Alliance, British navy ships captured some Portuguese ships engaged in the slave trade, principally from Bahia and Pernambuco, on the Costa da Mina, and sent them for adjudication to the British Admiralty court in Sierra Leone.³ Finally when, taking advantage of the revolutions for independence in Spanish America, the Corte, and especially Carlota Joaquina, D. João's Spanish wife, considered the idea of recapturing Colônia do Sacramento (ceded to Spain in 1778), taking Montevideo, and expanding the territory of Portuguese America to the Río de la Plata; Strangford always made clear British opposition.

The evident decline of Britain's political influence in the Corte accelerated after the death of Linhares in January 1812, and especially when two years later António de Araújo de Azevedo (from 1815 conde da Barca), returned to government as Secretary of State for the Navy and the Colonies, responsible for Portugal's foreign relations. Araújo de Azevedo, a francophile, was a strong adversary of the 'partido inglês' and opponent of the treaties signed in 1810. He found the entire English connection, as Strangford reported to Lord Castlereagh, Canning's successor as British Foreign Secretary, 'oppressive

2 See L. Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807–1869* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

3 J.P. Marques, *The Sounds of Silence: Nineteenth-Century Portugal and the Abolition of the Slave Trade* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), p. 35.

and degrading to Portugal'.⁴ In any event Portugal no longer needed British protection. The war in Portugal had effectively ended in May 1811 with the defeat of the third French invasion. By October 1813 Wellesley had liberated Spain and entered France and after the battle of Leipzig the war in Europe turned decisively against Napoleon. The Emperor resigned in April 1814.

Although Britain had armed, financed and commanded the Portuguese army, Portugal regarded itself as having made a decisive contribution in the war against France. The Congress of Vienna (September 1814–June 1815) offered an opportunity for Portugal to demonstrate to the world that it was no longer dependent on Britain. (The Treaty of Paris in May 1814 had been signed by Britain on behalf of Portugal without its express approval.) However, the Great Powers that had defeated Napoleon – Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia – treated Portugal as a second-class power at Vienna and the Portuguese representatives were unable entirely to resist Castlereagh's demands.

Two Anglo-Portuguese conventions were signed in January 1815. The first annulled the 1810 Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, but confirmed the validity of the ancient treaties between Britain and Portugal that protected the Portuguese dominions against external threats. Britain also paid £300,000 in compensation for Portuguese slave ships illegally captured by ships of the British navy and annulled that part of the loan of £600,000 contracted by Portugal in 1809 that remained unpaid (75 per cent). However, Portuguese attempts to retain French Guiana (occupied with the support of the British navy in 1809), to transfer Colônia do Sacramento from Spain to Portugal, to secure the return of Olivença (captured by Spain in 1801) and, above all, to terminate the Anglo-Portuguese commercial treaty of 1810 all failed.

Moreover, in the second convention signed in January 1815 Portugal declared the slave trade north of the Equator illegal, which penalised in particular the interests of Bahia, Pernambuco, Maranhão and Pará. The Portuguese trade in slaves continued to be permitted south of the Equator, but was restricted to territories in Africa over which the Portuguese crown claimed dominion and to trade destined for the transatlantic possessions of Portugal. (This was more than enough to furnish Brazil with the slaves it needed.) Portugal promised to introduce and implement legislation to punish Portuguese subjects engaged in the illegal trade, and reiterated its promise to gradually abolish the entire slave trade. No legislation was introduced, and the Portuguese continued to resist British pressure to fix a date for the total abolition of the trade. Britain did not have the powers to enforce the 1815 treaty until an additional convention was signed in 1817 under which Portugal conceded to the British navy the right to detain ships suspected of carrying slaves illegally, i.e. north of the Equator, and

4 Strangford to Castlereagh, 20 Feb. 1814, cited in P. Wilken, *Empire Adrift: the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1821* (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), p. 142.

send them to be judged before Anglo-Portuguese courts of mixed commission especially created for the purpose in Freetown, Sierra Leone and Rio de Janeiro.⁵

There was an expectation – in both Britain and Portugal – that with the end of the war in Europe the Portuguese prince regent, his court and his government, after seven years in Rio de Janeiro, would return to Lisbon. From May 1814 Strangford had been encouraging D. João to return. ‘The hatred of the natives of Brazil to England is now more violent than I can describe. It pervades every class of person in this country’, Strangford had warned Castlereagh in February.⁶ Only in Lisbon could Britain restore its traditional influence in the Portuguese court. Twice D. João refused. Finally, preoccupied with the demands arriving from Lisbon, he indicated to Strangford his willingness to return. In September, Castlereagh sent Vice-Admiral Sir John Beresford (younger brother of General Beresford in Lisbon) to Rio de Janeiro with three Royal Navy ships to provide transport, if necessary, or at least protection for the royal family in its return voyage to Lisbon. The former Foreign Secretary George Canning was sent to Lisbon as ambassador in order to receive (and influence) D. João on his return. Beresford arrived in Rio on 28 December 1814 but in January the conde de Aguiar announced that the prince regent had no immediate plans to leave Brazil. D. João’s decision to remain was seen as a fatal blow to British influence in the Portuguese court. Strangford was recalled to London (he left Brazil in April 1815), and was not replaced. The consul-general Henry Chamberlain was *chargé d’affaires* for the next five years until the arrival of Edward Thornton as minister in November 1819.

There were various reasons for the Portuguese government’s decision to remain in Brazil. One – reinforced by Portugal’s experience at the Congress of Vienna – was the desire to reduce the level of dependence on Great Britain. At Vienna Talleyrand, the French minister of foreign relations, had encouraged Portuguese diplomats to persuade D. João to remain in Brazil for this reason. The instructions of Richelieu, the French prime minister, to Colonel Maler, the French *charge d’affaires* leaving for Rio de Janeiro, are very revealing: the prince regent must choose between being the head of the leading power in America Meridional for some time to come or the head of one of the third class powers of Europe. In Vienna, Talleyrand apparently also suggested to the conde de Palmela, Portuguese ambassador to Britain, the advantages of raising Brazil to the status of a kingdom equal with Portugal. Under a monarchy Brazil could

5 At Vienna on 8 February 1815, in a significant declaration in the history of international law and human rights, the slave trade was denounced by a committee of all eight signatories to the Treaty of Paris, including Portugal, as ‘repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality’. On the question of the abolition of the slave trade at Vienna, see Brian E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 195–212.

6 Strangford to Castlereagh, 20 February 1814, quoted in Wilken, *Empire Adrift*, p. 142.

avoid the revolutions for independence and fragmentation afflicting Spanish America and at the same time become an obstacle to the spread of republicanism on the American continent.⁷

In any event, on 16 December 1815, in recognition of the new reality since 1808, the change in the relative importance of Portugal and Brazil, and the inevitable consequence of his decision to remain in Brazil after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, D. João declared Brazil and Portugal equal parts of a *Reino Unido* [United Kingdom]. Three months later, in March 1816, on the death of his mother, Queen Maria, the prince regent became D. João VI, the first (and, as it would transpire, the last) king of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves.

The future residence of the Portuguese court was, however, still not defined. The American option presented considerable difficulties for D. João in Portugal where the economic crisis deepened and resentment at the continued absence of the Court in Brazil and the continued presence of Britain in Portugal grew. Beresford (now Lord Beresford) returned from a visit to Rio de Janeiro (September 1815–July 1816) with his powers greatly enhanced, a virtual dictator of Portugal. He guaranteed order in Portugal and resistance to any possible aggression from Spain, especially after the Portuguese invasion of the Banda Oriental of the Río de la Plata and occupation of Montevideo in January 1817. However, in August 1817 Beresford wrote to the conde de Barca: 'If you wish the Crown to remain with the Braganças, D. João must return to Portugal ... at present there is no government here.'⁸ At the beginning of 1820 Beresford again travelled to Brazil, this time to insist on the return of D. João to Lisbon. But, like his brother in 1814, he failed in his mission. Beresford returned to Portugal and arrived in October 1820 to find himself in the middle of a revolution.

The Liberal revolution in Portugal in 1820, the return of D. João to Lisbon in 1821 (leaving behind his 24-year-old son D. Pedro as prince regent), the attempt by the Portuguese Cortes in 1821–2 to put the clock back to 1808 and 'recolonise' Brazil, Brazil's declaration of independence in September 1822 and the acclamation of D. Pedro as emperor in October, created new opportunities for Britain to re-establish its political influence and consolidate its economic pre-eminence in Brazil.

The government of the independent empire of Brazil sought international recognition, not least in order to secure access to international capital markets

7 M. de Oliveira Lima, *D. João VI no Brasil* [1908] (4th edn., Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 2006), pp. 385, 439–40; V. Alexandre, *Os Sentidos do Império. Questão Nacional e Questão Global na Crise do Antigo Regime Português* (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1993), p. 336; J.M. Pedreira and F. Dores Costa, *D. João VI. Um Príncipe entre dois Continentes* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2008), p. 302.

8 G. Paquette, *Imperial Portugal in the Age of Atlantic Revolutions: the Luso-Brazilian World, c.1770–1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 103.

for government loans. Recognition was also important, first, in order to forestall any attempt by Portugal to re-establish a *Reino Unido*, encouraged and possibly assisted by the reactionary Holy Alliance powers of Europe (Austria, Prussia and Russia), together with France, which had restored Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain; second, and ultimately more important, to maintain the unity of Brazil and to strengthen the new emperor's authority in confronting loyalist, regionalist and separatist elements in the north-east and north of Brazil.

The movement for independence in Portuguese America had drawn its strength from the provinces of the centre-south – Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas Gerais – and especially from the capital, Rio de Janeiro. The provinces of the north-east and the north, which were closer to Portugal geographically, which were not economically integrated with the centre-south and which in many respects had closer historical ties with Lisbon than with Rio de Janeiro, and where there was still a considerable Portuguese military presence, sizeable Portuguese merchant communities and a good deal of pro-Portuguese sentiment, initially chose to remain loyal to Portugal. In July 1823, however, the military loyal to D. Pedro and the navy organised by the English mercenary, Lord Cochrane, fresh from his triumphs in Chile and Peru, crushed the opposition in Bahia, Maranhão and Pará.⁹

Apart from two kingdoms on the west coast of Africa, Benin and Lagos, the United States was the first to recognise the independent empire of Brazil. However, recognition by Great Britain was evidently more important. As Felisberto Caldeira Brant Pontes, the future marquês de Barbacena, D. Pedro's representative in London, wrote in July 1823: 'With the friendship of England we can snap our fingers at the rest of the world ... It will not be necessary to go begging for recognition from any other power for all will wish our friendship'.¹⁰

Brazil was fortunate, therefore, in finding Britain, and in particular George Canning, who had become Foreign Secretary again a month after the suicide of Castlereagh in September 1822, for a variety of different reasons disposed to offer early recognition to Brazil. In the first place, the independence of Brazil was, in Canning's view, a *fait accompli*. Portugal had neither the political will nor the financial and military resources to resist Brazilian independence. And Canning was already preparing to recognise several de facto independent Spanish American republics – Mexico, the Confederation of the Río de la Plata, Colombia and Chile. He was also anxious to preserve the monarchy in Brazil as an antidote to republicanism and what he regarded as the 'evils of universal

9 See Thomas Cochrane, 10th earl of Dundonald, *Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chile, Peru and Brazil, from Spanish and Portuguese Domination* (2 vols., London, 1858–9). Also B. Vale, *Independence or Death! British sailors and Brazilian Independence 1822–25* (London, 1996) and *The Audacious Admiral Cochrane: the True Life of a Naval Legend* (London, 2004).

10 Manchester, *British Pre-eminence*, p. 193, n. 25.

democracy' on the American continent and as a vital link between the Old and New Worlds. 'The conservation of the monarchy in one part at least of the great continent of America', he wrote to Edward Thornton in Rio, 'is an object of vital importance to the Old World'.¹¹ Of more immediate importance, the Anglo-Portuguese commercial treaty of 1810 was due to expire in 1825 after 15 years. Its acceptance and renewal by the independent empire of Brazil was regarded as imperative for the protection of Britain's economic interests in the country. In the 1820s Brazil was, after the United States and Germany, the third largest market for British textiles and a whole range of manufactured consumer goods.

Finally, Brazil's need for recognition also presented Britain with a unique opportunity to make significant progress on the slave trade question. In normal circumstances, given the importance of slavery to the Brazilian economy and the dependence of the slave system on the continued importation of slaves from Africa, it might have been thought impossible to persuade a newly independent Brazil to abolish the transatlantic slave trade. But Canning was quick to realise that Brazil's anxiety for British recognition 'put [her] at our mercy as to the continuation of the trade'. Brazil, he told the British abolitionist leader William Wilberforce, would have to be 'purged of its impurity before we take it into our embraces'.¹² There would be no recognition without abolition.

Britain, however, also had economic and strategic interests in Portugal and treaty obligations to maintain the integrity of the Portuguese empire. It was preferable, therefore, that Portugal should first recognise the independence of Brazil – though this was not essential. In the negotiations between Portugal and Brazil held in London and mediated by Great Britain (and Austria) during July 1824 to February 1825, Canning made it clear that he was not prepared to wait indefinitely for Portuguese recognition of Brazilian independence. Any undue delay would endanger Brazil's fragile political institutions as well as its precarious political and territorial unity.¹³ It would also threaten Britain's political influence and commercial interests in Brazil and, above all, any chance of persuading Brazil to put an end to the slave trade. The conde de Subserra, one of Portugal's representatives in the London negotiations, had no doubt that it was British policy to 'cut all ties between Portugal and Brazil, converting the latter into a country completely dependent on Great Britain'

11 Canning to Thornton 23 Dec. 1823, quoted in Paquette, *Imperial Portugal*, p. 212.

12 Cited in Bethell, *Abolition*, p. 31.

13 In March 1824 an armed revolt in Pernambuco led to the establishment of an independent republic, the Confederation of the Equator. It was supported by Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba and Ceará, and attracted sympathy throughout the north-east. Like an earlier attempt to establish a republic in Pernambuco (in 1817), it was, however, short-lived: it was put down by imperial troops after six months.

and Canning 'appears already to have come to an agreement in this sense with the Brazilians'.¹⁴

Canning finally lost patience and decided that the time had come for Britain to act alone. He entrusted Sir Charles Stuart, British ambassador to Paris since 1815, with 'a special mission of the greatest delicacy and importance'. He was to go to Lisbon, and make a final effort to convince the Portuguese to accept the independence of Brazil. However, *whether or not he succeeded*, he was to continue to Rio de Janeiro, where he would enter into negotiations directly with the Brazilians for a commercial treaty which would include the abolition of the Brazilian slave trade. The signing of such a treaty would evidently constitute British recognition of the independent Brazilian empire.

After tough negotiations in Lisbon Stuart finally persuaded D. João to accept the inevitability of Brazilian independence. He was granted permission to negotiate with the Brazilian government in the name of Portugal as well as Britain. On 29 August 1825 in Rio de Janeiro, after no less than 13 meetings with the Brazilian negotiating team, a treaty was signed by which D. João recognised his son D. Pedro as emperor of an independent Brazil. In return, Brazil agreed to pay Portugal compensation amounting to two million pounds sterling. The treaty was ratified by D. Pedro on 30 August and celebrations took place on 7 September, the third anniversary of Brazil's declaration of independence from Portugal.

Now Brazil also had to pay a price to Britain for services rendered in securing international recognition of its independence – and for future British friendship and support. In October Brazil signed a treaty extending the 1810 commercial treaty and a treaty for the abolition of the slave trade. But Canning felt that Stuart, too eager to complete what he called 'the most infernal mission I ever filled' and anxious to leave Rio de Janeiro, 'this detestable place',¹⁵ had gone beyond his instructions and made too many concessions to the Brazilians. 'This comes of a man thinking himself cleverer than the rest of mankind and believing himself to be protected by the King against the responsible Minister under whom he is acting', Canning commented.¹⁶ He rejected the treaties and recalled Stuart. Although a year had been lost, the empire had become more secure and the situation therefore less favourable, Stuart's successor, Robert Gordon ('that ill-educated and stubborn Scot' as D. Pedro called him) successfully negotiated two treaties with Brazil acceptable to Canning. Under the first, signed on 23 November 1826, the importation of slaves into Brazil

14 11 Oct. 1824, *parecer* to the Council of State, cited in Paquette, *Imperial Portugal*, p. 212, n. 203.

15 Stuart to J. Planta, Under-Secretary of State, 19 Aug., 5 Sept. 1825, Canning papers, archive 109, Leeds District Archive. 'Whatever misfortune occurs to you through life', Stuart advised a friend, 'never go to the Brazils'. Quoted in Paquette, *Imperial Portugal*, p. 227.

16 H. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–27: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance and the New World* (London, 1925), pp. 508–9.

would become entirely illegal three years after its ratification. The Royal Navy's 'right of search' was extended to all Brazilian ships suspected of carrying slaves, north or south of the equator. Any ships detained would be sent for trial before the existing mixed commission courts in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Rio de Janeiro, which became Anglo-Brazilian courts. The treaty was ratified on 13 March 1827. The second treaty, signed in August 1827 and ratified three months later, maintained the maximum 15 per cent tariff on British goods imported into Brazil as well as the right to appoint special magistrates to deal with cases involving British subjects resident in Brazil and all the rights of British merchants under the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1810.¹⁷

Thus was concluded the process begun in 1810 by which Britain successfully transferred its privileged economic position in Portugal to Brazil, and at the same time secured the abolition (or at least the illegality) of the slave trade from Africa to Brazil. The foundations were laid for Britain's economic and political domination in Brazil throughout the long 19th century. In the judgement of the US minister in Rio, Condy Raguet, in November 1825, 'Brazil in continuation of Portugal has completely thrown herself into the arms of England and, to a certain extent, has transformed her colonial allegiance from one country to another'.¹⁸

There was anger and indignation in Brazil at the price paid to Great Britain for facilitating the recognition of its independence. Robert Gordon recognised that the Anglo-Brazilian treaties on trade and the abolition of the slave trade had been 'ceded at our request in opposition to the views and wishes of the whole Empire'.¹⁹ The treaties were widely regarded as being an excessive (and possibly unnecessary) sacrifice of national interests (or at least the interests of the land-owning and slave-owning dominant class) and national sovereignty at the insistence of a powerful, imperial Britain, pursuing its own economic, political and ideological interests when the newly independent Brazilian empire was at its most vulnerable. Brazilian historians have in general agreed with contemporary opinion.²⁰

17 Canning, who became prime minister in May 1827, did not witness this. After only 119 days in office, he died on 8 August 1827.

18 Quoted in J. Smith, *Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence* (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 2010), p. 198, n. 10. Manoel Rodrigues Gameira Pessoa, the Brazilian agent in Paris who became Brazil's first minister in London, had warned D. Pedro against 'putting Brazil under the influence [of Britain], as it would be difficult to extricate itself later, as the example of Portugal demonstrates ... Brazil should be the friend of Britain, but not its pupil'. Quoted in Paquette, *Imperial Portugal*, p. 26.

19 Cited in Bethell, *Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade*, p. 62.

20 See, for example, J.H. Rodrigues, *Aspirações nacionais. Interpretação histórico-política* (São Paulo, 1965) ('[The Anglo-Brazilian commercial treaty of 1827] transformed us into an English protectorate', p. 84); Rubens Ricupero, 'O Brasil no mundo', in Alberto da Costa e Silva (ed.), *Crise Colonial e Independência 1808–1830*, vol. 1 *História do Brasil Nação*

II

Under the Anglo-Brazilian treaty of 1826 the entire Brazilian slave trade became illegal in March 1830. The Brazilian government immediately came under intense British pressure to fulfil its treaty obligation to introduce legislation banning the importation of slaves into Brazil, and to enforce it. A law was finally passed on 7 November 1831. It was, as is often said, simply *para inglês ver*, that is to say, never intended to be enforced. Initially, some effort was made by customs officials, police [*delegados*] and judges to apprehend and free slaves illegally imported, but after a few years the task was largely abandoned. Brazilian demand for slaves continued to expand with the growth of the coffee sector and successive Brazilian governments proved unwilling and unable to enforce the 1831 law. Britain deployed its naval power to capture illegal Brazilian slave ships on the high seas and send them for adjudication before international tribunals set up for the purpose under the treaty of 1826: the Anglo-Brazilian mixed commissions in Freetown, Sierra Leone and Rio de Janeiro. However, Britain was hindered by limited powers and limited resources. Between 1831 and 1850 more than 750,000 slaves were imported into Brazil – all of them illegally.

When in 1844 the Brazilian government decided not only to revoke the commercial treaty with Britain but also the treaty for the abolition of the slave trade, the reaction of the British government was decisive – and possibly illegal. The controversial Slave Trade Brazil Act of 1845, the famous *bill Aberdeen* (named after Lord Aberdeen, the British Foreign Secretary), declared the Brazilian slave trade piracy under a controversial interpretation of the 1826 treaty, which was fiercely contested by Brazil. The British navy could capture Brazilian ships illegally engaged in the slave trade and send them for adjudication and, if condemned, the liberation of their slaves to British vice-Admiralty courts established in St Helena in the mid Atlantic, Sierra Leone on the west African coast and the Cape of Good Hope, which had been captured from the Dutch in 1795 during the Napoleonic Wars and incorporated into the British empire as the Cape Colony in 1815.

Nevertheless, despite the Aberdeen Act, the illegal slave trade continued to flourish. Indeed, in 1848 it reached its highest level when 60,000 slaves were imported into Brazil. For the first time there were signs that British pressure might soon be eased or even withdrawn. The British minister in Rio, Lord Howden, saw little chance of any progress on the slave trade question with any Brazilian government, Conservative or Liberal, and the issue was having a damaging effect on Anglo-Brazilian relations in general. 'All parties are alike in

their hatred of us', he told Lord Palmerston, the British foreign secretary.²¹ At the same time, there were growing doubts in Britain itself about the efficacy of the antislave trade measures being adopted. Domestic opposition to Britain's self-appointed role as the world's anti-slave trade policeman was becoming more vocal, both in parliament and in the press.

Lord Palmerston, famous for views such as 'half-civilized governments ... require a dressing down every 8 or 10 years to keep them in order ... and they must not only see the stick but actually feel it upon their shoulders' [September 1850],²² desperately needed to bring the war on the Brazilian slave trade to a successful conclusion, if necessary by the use of greater force. In 1850 he strengthened the naval squadron in the South Atlantic and ordered it, under the Aberdeen Act, in blatant violation of Brazilian sovereignty, to seize suspected slave ships in Brazilian territorial waters and Brazilian ports. It was not long before shots were exchanged between British warships and Brazilian coastal fortresses, notably at Paranaguá in July.

The Brazilian Foreign Minister, Paulino Soares de Sousa, the future Visconde de Uruguaí, argued that it was no longer possible for Brazil to resist 'the ideas of the age in which we live'. The alternative to acquiescence in Britain's demand that it should finally take the necessary steps to bring the illegal slave trade to an end was at best an endless series of violent conflicts with the British navy which would severely disrupt Brazil's coastal trade, at worst total economic blockade and even war with Britain (at a time when Brazil was preparing to go to war with Rosas over Uruguay). The Brazilian empire was faced, it seemed, with a major threat to its sovereignty, its hard won unity and stability and its economic prosperity.

As it happened, probably for the first time since independence, British pressure was brought to bear on a government which, as a result of political change, administrative centralisation and economic growth in the 1840s, had the legitimacy and the resources to ignore the interests of the slave owners and take action against the slave trade. This was made somewhat easier by the fact that there was a temporary glut on the slave market. A new anti-slave trade law was enacted on 4 September 1850 and effectively enforced by provincial presidents, chiefs of police and local magistrates. Thus, the trade in slaves from Africa to Brazil, which had been pursued entirely legally for three hundred years and illegally, despite all Britain's efforts, for the previous 20 years, came to a sudden, dramatic and permanent end. Only 3,278 slaves were imported

21 Quoted in D. McLean, *War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics of La Plata, 1836–1853* (London: British Academic Press, 1995), p. 178.

22 Cited in R. Hyam, *Britain's Imperial Century, 1815–1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion* (London, 1983), p. 119.

into Brazil in 1851, fewer than 1,000 in 1852. The last known attempt to land slaves in Brazil occurred in 1855.²³

After 1850–1 the Aberdeen Act remained in force as an insurance against the revival of the slave trade, ‘to be used’, as Palmerston declared in 1858, ‘in case the Brazilians should revert to their bad courses. So long as you have the act in reserve, so long will the government of Brazil pursue the policy which you compelled them to adopt’.²⁴ (It was not repealed until 1869.) Throughout the 1850s and early 1860s British diplomats regularly complained – and with more than a hint that it might be necessary for Britain to take further action – about the condition of the so-called *emancipados*, the 4–5,000 slaves liberated by the Anglo-Portuguese and Anglo-Brazilian courts of mixed commission in Rio de Janeiro between 1819 and 1845 who were still alive.²⁵ ‘It was always with a threat on its lips that the English government spoke to Brazil’, Sérgio Teixeira de Macedo, the Brazilian minister to London, complained to Lord Clarendon, the British Foreign Secretary, in 1854.²⁶ British diplomats also regularly enquired about the fate of the *Africanos livres*, those 3–4,000 illegally imported slaves who had been liberated by the Brazilian authorities under the law of 1831 and more especially under the law of 1850. While nominally under the protection of the Brazilian government these freed slaves – both *emancipados* and *Africanos livres* (frequently lumped together as *Africanos livres*) were employed in public works or hired out to private individuals (legally for a maximum of 14 years – a term frequently and unilaterally extended) to prepare them for repatriation to Africa or a future of ‘free labour’ in Brazil. It was a well-known fact that most ended up in conditions close to slavery.²⁷ There is little doubt that British pressure, culminating in a speech on the subject of liberated Africans in Brazil by Lord Palmerston, now prime minister, in the House of Lords on 12 July 1864, in the aftermath of the so-called ‘Christie affair’ (see below), speeded up the concession of letters of emancipation to some 5,000 remaining *Africanos livres* by the Brazilian Ministry of Justice under a decree of 24 September.²⁸

23 For a fuller account of British efforts to end the Brazilian slave trade, see Bethell, *Abolition*. On the revisionist literature since 1970, J.D. Needell, ‘The abolition of the Brazilian slave trade in 1850: historiography, slave agency and statesmanship’, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 33 (2001). See also Beatriz Gallotti Mamigonian, *Africanos livres. A abolição do tráfico de escravos no Brasil* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2017), ch. 6 & 7.

24 Quoted in Bethell, *Abolition*, p. 379.

25 On the *emancipados*, see R. Conrad, ‘Neither slave nor free; the *emancipados* of Brazil, 1818–1868’, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 53 (1973), pp. 50–70.

26 Quoted in Manchester, *British Pre-Eminence*, p. 288.

27 Mamigonian, *Africanos livres*, *passim*.

28 Mamigonian, *Africanos livres*, pp. 374–6.

More than this, it was the British government's view that under the treaty of 1826 and the subsequent Brazilian legislation of 1831 all slaves in Brazil who had been imported after 1830 – and their children and grandchildren – were legally free.²⁹ In 1850, as the need for stronger British action against the Brazilian slave trade was debated in the House of Commons, the future Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone had declared that Britain had 'a perfect right to go to Brazil and call upon her to emancipate every slave imported since 1830 and, upon refusal, to make war with them (*sic*) even to extermination' (although he went on to express the hope that this right would not be exercised).³⁰ Within two years of the effective end of the trade Sérgio Teixeira de Macedo was pressed on the issue of the hundreds of thousands of slaves – more than three quarters of a million – imported into Brazil since 1830. He replied that to give way on this would be equivalent to emancipating the vast majority of slaves of working age and by seriously disrupting the slave system could not fail to 'produce general revolution and annihilate the Brazilian Empire'. He therefore stated categorically that 'in slavery they must remain [na escravidão hão de ficar]'.³¹ However, politicians in London and diplomats in Rio kept the issue alive throughout the 1850s and 1860s until the issue was resolved in favour of the owners of illegally import slaves and their descendants, temporarily at least, by the creation of a national register of all existing slaves in 1872 (see Essay 4).

The British government was not directly involved in the final abolition of slavery in Brazil, but British public opinion, if not decisive, was certainly influential. Joaquim Nabuco, who had taken up the cause of abolition in parliament in 1879 and with the other Brazilian abolitionists had founded the Sociedade Brasileira contra Escravidão in September 1880, believed from the beginning that to be successful the struggle for abolition in Brazil would require worldwide support. He used three visits to London (February – May 1881, December 1881 – April 1884, April – August 1887) to raise international awareness of the continued existence of slavery in Brazil and

29 This had been a preoccupation of the Brazilian authorities and slave-owners since it became clear in the mid 1830s that the 1831 law could not be enforced and the (illegal) trade was out of control. Twice – in June 1837 and September 1848 – the Brazilian parliament (in secret session) had considered the possibility of revoking the 1831 law – retroactively, thus offering impunity to those who held slave imported since 1831. In the end, successive Brazilian governments had preferred simply to continue ignoring the existence of the 1831 law. On Brazilian attitudes and policy towards the slaves illegally imported into Brazil after 1831, see S. Chalhoub, *A força da escravidão. Ilegal idade e costume no Brasil oitocentista* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012), ch. 4, 5 & 7 and B. Gallotti Mamigonian, 'O Direito de Ser Africano Livre. Os escravos e as interpretações da lei de 1831', in S. Hunold Lara and J.M. Nunes Mendonça (eds.), *Direitos e Justiça no Brasil. Ensaios de História Social* (Campinas: Editora Unicamp, 2006).

30 Quoted in Bethell, *Abolition*, p. 381

31 Quoted in Bethell, *Abolition*, p. 382.

mobilise international opinion in favour of its abolition, furnishing information in particular to his friend Charles Allen, the secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. Allen in turn made sure that Brazilian slavery was given maximum coverage in the British press, especially in the London *Times* (for Nabuco *'a voz da civilização'* [the voice of civilisation]) which had considerable influence in Brazil. The Brazilian slave-owners and their representatives in parliament, however, successfully resisted abolitionist pressure, both domestic and international, until May 1888 (see Essay 4.)

III

The Anglo-Brazilian commercial treaty of 1827 was always unpopular in Brazil. The 15 per cent maximum tariff on imported British goods – extended under most-favoured-nation agreements to other European countries and the United States – severely restricted the income of the Brazilian government, primarily derived from customs' revenue. Britain offered no reciprocity: Brazil's principal agricultural exports faced stiff competition in the British market from British colonial imports which benefited from preferential duties. The balance of trade was, therefore, overwhelmingly in Britain's favour and the extraterritorial rights British subjects had in Brazil were thought incompatible with Brazil's sovereignty as an independent nation.

When the British diplomat Henry Ellis arrived in Rio de Janeiro in November 1842 to negotiate the renewal of the treaty, which was due to expire after 15 years, he found both the press and public opinion 'absurdly violent and impertinent' in their opposition to 'enslaving Brazil with treaties'.³² Britain invoked the two-year extension permitted under the treaty to allow further time for negotiation. But in 1844 Brazil revoked the commercial treaty with Britain, recovering its fiscal autonomy (duties on imports were immediately raised to between 25 and 30 per cent, and by the 1880s had reached almost 50 per cent) as well as its national sovereignty (the special British courts, the symbol of Britain's extra-territorial rights in Brazil, were finally abolished). Ultimately the British government accepted Brazil's decision to terminate the 1827 treaty with a certain equanimity because it was no longer necessary (if it had ever been necessary) for continued British predominance in Brazil's international trade.

The proportion of total British exports worldwide absorbed by Brazil had declined from 15 per cent in the 1820s to less than ten per cent by the early 1840s, but in the middle decades of the 19th century Great Britain supplied around 50 per cent of Brazilian imports (48.4 per cent in 1842–3, 53.3 per cent in 1852–3, 51.5 per cent in 1872–3).³³ British 'commercial houses' in Brazil

32 Quoted in Bethell, *Abolition*, p. 232.

33 M. de Paiva Abreu and L.A. Correa do Lago, 'A economia brasileira no Império, 1822–1889', in M. de Paiva Abreu (ed.), *A Ordem do Progresso. Dois séculos de política econômica*

imported and distributed British goods, 75 per cent of which were textiles (cottons, woollens, linens, etc.) but which also included a wide range of other manufactured consumer goods from ironware, cutlery, porcelain and glass to furniture, pianos and clothing, some foodstuffs, medicines and raw materials, especially coal. Later in the century capital goods, including industrial and agricultural machinery and above all equipment for the railways, were more important. However, the British share of the Brazilian market declined in the late empire and early republic; it was only 31.4 per cent in 1900, and 25–30 per cent in the period immediately before the First World War.

Three agricultural products, all based on slave labour, accounted for between 70 and 80 per cent of Brazil's exports during the empire. All three experienced substantial growth as a result of growing world demand, but their relative importance in Brazil's international trade changed over time. In the middle decades of the century sugar accounted for 20–30 per cent of exports, but by the 1880s, facing strong Caribbean, especially Cuban, competition in world markets, and the growth of beet production in Europe, it had declined to less than ten per cent. Cotton accounted for between five and 10 per cent of Brazil's exports in the mid 19th century, but as much as 20 per cent during the American Civil War when US production suffered a collapse, only to fall to less than five per cent at the end of the empire as a result of the renewal of exports from the United States and the emergence of a new competitor, Egypt. Coffee rose steadily from 20–30 per cent of Brazilian exports in the 1820s and 1830s, to 50 per cent in the 1850s, and between 60 and 70 per cent in the final two decades of the empire when it had become by far the most important factor responsible for Brazil's increasing integration in the international economy. Brazil was by this time supplying 60–70 per cent of the world's coffee. Brazil also exported tobacco, cacao, hides and various woods. At the end of the empire rubber, tapped by *seringueiros* [rubber tappers] in the Amazonian rainforest, was also beginning to be a significant Brazilian export. In response to growing world demand, exports of rubber increased from fewer than 1,500 tons in 1850 to 7,000 tons in 1880 and 17,000 tons in 1887 when it accounted for almost 15 per cent of Brazil's exports. In the boom years immediately before the First World War and the crash that was to follow the war – a crash that originated in the legendary 'botanical theft' of 70,000 rubber seeds from the Amazon rainforest by the British adventurer Henry Wickham in 1876, their unauthorised exportation to Liverpool and thence to Kew Gardens, and the

no Brasil (2nd edn., Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2014), p. 17 Table 1.1. France had the second largest share of the Brazilian market, 12–15% (cotton, linen, woollen and silk textiles, wine, a variety of luxury goods, including shoes, hats and perfume, and some chemical and pharmaceutical products), then Portugal (olive oil and wine) 8%, Germany 5–7% and the United States 6%.

subsequent transfer of 2,000 seeds to plantations in South Asia – rubber made up 40 per cent of Brazilian exports.

As well as Brazilian imports, British commercial houses handled the bulk of Brazil's exports. For example, Edward Johnston & Co., founded in 1842 (later Brazilian Warrant, c.1910), and Phipp Brothers & Co were prominent houses exporting coffee, the empire's major export.³⁴ Three of the five houses responsible for 80 per cent of Brazil's rubber exports at the end of the empire were also British. And British shipping companies were primarily responsible for carrying Brazil's exports to foreign markets. Britain itself, however, only imported around 25–35 per cent of Brazil's exports during the empire (27.9 per cent in 1842–3, 35.5 per cent in 1852–3, 36.9 per cent in 1872–3), and less than 15 per cent by the beginning of the 20th century.³⁵ The British simply did not drink enough coffee. Brazilian coffee was exported in British ships mainly to markets in the United States but also to Europe, particularly France, Germany, Holland and Scandinavia.

The City of London provided all the loans to the Brazilian government and most of the foreign capital invested in Brazil. Loans were made to Brazil of £1.7 million in August 1824 and £2 million in January 1825, and several more of between half a million and one million during the following three decades. In 1855 N. M. Rothschild and Sons became the exclusive agents of the Brazilian government (until 1908), responsible for all the loans raised in London. Two loans totalling £3.8 million in 1863 and one of £7 million in September 1865 'to meet the extraordinary expenses of the Empire' were raised on the eve of the Paraguayan War. Further loans of between £3.5 million and £6.5 million were provided in 1871, 1875, 1883, 1886 and 1888. At the end of the empire 98 per cent of the Brazilian public debt (£33.6 million) had originated in loans raised in London.³⁶ After the establishment of the Republic the Rothschilds brokered a funding loan to the federal government of £10 million in 1898, described by Marcelo de Paiva Abreu as 'a watershed in the financial and monetary history of Brazil: it involved a renegotiation of the foreign debt ... and conditionalities which entailed a domestic adjustment programme that was designed to balance the budget and stabilize the exchange rate'.³⁷ Various substantial loans were made to state and municipal governments in the first

34 On Johnstons, see R. Greenhill, 'E. Johnston: 150 anos em café', in M. Martins and E. Johnston Exportadores Ltd, *150 Anos de Café* (2nd rev. edn., 1992).

35 Abreu and Correa do Lago, in Abreu (ed.), p. 17, Table 1.1; M. de Paiva Abreu, 'British business in Brazil: maturity and demise (1850–1950)', *Revista Brasileira de Economia*, 54 (2000), pp. 389–90.

36 Abreu and Correa do Lago, in Abreu (ed.), *A Ordem do Progresso. Dois séculos de política económica no Brasil*, p. 26.

37 Abreu, 'British business in Brazil', p. 393.

decade of the 20th century and the Brazilian federal government secured a further funding loan of £15 million in London in 1914.

British direct investment in Brazil was modest before the 1860s when the first British commercial banks were established in Rio de Janeiro and the first joint stock enterprises began investing in early railway development and public utilities. Until then, since the mobility of domestic capital was not yet highly institutionalised, British commercial houses provided valuable financial services not only to the British communities in Brazil but also to local Brazilian clients in commerce and agriculture, and invested, modestly, in land, mining and food processing. Between 1865 and 1885, however, direct British investment in Brazil more than tripled from £7.3 million to £24.4 million, and reached £40.6 million in 1895. Until 1895 virtually all foreign investment in Brazil was British. Direct investment by Britain more than tripled again between 1895 and 1913 when it stood at £134.2 million. But by 1905 British investment was only 75 per cent of total foreign investment, and in 1913 it had dropped to 65 per cent.³⁸

Almost 80 per cent of British capital was directed towards the development of Brazil's railway network and urban public utilities in Brazil's major cities. The first British railway (though not the first railway in Brazil) was the Recife & São Francisco Railway (1858), followed by the Bahia & São Francisco Railway, the Minas & Rio Railway and, above all, the São Paulo Railway Company. *A Inglesa* as it was known, which began operations in 1867, was one of the great engineering feats of the Victorian era: only 139 kilometres long but rising 3,000 feet from Santos on the coast via the city of São Paulo, where the Estação da Luz, the third station built on the same site, became (and still is) one of the landmark buildings in the city, to Jundiaí on the edge of the expanding coffee frontier. In the 1880s British investors acquired, British engineers constructed or developed (with imported British track and rolling stock) and British managers and workers operated the Brazil Great Southern Railway, the Great Western of Brazil Railway Co., a network of 1,700 kilometres in Pernambuco and three other states in the north-east, and the Leopoldina Railway Co. (Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo), the largest of Brazil's networks. The British owned three railways in 1865, 11 in 1880, 14 in 1885 and 25 in 1889.³⁹

38 Abreu and Lago, in Abreu (ed.), *A Ordem do Progresso*, p. 17, Table 1.1; Abreu, 'British business in Brazil', p. 385, Table 1, p. 386.

39 There is a substantial literature on railways in Brazil. See R. Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernisation in Brazil 1850–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), ch. 2; C.M. Lewis, 'Public policy and private initiative railway building in São Paulo, 1860–89', University of London Institute of Latin American Studies Research Paper 26 (1991); William R. Summerhill, *Order against Progress: Government, Foreign Investment, and Railroads in Brazil, 1854–1913* (Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press, 2003); W.

The British also invested in urban tramways, water and sewage, gas, later electric energy and telephones in Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, São Paulo, Porto Alegre, Fortaleza, Belém and other cities; in the modernisation of the ports of Rio de Janeiro and Santos; in telegraph lines from Pará in the north to Rio Grande do Sul in the south (Western and Brazilian Telegraph Co.) and transatlantic telegraph lines from Brazil to Europe and the United States (Brazil Submarine Telegraph Co.); in coffee plantations, coffee warehouses and a commodity exchange; in gold mining (the St John d'el Rey Mining Company, Morro Velho)⁴⁰; in textile factories (J. & P. Coats), shoe factories (Clark Shoe Co.), breweries, flour mills (the Rio de Janeiro Flour Mills and Granaries) and sugar *centrales* in Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco; in shipping lines providing regular service along the Brazilian coast and across the Atlantic (the Royal Mail Steam Packet, Lamport and Holt, the Anglo-Brazilian Steam Navigation Co., Booth Steamship Co.); in insurance companies (Marine Insurance, the Royal Insurance of Liverpool, the Liverpool and London Globe, Guardian Assurance); and not least in commercial banks (the London & Brazilian Bank, the first, was founded in 1862; the English Bank of Rio de Janeiro; the London and River Plate Bank). By the end of the empire the London & Brazilian was the biggest foreign bank with branches throughout Brazil from Manaus and Belém to Curitiba and Porto Alegre.⁴¹ In 1913 more than half the insurance companies operating in Brazil were British, and British banks held a third of total bank assets, domestic and foreign, in Brazil.

IV

Was Brazil part of Britain's 'informal empire' in Latin America? The idea that in any discussion of the British empire and British imperialism in the 19th century it is important to make a distinction between formal empire – in which a particular territory and population came under the political-administrative and even the legal-constitutional control of the imperial state – and other forms of political subordination resulting from the expansion of the global capitalist economy dominated by Great Britain – has a long history. Lenin in 1916, for example, described Persia, Egypt and China as 'semi-colonial countries'. The expression 'informal empire' was apparently invented by C.R. Fay in his *Imperial Economy and its Place in the Foundations of Economic Doctrine, 1600–1932* (Oxford, 1934) and repeated in his chapter 'The movement towards free trade,

Edmundson, *The Great Western of Brazil Railway* (Chippingham: Mainline & Maritime, 2016).

40 See M.C. Eakin, *British Enterprise in Brazil: the St John d'El Rey Mining Company and the Morro Velho Gold Mine, 1830–1960* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).

41 See D. Joslin, *A Century of Banking in Latin America* (London, 1963); G. Jones, *British Multinational Banking, 1830–1990* (Oxford, 1993).

1820–53' in the *Cambridge History of British Empire*, volume II: *The Growth of the New Empire 1783–1870* (1940). It was used, principally in relation to Africa, in a pioneering and extremely influential article by J. Gallagher and R.E. Robinson, 'The imperialism of free trade' in the journal *Economic History Review* (1953) and in their book *Africa and the Victorians: the Official Mind of Imperialism* (1961). It was used for the first time in relation to Latin America in the 19th century in an article by H.S. (Harry) Ferns, 'Britain's informal empire in Argentina, 1806–1914' in the journal *Past and Present* (1953) and in his book *Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century* (1960).⁴² As it refers to Latin America, the concept has had a long and interesting life, but it was always the target of criticism from those who believed it to be analytically imprecise and vulnerable to specialised empirical research.⁴³

After the British invasion of the Río de la Plata in 1806–7, an attempt to liberate as much as to conquer Spanish America, at least in its inception totally unauthorised, which lasted only a year and a half and ended with the expulsion of the British forces, Great Britain never showed itself willing to assume the political and military burdens of empire in South or Central America. Britain had only two 'Crown colonies' in South America in the 19th century – British Guiana (partly contested by Venezuela and Brazil) and the Falklands Islands/ Islas Malvinas (contested by Argentina) – and one in Central America: British Honduras/Belize. South America was the only area of the world to remain largely free of empire in the 19th century, the British empire or the empire of any other European power. However, the argument is that the independent Spanish American republics in South America, especially Argentina, and the independent empire of Brazil were part of Britain's informal empire.

For more than a century – from the Napoleonic wars and, more especially, from the dramatic events of 1807–8 in the Iberian Peninsula which eventually led to the breakup of the American empires of Spain and Portugal, to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 (and to a lesser degree until the 1929 Depression and even the Second World War) – Britain was the dominant external actor in the economic and, to a lesser extent, political affairs of Latin America, especially South America. This is not difficult to explain. Firstly, Britain had

42 See also a later article by H.S. Ferns: 'Argentina: part of an informal empire?', in A. Hennessy and J. King (eds.), *The Land that England Lost. Argentina and Britain: A Special Relationship* (London, 1992). Also, A.S. Thompson, 'Informal empire? An exploration in the history of Anglo-Argentine relations, 1810–1914', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 24 (1992); A.G. Hopkins, 'Informal empire in Argentina: an alternative view', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 26 (1994).

43 The British historian D.C.M (Christopher) Platt, in various articles and books on Latin America, and especially Argentina, published in the 1960s and 1970s, was particularly determined to undermine and discredit the concept of informal empire. For an overview of the historiography, see R.M. Miller, 'Informal empire in Latin America', in R. Louis (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. V: *Historiography* (Oxford, 2001).

been 'present at the creation'; the foundations of Britain's political, commercial and financial preeminence were firmly laid at the time of the formation of the independent Latin American states during the second and third decades of the 19th century. Secondly, from 1815 until 1860 or 1870 Britain exercised an unchallenged global hegemony and, until 1914, a somewhat less secure global supremacy. The Royal Navy ruled the waves. Thirdly, and most importantly, Britain, the 'first industrial nation', the 'workshop of the world', supplied most of the manufactured and capital goods imported into Latin America, and the City of London, the world's major source of capital, supplied most of the loans granted to the new Latin American governments and most of the capital invested in Latin American infrastructure (above all, railways and public utilities), agriculture and mining. Moreover, Britain had more than half the world's merchant shipping and British ships carried the bulk of the produce exported from Latin America to markets throughout the world. Finally, Britain itself was a major market for Latin American food and raw materials.

To justify the use of the concept 'informal empire', however, British predominance in trade and finance, it could be argued, is necessary but not sufficient. What is also required is the exercise of *political* influence, combined perhaps with the threat of coercion, in order to persuade a formally independent state to adopt policies in the interest of the imperial power – thus restricting its own national sovereignty.

There are many examples in 19th-century Latin America of political armtwisting behind the scenes by British diplomats inclined to act in a high-handed 'imperialistic' manner (not least because they were effectively three to six months away from the Foreign Office). On a few occasions, notably the Anglo-French blockade of the Río de la Plata in the mid 1840s and the Anglo-German-Italian blockade of Venezuela in 1902–3 – Britain (with other powers) resorted to demonstrations of naval force (gunboat diplomacy) for the protection of the lives, liberties and properties of British subjects, for the promotion of trade or the collection of debts. On the whole, however, considering the extent of Britain's economic superiority – and Britain's overwhelming naval supremacy – British governments more often than not exercised a considerable degree of restraint and were generally extremely reluctant to engage in direct interference, much less intervention, in the internal affairs of the Latin American sovereign states.

In the historiography on Britain's informal empire in Latin America Argentina not only received, as we have seen, but continues to receive, the most attention. The four principal chapters – by Alan Knight, David Rock, Colin M. Lewis and Charles Jones – in the most recent study of British informal empire in Latin America, Matthew Brown (ed.), *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital* (Oxford, 2008), are all on Argentina. But

what of Brazil? The 19th century was for Brazil 'o século inglês' [the English century]. British domination of Brazil's trade was largely unchallenged in the period from independence to c.1870/80 (see above). Britain remained Brazil's main trading partner until the First World War, supplying manufactured and capital goods and carrying the bulk of Brazilian exports to markets throughout the world. But Britain's share of the Brazilian market, never more than 55 per cent, declined steadily after 1870/80, as we have seen. This was in large part a consequence of Britain's overall relative decline. As other European nations, especially Germany, and the United States industrialised Britain's share of manufacturing output and world trade inevitably fell. British industry also failed to remain competitive; it was no longer at the forefront of technological change. Britain simply could not compete with Germany, whose share of the Brazilian market reached almost 20 per cent in 1913, or the United States in producing and selling the goods for which Brazilian demand was rising most rapidly: modern electrical goods, chemicals, proprietary drugs and automobiles. In 1901 German and US exports to Brazil combined were two-thirds the value of British exports; by 1912 British exports were three-quarters the value of the combined German and US exports.⁴⁴ At the same time, the growth of manufacturing industry in Brazil had reached a point where many of the goods (especially textiles) which had dominated Britain's export trade for more than a century were increasingly produced domestically.

Britain, did, however, remain by far the most important source of loans to government, federal, state and municipal, and direct investment in Brazil up to the First World War, although there was by this time some very modest French and German as well as US direct investment. One consequence of this, for example in the case of the funding loan of 1898, as we have seen, was the insistence by Britain on behalf of British creditors that Brazilian governments pursue orthodox monetary and fiscal policies, that is to say, balancing the budget and maintaining a stable currency. Latin American historians, sociologists and economists of the 'dependency school' in the 1970s and 1980s argued that Brazil's 'dependence' on British finance, and in particular the 'conditionalities' attached to British loans, reinforced the structural obstacles to the independent economic development of Brazil, principally the accumulation of capital for industrialisation. In so far as this is true, and the argument remains highly controversial, it was only one of several factors which explain the underdevelopment of Brazil in the 19th century (compared, for example, with the United States). And it should be remembered that after the difficult relationship with Britain during the period of independence the political and economic elites of the empire and early republic Brazil ('collaborating elites' if you will) welcomed British economic

44 Abreu, 'British business in Brazil', p. 396.

'penetration' and pursued with considerable enthusiasm the model of capitalist modernisation through external borrowing, direct foreign investment, growth based on agricultural and mineral exports, and integration into world markets.

As for political influence, coercion or the threat of coercion to oblige the Brazilian government to adopt domestic and external policies against its own interests, the commercial treaty and the treaty for the abolition of the slave trade imposed on Brazil in return for recognition of its independence and certainly the 20-year-long campaign for the abolition of the illegal Brazilian slave trade could be seen in this light. Intense British diplomatic pressure on Brazilian governments to oblige Brazil to fulfil its treaty obligations, the use of force by the Royal Navy on the high seas for the suppression of the trade, and finally the deployment of British warships against slave ships in Brazilian territorial waters in 1850, which finally forced the Brazilian government to take the necessary steps to end the trade, constitute a prime example of Britain acting as an imperial power in its relations with the independent empire of Brazil, albeit for a predominantly humanitarian cause.⁴⁵

In December 1862 William D. Christie, a particularly arrogant and overbearing British minister, who had already irritated the Brazilian government by consistently championing the cause of the *emancipados*, *Africanos livres* and slaves illegally imported since 1831, authorised a naval blockade of Rio de Janeiro as a reprisal for the failure to pay compensation for the plundering of a British vessel *The Prince of Wales* after it sank off the coast of Rio Grande do Sul in June 1861 and the alleged mistreatment of three British naval officers of HMS *Forte* accused of misconduct on the streets of Rio in June 1862. It lasted only six days and only five Brazilian merchant vessels were seized. But the Brazilian government regarded it as unacceptable 'aggression', and in May 1863 broke off diplomatic relations with Britain. Christie, criticised by the British community in Rio, by commercial interests in Manchester and London and by the opposition in parliament, was withdrawn. After arbitration (in Brazil's favour) by Leopold II, king of Belgium and mediation by the king of Portugal, diplomatic relations were restored in September 1865 when Edward Thornton, the British minister in Buenos Aires, conveyed the apologies of Queen Victoria to D. Pedro II at Uruguaiana, where the Emperor was visiting Brazilian troops

45 Joaquim Nabuco, future leader of the movement for the abolition of slavery in Brazil, wrote in a student text *A escravidão* (1870): 'the enforcement of the *bill Aberdeen* [1845] was an outrage, an insult to our dignity as an independent people'. Britain's refusal to repeal it (until April 1869) had obliged Brazil to live for 25 years under the tutelage of England'. However, he continued, 'the shame is ours' because we left to England alone 'the role of defender of humanity'. The text, donated by Nabuco's widow to the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro in 1924, was published for the first time in the *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, 204 (1949); (2nd ed., Recife: Fundação Joaquim Nabuco/Editora Massangana, 1988).

at the start of the Paraguayan War (1864–70). Thus, the ‘Christie affair’ ended in a diplomatic victory for Brazil.⁴⁶

It is a myth that Britain manipulated Brazil (and Argentina) into waging war against Paraguay and played a decisive role in the Paraguayan War (1864–70) (see Essay 3). The British government was not directly involved in the final abolition of slavery in Brazil, as we have seen (above). Nor was Britain involved in the fall of the empire and the proclamation of a republic in 1889. An attempt was made to extract a new commercial treaty which would diminish the tariffs on British goods imported into Brazil in exchange for British recognition of the new republican government, but it failed.⁴⁷ The British minister in Rio and the commander of the British naval forces stationed in Guanabara Bay were strictly neutral during the Brazilian naval revolt against President Floriano Peixoto (September 1893 to March 1894), despite some British commercial losses, though Floriano spread rumours that the British secretly supported the rebels in order to restore the monarchy in Brazil.⁴⁸

In January 1895 the British occupied and hoisted the Union Jack over Trindade, a desolate and uninhabited island (not much more than a rock) in the middle of the Atlantic 500 miles east of Rio de Janeiro with the aim of establishing a cable station there. In Brazil there were violent anti-British protests in July and August 1895, however, similar to the anti-British protests in 1863 (the ‘Christie affair’). In August 1896 Britain accepted defeat and withdrew. In the long standing dispute between Britain and Brazil over the huge (30,000 sq. km), largely uninhabited territory to the north of the Amazon basin between Brazil and British Guiana the British, however, scored a notable victory. Portuguese and later Brazilian claims to the territory had been challenged by Britain following Sir Robert Schomburgk’s explorations on behalf of the Royal Geographic Society in the 1840s. In November 1901, after failing to reach agreement for decades, the two sides finally agreed to international arbitration by the king of Italy. Joaquim Nabuco, Brazilian minister in London at the time, spent the following year preparing the Brazilian case in the form of a memorandum *Frontières du Brésil et de la Guyane Anglaise. Le droit du Brésil* in five volumes. After the British had also presented their case in a written memorandum, Nabuco and his six assistants during the summer of

46 See R. Graham, ‘Os fundamentos da ruptura de relações diplomáticas entre o Brasil e a Grã-Bretanha em 1863: a Questão Christie’, *Revista de História*, 24 (1962), pp. 117–38, 379–402. Also Mamigonian, *Africanos livres* ch. 9 ‘A Questão Christie e a questão dos africanos livres’. W.D. Christie, *Notes on Brazilian Questions* (London, 1865) deals with the so-called ‘Christie affair’ and many other ‘Brazilian questions’ of the time, including slavery, abolition and commercial relations with Britain.

47 See J. Smith, ‘Limits of diplomatic influence: Brazil versus Britain and the United States, 1886–1894’, *History*, 92 (2007), pp. 472–95.

48 See J. Smith, ‘Britain and the Brazilian naval revolt of 1893–4’, *Journal of Latin American Studies* 2 (1970), pp. 175–98.

1903 prepared the Brazilian response: *La Pretention Anglaise; Notes sur la partie historique du Première Mémoire Anglais*; and *La Preuve Cartographique*. A third memorandum, in four parts, concluding with an *Exposé final*, was prepared in the winter of 1903–4. In the end Brazil submitted a total of 2,000 written pages, plus maps and documents, in no less than 18 volumes. On 14 June 1904, Nabuco, confident of victory, was summoned to the Quirinal, together with the British ambassador to Rome, to receive King Victor Emanuel III's decision, which was to award three-fifths of the territory in dispute to Britain.⁴⁹

Finally, there is the question of cultural imperialism. The volume *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital*, cited above, attempts (not always convincingly) to incorporate the 'cultural turn' in contemporary historical research into the debate about informal empire. In his introduction Matthew Brown argues that, beyond trade, capital and political control, for informal empire to exist 'there must be a demonstrable role for culture, either in supporting [political and diplomatic] relationships, or as an independent variable (as in a local consciousness of asymmetrical power relations) ... The tentacles of informal empire must be found on the ground and in the ... minds of the citizens and nations whose sovereignty is being compromised. Informal empire must be lived, and known'.⁵⁰ In Brazil, as we will see, the 'cultural encounters' between the British and the Brazilians, the 'day-to-day relationships formed between colonized, colonizers and their many mediators', were quite limited, except perhaps in the case of Protestantism and football, and the social and cultural influence Britain had in Brazil was readily accepted and absorbed. Moreover, external social, cultural – and intellectual – influences on the Brazilian elite during both the empire and the early republic were as much, if not more, French as British.

V

In his book *Os ingleses no Brasil* (1948) Gilberto Freyre brilliantly examines the influence of the small communities of British subjects established in the ports of Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Recife since the opening of Brazil to foreign trade in 1808, and of imported British manufactured consumer goods, on the private, everyday social lives of the Brazilian urban upper and middle classes in the first half of the 19th century.⁵¹

49 See L. Bethell, *Joaquim Nabuco no Mundo. Abolicionista, jornalista e diplomata* (Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias, 2016), ch. 1, 'Joaquim Nabuco na Europa e nos Estados Unidos'.

50 M. Brown (ed.), *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p. 21.

51 G. Freyre, *Os ingleses no Brasil (Aspectos da influência britânica sobre a vida, a paisagem e a cultura do Brasil)* (1948; English translation *The English in Brazil* Oxford: Boulevard Books, 2011). See also, on one British community in this period, L.H. Guenther, *British Merchants*

The second half of the 19th century and the period before the First World War witnessed mass immigration to Brazil. First the Portuguese, thus strengthening the existing Portuguese presence in the social and cultural life of the independent Brazilian empire, then Italians, Spanish, East Europeans and finally (from 1908) Japanese arrived in Brazil in great numbers. Over two million immigrants, two thirds of them Italian, entered Brazil between 1889 and 1914. There was no mass British immigration to Brazil. The British working class preferred to go to Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Several hundred English and Irish agricultural labourers were attracted to colonisation schemes in southern Brazil between 1867 and 1873 – but they all failed.⁵² On the other hand, as a result of the deepening of economic relations between Brazil and Great Britain the British communities in the cities of Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Recife, joined now by smaller communities in São Paulo and Santos as well as other Brazilian port cities, grew. At the end of the empire there were already 1,500 British residents in Rio de Janeiro, several hundred in Salvador, Recife, Santos/São Paulo, and smaller numbers in Porto Alegre, Fortaleza, São Luis de Maranhão, Belém and Manaus. The character of the British communities changed; they no longer consisted primarily of diplomats, merchants, judges, lawyers and a few artisans (tailors, carpenters, etc.). They now also included civil engineers, technicians and skilled workers on the railways and the mines, managers and administrative staff of railways, urban public utilities, banks, telegraph, shipping and insurance companies as well as teachers and missionaries – many with their families.⁵³

The British in Brazil had their own country clubs, schools, hospitals, churches, cemeteries and newspapers. As elsewhere in the empire – and informal empire – the British communities in Brazil tried to be as exclusive and self-contained as possible, but inevitably interacted with, and therefore had an impact on, local Brazilian society (lifestyles, fashion, food, language, values, etc.). Anglican churches and non-conformist missionaries, like the Scottish Congregationalists, and from the mid 1850s the London-based evangelical organisations and publishers, the British and Foreign Bible Society (founded in 1804) and the Religious Tract Society (founded in 1799), certainly played a key role in the growth of Protestantism and ideas of religious liberty and

in Nineteenth-century Brazil: Business, Culture and Identity in Bahia, 1808–1850 (Oxford: Centre for Brazilian Studies, 2004).

52 See O. Marshall, *English, Irish and Irish-American Pioneer Settlers in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Oxford: Centre for Brazilian Studies, 2005).

53 Apart from Freyre and Guenther cited above (n. 56), there are relatively few studies of the British communities in Brazil. However, see Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernisation in Brazil*, op. cit., ch. 4 'The Urban Style' and José Antonio Gonsalves de Mello, *Ingleses em Pernambuco. História do Cemitério Britânico do Recife e da participação de ingleses e outros estrangeiros na vida e na cultura de Pernambuco, no período de 1813 a 1909* (Recife, 1972).

pluralism in a predominantly Catholic country.⁵⁴ The British introduced Brazilians to many outdoor sports: tennis, cycling, rowing and sailing, golf (the nine-hole golf course in São Paulo was called the Morro dos Ingleses), rugby, horse racing, athletics (the São Paulo Athletics Club founded in 1880), cricket (the English Paysandú Cricket Club, the Rio Cricket Club in Niterói) and, above all, football – this perhaps the most lasting influence on Brazilian society and culture.⁵⁵

There is some evidence of a kind of football being played by students at Jesuit Colleges and British merchant seamen and sailors in Brazil in the 1870s and 1880s, but it is generally agreed that modern football in Brazil dates from the arrival in Santos of a 19-year old English student Charles Miller in October 1894. Miller, who had been born in Brazil, the son of a Scottish father and a Brazilian mother, had been at school in Southampton and arrived with two leather footballs, an air pump, football kit and boots, and a copy of the FA Rules of the Game (first published in 1863). He quickly persuaded the São Paulo Athletics Club to adopt football. The first football match in Brazil was between the São Paulo Railway Team against the Gas Team (from the municipal gas supply company) in April 1895. An Anglo-Swiss-Brazilian Oscar Cox brought football to Rio from Europe in 1897. Clubs were formed in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Recife (Náutico in 1901, Sport in 1905) and throughout Brazil. From an elite sport it soon became a popular sport with the creation of factory clubs: for example, Votorantim Athletics Club in the British owned Fábrica de Tecidos Votorantim in Sorocaba in the interior of São Paulo; Bangú in the British-managed textile firm Companhia Progresso Industrial do Brasil in the Zona Norte of Rio de Janeiro. The famous British amateur club Corinthians visited Brazil in 1910, 1913 and 1914 (but forced to turn back because of the outbreak of the First World War); the professional club Exeter City played three games in Rio in 1914. In 1922 Lima Barreto wrote: 'Everyone in this good city of Rio, provided they are not leaden footed ... plays the so-called British sport'.⁵⁶

54 See D.G. Vieira, *O Protestantismo, a Maçonaria e a Questão Religiosa no Brasil* (Brasília, 1980) and Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernisation*, ch. 11, 'Individual Salvation'. Pedro Feitoza is completing a PhD dissertation at Cambridge University on British Protestant missions in Brazil.

55 See A. Hamilton, *An Entirely Different Game: The British Influence on Brazilian Football* (Edinburgh and London: Mainstream, 1998); D. Goldblatt, *Futebol Nation: A Footballing History of Brazil* (London: Penguin, 2014), ch. 1; D.J. Davis, 'British football with a Brazilian beat: the early history of a national pastime (1894–1933)', in O. Marshall (ed.), *English-Speaking Communities in Latin America* (London: Macmillan, 2000); F.M. Rodrigues Ferreira Antunes, 'The early days of football in Brazil: British influence and factory clubs in São Paulo', in P. Fontes and B. Buarque de Hollanda (eds), *The Country of Football: Politics, Popular Culture & the Beautiful Game in Brazil* (London: Hurst, 2014); and especially J. Lacy, *God is Brazilian. Charles Miller: The Man Who Brought Football to Brazil* (Stroud: Tempus, 2005).

56 Quoted in Goldblatt, *Futebol Nation*, p. 17.

On the elite of the late empire and the early Republic, however, the predominant social and cultural outside influence was French. Since the arrival of the French Artistic Mission in 1816 art and architecture in Brazil had been heavily French-influenced. French fashion was the most sought after. French operas by Mayerbeer, Ambroise Thomas, Offenbach and Gounod were performed in the many opera houses of Rio de Janeiro and other Brazilian cities, although Italian opera – Rossini, Donizetti, Bellini, Verdi – dominated. French literature was the most widely read. French thinkers, for example, the philosopher and historian Ernest Renan, Arthur, Comte de Gobineau, who is best remembered for his theories on race, and, above all, the philosopher Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, who died in 1857, were also prominent in Brazilian intellectual life.

It is now recognised that English, Scottish and Irish novelists – Swift, Defoe, Fielding, Richardson, Sterne, Sir Walter Scott, Dickens, and so on – made a significant contribution to the formation of the Brazilian novel, though their work was often read in French translation.⁵⁷ A number of British men of letters were widely read by Brazilian intellectuals: Jeremy Bentham, the historian Thomas Babington Macaulay, Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill, author of the classic *On Liberty* (1859), the Scottish writer Thomas Carlyle, whom Rui Barbosa much admired, Walter Bagehot whose *The English Constitution* (1867) had a profound influence on the political thinking of Joaquim Nabuco and, above all perhaps, the sociologist and social Darwinist Herbert Spencer.⁵⁸

Among Brazilian public intellectuals Joaquim Nabuco was exceptional in the extent to which he was influenced by English ideas. He recognised that the 'dominant cosmopolitan passion' of most members of the Brazilian political, social, cultural and intellectual elite was Paris. He himself described a meeting with Renan in Paris as 'my greatest literary influence in life, the most perfect intoxicant of the spirit ... my intellectual *coup de foudre*'.⁵⁹ But he preferred London, the imperial metropolis, to Paris. His life-long admiration for England and all things English is given full expression in the chapters on Bagehot,

57 Sandra Guardini Vasconcellos is almost single handedly revising the established view among Brazilian literary historians and critics that French novels and novelists almost exclusively influenced the development of the Brazilian novel in the 19th century. See, for example, 'Migratory literary forms: British novels in nineteenth-century Brazil', in A.C. Suriani da Silva and S. Guardini Vasconcellos (eds), *Books and Periodicals in Brazil 1768–1930: A Transatlantic Perspective* (London: Legenda, 2014).

58 On Spencer's influence on Brazilian intellectuals, see Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil*, ch. 9, 'Progress and Spencer'. When in 1897 the members of the newly created Academia Brasileira de Letras met to elect 20 *sócio correspondentes* (foreign members) from leading writers and intellectuals around the world they elected Herbert Spencer along with three French *sócios*: Elisée Réclus, Emil Zola and Paul Groussac.

59 Joaquim Nabuco, *My Formative Years* (Oxford: Signal Books in association with Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias, Rio de Janeiro, 2012), p. 7. Edited and with an introduction by Leslie Bethell, this is the first English translation of *Minha formação* (1900).

London, 32 Grosvenor Gardens (the residence of the Brazilian minister in London, the barão de Penedo, during the late Empire), the English influence and the English spirit in his literary, intellectual and political autobiography *Minha formação* (Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1900).⁶⁰

Jeffrey Needell concludes his study of the *belle époque* in Rio de Janeiro thus: 'By 1900, a member of the Carioca elite was part of a profoundly *Europhile* culture that informed every aspect of his or her life ... all [the] delicate and crucial aspects of culture and society were increasingly informed by the *Franco-English* aristocratic paradigms accepted by this tropical elite as Civilization.' [Author's italics.]⁶¹

VI

The First World War brought to an end the international order of the 'long 19th century' which had been dominated by Great Britain. Between the First and Second World Wars the United States overtook Britain as the world's leading industrial and creditor nation. The United States steadily increased its trade and investments with its neighbours in Latin America. Britain strengthened its commercial and financial ties with the empire, and especially the Dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa), at the expense of Latin America, with the exception of Argentina (until the post-war period). In Brazil, the United States, which had been for a long time the main market for Brazil's principal export, coffee, now replaced Britain as Brazil's main source of manufactured and capital goods. Britain's share of the Brazilian market fell to 20 per cent during the 1920s and 10 per cent during the 1930s. Britain imported only three to five per cent of Brazilian exports during the 1920s and nine to 12 per cent during the 1930s. British direct investment declined during the 1920s, but in 1930 Britain remained the principal foreign investor in Brazil and still held the bulk of Brazil's external debt. During the 1930s and the Second World War (and the immediate post-war period) British investments in Brazil fell dramatically. At the same time the United States replaced Britain as the main source of capital: portfolio and direct. The Second World War also strengthened political, military and cultural relations between the United States and Brazil. The hegemonic transition in Brazil, from Great Britain to the United States, was complete.

60 This was Nabuco's own description of *Minha formação* in the entry he submitted to *Who's Who* in 1906. It is reproduced (in Portuguese translation) as an appendix to the most recent edition, with an introduction by Alfredo Bosi (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2012).

61 See J.D. Needell, *A Tropical Belle Époque: Elite Culture and Society in Turn of the Century Rio de Janeiro* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Appendix

British writers and artists in 19th century Brazil

The transfer of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro and the opening of Brazil's ports to world, especially British, trade in 1808, and the close political and economic relations between Britain and Brazil in the century up to the First World War brought many British travellers to Brazil, some of whom took up residence. Among the dozens of books on Brazil published by British visitors and residents the most notable are the following:⁶²

- John Mawe, *Travels in the Interior of Brazil, Particularly in the Gold and Diamond Districts of that Country* (London, 1812; 2nd expanded edn., 1821). Mawe, a mineralogist from Derbyshire, was the first foreigner allowed to visit the gold and diamond mines of Minas Gerais.
- John Luccock, *Notes on Rio de Janeiro and the Southern Parts of Brazil Taken During a Residence of Ten Years in that Country from 1808 to 1818* (London, 1820), described by the great 19th century Brazilian historian Varnhagen as 'the most faithful portrayal of the material, moral and intellectual state of the capital of Brazil' in the years immediately after the arrival of the Portuguese Court. Luccock was a cloth merchant from Leeds importing textiles and other manufactured goods from West Yorkshire.
- Henry Koster, *Travels in Brazil, in the Years from 1809 to 1815* (London, 1816; 2nd edn., 2 vols., 1817). Koster was a British merchant who had grown up in Portugal and established himself in Pernambuco in 1809 as a sugar planter.
- Maria Graham, *Journal of a Voyage to Brazil and Residence there During Part of the Years 1821, 1822, 1823* (London, 1824), one of the best – and most quoted – accounts of Brazil, especially Rio de Janeiro, at the time of independence. Graham, later Lady Calcott, was the wife of a British naval officer who visited Brazil in 1821–2 on her way to Chile and in 1823 on her way back to England. She returned in 1824 at the invitation of the Emperor D. Pedro to serve as tutor and governess to his daughter Princess Maria da Glória.
- Rev. Robert Walsh, *Notices of Brazil in 1828 and 1829* (2 vols., London, 1830). Walsh, an Irish Anglican clergyman, was chaplain to the British mission in Rio de Janeiro.

62 For a complete list, see L. Bethell, *Brazil by British and Irish Authors* (Oxford: Centre for Brazilian Studies, 2003).

- John Armitage, *The History of Brazil, from the Period of the Arrival of the Braganza family in 1808 to the Abdication of Dom Pedro the First in 1831* (2 vols., London, 1836). Armitage spent eight years in Rio de Janeiro as a merchant from 1828 to 1835. Planned as a sequel to Robert Southey's three volume *History of Brazil*,⁶³ this was the first history of the period 1808–31, based on state documents and other primary sources as well first-hand knowledge of the country. Translated into Portuguese in 1837 it remained a fundamental text for all later historians of the period.
- George Gardner, *Travels in the Interior of Brazil Principally through the Northern Provinces and the Gold Mining Districts During the Years 1836–41* (1846). Gardner, who was later Superintendent of the Royal Botanical Gardens of Ceylon, went to Brazil to collect botanical specimens and penetrated parts of south-east, central and north-east Brazil rarely visited by foreigners.
- Alfred Russel Wallace, *A Narrative of Travels on the Amazon and Rio Negro* (London, 1853) and Henry Walter Bates, *A Naturalist on the River Amazons* (2 vols., 1863). Wallace and Bates, aged 25 and 23 respectively, travelled to Pará in 1848 intending to collect for private dealers and for Kew Gardens, which had been reorganised in 1841 and formally recognised as the national botanic garden under the direction of Sir William Hooker (and later his son Sir Joseph Hooker). They remained together for two years, parting company in 1850. Wallace spent two more years on the Rio Negro and the Orinoco before returning to England, Bates another nine years on the Solimões and Upper Amazon. The books as well as the journals and letters of these two great British naturalists made an enormous contribution to scientific knowledge of the Amazon in the mid 19th century.⁶⁴ As an appendix to his volume Wallace included notes on the natural history, geography and geology of the Amazon valley and its aboriginal tribes, with vocabularies

⁶³ The poet Robert Southey, who never visited Brazil, wrote the first history of Brazil from the beginning of the 16th to the beginning of the 19th century. The first volume was published in 1810; the second volume in 1817; the third volume in 1820, almost half a century before Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen's classic *História geral do Brasil antes da sua separação e independência de Portugal* (2 vols., 1854–7). Southey's *History* was to some extent eclipsed by Varnhagen's *História*, although it was much admired by later historians of Brazil, João Capistano de Abreu and Manoel de Oliveira Lima.

⁶⁴ Besides the numerous biographies of Wallace, there are several studies of Wallace and Bates in the Amazon. The most recent and the best (which also includes Richard Spruce – see below) is John Hemming, *Naturalists in Paradise: Wallace, Bates and Spruce in the Amazon* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2015).

of Amazonian languages, which represent a mere fragment of the physical history of the Amazon he had planned to write. He became co-founder with Darwin of the theory of evolution by natural selection. Darwin believed Bates second only to Humboldt in his knowledge of tropical forests and regarded his book 'the best book of natural history travels ever published in England'.⁶⁵

- Richard Spruce, *Palmae Amazonicae* (London, 1869), *The Hepaticae of the Amazon and the Andes of Peru and Ecuador* (1885) and *Notes of a Botanist on the Amazon and the Andes* (2 vols., 1908) edited by Alfred Russel Wallace. Spruce (age 32, though with an established reputation for his work in Yorkshire and the Pyrenees) went to the Amazon in 1849, a year after Wallace and Bates. He stayed in northern Brazil, Peru and Ecuador for 15 years until 1864. Wallace and Bates were primarily entomologists, Spruce a botanist (though all three, it should be said, were also explorers, geographers, geologists, anthropologists, linguists, and much else besides).⁶⁶
- William Scully, *Brazil; its Provinces and Chief Cities, the Manners and Customs of the People, Agriculture, Commerce and Other Statistics* (London, 1866). Scully was the Irish-born proprietor and editor of the *Anglo-Brazilian Times*, published in Rio de Janeiro from 1865 to 1884.
- Sir Richard Burton, *Explorations of the Highlands of Brazil, with a Full Account of the Gold and Diamond Mines, also Canoeing Down 1500 miles of the Great River São Francisco from Sabará to the Sea* (2 vols., 1869). The great 'orientalist' and explorer was British consul in Santos 1865–68. Apart from travel, Burton's other great passion was translation, with Portuguese, which he learned in Goa, his favourite language after Arabic. While in Brazil, besides translating Camões' *Lusiads*, Burton translated several Brazilian works, including José Basílio da Gama's epic 18th-century poem *O Uruguai* (1769) and two contemporary novels, José de Alencar's

65 Darwin was himself twice in Brazil during the second voyage of H.M.S. *Beagle* (Dec. 1831–Oct. 1836) – in Bahia in February 1832 and Rio de Janeiro April–June 1832, sending home by naval vessel consignments of carefully labelled specimens, and again, briefly, in Bahia and Recife on the return journey in August 1836. See Charles Darwin, *Journals and Remarks 1832–6* (London, 1839), the third volume of Robert Fitzroy's four volume *Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of His Majesty's Ships 'Adventure' and 'Beagle' between the years 1826 and 1836* (1839). It was published separately as *Journal of Researches into the Geology and Natural History of the Various Countries Visited During the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle Round the World* (1840).

66 See M.R.D. Seward and S.M.D. Fitzgerald (eds.), *Richard Spruce (1817–1893). Botanist and Explorer* (London: Royal Botanic Gardens, 1996) and Hemming, *Naturalists in Paradise*.

Iracema (1865) and João Manuel Pereira da Silva's *Manuel de Moraes* (1866).⁶⁷

- Charles Barrington Brown and William Lidstone, *Fifteen Thousand Miles on the Amazon and its Tributaries* (London, 1878). Brown, a geologist, and Lidstone, a civil engineer, were employees of the Amazon Steam Navigation Company 1873–5.
- James W. Wells, *Exploring and Travelling Three Thousand Miles Through Brazil from Rio de Janeiro to Maranhão* (2 vols., London, 1886). Wells was a civil engineer who made this journey in 1873–5. His travels overlapped in many places with those taken earlier by George Gardner and Richard Burton.
- J.P. Wileman, *Brazilian Exchange: the Study of an Inconvertible Currency* (Buenos Aires, 1896). Wileman was a British civil engineer who lived in Rio Grande do Sul for many years and died in Rio in 1914. His book was the first systematic analysis of Brazil's financial history, covering the period from 1860 to 1894, and a major influence on the governments of the new Brazilian republic. He also founded in 1898 the weekly *Brazilian Review* (edited after 1914 by his son H.F. Wileman under the title *Wileman's Brazilian Review* until 1941), an important source of economic, financial and business news, aimed at subscribers abroad.
- H. M. Tomlinson, *The Sea and the Jungle (Being the Narrative of the Voyage of the Tramp Steamer Capella, 1909 and 1910)* (London, 1912), an account of a journey from England to Pará, along the Amazon and Madeira rivers, and back again. The book is considered a classic of travel literature.

British artists, professional and amateur, some spending lengthy periods in Brazil but many of them like naval officers or official artists on Royal Navy ships spending only days or weeks, made significant contributions to the iconography of Brazil in the 19th century. Their work is scattered in collections, public and private, throughout the world. The following either had their work published in albums at the time or were the subject of later studies:

67 Biographers have been fascinated by Richard Burton. On Burton in Brazil, see F. McLynn, *From the Sierras to the Pampas: Richard Burton's Travels in the Americas, 1860–69* (London, 1991); Alfredo Cordoviola, *Richard Burton: A traveller in Brazil, 1865–68* (Lewiston, NY, 2001).

- Richard Bate, a merchant (optics and nautical instruments) and gifted amateur artist, who spent 20 years in Rio de Janeiro between 1808 and 1848.⁶⁸
- William Swainson, botanist and ornithologist, who spent a year and a half in Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro in 1816–18. Swainson is considered the best illustrator of the flora and fauna, especially the birds of Brazil, since the Dutch artists resident in Pernambuco in the middle of the 17th century.⁶⁹
- Henry Chamberlain, a royal artillery lieutenant and amateur artist, the son of the British consul general/*chargé d'affaires* visited Rio de Janeiro, aged 22, in 1819–20. His watercolours formed the basis of a famous album of 36 lithographs.⁷⁰
- Augustus Earle, a professional artist trained at the Royal Academy, who spent two months in 1820 and then more than three years in Rio de Janeiro (December 1820–February 1824).⁷¹
- Charles Landseer, official artist, also trained at the Royal Academy, and William John Burchell, botanist and amateur artist, who came to Rio with the Stuart mission to negotiate the recognition of the independence of Brazil from Portugal in 1825.⁷²
- William Smyth, a lieutenant in the Royal Navy and amateur artist, who found himself in Rio de Janeiro on several occasions during the 1830s.⁷³

68 See G. Ferrez, *Aquarelas de Richard Bate. O Rio de Janeiro, 1808–48* (Rio de Janeiro, 1965).

69 W. Swainson, *Zoological Illustrations* (first series London, 1820–33, second series London, 1829–33), *The Ornithological Drawings of William Swainson. Series I: The Birds of Brazil* (1834–6), and *A Selection of the Birds of Brazil and Mexico: the Drawings* (London, 1841). See L. Bethell, 'William Swainson: naturalista britânica no Brasil, 1817–18', *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, forthcoming.

70 H. Chamberlain, *Views and Costumes of the City and Neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from Drawings Taken by Lieutenant Chamberlain During the Years 1819 and 1820, with Descriptive Explanations* (London, 1822).

71 See D. James, 'Um pintor inglês no Brasil do Primeiro Reinado', *Revista do SPHAN*, 12 (1955) and J. Hackforth-Jones, *Augustus Earle, Travel Artist: Paintings and Drawings in the Rex Nan Kivell Collection, National Library of Australia* (London: Scholar Press, 1980).

72 See L. Bethell (ed.), *Charles Landseer. Desenhos e aquarelas de Portugal e do Brasil 1825–1826* (2010); G. Ferrez, *O Brasil do Primeiro Reinado visto pelo William John Burchell 1825/1829* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação João Moreira Salles & Fundação Pro-Memória, 1981); L. Bethell, 'Dois artistas ingleses no Brasil: Charles Landseer (1825–6) e William John Burchell (1825–1830)', *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, 173, (2012), pp. 77–96.

73 See P. Geyer (ed.), *Aquarelas de William Smyth, 1832–1834* (Rio de Janeiro, 1987).

- Sir William Gore Ouseley, a diplomat and accomplished artist, who went to Rio de Janeiro as secretary to the British legation and became *chargé d'affaires* in 1838 (until his transfer to Buenos Aires as minister in 1844). His paintings are mainly of Rio and Bahia.⁷⁴
- Oswald Brierly, a professional artist on various ships of the Royal Navy – *Wanderer*, *Rattlesnake*, *Meander*, *Galatea* – which visited Rio de Janeiro at different times between 1842 and 1867.⁷⁵
- George Lothian Hall, a professional artist who spent the years 1848–54 in Rio de Janeiro (possibly as a merchant) and exhibited in London on several occasions at, for example, the Royal Society of British Artists and the Royal Academy during the following two decades.⁷⁶
- Benjamin Robert Mulock, the one British photographer of importance, who worked as an engineer in Salvador and the interior of Bahia between November 1859 and April 1862 during the construction of the Bahia–Sao Francisco railway.⁷⁷
- Marianne North, a ‘botanical globetrotter’ and prolific artist who visited Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais in 1872–3. She left a large number of paintings and drawings of both plants and topography to Kew Gardens.⁷⁸

74 See W.G. Ouseley, *Views of South America, from Original Drawings Made in Brazil, the River Plate, the Parana, etc.* (London, 1852).

75 See P. da Cunha e Menezes, *Oswald Brierly. Didárias de viagens ao Rio de Janeiro 1842–1867* (Rio de Janeiro: Andrea Jakobsson Estúdio, 2006).

76 See *Views of Rio de Janeiro from Sketches by George L. Hall* n.d. a rare album published in London by Maclure, MacDonald & MacGregor, lithographers to the Queen, c.185

77 See ‘Um fotógrafo inglês na Bahia: Benjamin Robert Mulock (1829–63). Biblioteca Nacional, Rio de Janeiro (<http://brasilianafotografica.bn.br/?p=8946>).

78 See L. Ponsonby, *Marianne North at Kew Gardens* (London, 1990) and Julio Bandeira, *A viagem ao Brasil de Marianne North 1872–3* (Rio de Janeiro: Sextante, 2012).

3. The Paraguayan War (1864–70)*

The Paraguayan War or the War of the Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) against Paraguay, which lasted for more than five years, from December 1864 to March 1870, was not only the longest but also the bloodiest inter-state war in the history of Latin America, indeed, apart from the Crimean War (1854–56), the bloodiest inter-state conflict anywhere in the world between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.¹ It claimed some 200,000 lives (mostly Paraguayan and Brazilian), either in battle or from disease and deprivation associated with the war. It had a profound effect on the economies, politics and societies of all four countries engaged, especially the two that did most of the fighting: Paraguay, the principal loser, and Brazil, the principal victor.

I

In a certain sense, all three of Brazil's wars in the Río de la Plata during the half century after independence – the first in 1825–8 against the newly independent United Provinces of the Río de la Plata; the second in 1851–2, in alliance with Uruguay and the Argentine provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes, against the province of Buenos Aires; the third and by far the most important, in 1864–70, in alliance with Argentina and Uruguay, against Paraguay – had their roots in the rivalry between Portugal and Spain during the 17th and 18th centuries. Portugal's involvement in the Río de la Plata began with the settlement of Colônia do Sacramento in 1680. The Spanish, however, later established themselves in Montevideo and under the treaty of San Ildefonso (1777)

* This essay is based on 'O Brasil no mundo [1822–1889]', in L. Moritz Schwarcz (ed.), *História do Brasil Nação* vol. II, J.M. de Carvalho (ed.), *Construção nacional 1830–89* (Madrid: Fundación MAPFRE and Rio de Janeiro: Editora Objetiva, 2012), pp. 157–68, which drew on 'A Guerra do Paraguai: história e historiografia', 'O imperialismo britânico e a Guerra do Paraguai' and 'A Guerra do Paraguai: cronologia', in M.E. Castro Magalhães Marques (ed.), *A Guerra do Paraguai: 130 anos depois* (Rio de Janeiro: Editores Relume Dumará, 1995) and *The Paraguayan War (1864–1870)* (Research paper, Institute of Latin American Studies, London, 1996).

1 450,000 people (two-thirds Russian) lost their lives in the Crimean War. There were, of course, several prolonged and extremely savage *civil wars* in the middle decades of the 19th century, notably the Taiping Civil Wars in China in the 1850s and 1860s, with incalculable loss of life, and the American Civil War (1861–65), in which more than 600,000 Yankee and Confederate soldiers died. In *The Age of Capital* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1975), Eric Hobsbawm described the 1860s as 'by any standards ... a decade of blood'.

Portugal ceded to Spain the entire east bank of the river Uruguay. In 1811, at a time of revolution and war in the Río de la Plata, sensing an opportunity to recapture lost territory and fearful of the spread of liberal ideas, including slave emancipation, to the southern province of Rio Grande do Sul, the Prince Regent D. João sent Portuguese troops to the Banda Oriental. But they were quickly withdrawn. In 1816 Portuguese troops invaded the Banda Oriental a second time and this time occupied Montevideo. Furthermore, in 1821 the Banda Oriental was incorporated into the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves as the Província Cisplatina. It thus formed part of Brazil when independence from Portugal was declared in 1822.

The governments of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, however, never relinquished the idea of incorporating into the new state the Banda Oriental as well as Paraguay and Upper Peru (Bolivia), which had all formed part of the Vice-royalty of the Río de la Plata, and in April 1825 a revolt against Brazilian rule, followed by an invasion by exiles based in Buenos Aires, led to the annexation of the Banda Oriental. Concerned not only at the loss of territory but also the consequences for the balance of power in the region and the threat to free navigation in the Río de la Plata, Brazil immediately declared war. Lasting almost three years, the war was finally brought to an end as a result of mediation by Britain which, like Brazil, had an interest in political stability and free trade in the Río de la Plata. In August 1828 a treaty was signed in Rio de Janeiro under which the independent republic of Uruguay was created as a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil. For Brazil, an unpopular and expensive war had ended in defeat with the loss of territory considered an integral part of the empire. The treaty, wrote the Rev. Robert Walsh in his *Notices of Brazil in 1828 and 1829* (1830), was received in Brazil with 'universal disappointment and discontent'. Along with opposition to the anti-slave trade and commercial treaties he had recently signed with Britain, as we have seen, as well as his authoritarian manner of governing and his refusal to separate himself totally from the 'Portuguese' faction in Brazil, the war of 1825–8 was one of the factors contributing to the abdication of Brazil's first emperor D. Pedro in April 1831.

In independent Uruguay, conflict between *blancos* [Conservatives] and *colorados* [Liberals] led eventually to civil war, the Guerra Grande (1838–51). Juan Manuel de Rosas, governor of Buenos Aires between 1829 and 1832, who had returned to power in 1835, intervened on the side of the deposed blanco president, Manuel Oribe, and began a 13-year siege of Montevideo. As a result, first France (1838–40) and then France and Britain together (1843–50) instituted a naval blockade of the Río de la Plata in order to protect their trade and the lives and properties of their citizens. Brazil remained neutral but was increasingly concerned to keep Uruguay out of the hands of Rosas, to

defend the interest of the *estancieiros* [ranchers] of Rio Grande do Sul – and the growing number of Brazilian *estancieiros* in Uruguay – in unrestricted cross-border trade (at a time when the government in Rio was already struggling to defeat a movement, the *farroupilha*, for the separation of the province of Rio Grande do Sul from the empire), and to maintain free access to the rivers Paraná and Paraguay in order to reach the otherwise isolated Brazilian province of Mato Grosso. A diplomatic mission to Paris and London led by the visconde de Abrantes (1844–46) proposed ‘three power’ (*sic*) intervention in Uruguay, but it failed because neither France nor Britain envisaged a land invasion and, not least in the case of Britain, because Brazil was at the time refusing to renew the Anglo-Brazilian commercial and anti-slave trade treaties (see Essay 2).

Paulino José Soares de Sousa (from 1854 visconde do Uruguai), Foreign Minister from October 1849 in the Conservative government which had come to power the previous September, finally lost patience and abandoned Brazilian neutrality. In May 1851, after a diplomatic mission led by Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, marquês de Paraná, had reached agreement with the governors of the Argentine provinces of Entre Rio and Corrientes, enemies of Rosas, Brazil went to war with Buenos Aires. The siege of Montevideo was lifted and in February 1852 at the battle of Monte Caseros Rosas suffered total defeat. Brazil had become the dominant regional power, at least temporarily. Uruguay’s independence from Buenos Aires had been guaranteed, and with 5,000 Brazilian troops in occupation until 1855 it was politically subordinate to Brazil. The Brazilian economic penetration of Uruguay continued apace in the post-war period. By the end of the decade over 20,000 Brazilians, mostly *gaúchos* from Rio Grande do Sul, together with their slaves, were settled there. Brazilians constituted between 10 and 15 per cent of Uruguay’s population. They owned perhaps 30 per cent of the land, including some of the best *estâncias*, and freely transported their cattle to Rio Grande do Sul.

The war of 1851–2 did not bring an end to violent conflict in the politics of Uruguay. It was a rebellion in March 1863 led by the *colorado* caudillo General Venancio Flores for the overthrow of the *blanco* government of President Bernardo Berro, elected in 1860, that triggered off the sequence of events leading to the Paraguayan War. Both Argentina and Brazil supported the *colorado* rebellion – the first time the two countries had been on the same side in an Uruguayan conflict. President Bartolomé Mitre of Argentina, a Liberal, elected in October 1862, took this position because the Uruguayan *colorados* had backed him in the Argentine civil war of 1861 and because he believed the *blancos* in power in Montevideo constituted a possible focus for residual federalist opposition in the littoral provinces to the recently united Argentine republic. For Brazil the main issue was the tough line the Berro administration had begun to adopt towards the Brazilians in Uruguay, attempting to restrict

settlement (and slaveholding) and to control, and tax, crossfrontier trade. Rio Grande do Sul, which had abandoned its struggle for independent statehood only 15 years before, expected the imperial government in Rio de Janeiro to protect Brazilian interests in Uruguay. The Liberal party was already dominant in Rio Grande do Sul, and as the political tide nationally began to turn in favour of the Liberals (culminating in January 1864 in the appointment of a LiberalProgressive government under Zacarias Góis e Vasconcelos) the Brazilian government became increasingly responsive to pressure from Rio Grande do Sul to join Argentina in supporting the colorado rebellion in Uruguay. It was in these circumstances that the blanco government looked to Paraguay as its only possible ally.

Paraguay, a former province of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, whose population was predominantly Guaraní-speaking, had successfully separated itself from both Spain and Buenos Aires in 1811–13. Under the dictatorship of Dr José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia (1813–40) and (at least until the 1850s) under that of his successor Carlos Antonio López (1844–62), Paraguay had isolated itself, politically and economically, from its neighbours and played only a minor role in the civil and interstate wars of the Río de la Plata during the first half of the 19th century. It was, however, fearful and distrustful of its much larger, much more populous and potentially predatory neighbours: the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata and Brazil. Both had been reluctant, and late, to recognise Paraguay's independence – Brazil in 1844, the United Provinces in 1852. Both had territorial claims against Paraguay: Brazil in the far north-east of the country on the borders of Mato Grosso between the rivers Apa and Branco, a region valuable for its natural yerba mate forests; Argentina east of the Paraná river (Misiones) but also west of the Paraguay river (the Chaco), a remote area potentially valuable for its quebracho trees from which tannin was extracted. There was also friction with both over freedom of navigation on the Paraguay/Paraná river system. During the 1850s, as Brazil adopted what Paraguay regarded as a predatory, imperialist policy towards Uruguay, the López government pursued with increasing urgency Paraguay's economic, and military, modernisation, with an emphasis on industry and infrastructure, making effective use of British technology and British technicians.²

Francisco Solano López, to whom the blanco government in Uruguay looked for support in July 1863, had come to power in Paraguay the previous October

2 In *The British in Paraguay, 1850–1870* (Oxford, 1976), Josefina Plá estimated that there were 200 British subjects (excluding women and children) in Paraguay in the period before the War, most of them under contract to the government, either as engineers employed in the shipyard, the arsenal at Asunción, the iron foundry at Ibicui, constructing railways and telegraph lines, or in the army medical corps. Paraguay's chief engineer from 1855 was the Scotsman William K. Whytehead. Paraguay's agents in London, J. and A. Blyth of Limehouse, supplied industrial and military hardware (pig iron, railway materials, arms and ammunition, even a steam warship or two).

on the death of his father. He was hesitant at first to make a formal alliance with the blancos, his natural allies, against the colorados in Uruguay, now that the latter were backed by both Brazil and Argentina. But during the second half of the year he issued warnings against what he saw as a growing threat to the existing balance of power in the Río de la Plata which guaranteed Paraguay's security, territorial integrity and independence. He also saw an opportunity to make his presence felt in the region and to play a role commensurate with Paraguay's new economic and military power. He had an army of 77,000 (compared to the Brazilian army of fewer than 20,000, with only 2,000 based in Rio Grande do Sul). In February 1864 Solano López began to mobilise for a possible war.

When, after diplomacy (the mission of José Antônio Saraiva in May 1864) had failed to resolve its differences with Uruguay, Brazil in August 1864 issued an ultimatum to the Uruguayan government threatening retaliation for the alleged abuses suffered by Brazilian subjects, Solano López in turn issued an ultimatum warning Brazil against military intervention. Underestimating the Paraguayan military and believing that Paraguay had no good reason to be hostile to Brazil, the Brazilian government ignored this warning and on 16 October Brazilian troops invaded Uruguay. Following an incident involving the seizure of a Brazilian merchant steamer, the *Marquês de Olinda*, leaving Asunción for Corumbá, with the president of the Mato Grosso on board, on 12 November, Brazil severed diplomatic relations with Paraguay. On 13 December, Solano López took the momentous decision to declare war on Brazil, and invaded Mato Grosso. After Argentina refused permission for the Paraguayan army to cross the disputed and largely uninhabited territory of Misiones in order to invade Rio Grande do Sul, Solano López also declared war on Argentina on 18 March 1865, and the following month invaded the Argentine province of Corrientes.³

3 On the origins of the Paraguayan War, the modern secondary literature begins with Pelham Horton Box, *The Origins of the Paraguayan War* (1927), a useful but traditional (predominantly diplomatic) account, in which Solano López is largely blamed for the war. See also R.J. Cárcano, *Guerra del Paraguay: orígenes y causas* (Buenos Aires, 1939) and *Guerra del Paraguay: acción y reacción de la triple alianza* (2 vols. Buenos Aires, 1941); L.A. Moniz Bandeira, *O expansionismo brasileiro e a formação dos estados na Bacia do Prata: da colonização à Guerra da Tríplice Aliança* [1974] (3rd edn., Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan/Brasilia: Editora da UnB, 1998); Alfredo da Mota Menezes, *Guerra do Paraguai. Como construímos o conflito* (Cuiabá, MT, 1998); M. Pastore, 'Análisis de las causas económicas de la Guerra del Paraguay', *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología*, 39 (2002); and T.L. Whigham, *The Paraguayan War*, vol. 1 *Causes and Early Conflict* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). On the War itself, see Francisco Doratioto, *Maldita Guerra. Nova história da Guerra do Paraguai* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002); L. Capdevila, *Una guerra totale: Paraguay, 1864–1870* (Buenos Aires, 2010); and in English the long-awaited second volume by T. Whigham, *The Road to Armageddon: Paraguay Versus the Triple Alliance 1866–1870* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2017).

To what extent Solano López's actions were rational, provoked by Brazil (supported by Argentina), and essentially in defence of threatened national interests (perhaps even his country's survival), or irrational, aggressive and expansionist – Brazilian intervention in Uruguay offering a pretext for a megalomaniac to realise a dream of empire? – is still a matter for debate. But whatever the thinking behind his actions, Solano López's decision to declare war first on Brazil and then on Argentina, and to invade both their territories, proved a serious miscalculation, and one that was to have tragic consequences for the Paraguayan people. At the very least Solano López made an enormous gamble – and lost. He overestimated Paraguay's economic and military power. He underestimated Brazil's potential, if not its existing, military power – and its willingness to fight. He was wrong in thinking that Argentina would be neutral in a war between Paraguay and Brazil over Uruguay since Mitre did not believe that Argentine interests were threatened by what he expected to be a brief, surgical Brazilian intervention in Uruguay. Solano López also exaggerated Argentina's internal contradictions and the possibility that, for example, Entre Ríos (under the powerful General José Justo de Urquiza) and Corrientes would prevent Argentina from waging war against Paraguay or, in the event of war, would take Paraguay's side against Buenos Aires.

Solano López's reckless actions brought about the very thing that most threatened the security, even the existence, of his country: a union of his two powerful neighbours – indeed, since Flores had finally managed to seize power in Montevideo in February 1865, a union of all three of his neighbours – in alliance and war against him. Neither Brazil nor Argentina had a quarrel with Paraguay sufficient to justify going to war. Neither wished nor planned for war with Paraguay. There was no popular demand or support for war; indeed, the war proved to be generally unpopular in both countries, especially Argentina. At the same time little effort was made by either to avoid war. The need to defend themselves against Paraguayan aggression (however much provoked or justified) offered both Brazil and Argentina not only an opportunity to settle their differences with Paraguay over territory and river navigation, but also to punish and weaken, perhaps destroy, a troublesome, emerging, possibly expansionist power in their region. Mitre seized the chance to remove a regime which, like Uruguay under the blancos, he regarded as a perpetual focus for federalist resistance to Buenos Aires and thus a constant threat to the process of nation building in Argentina. Emperor Pedro II seized the chance to strengthen and consolidate the imperial system in Brazil and assert Brazil's undisputed hegemony in the region, and in particular Brazilian rather than Argentine hegemony over Paraguay as well as Uruguay.

The original war aims as set out in the Treaty of Triple Alliance signed by Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay on 1 May 1865 were: (1) the overthrow of the

Solano López dictatorship; (2) free navigation of the Paraguay and Paranaá rivers; and (3) annexation of territory claimed by Brazil in the north-east of Paraguay and by Argentina in the east and west of Paraguay – this last clause kept secret until it was revealed, by Britain, in 1866. As the war progressed, it became, for Brazil in particular, a war for civilisation and democracy (*sic*) against barbarism and tyranny. This despite the awkward fact that as a result of the emancipation of the slaves in the United States during and immediately after the Civil War (Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation on 1 January 1863; the 13th Amendment to the Constitution was finally ratified in December 1865) Brazil was now (as well as being the only remaining monarchy) the only remaining independent state in the Western Hemisphere whose economy and society was based on slavery.

The Paraguayan War was not inevitable. Nor was it necessary. But it could have been avoided only if firstly, Brazil had been less assertive in defence of the interests of its subjects in Uruguay and in particular had not intervened militarily on their behalf. Secondly, if Argentina had remained neutral in the ensuing conflict between Paraguay and Brazil. Finally, and crucially, if Paraguay had behaved more prudently, recognised the realities of power in the region, and attempted to defend its interests through diplomacy, not war.

II

Considering the enormous disparity between the two sides in size, wealth and population (and therefore in real and potential human and material resources) – Brazil (population almost 10 million), Argentina (1.7 million) and Uruguay (250–300,000) against Paraguay (300–400,000 – certainly much less than the one million or more frequently cited) – the Paraguayan War would appear to have been from the outset an unequal struggle. Militarily, however, the two sides were more evenly matched.⁴ At the beginning of the war, as we have seen, and for at least the first year, Paraguay had, numerically, a military superiority; and Paraguay's army was probably better equipped and trained than the armies of its neighbours. Moreover, once the Paraguayan forces had been expelled from Argentine territory (and had no serious possibility of returning), Argentina reduced its commitment to the Allied war effort so that by the end of the war there were only some 4,000 Argentine troops on Paraguayan soil. Uruguay never had more than a symbolic presence in the theatre of operations. Brazil, on the other hand, expanded its standing army from 18,000 to 60–70,000 men during the first year of hostilities. This was achieved by means of transfers

4 For comparative data on population, government revenue, armed forces, etc., see D. Abente, 'The War of the Triple Alliance: three explanatory models', *Latin American Research Review* 22 (1987), Table 1 Regional power capabilities of Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, c. 1860, Table 2 Weighted index of power capabilities.

from the National Guard and the military police, appeals to patriotism and the formation of corps of *voluntários da pátria* (some more voluntary than others), and the forced recruitment of civilians, especially freedmen (ex-slaves), including *Africanos livres*, slaves liberated by the Anglo-Portuguese and Anglo-Brazilian courts of mixed commission in Rio de Janeiro between 1819 and 1845 and by the Brazilian authorities under the law of 1831 and more especially the law of 1850, but held in conditions close to slavery for 14 years or more, who had finally been granted letters of emancipation in September 1864 (see Essay 2). In October 1866, after nearly two years of war, defeat at the battle of Curupaití (see below) and the realisation that the war was likely to last much longer than expected, the decision was made (after much debate in the Council of State) to free slaves held in the imperial household and state-owned farms and industries [*escravos da nação*], slaves owned by the Church and religious orders, and some (though in the event few) privately owned slaves to fight in the war.⁵ (In the end only a few thousand slaves were liberated for military service.) In the course of the war Brazil is estimated to have mobilised some 140,000 men (fewer than the 200,000 indicated by some historians).⁶ And, unlike Paraguay, which had to rely on its own arsenal and shipyard, Brazil had access to arms, ammunition and warships, both purchased abroad, mostly in Europe, and manufactured and built in Brazil, as well as a loan of £7 million raised by Rothschilds in the City of London in September 1865 to help pay for them (see below). Finally, Brazil had the largest and most powerful navy in the region (33 steam and 12 sailing ships, with the first of many ironclads arriving in December 1865).

The war can be divided into three phases.⁷ The first began with the limited Paraguayan offensives against Mato Grosso in December 1864 and Corrientes in April 1865. In May 1865 the Paraguayan army finally crossed Misiones and

5 On the mass recruitment for the war, especially of blacks (slave, freed and free), see R. Salles, *Guerra do Paraguai: escravidão e cidadania na formação do exército* (São Paulo, 1990); H. Kraay, 'Patriotic mobilisation in Brazil: the Zuavos and other black companies', in H. Kraay and T.L. Whigham (eds), *I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); V. Izecksohn, *Slavery and War in the Americas. Race, Citizenship, and State Building in the United States and Brazil, 1861–1870* (Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 2014), ch. 3 and 5. In *Prince of the People: The Life and Times of a Brazilian Free Man of Colour* (London: Verso, 1993), E. Silva offers a singular portrait of one free black *voluntário*, Cândido da Fonseca Galvão, better known as Dom Oba II d'Africa. See also E. Silva, 'O Príncipe Oba, um voluntário da pátria', in M.E. Castro Magalhães Marques (ed.), *A Guerra do Paraguai: 130 anos depois* (Rio de Janeiro: Editores Relume Dumará, 1995).

6 Francisco Doratioto provides the following estimates of Brazilian troops enlisted after the outbreak of the War (joining a regular army of c.18,000 men): *voluntários da patria*, 54,992; *Guarda Nacional*, 59,669; general recruitment and slaves freed to serve, 8,489, in *Maldita Guerra*, p. 458.

7 A. Tasso Fragoso, *História da Guerra entre a Tríplice Aliança e o Paraguai* (5 vols., Rio de Janeiro, 1934) is the classic Brazilian military history of the war.

invaded Rio Grande do Sul. Initially successful, the invasion was eventually contained by the allied forces. The Paraguayans never reached Uruguay. The Paraguayan commander Colonel Estigarribia surrendered to President Mitre (commander of the allied forces during the first two and a half years of the war), Emperor Dom Pedro II – on his only visit to the war zone – and President Flores at Uruguaiana on 14 September. The Paraguayan army then retreated back across the Paraná river and prepared to defend the country's southern border. At the end of the first year of the war the only Paraguayan troops left on allied soil were those (few) in Mato Grosso (which remained a secondary front in the war). In the meantime, on 11 June at Riachuelo on the Paraná just south of Corrientes, in the only major naval battle of the war, the Brazilian navy had destroyed the Paraguayan navy and instituted an effective blockade of Paraguay, which it maintained for the rest of the war.

The second and major phase of the war (which included several periods in which there was little actual fighting) began when the allies finally invaded Paraguay in April 1866 and established their headquarters at Tuiutí at the confluence of the rivers Paraná and Paraguay. There on 24 May, in the first major land battle of the war, which left the commander of the Brazilian troops, Manuel Luís Osório, severely wounded, they repelled a ferocious Paraguayan assault. It was, however, more than three months before the Allied armies began to advance up the river Paraguay. On 12 September, at a secret meeting with Mitre at Yatayti-Cora, Solano López's offer of concessions, including territorial concessions, to bring the war to an end, provided only that he survived and Paraguay was not totally dismembered or permanently occupied, was rejected. Ten days later, at Curupaití a few miles south of the great river fortress of Humaitá on the river Paraguay, the allies suffered their worst defeat of the war. They did not renew their advance until July 1867 when a movement was initiated to encircle Humaitá (Paraguay's Sebastopol) which blocked access to the Rio Paraguay and the Paraguayan capital, Asunción. Even so it was more than a year before the allies occupied Humaitá (5 August 1868) and a further five months, following the decisive defeat and virtual destruction of the Paraguayan army at the battle of Lomas Valentinas on 27 December, before Allied (mostly Brazilian) troops under the command of Marechal Luís Alves de Lima e Silva, marquês de Caxias, Brazilian commander in chief since October 1866 and allied commander in chief since January 1868 (replacing President Mitre), finally entered a largely deserted Asunción on 1 January 1869 and brought the war to an end. Or so they believed.

There was, however, a third phase to the war. Solano López escaped, formed a new army in the Cordillera east of Asunción, and began a guerrilla campaign. Caxias had returned to Brazil after the fall of Asunción (believing the mission accomplished!), and in March D Pedro appointed his son-in-law, Gastão de

Orléans, the conde d'Eu, commander of the allied forces. Solano López was defeated and his troops massacred in the last great battle of the war at Campo Grande or Acosta Nu, north-east of Asunción on 16 August 1869. Even now Solano López himself escaped capture. He and his Irish companion Eliza Alicia Lynch were pursued northwards by Brazilian troops for a further six months before he was finally cornered and killed at Cerro Cora in the extreme north-east of Paraguay on 1 March. The first contingents of voluntários da patria from Minas Gerais, Bahia and Pernambuco had already left Paraguay. They were received as war heroes on their arrival in Rio de Janeiro on 23 February (as was the conde d'Eu on 19 April). A preliminary peace treaty was signed on 27 July 1870.

Why did it take so long for the allies to bring the war to a successful conclusion despite their overwhelming naval and, at least after Tuiutí, military superiority? At the beginning of the war Mitre had boasted, famously, that the allies would be in Asunción within three months. In the event it was almost four years before the allies reached the Paraguayan capital. Even then the war dragged on for more than another year. The explanation lies, on the one hand, on the allied side, or rather on the Brazilian side, since after the first year or so Brazil fought the war practically alone. Brazilian governments faced enormous logistical problems, first organising, then transporting their troops thousands of kilometres either overland or by sea and up river, and finally supplying their troops. Breaking down Paraguay's excellent land and river defences was not an easy task but it is also true that Brazilian commanders demonstrated a high degree of strategic and tactical ineptitude. On the other hand, the Paraguayan troops, indeed the Paraguayan people, remained loyal to Solano López and fought with extraordinary tenacity and in the end, when national survival was at stake, heroically.

III

There is a myth – a powerful myth, originating in the writings of André Gunder Frank (*Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, 1967) and Eduardo Galeano (*As Veias Abertas da América Latina*, 1971) and developed by revisionist Latin American historians on both the Marxist Left and the nationalist Right in the 1970s and 1980s – that in the Paraguayan War or War of the Triple Alliance Brazil and Argentina were instruments of British capitalism, 'client states', 'neocolonies', prompted and manipulated by an 'imperialist' Britain, the 'indispensable fourth Ally', into waging war against Paraguay.⁸ Britain's

8 See, for example, L. Pomer, *La Guerra del Paraguay. Gran negocio!* (Buenos Aires, 1968; Port. trans. São Paulo, 1980); J.J. Chiavenatto, *Genocídio Americano: A Guerra do Paraguai* (São Paulo, 1979); J.A. Fornos Peñalba, 'The fourth ally: Great Britain and the War of the Triple Alliance', unpublished University of California PhD thesis, 1979. For an alternative view,

purpose allegedly was to undermine and destroy Paraguay's state-led, nationalist economic development 'model' created by Dr Francia and his successor Carlos Antonio López in the half century after independence, which supposedly posed a threat to the advance of its own liberal capitalist 'model' in the region. More specifically, the aim was to open up the one remaining closed economy in Latin America to British manufactured goods and British capital and to secure for Britain new sources of raw materials, especially cotton, since US supply had been disrupted by the Civil War.

It is an appealing and intellectually stimulating argument, but unfortunately there is little empirical evidence to support a thesis which demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding both of the nature of Britain's relationship with Brazil (and Argentina) and of British interests in Paraguay. Britain did not exercise the degree of control over Brazil (or Argentina) necessary to manipulate them into waging war against Paraguay, even had it so wished. There were those, not least among the British merchant community in Buenos Aires, who believed that Paraguay was an 'American China' of enormous potential for British trade and investment, but they constituted a small minority with little influence over British policy and their views were in any case scarcely credible. Paraguay was a remote, backward country with a population of no more than 400,000 of which little was known and which was of only marginal interest to the British government, British industrialists, British merchants or the City in the first half of the 19th century. There is no indication that interest in Paraguay as a market for British exports or source of raw materials increased in the 1860s. As for the British textile industry's dependence on imported cotton about which so much has been made in the literature, Britain had already located alternative sources to the American South – the British West Indies, Egypt and Brazil. Moreover, Britain had no wish to worsen existing quarrels in the Río de la Plata, much less promote war, which could only threaten the free navigation of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers, British trade and British lives and property.

On the actual course of events leading to war, from the Brazilian invasion of Uruguay in October 1864, with the acquiescence of Argentina, in defiance of the ultimatum issued by the Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano López to López's invasion of the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso in December and the Argentine province of Corrientes in April 1865, Britain had, it seems, little influence. British interests were obviously greater in Argentina and Brazil

see L. Bethell, 'O imperialismo britânico e a Guerra do Paraguai', in M.E. Castro Magalhães Marques (ed.), *A Guerra do Paraguai: 130 anos depois* (Rio de Janeiro: Editores Relume Dumará, 1995), pp. 131–64; reprinted in *Estudos Avançados* 9 (1995). See also J.C. Herken Krauer and María Giménez de Herken (Paraguayan historians), *Gran Bretaña y la Guerra de la Triple Alianza* (Asuncion, 1983); and most recently A. da Mota Menezes (a Brazilian historian), *A Guerra é Nossa. A Inglaterra não provocou a Guerra do Paraguai* (São Paulo, 2012).

than in Paraguay, and Edward Thornton, the British minister in Buenos Aires, who had responsibility for Paraguay, and British merchants on the spot, were critical of the Solano López regime, had contempt for the Paraguayans, generally blamed Paraguay for the war and favoured the allies, which has led to a great deal of misunderstanding. But the British government did nothing to encourage or promote war, was neutral throughout, did nothing actively to seek Paraguay's defeat and consistently used its influence in the interests of peace. It is true that British manufacturers sold arms and ammunition to the belligerents – i.e. in practice to Brazil and Argentina, since Paraguay quickly came under a Brazilian blockade. But this was business, an opportunity for private interests in Britain, as for that matter in France and Belgium, to do well out of a war. It is also true that the £7 million loan raised by Rothschilds for the Brazilian government in September 1865 was used to buy warships, and in this sense Britain made an important contribution to the eventual victory of the allies over Paraguay. However, no further loans were made to Brazil for the duration of the war. Carlos Marichal has calculated that British loans represented only 15 per cent of total expenditure by Brazil (and 20 per cent of total expenditure by Argentina) on the Paraguayan War.⁹

It is true that Britain made little effort to mediate but it is also true that neither Paraguay nor the allies were much interested in mediation. Britain had its own dispute with the Paraguayan government over its refusal to release British subjects held in Paraguay against their will (mainly because so many of them were essential to the Paraguayan war effort). After the summer of 1865 it was impossible to get out of Paraguay. On three occasions British warships went through the Brazilian blockade to reach trapped British subjects.¹⁰ But there was no great show of force or direct intervention on behalf of the allies. As British ministers insisted throughout, there was never the slightest danger of Britain itself being dragged into the Paraguayan War.

Finally, if Britain really had been as deeply involved in the Paraguayan War as some historians would have us believe, it was a well-kept secret at home. Sir Richard Burton, the British scholar and explorer, consul in Santos (1865–8) and author of *Explorations of the Highlands of Brazil* (2 vols., 1869), travelled to Paraguay to report on the war. Burton was in Paraguay twice; for three weeks in August to September 1868 and two weeks in April 1869. His excellent *Letters from the Battlefields of Paraguay* (1870), it is claimed, greatly influenced Conrad in the writing of *Nostromo*. Returning to Britain at the end of the war Burton found in London a 'blankness of face whenever the word Paraguay ... was named and a general confession of utter ignorance and hopeless lack of

9 C. Marichal, *A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: From Independence to the Great Depression, 1820–1929* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 92–3.

10 E.N. Tate, 'Britain and Latin America in the 19th century: the case of Paraguay, 1811–1870', *Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv* (1979), pp. 62–3.

interest'.¹¹ There is no avoiding the conclusion that the prime responsibility for the Paraguayan War lay with Brazil, Argentina, to a lesser extent Uruguay, and of course, most of all, sadly, Paraguay itself.

IV

The large number of Brazilian first-hand accounts of the war by Brazilians include *Reminiscências da Campanha do Paraguai, 1865–70* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1980) by General Dionísio Cerqueira; André Rebouças, *Diário: A guerra do Paraguai (1866)* (São Paulo: Instituto de Estudos Avançados da Universidade de São Paulo, 1973); and the various writings of Alfredo d'Escagnolle Taunay – *Em Matto Grosso (1866–7)*, *Marcha das forças (expedição de Matto Grosso: 1866–7)*, *Recordações de guerra e de viagem*, *Memórias* and, above all, *La retraite de Laguna* (see below). Equally valuable are the writings of Bartolomé Mitre, published as volumes 1–VI of the *Archivo del General Mitre* (Buenos Aires, 1911–13), and other Argentine and Paraguayan participants in the war. Accounts by foreign combatants and outside observers include, besides Sir Richard Burton, *Letters from the Battlefields of Paraguay* (1870) (see above), *The War in Paraguay* (1869) by Colonel George Thompson, the former British army officer and specialist in fortifications and entrenchment who was one of Solano López's senior military engineers until his capture by the allies in 1868; *Seven Eventful Years in Paraguay* (1869) by George Frederick Masterman, the young British military apothecary who directed the pharmaceutical services of the Paraguayan army until his arrest for plotting against Solano López in 1868; and *The History of Paraguay, With Notes of Personal Observations* (1871) by Charles Ames Washburn, who was US minister in Asuncion until his expulsion in 1868.

The war literature produced in Brazil during the Paraguayan War – novels such as *Amores de um voluntário*, plays like *Um herói do Riachuelo* performed at Teatro São José in São Paulo and *Os voluntários da honra* at the Teatro Santa Isabel in Recife – was not of a high quality. More interesting and of more lasting value was the literature not directly related to the war but reflecting an emerging Brazilian patriotism/nationalism. One of Brazil's greatest poets Castro Alves, who had enlisted as a *voluntário* in August 1865, aged 18, and served for four months, presented his play *Gonzaga ou a Revolução de Minas* based on the life of the 18th century *mineiro* poet Tomas A. Gonzaga at the Teatro São João in Salvador da Bahia in 1867. It enormously impressed José de Alencar and Machado de Assis ('o jovem Dante' they called him) and served as his passport to literary circle in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Famous for his poetry directed against slavery, Castro Alves also dedicated poems to the

11 R. Burton, *Letters from the Battlefields of Paraguay* (London, 1870), p. vii.

campaign to help orphans of the heroes of the war. At the end of the War Castro Alves published his first book of poems *Espumas Flutuantes* (1870), social realist in theme, romantic in sentiment, before his early death, aged 24, in 1871. Machado de Assis himself, like Alencar, was best known for articles, essays in newspapers, especially his *crônicas* in support of the War (up to the invasion of Paraguay) in the *Diário de Rio de Janeiro*, 1864–5. Alencar had published his famous novel *Iracema* in 1865, but Machado's great novels came later. However, John Gledson has made a good case for the influence of the Paraguayan War on Machado's novels, *Iaiá Garcia* (1878), *Bras Cubas* (1881), *Quincas Borba* (1891) and especially *Dom Casmurro* (1899).¹²

The one undoubtedly literary masterpiece produced by the war was Alfredo d'Escragnolle Taunay's *La retraite de Laguna*, an account of a failed Brazilian military operation in Mato Grosso early in 1867 by a then engineer, later novelist (*Inocência*, 1872) and historian. It was written and first published in French by the Imprensa Nacional in 1871. A Portuguese translation by Salvador de Mendonça followed in 1874. *La retirada de Laguna* stands with *Os sertões* (1902), on the Canudos rebellion in the interior of Bahia in 1897, by Euclides da Cunha, also an engineer, as one of the classic works of Brazilian literature. Another Brazilian classic, which has a great deal on both the origins and the conduct of the war is Joaquim Nabuco's biography of his father: *Um estadista do Império: Nabuco de Araújo [1898–99]* (5th edn., 2 vols., Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1997).

The war also generated an extraordinarily rich iconography. Best known perhaps is the work of Cândido López, the young painter from Buenos Aires who joined the Argentine forces at the outbreak of the war, lost his right arm at the battle of Curupaití, taught himself to paint with his left hand and spent the next 20 years painting in oil from earlier sketches and notes the scenes and especially the battles he had witnessed.¹³ Several Brazilian artists, notably Victor Meireles de Lima (*Batalha Naval de Riachuelo, Passagem de Humaitá*) and Pedro Américo de Figueiredo e Melo (the magnificent *Batalha do Avaí*, 10 x 5 metres) painted battle scenes, although unlike Cândido López they were trapped in the aesthetic of academic neoclassicism first introduced into Brazil by the French artistic mission of 1816. The Italian naval officer and amateur artist Edoardo de Martino, who arrived in Montevideo in 1864 and Rio de Janeiro in 1868, was commissioned by D. Pedro to accompany Admirals Tamandaré and Barroso and record the naval battles of the War. The Swiss-born Argentine Adolf Methfessel, the Argentine José Ignacio Garmendia,

12 J. Gledson, *The Deceptive Realism of Machado de Assis* (Liverpool: Francis Cairns, 1984), pp. 140–56.

13 See *Cândido López* (Buenos Aires: Colecciones del Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes, 1971), texts by Marta Gil Solá and Marta Dujovne, and *Cândido López* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Banco Velox, 1998), text by Marcelo Pacheco.

the Uruguayan Juan Manuel Blanes, the Paraguayans whose woodcuts were published in the illustrated journals *Cabichuí* and *El Centinela* – all left lasting images of the war. Most interesting, and useful, perhaps, is the work of two outstanding Brazilian caricaturists: the German-born Henrique Fleiuss, who had arrived in Brazil in 1858, aged 35, and the Italian-born Angelo Agostini, who had arrived in Brazil in 1859, aged 16. Fleiuss's work appeared in *Semanas Ilustradas*, Rio de Janeiro's (and Brazil's) first great illustrated weekly (1860–76). Agostini's work, even more brilliant and certainly more savage, appeared first in *O Diabo Coxo* (1864) and *O Cabrião* (1866–7) in São Paulo, then in *O Arlequim* (1867) and, beginning in 1868, in *Vida Fluminense* (1868–75), both published in Rio de Janeiro – and later in *Revista Ilustrada* (1876–98).¹⁴

The Paraguayan War was the first South American war to be recorded by photographers. Photographs were the basis for the lithographs published in the illustrated press in Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro and European capitals as well as a key source for historical paintings. We do not have a complete visual record of the Paraguayan War of the kind provided by Mathew Bray and his assistants, notably Alexander Gardner, for the American Civil War. The firm of Bate & Co., established by the Irish-born American photojournalist George Thomas Bate in Montevideo (Bate & Co. W. after it was sold to Bate's Belgian partner Juan Vander Weyde in May 1866), was a pioneer in battlefield photography in the early years of the war. A collection of the work of Javier López and his assistant can be found in the Biblioteca Nacional in Montevideo. The Brazilian government sent photographers to document the later stages of the war. See the album of Carlos César *Recordações de la Guerra do Paraguay* on the siege of Humaitá and two albums by unidentified photographers *Lembranças do Paraguay* and *Excursões ao Paraguay* on the occupation of Asunción in the Biblioteca Nacional in Rio de Janeiro.¹⁵

During the war there was an outpouring of patriotic music – hymns and songs such as *Hino da guerra*, *Hino da vitória*, *Vitória ou morte*, *Viva o Brasil*, *Os voluntários da pátria*, *A vitória de Paissandú*, *Os vencedores*, *Aliança triunfante ou Queda do tirano López*, etc.¹⁶ But the most remarkable musical creation in

14 See H. Lima, *História da Caricatura no Brasil* (4 vols., Rio de Janeiro, 1963), vol. 1, and M.C. Silveira, *A Batalha de Papel. A Guerra do Paraguai através da caricatura* (Porto Alegre: L & PM Editores, 1996).

15 On the iconography of the Paraguayan War, see M.A. Cuarterolo, *Soldados de la Memoria. Hombres e imágenes de la Guerra del Paraguay* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Planeta, 2000) and 'Images of war: photographers and sketch artists of the Triple Alliance Conflict' in H. Kraay and T.L. Whigham (eds.), *I Die with My Country, Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); Andre Meneses Toral, *Imagens em desordem. A iconografia da Guerra do Paraguay (1864–1870)* (São Paulo: Humanitas, 2001); and, most important, Ricardo Salles, *Guerra do Paraguai. Memorias e Imagens* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Biblioteca Nacional, 2003).

16 See M. de Moura Reis, *A Música Militar no Brasil do século XIX* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Militar, 1952), which has an entire section on 'patriotic songs of the Paraguayan War'.

this period, though only indirectly related to the war, was the opera *Il Guarany* by Antônio Carlos Gomes, Brazil's (and Latin America's) greatest 19th century composer. Very much influenced by Verdi, it was written in Italy, where Gomes spent the entire period of the war. However, based on the novel *O Guarani* (1857) by José de Alencar which was set in 16th-century colonial Brazil, its theme was nativist. It was first performed at La Scala, Milan on 19 March 1870 (less than three weeks after the end of the war), but then nine months later (2 December) at the Teatro Lírico Fluminense in Rio de Janeiro. Neither performance included the Sinfonia overture which was added in 1871 and became a second Brazilian national anthem. *O Guarani* was a huge success in Europe and throughout the Americas and has remained in the repertoire ever since.

Towards the end of the war, on 3 May 1869, a few days before his 40th birthday, Louis Moreau Gottschalk, a native of New Orleans, the greatest North American composer and virtuoso pianist of the 19th century, arrived in Rio de Janeiro at the end of his first South American tour. Hugely popular throughout the Americas for his romantic compositions for orchestra, orchestra and piano and solo piano and his lively, syncopated piano pieces (50 years before ragtime), he had visited Lima and Santiago before spending two years between Montevideo and Buenos Aires – both countries at war. He found in Rio what he regarded as the most vigorous musical scene in the New World. His first concert, on 3 June, at the Teatro Lírico Fluminense in the presence of the Emperor D. Pedro and members of royal family, like many subsequent concerts during next three months, was sold out. For his first *concerto monstro* à la Berlioz on 5 October he arranged music (including his own) for 16 pianos, 32 pianists and two orchestras. And for the 'biggest concert ever' at the Teatro Lírico Fluminense, on 24 November, he employed 650 performers and nine bands (fewer in fact than he had gathered together for a concert in the Grand Tacón theatre in Havana in 1860). The concert ended, to huge public acclaim, with his *Grande fantaisie triomphale sur l'hymne national bresilien* (op. 69) for solo piano work composed in Brazil and his *Gran Marcha Solemne*, composed in Santiago for a Chilean audience, but re-worked first in Buenos Aires, then in Rio de Janeiro, with the help of the Brazilian pianist Arthur Napoleão. It was dedicated to the Emperor and re-titled, significantly, *Humaitá*. The concert was due to be repeated two days later. In the meantime, at a regular concert at the Sociedade Filarmônica Fluminense on 25 November, immediately

Vinícius Mariano de Carvalho is engaged on a study of the military bands and the music they played during the Paraguayan War. For example, five pieces composed by Filipe Neri de Barcellos, band master of the 7th battalion of Voluntários da Pátria dated February 1866 were discovered in the Biblioteca Nacional in Rio de Janeiro: *O rompante de Lopes*, *O attaque do Riachuelo*, *O explendido triunfo de Urugayanna*, *Hymno de Glória (O Imperador do Brasil)* and *A patiada aos paraguays*. See V.M. de Carvalho and R. McMahon, *Military Music in the War of the Triple Alliance: Explanatory Notes and Revealed Manuscripts*, unpublished MS.

after playing one of his most popular compositions *Tremolo* on his favourite Chickering grand piano imported from Boston, Gottschalk faltered at the start of a work entitled *Morte!* (op. 60) and collapsed over the keyboard. He died three weeks later on 18 December at Bennett's Hotel in Tijuca, four years to the day after the death of Francisco Manoel da Silva, the composer of Brazil's national anthem.¹⁷

V

The Paraguayan War was for Paraguay an almost unqualified disaster.¹⁸ In the event Paraguay survived as an independent state, although in the immediate post-war period under Brazilian occupation and tutelage. (2,000 Brazilian troops and six Brazilian warships were only finally withdrawn in July 1876.) The ultimate consequence of total defeat – total dismemberment – was avoided, but its territory was reduced by 40 per cent. What was left of Paraguay's army was disarmed, its famous and formidable river fortifications permanently dismantled. Although population loss has been grossly exaggerated – even put as high as 60 or 70 per cent of Paraguay's (usually inflated) pre-war population, more modest recent estimates of 15–20 per cent of a much smaller pre-war population, i.e. 50–80,000 deaths, in battle as well as from disease (measles, small pox, yellow fever and cholera), are enormously high percentages by the standards of any modern war.¹⁹ Paraguay's economy was left in ruins, its manufacturing base and infrastructure destroyed, the beginnings

17 On Gottschalk, see S.F. Starr, *Bamboula! The Life and Times of Louis Moreau Gottschalk* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), re-issued in paperback as *Louis Moreau Gottschalk* (Urbana, Ill., 2000). Gottschalk's autobiography, *Notes of a Pianist*, ed. and trans. from the original French by his sister Clara Gottschalk Peterson (Philadelphia, 1881), covers his tours of the West Indies, 1857–62, the United States, 1862–65 and South America, 1865–68.

Unfortunately, it ends before his visit to Brazil in 1869. On the last seven months of his life in Rio de Janeiro, see 'Vida y muerte de Louis Moreau Gottschalk en Rio de Janeiro (1869)', *Revista de Estudios Musicales*, Universidad de Cuyo, I, August 1950, vol. II nos 5 & 6, December 1950/April 1951 by the German born Uruguayan scholar Francisco Curt Lange. See also, J.M. de Carvalho, 'Gottschalk: Glória e Morte de um pianista no Rio', in *Pontes e Bordados. Escritas de história e política* (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 1998).

18 See J. Hoyt Williams, *The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 1800–1870* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979), the best history of the Paraguayan republic up to and including the war since E. Cardozo, *Paraguay independiente* (1949); H.G. Warren, *Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: the Postwar Decade 1869–1878* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978).

19 On the much debated question of Paraguay's losses and the demographic impact of the War, see V. Blinn Reber, 'The demographics of Paraguay: a reinterpretation of the Great War, 1864–70', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 68, (1988) and 'Critique' by T.L. Whigham and B. Potthast, *HAHR*, 70 (1990); and a later exchange of views between Reber, Whigham, Potthast and J.M.G. Kleinpenning, in *Latin American Research Review*, 37 (2002). See also V. Blinn Reber, 'A case of total war: Paraguay, 1865–1870', *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies*, 5 (1999).

of development outwards through greater trade and closer integration into the world capitalist economy set back a generation. Finally, a huge indemnity was imposed by the victors, although this was never collected and eventually cancelled (not, however, in the case of Brazil until the Second World War).

Argentina suffered estimated (possibly exaggerated) losses of 18,000 in battle, plus 5,000 in internal disturbances triggered by the war and 12,000 in cholera epidemics. The territory it gained fell short of its ambitions. In the treaty it finally signed with Paraguay in February 1876 it secured Misiones and the Chaco Central between the rivers Bermejo and Pilcomayo. Astute Brazilian diplomacy kept Argentina out of the Northern Chaco between the rivers Pilcomayo and Verde. (This area Argentina was persuaded to submit to arbitration, and in November 1878 US President Rutherford Hayes awarded it to Paraguay.) Nevertheless, an increasingly strong, potentially expansionist Paraguay had been removed from the politics of the Río de la Plata. On balance the war had contributed positively to national consolidation: Entre Ríos and Corrientes had not broken ranks; *motonero* rebellions in various provinces had been suppressed; Buenos Aires was accepted as the undisputed capital of a united Argentine republic; Argentine national identity had been considerably strengthened. The ground had been laid for Argentina's remarkable economic, social and political transformation during the following half century.

Brazil, which had made the major contribution to the war effort, suffered human losses totaling at least 50,000 in combat, and more from disease, though fewer than the total of 100,000 sometimes claimed. The financial cost of the war put a great strain on Brazil's public finances. Brazil had, however, successfully realised all its objectives. Under the treaty signed with Paraguay in January 1872 Brazil gained all the territory it claimed between the Rio Apa and the Rio Branco. Argentina had also gained territory but had been kept out of the northern Chaco. Free navigation of the rivers Paraguay and Paraná, important to Mato Grosso and western São Paulo, had been secured. And Paraguay itself, even more than Uruguay, was now firmly under Brazilian influence and control. Brazil had consolidated for the time being its undisputed regional hegemony, although rivalry with Argentina would continue long after the fall of the empire in 1889.

The war had a profound impact on the Brazilian economy, society and politics. It had stimulated Brazilian industry, directly in the case of cotton textile mills (for army uniforms) and Rio's arsenal, indirectly as a result of the protectionism provided by the higher general import tariffs imposed to finance government deficits. The war also modernised Brazil's infrastructure and rudimentary state organisation, which suddenly and unexpectedly became responsible for the recruitment, training, clothing, arming and transportation of a large standing army engaged in a war beyond Brazil's borders.

At the same time the war sharpened social tensions in Brazil in a number of ways – the inevitable result of mass mobilisation (and, after the war, demobilisation). It is not easy to disentangle the impact of the emancipation of the slaves in the United States (and other international influences and pressures at the time, notably from Great Britain and France) from the impact of the Paraguayan War itself – justified as a war between civilisation and barbarism – in explaining the beginnings of a change in the intellectual and political climate in Brazil on the issue of slavery. The fact is that it was necessary, as we have seen, to offer freedom to the several thousand slaves recruited to fight in the war. Moreover, prompted by the emperor, various projects for the gradual, though even now not immediate, abolition of slavery in Brazil were brought before the Council of State during the early years of the war. At the same time the war provided a reason, or a pretext, for delaying any significant steps towards the final abolition of slavery in Brazil. Nevertheless, the ground was prepared for at least a law of free birth, introduced and passed in 1871 immediately after the war (see Essay 4).

The Paraguayan War also stimulated discussion of political reform in Brazil. The conflict between on the one hand Caxias, the Brazilian commander in chief from October 1866 (and from January 1868 the allied commander) and a leading Conservative politician, and on the other Zacarias, Liberal prime minister again from August 1866, dominated the middle years of the war, and raised for the first time in Brazil the question of civilian control of the military. It culminated in the socalled Conservative 'coup' of July 1868 (which was also aimed at slowing down progress towards abolition).²⁰ Zacarias's resignation, however, led directly to the formation of various new Radical and Liberal centres and clubs, many of them close to the conde d'Eu, the emperor's French son-in-law, commander of the Brazilian forces in Paraguay in the final stages of the war (from March 1869) and a well-known Liberal (and opponent of slavery). A Reform Manifesto (May 1869) raised a wide range of political and constitutional issues and proposed among other things greater autonomy for the judiciary, limited tenure for senators, a reduction of the powers of the Council of State and slave emancipation. This was followed in November 1869 by a Radical manifesto, which added to the reform agenda an extension of the suffrage, the election of provincial presidents and an end to the Emperor's 'moderating power' (used to remove Zacarias from power), and in December 1870 a Republican manifesto and the formation of the Republican party.

20 On domestic politics in Brazil during the Paraguayan War, see R. Graham, 'Brazil from the middle of the nineteenth century to the Paraguayan War', in L. Bethell (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 789–91, and Jeffrey D. Needell, *The Party of Order: the Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831–1871* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), ch. 5 & 6.

The Paraguayan War also produced for the first time in Brazil a modern, professional army that aspired to play a political role and was increasingly dissatisfied with Brazil's existing political institutions.²¹ The link between the Paraguayan War, the *questão militar* in the 1870s and 1880s and the military coup of November 1889 that overthrew the empire and established a republic in Brazil, only 18 months after the abolition of slavery, is too well known to require elaboration here. For many Brazilian historians Brazil's victory in the Paraguayan War represents a division of the waters in the history of the slave-based monarchy, both its apogee and the beginning of its decline – something therefore of a Pyrrhic victory.

21 On the militarisation of politics and the politicisation of the military in Brazil during the war, see W. Peres Costa, *A Espada de Damocles: o exército, a Guerra do Paraguai e a crise do império* (São Paulo, 1996); V. Izecksohn, *O Cerne da Discordia. A Guerra do Paraguai e o Núcleo Profissional do Exército* (Rio de Janeiro, 2002); and F. Doratioto, *General Osório. A espada liberal do Império* (São Paulo, 2008).

4. The decline and fall of slavery in Brazil (1850–88)*

I

In the middle of the 19th century between six and seven million Africans and African-Americans were held in slavery in the three remaining major slave societies in the Americas, more than twice as many as there had been at the time of the first emancipation of slaves in some of the former British colonies in North America during the last quarter of the 18th century and Haiti, the former French colony of St Domingue, in 1804. Most of the Spanish American republics had abolished slavery in the period during and immediately after the wars of independence, Britain in its Caribbean colonies in 1834 and France in its colonies in 1848. There were, however, in the United States four million slaves (compared with half a million at the time of independence in 1776 and under one million in 1800, though now entirely concentrated in the states of the South and ‘border South’), in Brazil between two and two and a half million (compared with under one million in 1800 and between one and one and a half million at the time of independence in 1822) and in the Spanish colony of Cuba 300–400,000 (compared with under 200,000 in 1800). The increase in the number of slaves since 1800 was, above all, a result of the expansion of production for world markets of cotton in the American South, coffee in the south-east of Brazil and sugar in Cuba. Slavery was abolished in the United States during and immediately after the American Civil War (1861–5) – when the slave population was at its peak.¹ It was not, however,

* This essay is a revised and expanded version of ‘Joaquim Nabuco e a abolição da escravidão no Brasil em perspectiva internacional’, in *Joaquim Nabuco no mundo: abolicionista, jornalista, diplomata* (Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias, 2016), ch. 2, pp. 49–117, which drew on ‘Introdução’ (with J. Murilo de Carvalho), in *Joaquim Nabuco e os abolitionistas britânicos: Correspondência 1880–1905* (Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 2008).

1 Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation (1 January 1863) declared slaves in Confederate states in rebellion against the Union free, but could be applied only as and when these states came under the control of the Union. Lincoln’s proposed Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, to give permanence and constitutionality to the abolition of slavery throughout the United States, was approved by the Senate in June 1864 and the House of Representatives in January 1865, but not ratified by the required number of states (27 of the then 36 states) until December 1865, eight months after the end of the Civil War (and Lincoln’s assassination).

abolished in Cuba until 1880–6² and in Brazil until 1888 – in each case after the protracted decline of the slave population.³

The annual injection of new slaves from Africa through the transatlantic slave trade was largely responsible for the steady growth of the slave population during the first half of the 19th century in Brazil (unlike that of the United States where the slave trade was effectively abolished in 1808 and the slave population reproduced itself internally). More than two million African slaves were imported into Brazil between 1800 and 1850⁴, three-quarters of a million or more during the 1830s and 1840s when the trade was entirely illegal under the terms of the Anglo-Brazilian treaty of November 1826 (which the newly independent empire had been required to sign as the price of British recognition and support and which declared the Brazilian trade illegal three years after the treaty's ratification, i.e. in March 1830) and the Brazilian law of 7 November 1831 (which prohibited the importation of slaves into Brazil). In spite of persistent British diplomatic pressure to persuade Brazil to fulfill its treaty obligations, successive Brazilian governments proved largely unable or unwilling to enforce the 1831 law. The efforts of the British navy to suppress slavery on the high seas were restricted by limited powers and, even after the passage of the notorious Aberdeen Act in 1845, limited resources. Finally, however, the British government's decision in 1850 to permit the British navy to enter Brazilian territorial waters and ports in pursuit of illegal slave ships, in blatant violation of Brazilian sovereignty, was largely responsible for persuading the Brazilian government to enact new legislation against the slave trade and for the first time effectively to enforce it.⁵ (See Essay 2.)

- 2 In January 1880 the Spanish parliament, which had ended slavery in Puerto Rico in 1873, abolished slavery in Cuba, but slaves were to remain for eight years under a system of *patronato*. Like apprenticeship in the British Caribbean after abolition in 1834, it guaranteed the continued labour of ex-slaves for a limited period. The *patronato* system was ended 15 months early in October 1886.
- 3 There are three recent general studies of abolition in the Americas: D. Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); S. Drescher, *Abolition: a History of Slavery and Anti-Slavery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); R. Blackburn, *The American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation and Human Rights* (London: Verso, 2011) – all excellent books, but it is fair to say not at their strongest on Brazil.
- 4 Since the first scholarly attempt to calculate the size of the transatlantic slave trade to the Americas, P. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), the figures have generally been revised upwards, especially for Brazil. See H. S. Klein, *The Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; 2nd edn. 2010); D. Eltis, 'The volume and structure of the transatlantic slave trade: a reassessment', *William and Mary Quarterly* (January 2001); and D. Eltis and D. Richardson (eds.), *Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).
- 5 On the abolition of the slave trade, see L. Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question 1807–1869* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). On the revisionist literature since 1970, see J.D. Needell, 'The abolition of

The final suppression of the transatlantic slave trade by the Brazilian government in 1850–1 dealt a decisive blow to the institution of slavery in Brazil, such was its dependence on massive inflows of new slaves from Africa each year. In contrast to the United States where the slave population grew three or four times between the ending of the slave trade and the outbreak of the Civil War, in Brazil the slave population entered a period of decline immediately after the abolition of the trade: birth rates were lower than in the American South (in part because of the sex ratio within the slave population, itself a reflection of the slave system's previous dependence on the external supply of slaves, mostly male); mortality rates were higher (in part because of ill treatment but more because of Brazil's disease and nutritional environment). Brazil also had a long history of both slave manumission and *quilombos* [settlements of fugitive slaves]. Nevertheless, in 1866–7, when Agostinho Marques Perdigão Malheiro published his great study *A Escravidão no Brasil: ensaio histórico, jurídico e social*, there were still, he calculated, 1,700,000 slaves in Brazil. Brazil's first national census in 1872 indicated a slave population of 1,500,000. Slaves, however, constituted only 15 per cent of Brazil's total population (compared with some 30–40 per cent during the first half of the 19th century for which there are no precise figures).

Since 1850, driven by demand for labour and relative slave prices, there had also been a significant re-location of Brazil's slave population through an inter-provincial trade (5–6,000 per year for 20 years) from the north and north-east, and to a lesser extent the south, to the centre-south where three provinces – 'as províncias negreiras da nação' – Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and São Paulo – now accounted for more than half of the total slave population. There had also been an intra-provincial trade, including within the Centre-South itself, from the cities to the countryside (in Rio de Janeiro, which had been more a city characterised by slavery than, for example, New Orleans or Havana and where in mid century 40–50 per cent of the population were slaves, the slave population had declined to less than 20 per cent), from less profitable small and medium-sized farms to large plantations, from subsistence and nonexport agriculture to plantation agriculture, especially the production of coffee, and from declining coffee areas in the Paraíba valley to expanding coffee areas in the interior of São Paulo province, where there were actually more slaves than there had been 20 years before.⁶ Slaves, however, could still be found in every

the Brazilian slave trade in 1850: historiography, slave agency and statesmanship', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 33 (2001).

6 On the internal slave trade after the abolition of the transatlantic trade, see R. Graham, 'Another middle passage? The internal slave trade in Brazil' and R.W. Slenes, 'The Brazilian internal slave trade, 1850–1888: regional economies, slave experience and the politics of a peculiar market', in W. Johnson (ed.), *The Chattel Principle: Internal Slave Trades in the Americas* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).

province, north and south (there were no 'free-soil' provinces in Brazil), in both urban and rural areas and in both export and non-export agriculture. Unlike the United States before Civil War, slavery in Brazil remained a *national* institution deeply embedded in the economy, society and culture of the entire country.

Slavery in Brazil in 1870 was not doomed inevitably to wither away – at least not in the short and even medium term. It remained highly profitable – as it had been in the American South before the Civil War. There were no signs of a weakening of the Brazilian slave owners' commitment to slave labour. Slave owners were not consciously turning to free labour from preference, nor yet from necessity, despite the rising cost of slave labour and the beginnings of a problem of slave supply. There was no attempt at a significant mobilisation of free and freed labour in nonexport and subsistence agriculture which now represented over 80 per cent of the rural labour force in the country as a whole (compared with less than 50 per cent in 1822) for work on plantations. Nor was there yet any significant attempt to attract European immigrants to Brazilian agriculture. And slave-owners and their political representatives in parliament – both Conservative and Liberal – had no difficulty justifying slavery. Compared with the American South, there was less of an ideological commitment to slavery as a permanent institution, fewer rationalisations founded on race and identity in Brazil, where over 40 per cent of the total population in the 1872 census was free black or mulatto, but the economic imperatives sustaining slavery were just as strong. How was a free labour market to be organised in conditions of an open frontier and free, unoccupied or only nominally appropriated land, especially in the regions growing coffee, which accounted for 60–70 per cent of Brazil's exports? Moreover, with access to land, a good deal of spatial mobility and therefore alternative survival strategies, why would small producers, tenants and squatters of various kinds, or rural labourers and peasants sell their labour and submit themselves to the harsh discipline of plantation agriculture which had always been served by and associated with slave labour?

As always, since José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva's *Representação* to the Constituent Assembly in 1823 arguing in favour of an end to the slave trade and the gradual emancipation of the slaves, there were in Brazil individual voices denouncing slavery on the grounds of its injustice and its supposed economic inefficiency (for example, Aurélio Cândido Tavares Bastos in *Cartas do solitário*, 1863), but no widely-held abolitionist opinion. There were a few short-lived philanthropic associations formed to accelerate the processes by which slaves secured their freedom through manumission, but no organised abolitionist movement, no popular mobilisation first against the slave trade, then against the institution of slavery, of the kind seen in Britain and the

United States earlier in the century. The Brazilian parliament had rejected a bill introduced by Pedro Pereira da Silva Guimarães in 1852, immediately after the suppression of the slave trade, for the gradual emancipation of the slaves, beginning with freeing of children born to slave mothers, and afterwards it had been silent on the issue for more than a decade and a half.

II

It was the Emperor D. Pedro II who put the future of slavery on the political agenda for the first time in the mid 1860s. He had come to the view that slavery in Brazil could no longer be justified, and that its evident decline since the end of the slave trade should be accelerated, though in a gradual, controlled fashion so as to ensure the minimum of economic and social dislocation. He was also keenly aware of Brazil's increasing international isolation on this issue: all the Spanish American republics had abolished slavery by this time, and the expected ratification of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution (approved by the Senate in June 1864 and the House of Representatives in January 1865) would finally end slavery throughout the United States. At the same time, the British government never ceased to demand information on the fate of the so-called *emancipados* (the slaves liberated by the Anglo-Portuguese and Anglo-Brazilian mixed courts in Rio de Janeiro from 1819 to 1845) and *Africanos livres* (illegally imported slaves captured and liberated by the Brazilian authorities under the law of November 1831 and more particularly in the years immediately after the passage of the law of September 1850) for whom the Brazilian government was responsible. (In September 1864, under intense British pressure, some 5,000 remaining *Africanos livres*, including *emancipados*, still held in conditions of semi-slavery were granted letters of emancipation.) More serious because it threatened the very existence of slavery in Brazil, the British government never ceased to insist that all Africans illegally imported since 1830 when the Anglo-Brazilian treaty of 1826 came into effect, together with their children and grandchildren, were legally free. The refusal to repeal the Aberdeen Act of 1845 and the so-called 'Christie affair', the British blockade of Rio de Janeiro (December 1862–January 1863), although unauthorised and repudiated, were reminders that Britain was always capable of resorting to force in its dealings with Brazil on issues relating to slavery (see Essay 2).

D. Pedro's instructions to Zacarias de Góis e Vasconcelos, the newly appointed Liberal-Progressive president of the Council of Ministers in January 1864 began:

Events in the American Union require us to think about the future of slavery in Brazil, so that what occurred in respect to the slave trade does not happen again to us. The measure which seems to me the most efficacious is that of freeing the children of slaves who are born a certain number of years from the present.⁷

7 Quoted in H. Lyra, *História do Império de Dom Pedro II* (3 vols, São Paulo 1940), vol. II, pp. 235–6; R.J. Barman, *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825–91* (Stanford:

In April 1865, the month the American Civil War ended, the emperor invited a well-known jurist and close associate Senator José Antônio Pimenta Bueno, the visconde de São Vicente, to draft legislation not only to improve the condition of the slaves but to move towards gradual abolition by the end of the century. The most important of the five draft bills he submitted in January 1866 proposed that children born to slave mothers would henceforth be free, but it found little support in the Conservative cabinet headed by the Marquês de Olinda, who had replaced Zacarias as Prime Minister.

The main reason (or excuse) offered for inaction was Brazil's involvement since the end of 1864 in the war (with Argentina and Uruguay) against the López dictatorship in Paraguay. Nevertheless, in August 1866 a new government led by Zacarias caused a political commotion by stating in a reply to an appeal from the Comité Français d'Emancipation, drafted with the emperor's full knowledge, that 'the emancipation of the slaves, a necessary consequence of the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, is therefore only a question of form and opportunity'. In October, as the shortage of manpower in the war became critical, and despite deep divisions in the Council of State on the issue, the decision was taken to free state-owned slaves [*escravos da nação*], slaves owned by the Church and religious orders and, finally, privately owned slaves to serve in the army, although no undue pressure was brought to bear on slave-owning *fazendeiros* [plantation owners] because of the needs of Brazilian agriculture and in the end only a few thousand slaves were liberated for military service (see Essay 3). In his *Fala do Throno* in May 1867, which Joaquim Nabuco later described as coming 'like a bolt of lightning in a cloudless sky',⁸ D. Pedro repeated his view that the issue of the 'servile element' would have to be dealt with at the appropriate time, although agriculture, 'our leading industry', would be safeguarded and existing property rights (that is to say, ownership of slaves, including slaves imported after 1830) would be respected.

A committee of the Council of State was established and charged with consolidating Pimenta Bueno's various drafts into a single bill whose main feature would be the liberation of children born of slave mothers. Its chairman was senator José Thomaz Nabuco de Araújo, one of the few prominent politicians in Brazil opposed to slavery at the time. As Minister of Justice (1853–7) he had been responsible for the repression of the last, desperate attempts to import slaves into Brazil. In July 1868, however, a political crisis led to yet another change of government. The emperor, anxious about the lack of progress in the war against Paraguay, removed Zacarias and called upon the Conservative Visconde de Itaboraí to form a government. Itaboraí was totally

Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 195. Further research is needed on the impact of the end of slavery in the United States during the Civil War on the future of slavery in Brazil.

⁸ J. Nabuco, *O Abolicionismo* (London, 1883); English translation *Abolitionism: the Brazilian Anti-Slavery Struggle*, R. Conrad (ed.) (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1977), p. 49.

opposed to abolition, and there would be no further discussion of the slavery question for the next two years.

The political crisis of 1868, however, revitalised the reform wing of the Liberal party. Nabuco de Araújo denounced the 'coup d'état' that led to Itaboraí's appointment. He helped found the radical Liberal newspaper *A Reforma*, which adopted an anti-slavery stance, and in 1869, with other reform-minded Liberals, established the Centro Liberal, which, although its main objective was electoral reform, included in its programme slave emancipation – the first political organisation in Brazil to do so. At the same time, a number of associations aiming to encourage and assist the emancipation of slaves were formed: according to Angela Alonso, in what she refers to as the 'first cycle of abolitionist mobilisation' in Brazil, 25 associations were formed between 1869 and 1871 in 11 of the 20 provinces of the empire.⁹ Nevertheless, international pressure was unrelenting. In 1869 the International Abolitionist Association based in Paris sent a message to 'the people of Brazil' encouraging them to end slavery, 'the disgrace of mankind', once and for all.

The war with Paraguay ended in March 1870 and in May of the same year Itaboraí resisted pressure from the emperor to move forward on the slavery question, and resigned. In July the Spanish Cortes passed legislation freeing all slaves over 60 and children born of slave mothers since the Liberal revolution and the beginning of the Ten Years War for Cuban independence in 1868. In March 1871 D. Pedro finally found a Conservative politician, José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the visconde do Rio Branco, willing to form an administration that would bring before the Brazilian parliament a bill to free children born of slave mothers. After a long and bitter series of debates throughout June, July and August, during which Conservative and Liberal pro-slavery deputies received dozens of representations from slave-owners throughout the country, organised for the first time in defence of slavery, the bill was finally passed in the Chamber of Deputies on 28 August with 61 (Conservative and Liberal) votes in favour and 35 (mostly dissident Conservatives) voting against. When the bill came before the Senate on 27 September only four senators voted against, though many more were absent. It was approved by the Princess Regent Isabel in the absence of the emperor, who was travelling in Europe at the time, and became law on 28 September 1871.¹⁰

9 A. Alonso, *Flores, votos e balas: o movimento abolicionista brasileira (1868–88)* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2015), pp. 68, 436–7.

10 On the debate and the vote on the Law of Free Birth (1871), see J.M. de Carvalho, *A Construção da Ordem, Teatro de Sombras* (2nd edn., Rio de Janeiro; Editora UFRJ/Relume Dumará, 1996), pp. 280–90; Barman, *Citizen Emperor* ch. 7; J.D. Needell, *The Party of Order: the Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831–1871* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 284–303.

By cutting off the internal supply of slaves – no-one could now be born a slave in Brazil – 20 years after the suppression of the transatlantic slave trade had cut off the external supply, the *Lei de Ventre Livre* [Law of Free Birth] condemned slavery to *eventual* extinction. The clock was set ticking on the end of slavery in Brazil. No single slave, however, had been emancipated. Moreover, the children born of slave mothers [*ingênuos*], though nominally free, were to remain with their masters until they were eight years old (at which point they would be freed, and handed over to the state for protection, with payment of compensation to their owners in government bonds) or, as proved to be more common, continue in semi-slavery until they reached the age of 21, their owners compensated by their labour up to that time. Thus the law implicitly recognised the slave owner's right to indemnification if and when slavery were eventually abolished. A modest Emancipation Fund aimed at stimulating the voluntary emancipation of slaves by their owners and the self-purchase of freedom by the slaves themselves, which owners were now obliged by law to permit if full remuneration were offered, was slow to be established. In the 10 years after 1871, the number of slaves freed under the new law (less than one per cent) was not significantly greater than the number regularly freed each year during the previous two decades. Finally, the Law of 1871 provided for a national register of all existing slaves.¹¹ As many politicians and slave-owners had anticipated in supporting it, however reluctantly, the law thus recognised the legitimacy of *existing* slave property, posed no *immediate* threat to it, and ended once and for all, in favour of the slave owners, the debate on whether slaves imported since 1830/1831, and their descendants, were legally free. The passage of the 1871 law and the 1872 national register of slaves ended further debate in parliament on the slavery issue for almost a decade.

III

During the 1870s the Brazilian slave population continued its steady, albeit relatively slow, decline: in 1879 there were still one and a quarter million slaves in Brazil (15 per cent of the population). But, as a result of the intensification of the inter-provincial slave trade from the north-east and now from Ceará, which was suffering from severe drought, to the centre-south – it had reached 10,000 per year¹² – the regional concentration of slavery was further accentuated. By the end of the decade slaves constituted less than ten per cent of the population in more than half of Brazil's provinces, less than five per cent in more than a quarter (mostly in the north, the south and the centre-west), the level at which

11 See Beatriz Gallotti Mamigonian, 'O Estado nacional e a instabilidade da propriedade escrava: a Lei de 1831 e a matrícula dos escravos de 1872', *Almanack*, Guarulhos (2011), pp. 20–37 and *Africanos livres*, ch. 10 'Registro de escravidão e da liberdade'.

12 Slenes, 'The Brazilian internal slave trade', pp. 330–1.

the northern states in the United States had opted for emancipation a hundred years earlier. Like the progressive decline of the slave population of working age, the decline of the slave population as a proportion of the total population, the intra-provincial slave trade (progressively emptying the cities of slaves, leaving an urban population without a strong commitment to the survival of slavery), the inter-provincial slave trade contributed to hastening the end of slavery by reducing the number of provinces that would be adversely affected by its abolition and thus making it more vulnerable to attack nationally. In December 1880 and January 1881 the provincial assemblies of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and São Paulo were sufficiently concerned that whole areas of Brazil were becoming 'free soil', a haven for fugitive slaves and a base for abolitionism, that they imposed crippling taxes on the importation of slaves. This virtually brought the inter-provincial trade to an end, although it only became illegal throughout Brazil with the passage of the Sexagenarian Law in September 1885 (see below).

The north-east, where two thirds of Brazil's slave population was located in 1822, had by now fewer slaves than, for example, the province of Minas Gerais. In Pernambuco and especially Bahia, there were sugar planters who retained hundreds, in some cases thousands, of slaves. There had, however, been little recent investment in slaves; the existing slave population, unable to renew itself, was ageing fast. In Pernambuco, however, there was an adequate supply of alternative 'free' labour which was now being tapped. While not actively promoting its final collapse, many planters in the north-east no longer regarded the survival of the slave system as a matter of life and death. Die-hard slavocrats were mostly to be found in the centre-south, especially in the older, declining regions of coffee production in Rio de Janeiro province and southern Minas Gerais. There, many landowners had invested recently and heavily in slaves (through purchase at high prices and through maintenance); their slaves were younger than those in the north-east and potentially mobile (that is to say, given the opportunity ready to move to new areas of coffee production in São Paulo); and no adequate, cheap alternative free labour force was readily available.

On the new, expanding coffee frontier in the north and west of São Paulo province the problem was more complex. Fazendeiros there, producing coffee for a buoyant world market, found themselves in an unprecedented situation: for the first time in the history of Brazil slavery could no longer supply the labour needs of the most dynamic sector of the economy. Slaves were increasingly difficult to obtain, increasingly expensive to buy and maintain, and now perhaps a poor long-term investment. The so-called 'progressive' fazendeiros, that is to say, the most capitalist in attitudes to land, credit, investment in machinery and transport, were thus less committed to slave labour than the

fazendeiros of the Paraíba valley – or even the sugar planters of the north-east. It is, however, a mistake to think of them as necessarily opponents of slavery. Free Brazilians were still not considered suitable for, nor were they apparently willing to engage in, disciplined labour on coffee plantations. At least in the short term, until an alternative could be found, slavery continued to be the preferred system of labour for most planters in São Paulo.

There was still relatively little public discussion of the inexorable process of transition from a predominantly slave to a predominantly free labour system. The *Lei de Locação de Serviços* (March 1879) was a first attempt to structure a 'free labour market' in Brazil by outlawing vagrancy, regulating experiments with long term employment contracts (three years for Europeans, five years for free Brazilians, seven years for *libertos* [freed slaves]) and controlling 'free' labourers by punishing breaches of contract and collective resistance to conditions of work, especially strikes.¹³ The broader issue of how in the longer term to provide plantation agriculture, especially the production of coffee, with a permanent supply of free labour was, however, rarely seriously addressed. One possible solution was Chinese indentured ('coolie') labour. One thousand or so Chinese labourers were imported in 1874. The Chinese government, however, was reluctant to sanction emigration to Brazil, not least because of the notoriously harsh treatment of the Chinese in Cuba, Peru and Britain's tropical colonies. The British government was also opposed: in 1873 Chinese migration from Hong Kong was banned (except to Britain's own colonies) and in 1874 the Portuguese authorities in Macau were persuaded to do the same. In 1878 the Brazilian government finally declared itself favourable to Chinese immigration, and the following year sent a mission to China. But fazendeiro opinion, as evidenced, for example, at the two national Agrarian Congresses held in Rio de Janeiro in July and Recife in October 1878, was divided on the Chinese solution. The Brazilian press and public were hostile, mainly on ethnic or racist grounds (fears for the 'degeneration' of the Brazilian population). Abolitionists were opposed because the traffic in *cules* could become 'a new slave trade' extending the life of slavery.¹⁴ In the end, fewer than 3,000 Chinese labourers were imported into Brazil during the 1870s.

IV

In January 1878, after ten years of Conservative rule, the emperor invited the Liberals to form a government. The government led by the Visconde de

13 See M.L. Lamounier, *Da escravidão ao trabalho livre (A lei de locação de serviços de 1879)* (Campinas, 1985) and A. Gebara, *O mercado de trabalho livre no Brasil (1871–1888)* (São Paulo, 1986).

14 See R. Conrad, 'The planter class and the debate over Chinese immigration to Brazil, 1850–1893', *International Immigration Review*, 9/1, 1975.

Sinimbu supported slavery unconditionally, and the newly elected Chamber of Deputies, overwhelmingly Liberal, was no less committed to agriculture and opposed to slave emancipation than its Conservative predecessor. However, the reform wing of the Liberals, which had become increasingly frustrated with the limited impact made on the institution of slavery in Brazil by the 1871 Law of Free Birth, sensed an opportunity to challenge the pact between state and slave-owners and re-open the issue of gradual emancipation. And they found a new leader in Joaquim Nabuco.¹⁵

Before his death in March 1878, Senator José Thomaz Nabuco de Araújo, with the support of Domingos de Souza Leão, barão de Vila Bela, the Liberal leader in Pernambuco, had prepared the ground for his son, the 28-year-old Joaquim, to be elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the elections scheduled for September. In April Nabuco, an attaché at the Brazilian legation in London at the time, abandoned his brief career as a diplomat and returned to Brazil. He was duly elected a Liberal deputy in Recife and took his seat in January 1879. It fell to Dr Jerônimo Sodré Pereira, a Liberal deputy from Bahia – professor of medicine, ultramontane Catholic and son-in-law of the senator for Bahia Manuel Pinto de Sousa Dantas – in a speech on 5 March and Rodolfo Dantas, Senator Dantas's son, in a speech on 22 March to put the abolition of slavery on the political agenda for the first time since 1871. Nabuco's first speech was on the issue of religious freedom, not the emancipation of the slaves. However, he soon adopted the issue as his own and from 1879 until slavery was finally ended in May 1888 he was entirely dedicated to the cause, both inside and outside parliament.

How and why did Nabuco become an abolitionist? He was familiar with the names of English and North American abolitionists, notably William Wilberforce, William Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass and, of course, Lincoln, from his extensive reading as a child. In *Minha formação*, his 'literary, intellectual and political autobiography' published in 1900, he claimed to have read Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* 'a thousand times over'.¹⁶ However, it was as a student in the faculty of law in São Paulo (1866–8) that he read the anti-slavery poems of Castro Alves and came into regular contact for the first time with anti-slavery (and republican) ideas circulating among the professors and students. The influence of his father, José Thomaz Nabuco de Araújo, Minister of Justice, senator and member of the Council of State, was

15 The most recent biography is A. Alonso, *Joaquim Nabuco* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2007). See also L. Bethell, *Joaquim Nabuco no mundo. Abolicionista, jornalista e diplomata* (Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias, 2016).

16 J. Nabuco, *My Formative Years* (Oxford: Signal Books in association with Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias, Rio de Janeiro, 2012) edited and with an introduction by L. Bethell, p. 127. This is the first translation in English of *Minha Formação* [1900] (São Paulo: Editora 34, 2012).

also important in the evolution of Nabuco's thinking on slavery and abolition. 'No moral influence was as strong as my awareness of the relationship that bound me to him', Nabuco wrote in *Minha formação*.¹⁷ He describes how, as a young student in the Faculty of Law in Recife (1869–70), he followed closely his father's involvement in the struggle to enact the Law of Free Birth, helping him translate documents published in the *Anti-Slavery Reporter*, the journal of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in London. In a letter written to his father in 1870, Nabuco confessed that his greatest wish was to see him President of the Council of Ministers for just two days so that he could abolish slavery by decree, thus becoming 'Brazil's Lincoln' (o Lincoln brasileiro).¹⁸

Above all, he was, Nabuco writes, inspired by his own personal experience of slavery as a child in Pernambuco. There is a well-known passage in *Minha formação* in which he describes a visit he made in 1869 to Massangana, the *engenho* [sugar plantation] worked by slaves in Cabo de Santo Agostinho 50 kilometres south of Recife owned by his godmother, where he had spent the first eight years of his life. He entered the small enclosure behind the little chapel of São Mateus that had been a cemetery for slaves. Standing among the crosses marking the graves, he reflected on the past and remembered the names of many of the slaves that he had known. 'It was thus', he wrote, 'that the moral problem of slavery was laid out for the first time before my eyes in all its clarity and with its obligatory solution ... right there at twenty years of age I resolved to devote my life ... to the service of this most generous of races'.¹⁹ The driving force behind his opposition to slavery was, he claimed, the memory of his childhood and of the suffering he witnessed. That is to say, it was a personal, emotional, indeed sentimental, essentially moral commitment to abolish slavery.

This chapter of *Minha formação* was, however, written almost 30 years after the visit to Massangana. In 'A escravidão [Slavery]', a lengthy student essay written at the time,²⁰ in his diary, in his later writings, notably *O abolicionismo* (1883), and in his election campaign speeches of 1884 and 1887, slavery was

17 Nabuco, *My Formative Years*, ch. XVIII 'My father'.

18 Quoted in C. Nabuco, *A vida de Joaquim Nabuco por sua filha* (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1928), pp. 36–7. It was in 1870 that Nabuco, a final-year law student, famously defended before the court of appeal in Recife a slave, Thomaz, accused of killing a man who was publicly flogging him and another who attempted to prevent his flight from custody. Arguing that slavery was itself a crime, Nabuco secured a life sentence for Thomaz instead of the expected death penalty. See Peter M. Beattie, 'Joaquim Nabuco, o advogado, e Thomaz, o escravo: perspectivas locais, nacionais e comparativas sobre anti-escravidão e pena de morte', in *Conferências sobre Joaquim Nabuco* (2 vols., Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi Produções Literárias, 2010): vol. 2 *Joaquim Nabuco em Wisconsin*, Severino J. Albuquerque (ed.).

19 Nabuco, *My Formative Years*, chap. XX 'Massangana'.

20 'A escravidão' (1870), donated to the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro by Nabuco's widow, Evelina, in September 1924, was published for the first time in the *Revista do*

challenged with different arguments: it was a crime (the first two parts of 'A escravidão' were entitled 'O crime' and 'A história do crime' – the projected third part, 'A reparação do crime', was never completed); it was largely unlawful because of the Brazilian law of November 1831; it was an outrage against civilisation; along with latifundia and monoculture it was responsible for the country's social and economic backwardness, an obstacle to economic and political progress, citizenship and the construction of a nation. Slavery was also responsible for Brazil's pariah status internationally (Brazil, 'o Paraguai da escravidão'). Abolition thus would be the catalyst for both national regeneration and international respect.

Moreover, while there is no doubt that Nabuco was totally opposed to slavery throughout his life and wished it brought to an end, there is little evidence, either in his extensive correspondence or in his diaries, that his decision to devote his life to its abolition was taken earlier than 1879, the year he entered parliament for the first time. In the years following his graduation from the faculty of law in Recife in November 1870, abolition was not Nabuco's central preoccupation; he pursued a career as a literary critic, poet and playwright – and as a diplomat. On his first visit to Europe, principally Paris and London, in 1873–4, in the United States in 1876–7 as attaché in the Washington legation and again in England in 1877–8 as attaché in the London legation, it seems he made no effort to make contact with local abolitionists. He did, however, write in his diary in Washington in June 1877 – the only reference to abolition in his diary before his election to parliament: 'In Brazil the abolitionist campaign should be renewed. The law of 1871 must be seen only as a first step. There is no contract with the fazendeiros to stop there. It is necessary to destroy the stain [nódoa] that shames us in the eyes of the world'.²¹

The specific initiative that first brought Nabuco national and international renown as the champion of the slaves in Brazil was his denunciation of the British-owned St John d'El Rey Mining Company for owning slaves (illegally) in his speeches in the Chamber of Deputies on 26 August and 30 September 1879. In addition to its own slaves, the company kept over 1,000 slaves at its Morro Velho gold mine in Nova Lima, Minas Gerais that had been acquired ('rented') from the Cata Branca, Cocais and Gongo Soco mining companies when they collapsed in the mid 1840s, with a contractual clause to free them after 14 years' service. However, 20 years had gone by without any steps being

Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 204 (1949); 2nd edn. (Recife: Fundação Joaquim Nabuco/Editora Massangana, 1988).

21 J. Nabuco, *Diários I 1873–1888, II 1889–1910* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Bem-Te-Vi/Recife: Editora Massangana, 2005), preface and notes by Evaldo Cabral de Mello, vol. 1 p. 169: 17 June 1877.

taken to secure their freedom.²² Nabuco's speeches had repercussions around Europe (it produced favourable comment in, for example, the *Revue des deux mondes* in France) but more particularly in Great Britain. The Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, Charles Harris Allen, wrote to congratulate him on his defence of the Morro Velho slaves. In his reply Nabuco wrote, 'I assure you will always find me at the fighting post I now occupy ... I place the emancipation interest beyond any other, above any party allegiance or engagement ... Compared to this great social reform ... political reforms remain in the shade'.²³

Nabuco told Allen in April 1880 that he was planning to submit to parliament a bill for the total abolition of slavery in Brazil on 1 January 1890. Immediate abolition was impossible because of its impact on public finances and agricultural production. He did not expect even this modest proposal to pass in view of the existing strength of pro-slavery opinion, in the Liberal as well as the Conservative party. But, as Wilberforce had done in England to secure the passage of the bill declaring slavery illegal throughout the empire in 1834, he planned to introduce it in every session until it was eventually passed. 'The frontier of the next decade', Nabuco predicted, 'shall not be crossed in Brazil ... by any man calling himself a slave'.²⁴

A bill for the amelioration and eventual abolition of slavery was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies on 24 August. It included new taxes on slave property to strengthen the Emancipation Fund under the 1871 law, the prohibition of the inter-provincial slave trade, the abolition of the corporal punishment of slaves, the prohibition of the separation of slave mothers and children under eight years old, greater protection for slaves over 60 and the emancipation of any remaining slaves owned by the state. But, in view of the strength of the inevitable opposition, it was moderate, inasmuch as it not only envisaged a ten-year period before the total emancipation of the slaves but offered compensation to the slave-owners, as Britain had done, Nabuco pointed out, in its colonies half a century earlier. Nevertheless, the bill failed to make progress. Initially, 38 of the 122 deputies signed a motion for an early decision [*urgência na votação*] on whether to hold a debate on the bill, but

22 Nabuco pursued the freedom of the Cata Branca slaves through the Brazilian and British courts until the 223 still alive were finally freed in June 1882. See C.J. Campbell, 'Tinha apenas em vista chamar a atenção: Joaquim Nabuco, os abolicionistas e o caso de Morro Velho', in *Conferências sobre Joaquim Nabuco*, vol. 2.

23 Allen to Nabuco, 8 January 1880, Nabuco to Allen, 8 April 1880, in L. Bethell and J.M. de Carvalho (eds.), J. Nabuco, *British abolitionists and the end of slavery in Brazil. Correspondence 1880–1905* (London: University of London Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2009), pp. 25–6, 28–31. Some parts of this essay are taken from the Introduction to the volume. I am grateful to José Murilo de Carvalho, co-author of the Introduction, for permission to do so.

24 Nabuco to Allen, 8 April 1880, in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.) *Joaquim Nabuco*, p. 30.

when, a week later, Sinimbu's successor as Liberal president of the Council of Ministers, Senator José Antônio Saraiva, made it a question of confidence in his government, only 18 deputies (14 of them from the north and north-east, including seven from Pernambuco) actually voted for a debate and the bill was quietly withdrawn. Nabuco was deeply disappointed. However, he continued to believe that abolition was a matter for parliament only. 'Emancipation', he told Allen, 'cannot be done through a revolution, which would be to destroy everything – it will only be carried by a parliamentary majority'.²⁵

In 1879–80, for the first time since 1867–71, a number of associations dedicated to the emancipation of slaves were formed in Brazil. The members were mainly younger and more educated members of the growing urban professional middle class, influenced in their opposition to slavery by what John Stuart Mill had called 'the spread of moral convictions', though in Brazil, unlike Britain and the United States earlier, these were secular rather than religious convictions: there were no Quakers in Brazil and there was no 'Great Awakening'. They were frustrated by the disappointing results of the 1871 law and encouraged by the opportunity for progress to be made offered (they believed) by the return of the Liberals to power. The most important associations were the *Associação Central Emancipadora*, established in August 1880 and led by André Rebouças, a black engineer and professor at the Polytechnic Institute in Rio, and the militant journalist José do Patrocínio, a *cafuso* [a mixture of Indian, European and African] who identified himself as negro, and the *Sociedade Brasileira Contra Escravidão* founded by Nabuco and a group of fellow abolitionists meeting in Nabuco's home on 7 September (Brazilian independence day). Nabuco himself was elected president of the *Sociedade*, with his friend Rebouças as its treasurer. Several smaller anti-slavery associations joined the *Sociedade* and the executive committee included seven representatives of the *Associação Central Emancipadora* as well as five deputies and two former provincial presidents.

Nabuco immediately found an opportunity to put the *Sociedade Brasileira Contra Escravidão* on the map and re-ignite the debate on slavery in parliament, in the press and on the street. On 19 October 1880 he wrote an open letter to Henry Washington Hilliard, former US Congressman and University of Alabama law professor who had been appointed US minister in Brazil in October 1877, soliciting his views on slavery, emancipation and free labour in the American South. Nabuco knew Hilliard to be a pro-Union Southern moderate who had defended slavery as a legal institution under the Constitution but was now ready to seize an opportunity to redeem himself by becoming an agent of slave emancipation in Brazil. Hilliard replied to Nabuco on 25 October offering his full support to the *Sociedade* and the cause of

25 Nabuco to Allen, 5 June 1881, in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco*, p. 46.

abolition in Brazil, and proposing the symbolic date of 28 September (the passage of the Law of Free Birth – though not until 1887) for the emancipation of Brazil's remaining 1.5 million slaves. The exchange of letters between Nabuco and Hilliard received enormous coverage in the press, as did the banquet on 20 November offered in Hilliard's honour at the Hotel dos Estrangeiros in Rio by the Sociedade and attended by 50 prominent Brazilians (and with a large crowd outside the open windows listening in). The room in which the banquet was held had on the walls portraits of Abraham Lincoln, William Lloyd Garrison, and the menu included mayonnaise de homards à la Wilberforce, jambon d'York à la Garrison, culotte de boeuf à la Paranhos, etc. Speeches were followed by liqueurs l'Emancipation.²⁶ The Hilliard *affaire* reignited the public debate about abolition in Brazil. The US minister was accused in the Conservative press and by Conservative politicians of interfering in Brazilian domestic issues, and there was a debate – on both Hilliard's intervention and slavery – in a special session of the Chamber of Deputies on 25 November.

In his speech at the banquet for Hilliard Nabuco emphasised the need to mobilise public opinion worldwide in support of the movement for emancipation in Brazil. Public opinion had not yet been mobilised in Brazil itself and there was no sign of any weakening in the resistance to abolition in parliament. But the Brazilian political elite, including the emperor, if not the slave-owners themselves, could be influenced by international, especially British and French, opinion. Use of external pressure against internal resistance had undoubtedly contributed to the introduction and passage of the Law of Free Birth in 1871. In December, taking advantage of the parliamentary recess, Nabuco left for Europe in order personally to raise international awareness of the continued existence of slavery in Brazil.

In Lisbon Nabuco was received in the Chamber of Deputies as the leader of the abolitionist 'party' in the Brazilian legislature. In Madrid, where a year earlier the Cortes had abolished slavery in Cuba,²⁷ he was honoured by the Sociedad Abolicionista Española. In Paris he met the veteran president of the French abolitionist society, Victor Schoelcher, who had played a central role in the abolition of slavery throughout the French colonies in 1848.²⁸ Arriving in

26 See D.I. Durham, *A Southern Moderate in Radical Times: Henry Washington Hilliard 1808–1892* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008), ch. 7, pp. 166–96. Also D.I. Durham and P.M. Pruitt Jr, *A Journey in Brazil: Henry Washington Hilliard and the Brazilian Anti-Slavery Society* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama School of Law, 2008).

27 See n. 2. On the abolition of slavery in Cuba, see A.F. Corwin, *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817–1886* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967); R.J. Scott, *Slave Emancipation in Cuba: the Transition to Free Labor, 1860–1899* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Anti-Slavery: Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1833–74* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999).

28 See A. Alonso, 'O abolicionista cosmopolita. Joaquim Nabuco e a rede abolicionista transnacional', *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* 88 (Nov. 2010), pp. 55–70.

London in February 1881, he immediately sought out the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, which had been founded in 1839 after the emancipation of the slaves in the British Empire precisely in order to act as a clearing house for information on slavery and anti-slavery and to promote its abolition throughout the world and which the Brazilian Society regarded as 'the first and most influential organisation of its kind in the world' whose cooperation was essential in the fight against slavery in Brazil.²⁹ For its part, the Society welcomed Nabuco at a special session in his honour on 4 March and on 23 March he was offered a splendid breakfast in the Charing Cross Hotel presided over by Thomas Fowell Buxton, son of the famous abolitionist of the same name who was about to become president of the Society. One hundred and fifty people were present, including 11 members of parliament. The banquet was widely covered by the London press – and, equally important, by the Rio de Janeiro press. The British connection was consolidated, and especially relations between Nabuco and Charles Allen, the Secretary of the BFASS from 1879 until 1898, who became, and remained a close friend until Allen's death in December 1904.

Nabuco returned to Brazil in April 1881. When the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved on 30 June – with nothing achieved on abolition – he offered himself as a candidate for the first district of the *Corte* [the capital, Rio de Janeiro] in the elections to be held on 31 October. Despite a strong campaign, he was defeated and forced to leave parliament. In the newly elected legislature the abolitionists were an even smaller minority than before: perhaps a dozen sympathisers, mostly Liberal – for example, Adolfo Bezerra de Menezes (RJ), Afonso Celso (MG), Rodolfo Dantas (Bahia) and Rui Barbosa (Bahia), José Mariano (Pernambuco). Only Mariano could be said to be fully committed. The leaders of neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives were prepared to assume responsibility for a bill abolishing slavery, even for gradual abolition. One Liberal Prime Minister Saraiva gave way to another, Martinho Campos, who was closer to the Conservatives and strongly opposed to slave emancipation. He did not believe slavery was destined to last forever; under the law of 1871 it would gradually give way to free labour. But for the foreseeable future slavery was necessary for the production of coffee and for 'paz e tranquilidade' in the countryside.³⁰ In his frustration, and despite being accused by some of too readily abandoning the struggle, Nabuco left Brazil in December and returned to London.

During his stay in London, from December 1881 to April 1884, Nabuco earned his living as a legal consultant to English firms with investments in

29 Sociedade Brasileira contra Escravidão to British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 20 December 1880, in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco*, p. 35.

30 I.A. Marson and C.R. Tasinao, 'Considerações sobre a história do livro e de seus argumentos', in Joaquim Nabuco, *O Abolicionismo Brasílio*: (Editora UnB, 2003), pp. 30–4.

Brazil and as the foreign correspondent of Rio's leading newspaper, the *Jornal do Commercio*, but devoted much of his time to promoting the cause of abolition in Brazil. He worked closely with the Anti-Slavery Society, attending its monthly meetings. With Charles Allen he set up an efficient propaganda scheme – Nabuco would give information to Allen who would be responsible for releasing it to the press, especially *The Times*. When Allen was unable to do so, which rarely happened, he would publish it in the Society's own journal, the *Anti-Slavery Reporter*. *The Times*, which Nabuco referred to as 'a voz da civilização [the voice of civilisation]',³¹ and which took a clear stance in favour of abolition in Brazil, was the ideal medium because of its enormous influence, not least in Brazil. He maintained his ties with abolitionists in Madrid and in Paris and attended a number of international abolitionist meetings, notably the International Law Congress held in Milan in September 1883. He planned to hold a great, international Anti-Slavery Congress at the Grand Hotel D'Orleans in Petrópolis in August 1884, which would bring to Brazil the leading abolitionists from Europe and the United States. The Congress, however, never took place.

Regarding abolition itself, Nabuco's position had become more radical. On 14 July 1882, Bastille Day, Antônio Pinto, deputy for Ceará, presented to the Brazilian parliament a petition written by Nabuco in London, not this time for abolition after ten years, but for the 'total abolition of slavery, either immediately or within a short period of time to be defined immediately' – though indemnifying slave-owners for the loss of their slaves.³² In *O Abolicionismo*, a major work of political propaganda for which Nabuco had researched for more than a year in the late Richard Cobden's library in Brighton and in the British Museum, he recognised more clearly than in 1880 that the 1871 law, far from advancing the cause of abolition, had paralysed it: 'Imperfect, incomplete, unjust, even absurd', apart of course from the fact that 'no-one can ever again be born a slave', the law had served morally to anaesthetise slaveowners.³³ He repeated the need for the immediate emancipation of the slaves, but now without any compensation for their owners who, he argued, had been sufficiently compensated by the labour of their slaves. Inevitably, his petition failed to secure any significant support but he continued to believe

31 Nabuco to Allen, 27 July 1883, in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco*, p. 79.

32 Annaes do Parlamento Brasileiro 1882 tomo II, p. 294; *Jornal do Commercio*, 15 July 1882.

33 Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, ch. VIII, 'The promises of the "Law of Emancipation"'. *O abolicionismo* was meant to be the first in a series of volumes on 'reformas nacionais': the abolition of slavery, financial reform, the reform of public education, improvements in political representation, a degree of administrative de-centralisation, religious equality, European immigration. The abolition of slavery was only the beginning of the 'Brazilian Rinnovamento'. However, 'the emancipation of the slaves and of the *ingénous* [the first of whom had under the Law of Free Birth 1871 become legally free at the age of eight in 1879] ... must take precedence over every other reform'. Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, Preface.

that abolition should be peaceful, not as a result of insurrection as in Haiti or war as in the United States but by law passed in parliament: 'thus it is in Parliament, not on the plantations or in runaway slave camps [*quilombos*] in the interior or in the streets and plazas of the cities, where the cause of freedom will be won or lost'.³⁴

In May 1884, after almost two and a half years in London, Nabuco returned to Brazil. Not yet 35 years old, he was in poor health, homesick and in need of a holiday from the grind of writing nine lengthy articles a month for the *Jornal do Commercio* and since November two each month for *La Razón* in Montevideo. His decision to return was also influenced by the fact that the abolitionist movement outside parliament had gained considerable momentum during his absence, not least because of parliament's failure to pass the anti-slavery legislation proposed by Nabuco in August 1880, the defeat of Nabuco (and other anti-slavery candidates) in the election of October 1881, and a succession of five anti-abolitionist Liberal prime ministers between 1878 and 1884 – Sinimbu, Saraiva, Martinho Campos, visconde de Paranaguá (from July 1882) and Lafayette Rodrigues Pereira (from May 1883). It was time to re-engage personally with the movement, re-assert his leadership, time, Nabuco told Allen, for 'some energetic kind of action' on his part.³⁵

V

In the years from 1878 to 1885, the period of Liberal government, Angela Alonso has calculated that some 230 abolitionist associations were formed (compared with 22 during the period of Conservative government before the passage of the 1871 Law, 1868–71, and only six during the period of Conservative government, 1872–77) – more than a third of them in 1883 alone. Thirty-three were established in Pernambuco, 32 in Rio de Janeiro, 21 in Ceará, 14 in Amazonas, 14 in Rio Grande do Sul, 10 in Rio Grande do Norte and ten in São Paulo.³⁶ The members of these associations were predominantly lawyers, journalists, students, professors, writers, artists, typographers and, not least, women. They were overwhelmingly white in the case of Pernambuco, for example, but with a strong mulatto and African element in Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian abolitionist movement – and it is possible for the first time to refer to a 'movement' – was at this stage largely peaceful and moderate in its methods and its aims. It adopted a policy of organising open public meetings to bring popular pressure to bear on reluctant or hostile governments, national and provincial, which were protecting the interests of slave-owners. These events

34 Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, p. 24.

35 Nabuco to Allen, 31 March 1884, in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco*, p. 84.

36 Alonso, *Flores, votos e balas*, pp. 120, 146, 181, 398, 437–44.

usually took place in theatres rather than town halls, churches and chapels, as in England and the United States (hence the concept 'a teatrização da política' used by Alonso), and included music, poetry readings or plays. The aim was to raise money to bolster private and municipal emancipation funds, and the meetings ended with the presentation of a number of certificates of slave manumission [*cartas de alforria*]. At the same time, abolitionists like Luís Gama, the son of a Portuguese father and an African mother who had been sold into slavery and later freed, brought cases of slaves imported into Brazil in violation of the 1831 law – and their descendants – before the courts. Gama died in 1882, but his work was carried on by others.

In May 1883 15 abolitionist societies, 11 from Rio plus one each from Espírito Santo, Pernambuco, Ceará and Rio Grande do Sul, had come together to form the Confederação Abolicionista, with as its president João Clapp, the son of US emigrants who had risen to become a manager of the Banco do Brasil. Other provinces also attempted to consolidate their various abolitionist organisations. In July, for example, 14 organisations in Recife had unified under the Central Emancipadora do Município do Recife.³⁷ The Confederação Abolicionista provided national coordination for the abolitionist movement. It was soon active in ten of Brazil's 20 provinces, including seven of the nine provinces in the north/north-east. In August it issued a radical manifesto in favour of immediate abolition without indemnification.

At the same time, the Rio press was increasingly opposed to the institution of slavery. José do Patrocínio, who had since 1879 written for the *Gazeta de Notícias*, in 1881 switched to the more militant *A Gazeta da Tarde*, founded by José Ferreira de Menezes. The *Rio News*, which was widely read (and not only by the English-speaking community), owned and edited by Andrew Jackson Lamoureux, who had come to Brazil from the United States in 1874, consistently supported immediate abolition without indemnification. The *Jornal do Commercio*, the most influential newspaper in the capital, did not ostensibly take sides, but one of its editors from 1880, Francisco Gusmão Lobo, a friend of Nabuco, also from Pernambuco, was a committed abolitionist, and the editor-in-chief since 1868, Luís de Castro, also discreetly supported the cause. Most importantly, the weekly *Revista Illustrada* published the devastating satirical lithographs of the Italian-born artist Ángelo Agostini, Brazil's Daumier. Nabuco later described the *Revista Ilustrada* as 'the abolitionist

³⁷ On the abolitionist movement in Pernambuco, see C.T. Castilho, 'Abolitionism matters: the politics of anti-slavery in Pernambuco, Brazil, 1869–88' (University of California, Berkley, unpublished PhD, 2008) and *Slave Emancipation and Transformations in Brazilian Political Citizenship* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016).

Bible of the people, the people who can't read', that is to say, the vast majority of Brazilians.³⁸

On 25 March 1884 Ceará – where in município after município slaves had been freed and where in May 1883 the *jangadeiros* [raft fishermen] in Fortaleza had famously refused to carry slaves to steamers leaving for southern markets³⁹ – became the first of Brazil's provinces to emancipate all its slaves. Ceará was followed on 10 July by Amazonas and on 7 September by Rio Grande do Sul. These were, of course, provinces with relatively few slaves: 20,000 in Ceará, 1,600 in Amazonas, 60,000 in Rio Grande do Sul. As Adam Smith said of the Quakers in Pennsylvania and other northern states in the United States which opted at the end of the 18th century for emancipation, '[Their] resolution . . . to set at liberty all their negro slaves may satisfy us that their number is not very great'. Nevertheless there were huge celebrations in Recife and Rio de Janeiro (a crowd of 10,000), and events to mark the occasion in Lisbon, Madrid, Paris and London. While José de Patrocínio was having a celebratory dinner with Victor Hugo in Paris, Nabuco attended, along with Lord Granville, the foreign secretary, and the prince of Wales, a banquet offered by the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in London.

VI

In June 1884, recognising the growing strength of abolitionism as a national political movement, the Emperor D. Pedro invited one of Brazil's most experienced and reform-minded politicians, Senator Manuel Pinto de Sousa Dantas – four times a deputy, president of three different provinces, minister of Agriculture, Justice and the Interior, Councillor of State – to form a government, the sixth Liberal government in six years, prepared to introduce the first anti-slavery legislation since the Law of Free Birth in 1871 13 years earlier, albeit legislation whose purpose was still *gradual* not immediate abolition. The bill submitted to the Chamber of Deputies by Dantas's son Rodolfo (who was a great friend of Nabuco) and fellow deputy from Bahia Rui Barbosa on 15 July reinforced the existing Emancipation Fund, introduced new taxes to discourage slavery in urban areas and proposed to establish agricultural colonies for ex-slaves and immigrants, but its main purpose was to free slaves over 60 years of age. A modest proposal, it might be argued, but the bill was radical in the sense that it represented the first direct challenge to *existing* slave property in Brazil. Significant numbers of slaves would be freed, and no compensation would be

38 *O Paiz*, 30 Aug. 1888, cited in M. Balaban, *Poeta do lapis. Sátira e Política na trajetória de Angelo Agostini no Brasil Imperial (1864–1888)* (São Paulo: Editora Unicamp, 2009), pp. 86–7.

39 See Nabuco's letters to *The Times*, 5 April, 28 May 1883.

offered to their owners. Moreover, the bill was somewhat more far-reaching than appeared at first sight since many slaves under 60 had been registered as older than they in fact were so that their owners could claim that they, or their parents, had been legally imported before the 1831 law prohibited the importation of slaves into Brazil. The bill aimed to liberate some 110,000 slaves, 10 per cent of the slave population, and another 95,000 by 1894. Nevertheless, unless further legislation were introduced, slavery would not come to an end until 1930 when the slaves born before the 1871 law reached 60! *The Times* was more optimistic: as a result of this first step it confidently predicted that slavery would be abolished in ten years.⁴⁰

Support for the immediate liberation of slaves aged 60 and over without indemnification gained extraordinary force in the following weeks, especially in the press. Though many were disappointed that Dantas's bill did not go further, most abolitionists, including Nabuco, united in its support. They recognised it was the best they could hope for from the Legislature elected in 1881. In writing to the press the supporters of Dantas adopted British and North American pseudonyms: for example, Nabuco signed his articles Garrison, Gusmão Lobo Clarkson, Rui Barbosa Lincoln. At the same time, there was organised resistance to the bill and petitions flooded in from Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Bahia and Pernambuco. A Congresso da Lavoura Nacional was held to defend the importance of slavery for Brazilian agriculture, the economic prosperity of the nation and, not least, social peace and stability. Abolition, it was argued, represented 'suicídio nacional'.

The Liberals had 75 deputies in the Chamber, a majority of 28 over the Conservatives, but Dantas could not unify the party behind his bill. Too many Liberal deputies were hostile or indifferent. Only 29 initially gave their support, and in the end the bill was defeated on a motion of confidence by 59 votes (Conservatives and dissident Liberals) to 52 (48 *dantista* Liberals and 4 Conservatives). However, ignoring the wishes of the Council of State, which voted 9 to 3 against his decision, the emperor granted Dantas the dissolution of parliament and new elections before the end of the year.

This presented Nabuco with an opportunity to re-enter parliament. He was still regarded as the principal leader of the abolitionists, its best candidate, certainly its best speaker, despite a certain rivalry with José do Patrocínio and spasmodic attacks on him for his extended absence from Brazil. (Nabuco and Patrocínio were never close friends. Their personalities, social and racial backgrounds, and political strategies for abolition were markedly different but they worked together, usually thanks to the mediation of André Rebouças.) Nabuco had been interested in standing for Ceará although the Confederação Abolicionista had wanted him to stand in the Corte. But Dantas, following

40 *The Times*, 31 July 1884.

the intervention of the president of Pernambuco province, Sancho de Barros Pimental, a friend of Nabuco, who needed him to defeat the Souza Leão clan, preferred that he became a candidate for the first district of Pernambuco (the city of Recife), which had elected him in 1878. The second district would be contested by José Mariano, a popular politician and, despite family ties to sugar, a strong opponent of slavery, who had been elected in 1878, one of few abolitionists re-elected in 1881 and one of 29 initial supporters of the Dantas bill.

The elections of December 1884, in which the Dantas bill was the key issue, indeed virtually the only issue, were the first to be held under the new rules introduced by the Saraiva political reform law of January 1881. Elections were no longer indirect, and the vote was restricted to literates, except those already registered to vote. The abolitionists expected to be the main beneficiaries of these changes since they increased the weight of the urban vote and reduced both outright fraud and the influence of government in elections. Nabuco and Mariano were the first Brazilian politicians to campaign in a national election on a platform of immediate abolition without compensation for slave-owners. Equally if not more radical, under the influence of both Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* (1879) and André Rebouças's *Agricultura nacional: estudos econômicos* (1883), they proposed land reform; a reform, Nabuco claimed in a speech on 5 November 'so comprehensive, so broad and so profound that it could be called a Revolution'.⁴¹ The electorate consisted of 1,500 male voters, but Nabuco delivered 18 addresses between 12 October and 31 November, including six in the Teatro Santa Isabel in Recife, to crowds of hundreds, sometimes thousands. It was the first time any Brazilian politician had used popular pressure as a political tool. His name appeared on hats, cigar boxes, beers, etc. The election, Nabuco reported to Charles Allen in London, was 'first of its kind in Brazil, quite an English or American election, disputed in public meetings instead of corrupt system of intimidating and buying votes in which Slavery puts its force'.⁴²

On 1 December Nabuco narrowly defeated the incumbent Conservative candidate Manoel do Nascimento Machado Portela (who while calling himself an 'emancipacionist' had opposed the Dantas bill) by 746 votes to 744. (Mariano won more convincingly, 917 votes to 646.) However, due to some disturbances, irregularities and accusations of fraud the result was declared invalid by the oversight committee. In a second election on 9 January 1885 Machado Portela chose to abstain and Nabuco therefore won unopposed, only for the credentials committee of the Chamber to overturn the result of the December election (51 votes to 48) when it met in May and awarded the seat

41 J. Nabuco, *Campanha abolicionista no Recife (eleições de 1884)* [1885] (2nd edn. Recife: Fundação Joaquim Nabuco/Editora Massangana, 1988), p. 47.

42 Nabuco to Allen, 22 February 1885, in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco*, p. 89.

to Machado Portela after all. However, the representative of the 5th district of Pernambuco, the municípios of Nazaré da Mata and Bom Jardim, had died in March and the other potential Liberal candidates stood aside in favour of Nabuco. On 5 June he was duly re-elected to the Chamber. He described for Allen the reception his victory received: 'Never was such a scene seen before. More than 50,000 people took part in it and it was a general holiday, all the city being in flags, music, flowers and illuminations in the evening. This shows the strength the abolitionist movement has acquired, it is a national resurrection or still better a national birth'.⁴³ This time he was allowed to take his seat.

Before Nabuco finally re-entered parliament in August 1885, however, after an absence of four years, the Dantas bill had been reintroduced into the newly elected Chamber (in which the Liberals had an even bigger majority) and again defeated – by 52 votes to 50. Dantas failed to persuade the emperor to grant him a second dissolution and was forced to resign on 4 May. He was replaced by José Antônio Saraiva, who in August secured the Chamber's approval (by 73 votes to 17) of a much watered-down version of Dantas's bill which aimed to 'tranquillise' the slave-owners and their friends in the Conservative (and Liberal) parties by slowing down the emancipation process: slaves between the ages of 60 and 63 would be freed but forced to work for three more years, slaves of 63 for two more years, at which point they would be free and the slave-owners would receive compensation for their emancipation. Only slaves over 65 were immediately freed unconditionally. Masters who emancipated slaves under 60 would be indemnified from an enhanced Emancipation Fund, but in these cases freed slaves were obliged to remain in their municípios and provide their services for a further five years. (Prices for slaves were fixed at levels far above the market price not only in the interests of masters choosing to free slaves or seeking indemnification if and when slavery were finally abolished, but also in order to hinder the freeing of slaves by abolitionist associations and self-purchase by the slaves themselves.) *The Times* now conceded that, unless further legislation were introduced, slavery in Brazil could now legally persist until 1935!⁴⁴

Nabuco bitterly opposed the 'shameful' Saraiva bill, for 'making us and poor people and the old slaves themselves, besides all those who have spontaneously liberated their slaves, pay taxes for the redemption of other people's slaves'. The 'political oligarchy' had successfully replaced the Dantas bill with one for the liquidation of slavery (*sic*) 'on the best possible terms for the persons interested in it'. He accused the Saraiva government of seeking to 'make the death of slavery and its burying so soft that no one be aware of it – neither the master nor

43 Nabuco to Allen, 23 June 1885, in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco*, p. 96.

44 *The Times*, 19 June 1885.

the slave, the country nor the world'.⁴⁵ Even so, Conservative opposition was such that Saraiva did not feel he had enough support to have his bill approved in the Senate. He therefore resigned after only three months in power, and the emperor called upon Senator João Maurício Wanderley, barão de Cotelipe, leader of the Conservative party and, together with his Conservative colleague Paulino José Soares de Sousa Jr, one of the fiercest opponents of abolition, to complete what Saraiva had begun. The bill was passed in the Senate in August and became the Saraiva-Cotelipe Law, better known as the Sexagenarian Law, on 28 September 1885, the 14th anniversary of the Law of Free Womb.⁴⁶ On 26 October new elections were called for 15 January 1886, which the Conservatives won in a landslide. Nabuco was again defeated in Recife. José Mariano won his seat, but his election was later overturned by the credentials committee of the Chamber. The other Liberals elected were all anti-dantista supporters of the Saraiva-Cotelipe Law.

VII

Following the rejection of the Dantas bill by the Chamber of Deputies *twice*, the successful mobilisation of the anti-Dantas resistance in and out of parliament, the appointment of Cotelipe as prime minister, the passage of the Saraiva-Cotelipe law and the January 1886 election removing virtually all Liberal abolitionist deputies from the Chamber, no further measures towards the liberation of Brazil's remaining one million slaves were to be expected from the Cotelipe government – and none were forthcoming. The political representatives of the slaveholding elite in parliament continued for the most part to regard slavery as both indispensible and legitimate. Neither the Liberal party nor the Conservative party favoured its abolition. Slavery was to be allowed to die naturally. Even the most optimistic abolitionists expected the process to take eight to ten years and some calculated it could take another 30 years. João Alfredo Correia de Oliveira, since the death of the visconde do Rio Branco in 1880, the leader of the reformist wing of the Conservative

45 Speeches of 3 July & 24 July 1885, in J. Nabuco, *Discursos parlamentares, 1879–1889* (São Paulo: Instituto Progresso Editorial, 1949) (*Obras completas* vol. XI), pp. 159–211; Nabuco to Allen, 17 May 1885 & 6 August 1885, in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco*, pp. 90–1, 97–100. Allen was equally outraged: the revised bill was 'monstrous ... after working the poor wretches nearer to death, these men are to be paid for giving freedom to their worn out slaves with one foot already in the grave!'. Allen to Nabuco, 8 June 1885, in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco*, pp. 92–3.

46 On the law of 1885, see J. Maria Nunes Mendonça, *Entre a mão e os anéis. A lei dos sexagenários e os caminhos da abolição no Brasil* (Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 1999). It did little to accelerate the end of slavery: fewer than 20,000 slaves over 60 were freed under the new law during the first 12 months.

party, proposed the final abolition of slavery on the centenary of Brazilian independence in 1922.⁴⁷

Moreover, the Cotelipe government adopted a policy of repression towards the abolitionist movement. There were bans on public meetings; the use of the military as well as the police in rounding up fugitive slaves; additional judicial obstacles erected to slave manumission. The onward march of the Brazilian abolitionist movement was temporarily halted. Abolitionist activities were reduced to 'anti-slavery days' like 25 March (the abolition of slavery in Ceará) and 28 September (the 1871 law) and special events like the election of Patrocínio as a *vereador* [municipal councilman] in Rio de Janeiro in July 1886 and the funeral in October 1886 of the Liberal politician and poet José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, o Moço, who had defended abolition.

Disenchanted and disillusioned, Nabuco spent much of the year 1886 writing for the press and publishing pamphlets, including *O erro do Imperador* and *O eclipse do abolicionismo* in which he bitterly criticised the emperor for having first encouraged the abolitionists with the choice of Dantas and then surrendered the government first to Saraiva and then to the uncompromisingly pro-slavery Cotelipe. Nabuco wrote a regular column ferociously attacking the pro-slavery Cotelipe government for the Rio newspaper *O Paiz*, which had been founded in 1884 by the republican Quintino Bocaiúva, who considered abolitionist propaganda useful in his criticism of the political system of the empire. One positive achievement was forcing the government to adopt measures for the greater protection of slaves, notably in October 1886 legislation to abolish the use of the whip [*pena de açoites*]. This followed a particularly brutal case in which four slaves in Rio province were each condemned to 300 lashes and two subsequently died. Slave-owners believed that without the whip there would be a breakdown of plantation discipline – as proved to be the case. In the end Nabuco felt he had done more for the cause of the slaves writing for *O Paiz*, he told Allen, than he could have done as a deputy. It was through the press that the Conservative government had been forced to pass a law abolishing flogging, 'which if we had judges and the laws with regard to slaves were a reality, would amount practically to the end of slavery'.⁴⁸

In April 1887 Nabuco returned to London as correspondent for *O Paiz* – but he did not stay long. The appointment of Machado Portela to a ministerial post in July presented Nabuco with an opportunity to return to parliament. Under the rules at that time there had to be a 'special election' in Recife to reaffirm Machado Portela's mandate. This was normally a formality as it was never seriously challenged but Nabuco returned from London to contest the election. He was greeted by hundreds of supporters in the docks of Recife

47 Alonso, *Flores, votos e balas*, p. 257.

48 Nabuco to Allen [April 1887], in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco*, p. 116.

on his arrival on 27 August. The next day, in defiance of the police ban on public meetings in the city's streets and squares, he addressed a huge gathering outside the Teatro Santa Isabel. His campaign on a platform of immediate abolition without compensation produced a level of popular mobilisation not seen in Recife, indeed in Brazil, since his October–November 1884 campaign. His speeches received extensive coverage in the press throughout Brazil and Nabuco won the election on 14 September 1887 by 1,409 votes to 1,266. It was a huge blow to Cotelipe's credibility from which he never fully recovered; 'golpe de morte no ministério Cotelipe [the death-blow to the Cotelipe cabinet]', Nabuco wrote in his diary.⁴⁹ In his study of the politics of abolition in Pernambuco Celso Thomas Castilho calls Nabuco's victory in Recife in September 1887 'a monumental upset ... the most significant victory by an opposition candidate in the 1880s'.⁵⁰ It was also a huge shot in the arm for the abolitionist movement.

VIII

In the second half of 1887, after the setbacks during the period 1884–6, the abolitionist movement had again begun to grow in strength and, frustrated by the lack of progress in parliament and the repression imposed on its peaceful activities by the Cotelipe government, it had become radicalised.⁵¹ Meetings were held and the work of freeing slaves, municípios by município, block by block, even street by street, in the *Corte*, Recife and São Paulo and smaller towns in, for example, the provinces of Rio Grande do Norte, Goiás and Santa Catarina continued. But also now, for the first time, abolitionists engaged in direct action to subvert the slave system, as slaves began to desert plantations in São Paulo, Minas Gerais and even Rio de Janeiro in unprecedented numbers, at times accompanied by violence against masters and overseers. (It could be argued that slaves uprooted from their families by the internal slave trade

49 Nabuco, *Diários*, vol. 1, p. 284: 14 September 1887.

50 Castilho, *Abolitionism matters*, p. 221.

51 On the abolitionist movement outside parliament during the 1880s, the classic study is Evaristo de Moraes, *A campanha abolicionista 1879–1888* [1924] (Brasília: Editora da Universidade de Brasília, 1988). See also E. Viotti da Costa, *Da senzala à colônia* (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro, 1966); R. Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery 1850–1888* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972; Port. trans., Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1975); Sidney Chalhoub, *Visões da liberdade: uma história das últimas décadas da escravidão na Corte* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1990); M.H. Pereira Toledo Machado, *O plano e o pânico. Os movimentos sociais na década da abolição* (Rio de Janeiro/São Paulo: Editora da URFJ/Edusp, 1994); C. T. Castilho, 'Abolitionism matters' (2008); and, above all, A. Alonso, *Flores, votos e balas* (2015), cited above. An attempt to 're-contextualise abolitionism' by showing how the abolitionist movement interacted with elite, parliamentary politics is J.D. Needell, 'Brazilian abolitionism, its historiography and the uses of political history', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 50 (2010).

from the North East to the Centre South during the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s were the most likely to flee, and the most likely to resort to violence but this needs further research.) Antônio Bento in São Paulo and Carlos Lacerda in Campos were notable examples of the many abolitionists inciting slaves to flee, organising transportation to cities (called the 'underground railway' in the United States) and providing urban sanctuaries for fugitive slaves.

The flight of slaves from the plantations was facilitated by the fact that junior officers in the Brazilian army, many of whom were positivist, abolitionist and republican, were becoming less willing to support the slave system by coercing slaves into remaining on plantations and in particular by pursuing fugitive slaves. This was, in part, another contribution Nabuco made to the cause. He took his seat in Parliament on 5 October. Two days later in his first speech he appealed to the military to stop the pursuit and capture of fugitive slaves.⁵² On 25 October the president of the *Clube Militar* successfully petitioned Princess Isabel, acting as regent in the absence of the emperor, who had gone to Europe in June for medical treatment, to excuse the military from this increasingly onerous and disagreeable task.

Slave flights accelerated the natural decline of slave system, as did the dramatic increase in the number of the voluntary liberation of slaves by their owners. Despite frequently proclaiming their humanitarian intentions, they were really attempting to bring what was happening all around them under some sort of control and prevent the complete collapse of the plantation labour system by offering the slaves who had not yet fled eventual freedom in return for promises to remain on their plantations for up to three years, thus guaranteeing a more orderly transition to free labour.

Equally significant in the final demise of slavery in Brazil was the first crucial break in the ranks of the defenders of slavery. The coffee fazendeiros of the north and west of São Paulo, where the demand for slave labour was greatest and the commitment to slavery as an institution with a long-term future weakest, had finally secured at this critical juncture an alternative source of labour in the form, not of free Brazilian wage labourers, but European, mainly Italian, immigrants. As early as 1878 Antônio de Queirós Telles, the future visconde de Parnaíba, had visited eight countries in western Europe on behalf of the Associação Auxiliadora de Colonização e Imigração of São Paulo and singled out Italy, which was suffering rapid population growth, land hunger and unemployment, as the most promising source of non-slave labour for coffee production in São Paulo. Italians began to arrive in significant numbers from the mid 1880s. In 1884 São Paulo had received 5,000 European, mostly Italian, immigrant workers, their transportation subsidised by the provincial government; 6,500 in 1885, 9,500 in 1886 and 32,000 arrived in 1887.

52 Speech of 7 Oct. 1887, in Nabuco, *Discursos parlamentares*, pp. 189–91.

These numbers were sufficient to satisfy the paulista coffee fazendeiros that their labour requirements could be met and to persuade their leading political representatives, like Senator Antônio da Silva Prado, that they could safely support the abolition of the remnants of slavery in Brazil. Prado had agreed to serve as minister of agriculture in the Conservative government formed by Cotelipe in August 1885. He resigned in May 1887, and before the end of the year he had broken with the die-hard anti-abolitionists.⁵³

By the beginning of 1888 Brazil's political leaders were being forced to face the fact that the slave system was not only losing support but was clearly close to collapse. The slave population, which had declined by 20 per cent between 1874 and 1884 (from 1.5 to 1.25 million) and 40 per cent in the three years between 1884 and the slave registration of March 1887 (to 725,000), had fallen by a further 50 per cent in the 12 months from March 1887 to March 1888 (to between 250,000 and 500,000 – less than four per cent of the total population of Brazil). The abolitionists were threatening large-scale popular mobilisation in favour of immediate abolition, which led to exaggerated fears that the final stages of slavery's collapse might be accompanied by a major social upheaval, even a Haiti-style bloodbath. Abolition could no longer be avoided, although even now few abolitionists expected it immediately. Patrocínio thought 1889, the centenary of the French Revolution and the Declaration of Rights of Man, an appropriate date; Dantas proposed 31 December 1889.

In the Conservative dominated Legislature elected in January 1886, the majority of the Liberal deputies were now – finally – in favour of abolition; perhaps in five, four, two years. The Conservatives, however, were divided. Finally, on 10 March 1888, Cotelipe was persuaded to resign by the princess regent. He was replaced by the moderate João Alfredo Correia de Oliveira, who had indicated his willingness to form a government committed to the emancipation of Brazil's remaining slaves. Initially João Alfredo hoped to be able to postpone final abolition for at least five years, and to secure some kind of indemnification for slave-owners, but this proved to be an impossible dream. Antônio Prado returned to government as foreign minister, and within days of taking power he and João Alfredo consulted privately in Petrópolis with André Rebouças, one of most influential of the abolitionist leaders. By the end of March Rebouças had drafted legislation for immediate and unconditional

53 T.H. Holloway, *Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in São Paulo 1886–1934* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), Appendix 4, p. 179. See also Holloway, 'Immigration and abolition. The transition from slave to free labour in the São Paulo coffee zone', in D. Alden and W. Dean (eds.) *Essays Concerning the Socio-Economic History of Brazil and Portuguese India* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press 1977), 92,000 European immigrants arrived in São Paulo (of 135,000 to Brazil) in 1888 and three-quarters of a million, mostly Italian, in the decade after abolition.

abolition. It was presented to the cabinet on 7 April and agreed sometime between 20 and 29 April, a decision accepted by the princess regent.⁵⁴

Joaquim Nabuco was in London when he heard that João Alfredo had formed a cabinet and that abolition was now certain. He had travelled once again to Europe with the principal objective of persuading Pope Leo XIII to speak out against slavery. Princess Isabel, who was believed to be increasingly sympathetic to the cause of abolition, was well known for the strength of her religious sentiments, and Nabuco calculated that she could be persuaded to take the necessary steps to emancipate Brazil's remaining slaves if the pope gave her his blessing. After waiting around in Rome for a month, Nabuco was finally received by the pope on 10 February and Leo XIII promised – and issued – a papal encyclical condemning slavery.⁵⁵ Nabuco immediately returned to Brazil where on 12 April in Recife he addressed yet another huge abolitionist rally at the Teatro Santa Isabel.⁵⁶ On 18 April he was in Rio de Janeiro ready for the reopening of parliament on 3 May and prepared to lead the final battle for abolition. He admitted in his diary, however, that many of the leaders of the Confederação Abolicionista, especially José do Patrocínio writing for *Cidade do Rio*, were angry with him for spending so much time outside Brazil.⁵⁷

On 8 May a bill for the immediate abolition of slavery without compensation was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. Nabuco, the historic leader of the abolitionists in parliament, though still only 38 years old, took it upon himself to ensure that the Liberals supported the bill, albeit introduced by a Conservative government, that there was no backsliding by the Conservatives in their commitment to immediate unconditional abolition, and that the Chamber dispensed with its normal timetable for legislation and allowed the bill to pass rapidly as a matter of urgency. The bill was approved by 83 votes to nine (mostly die-hard Conservatives from Rio de Janeiro) on its second reading on 9 May. It was given a third reading and sent to the Senate the following day. Manuel Pinto de Sousa Dantas took responsibility for the bill when it was submitted to the Senate on 11 May. It was approved on its second reading the following day, by 46 votes to six (including that of Cotelipe), with eight abstentions. On 13 May, after the bill's third and final reading in the Senate, Nabuco had the satisfaction of addressing a large and enthusiastic crowd from a window of the Paço da Cidade (Paço Imperial) in Rio de Janeiro where the princess regent had signed the *Lei Áurea* [Golden Law] declaring slavery in

54 Needell, 'Brazilian abolitionism', p. 40, n. 43.

55 See Nabuco, *My Formative Years*, ch. XXIV 'At the Vatican'. In the event, Cotelipe managed to have its publication postponed, but Nabuco's account of his meeting with the pope was published in *O Paiz* and the pope's position on slavery became generally known.

56 Castilho, *Abolitionism matters*, p. 260, quoting reports in *A Província*.

57 Nabuco, *Diários*, vol. 1 p. 291: 23 April 1888.

Brazil extinct and liberating all of Brazil's remaining quarter to half a million slaves – without compensation to the slaveowners.⁵⁸

IX

In the course of the American Civil War some 600,000 slaves (14 per cent of the total slave population) were freed, the rest – some 3.3 million – only in December 1865 when the slow process of securing the ratification of the 13th Amendment to the US Constitution by three-quarters of the states was concluded.⁵⁹ The urgent question now became 'What to do with the negro?' post-emancipation. Radical Republicans demanded that post-war reconstruction include legislation aimed at the political and social inclusion of the former slaves but there was fierce resistance to this, and not only in the south. Many Republicans in the north who had opposed slavery were as hostile to free blacks and to racial inclusion as the Democrats in both the north and the south who had defended slavery to the end. They were especially opposed even to the limited black suffrage proposed by Lincoln in a speech soon after the end of the war. It was fear of 'nigger citizenship' which had provoked John Wilkes Booth to assassinate Lincoln on 14 April 1865. Four million slaves may have secured their legal freedom, but they faced a future of poverty, limited education, disenfranchisement on grounds of their race (and their illiteracy) and eventually segregation (even in North).⁶⁰

'What to do with the negro?' was not such an urgent question in Brazil when slavery was abolished. The slave population had been in steady decline for almost 40 years since the end of the slave trade in 1850–1 when there were between two and two and half million slaves in Brazil. There were 250–500,000 in 1888. 'Nigger citizenship' was not an issue because under the law of 1881 the vote was restricted to (male) literates. At the time of abolition only 120,000 Brazilians, less than one per cent of the population (of 13 million), had the vote. At the same time, there was in Brazil, unlike the United States, no 'backlash' to slave emancipation and the social inclusion of former slaves leading to segregation on racial grounds. Miscegenation had been a feature of Brazil's slave-based society since the 16th century. The slaves legally freed in May 1888

58 Nabuco commented to Allen, 'It was a very daring, bold thing the Princess did but I trust in God she will not lose her throne for it' (Nabuco to Allen, 8 January 1889, in Bethell and Carvalho (eds.), *Joaquim Nabuco*, p. 145). The empire was overthrown 18 months later on 15 November 1889.

59 Two outstanding recent studies of the end of slavery in the United States are E. Foner, *The Fiery Trial. Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery* (New York: Norton, 2010) and James Oakes, *Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861–1865* (New York, NY: Norton, 2013.)

60 See E. Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1988; 2nd edn. 2014).

were absorbed into a society in which already more than half the population were free blacks and mulattos. The 1872 census showed a population composed of 38.1 per cent whites, 19.6 per cent blacks, 38.2 per cent *pardos* [mixed race] and 3.9 per cent Indians. Blacks and pardos together (free, freed and slave) constituted 57.8 per cent of the total population; excluding slaves, 42.7 per cent were free blacks and pardos, an extremely high percentage compared with other slave societies in the 19th century.⁶¹ The 1890 census still showed a population that was less than half white (44 per cent), despite the beginnings of mass European immigration during the previous decade.⁶²

Nabuco had argued in *O Abolicionismo* that, as a consequence of 'contacts between the races', 'the unlimited degree of social mixing which [went] on between the slave and the free', during three centuries of slavery, there had never developed in Brazil obstacles to social advancement based on race alone. He quoted the British historian and Whig politician Thomas Babington Macaulay in the House of Commons in 1845: 'I do not deem it unlikely that the black population of Brazil will be free and contented within eighty or a hundred years; I do not envision, however, a reasonable likelihood of a similar change in the United States'.⁶³ 'In Brazil', Nabuco wrote in *Minha formação*, 'slavery was a melting of the races. In the United States it was a war between them'. However, he showed himself painfully aware that the abolition of slavery in Brazil had not been accompanied by the 'complementary social measures in favour of the freed slaves', especially in the provision of education and land that he had strongly advocated in *O abolicionismo* and in his campaign speeches of 1884–5 and 1887. The sad truth, he wrote, was that in Brazil 'the abolitionist movement stopped on the day abolition was decreed and retreated the day after'. He could only hope that 'in time a more just society will be built on the ruins of slavery'.⁶⁴

61 S. Chalhoub, 'População e sociedade', in *História do Brasil Nação: 1808–2010*, vol. II *A Construção nacional 1830–1889*, J. Murilo de Carvalho (ed.) (Madrid: Fundación Mapfre/Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2012), pp. 41–2.

62 During the 1880s Brazil received a total of 450,000 immigrants, two-thirds of them in 1888–9 alone: 62 per cent were Italian, 23 per cent Portuguese, seven per cent Spanish, four per cent German and two per cent French.

63 Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, pp. 121–2.

64 Nabuco, *My Formative Years*, pp. 135, 147.

III

5. The long road to democracy in Brazil*

Thirty years ago, in the late 1980s, Francis Fukuyama began to formulate his ideas on the late 20th century triumph of liberal democracy (and free market capitalism) worldwide – ‘the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’. They were presented, first in a series of lectures at the John M. Olin Center for Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy at the University of Chicago during the academic year 1988–9, and then in an article published in *The National Interest* (summer 1989). At the time, not only were China, the Soviet Union and much of Eastern and Central Europe still under Communist rule but, in the western hemisphere, besides the notoriously complex case of Mexico, Brazil – the fifth largest country in the world, with the fifth largest population (160 million) – was not an insignificant exception to Fukuyamian triumphalism.

Since its independence from Portugal in 1822 Brazil had had a long history of elections that compared favourably with most countries in the world. Under the empire (1822–89), under the First Republic (1889–1930), in the aftermath of the revolution of 1930, in the period after the Second World War (1945–64), even under military dictatorship (1964–85), elections had been regularly held in Brazil. There had in fact been only one period in the entire modern history of Brazil without elections: the authoritarian *Estado Novo* (1937–45). There is, of course, more to democracy than elections, but elections are fundamental to liberal representative democracy. Brazilian elections, however, were rarely completely honest; although there was always some measure of competition between different parties and candidates, they were usually not entirely freely contested; and most important, although wider sections of the Brazilian population were gradually incorporated into the political process,

* This is a new essay based in parts on ‘Politics in Brazil under Vargas 1930–1945’, ‘Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic 1945–1964’, (with Celso Castro) ‘Politics in Brazil under military rule 1964–1985’ and (with J. Nicolau), ‘Politics in Brazil since 1985’, in *Cambridge History of Latin America Vol. IX Brazil since 1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and an inaugural lecture ‘The long road to democracy in Brazil – and present concerns’, delivered in the Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy, King’s College London, 14 March 2017. It includes ideas first formulated in ‘Politics in Brazil: from elections without democracy to democracy without citizenship’, *Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Special issue, *Brazil: burden of the past, promise of the future*, 129 (2000); revised version in J. Dunkerley and M. D’Alva Kinzo (eds.), *Brazil since 1985: Economy, Polity and Society* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2003).

the level of participation always fell some way short of universal suffrage. The painfully slow process of political liberalisation, initiated towards the end of the military regime, continued after the transition to civilian rule in 1985 and leading eventually to democracy, part of Samuel Huntington's 'third wave' of global democratisation which started in southern Europe in the 1970s and spread to Latin America in the 1980s – was still not yet complete. (And the Brazilian economy remained – and remains – one of the most closed and state-regulated – with one of the largest public sectors – in the capitalist world.)

However, by the time Fukuyama published his book *The End of History and the Last Man* in 1992, Brazil could unquestionably be counted as a democracy. Under the Constitution in 1988 the presidential elections at the end of 1989 and the congressional elections at the end of 1990 were free, fair, competitive and based on universal suffrage. Brazil had become, after India and the United States, the third largest democracy in the world. Brazil's democracy has several structural flaws, and political reform has been the subject of debate for more than two decades, but it has so far survived, despite fears at the time of its birth that it might not with little in the past to justify much optimism that it would. Nevertheless, the political/institutional crisis arising from the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers' Party) in 2016 was a reminder that liberal representative democracy in Brazil is relatively new and perhaps less than fully consolidated.

I

In contrast to the 13 Colonies in British North America, but like colonial Spanish America, Brazil served no significant apprenticeship in representative self-government under Portuguese colonial rule. For three centuries Brazil was governed by Crown-appointed governors-general (or viceroys), captains-general (or governors), high court judges, magistrates and other lesser bureaucrats. It has been argued that the municipal councils (*senados da câmara*), like the *cabildos* in late colonial Spanish America, were rather more than simply self-perpetuating oligarchies: councilmen [*vereadores*] and some local judges were chosen or indirectly 'elected' by *homens bons* [men of wealth and good standing]. However, the number of 'voters' was always small and the powers of the câmaras severely restricted.

The first general elections in Brazil (albeit on an extremely limited suffrage) were held to elect delegates to the Cortes, who, beginning in April 1821, were summoned to meet in Lisbon in the aftermath of the Portuguese liberal revolution of 1820. By that time, as a consequence of the transfer of the Portuguese court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1807–8 during the Napoleonic wars Brazil was already no longer strictly speaking a Portuguese colony but an equal partner in a dual monarchy: *O Reino Unido de Portugal*,

Brasil e Algarves. A year later, in June 1822, as Brazil finally moved towards full separation from Portugal, there followed elections to a Constituent Assembly in Rio de Janeiro. They were indirect elections on a strictly limited suffrage after the extreme liberals or radicals of the period (many of them republicans) failed to secure direct popular elections.

The independence of Brazil in 1822 can be regarded as part of the so-called 'democratic revolution' of the Atlantic world in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in the sense that liberal democratic ideas were widely proclaimed in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and absolutism. There was, however, never any intention of establishing in Brazil anything that, even at the time, looked remotely like liberal representative democracy based, however theoretically, on the sovereignty of the people. The main aim of the leaders and supporters of Brazilian independence – *fazendeiros* [plantation owners], especially in the province of Rio de Janeiro but to a lesser extent also Bahia and Pernambuco, merchants in the principal cities and some bureaucrats – was to achieve political autonomy without sacrificing the stability so crucial for the maintenance of Brazil's territorial unity and existing socio-economic structures built, above all, on African slavery. (Brazil's population at the time, in a vast territory of three million square miles, was between four and five million, less than a third white, more than a third slave.)

Once decided upon, independence was secured quickly and peacefully – without either a long and bloody war with the colonial power or a civil war (in sharp contrast to events in Spanish America). The transition from Portuguese colony to independent state was characterised by political, economic and social continuity. The existing Portuguese state apparatus never ceased to function. The economy suffered no major dislocation. Above all, as well as the existing pattern of land ownership, the institution of slavery survived – in all regions of the country and, while heavily concentrated in plantation agriculture, in all sections of the economy and society, rural and urban. Unlike the newly independent Spanish American states, Brazil did not even become a republic. Uniquely, Brazil proclaimed itself an empire, with Dom Pedro, the son of King João VI of Portugal and heir to the Portuguese throne, becoming independent Brazil's first emperor (succeeded on his abdication in 1831 by his five-year-old son who eventually became Dom Pedro II).

The Constituent Assembly elected in June 1822 was inaugurated in May 1823 but forcibly dissolved in November of the same year. The constitution of the independent Brazilian empire was imposed by Emperor D. Pedro in March 1824. Under the Constitution of 1824 there was an elected Chamber of Deputies (and elected provincial assemblies and municipal câmaras). But

governments were only to a limited extent responsible to them. Power was concentrated in the hands of the hereditary emperor himself, his chosen ministers, the counsellors of state he appointed (for life), the provincial presidents he also appointed, and a Senate (with senators appointed, also for life, by the emperor, though from lists of three elected by each province). The purpose of an election was not to form a government but to sustain a government already chosen by the emperor.

The parliamentary elections of the empire were contested by two principal parties, Liberals and Conservatives. In the middle decades of the 19th century, the golden age of the empire, the level of political participation in Brazil was potentially surprisingly high: men (not women, of course) who were 25 years old (21 if married), Catholic, born free, and with a quite low annual income from property, trade or employment had the right to vote in elections for the Chamber of Deputies. Reliable statistics are hard to come by, but it is generally agreed that around one million Brazilians could vote (i.e. half the free adult male population, including many of quite modest means and illiterates, regardless of colour). (This compares favourably with the electorate in England, for example, after the Reform Act of 1832 and even after the Reform Act of 1867.) However, a much smaller proportion of the population registered to vote. And the elections were indirect. The so-called *votantes* elected *eleitores* (who were required to have a higher annual income), and only eleitores – some 20,000 of them in 1870, for example – had the right to vote for *deputados* [*deputies*]. Moreover, the turn-out was generally extremely low. This was hardly *democracia coroada* [crowned democracy], as the historian João Camillo de Oliveira Torres entitled a book published in 1957 on the political system of the empire.¹

The number of Brazilians legally enfranchised was severely reduced as a result of the Saraiva law of 1881. During the last quarter of the 19th century, as the coffee economy expanded and the shift from slave to free labour finally gathered momentum, making the final abolition of slavery increasingly inevitable, there was a growing fear amongst the dominant political class – shared by many liberal reformers – that ex-slaves, in the rural areas but more particularly in the rapidly expanding urban areas, would readily acquire the low income sufficient to secure the right to vote. Elections for the Chamber of Deputies were made direct; the property/income qualification for eleitores was removed; and non-Catholics, naturalised citizens (though not resident foreign immigrants) and ex-slaves (freedmen) were eligible to become voters. However, undermining

1 R. Graham, *Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth Century Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 109, Table 2, and p. 332, n. 41; J. Nicolau, *Eleições no Brasil. Do Império aos dias atuais* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2012), p. 30. On the political system of the empire, see also J.M. de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem: a elite política imperial; Teatro de sombras: a política imperial* (2nd rev. edn., Rio de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ/Relume Dumará, 1996).

somewhat these apparent liberal-democratic advances, a new requirement for future voter registration was introduced for the first time: namely, education as measured by a literacy test or rather a capacity to sign one's name. (The individual was responsible for his own voter registration.) This in a country in which 80–85 per cent of the population was illiterate. (In England, John Stuart Mill, the great apostle of liberal democracy, also argued against giving the vote to illiterates, but Mill at least believed in the rapid expansion of public education to reduce the level of illiteracy, not something advocated by many people in Brazil in the late 19th century.) Thus, in the final decade of the empire, while the number of eleitores increased (in 1886 117,000 voted in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies), the vast majority of Brazilians were consciously and deliberately excluded from political participation.²

Liberalism may have been the dominant ideology in 19th-century Brazil but, as in Spanish America, it was liberalism of a predominantly and increasingly conservative variety as it was forced to adjust to the realities of an authoritarian political culture, economic underdevelopment and, most of all, a society deeply stratified (and along racial lines).

Brazil was not only the last independent state in the Americas to abolish slavery, it was also the last to declare itself a republic. It was no accident that the republic was finally proclaimed in 1889, the centenary year of the French revolution. The ideology of republicanism, especially radical republicanism, supported by progressive urban middle-class intellectuals, was profoundly French-inspired. But there was no revolution in Brazil in 1889. The Brazilian republic came out of a military coup born of a conspiracy between a small number of army officers and representatives of the rising coffee-producing landed oligarchy of the state of São Paulo. Like the transition from colony to empire, the transition from empire to republic was marked more by fundamental social and economic continuity than by change.

Under the republican constitution of 1891 the president, state governors/presidents,³ municipal *prefeitos* (mayors) as well as both houses of Congress (the Senate and Chamber of Deputies), state assemblies and municipal councils were all elected. Elections under the First Republic (1889–1930), however, were not much less dishonest than elections under the empire, possibly more so, controlled as they were for the most part by state governments and local political bosses known as *coroneis* (because many had once held the rank of colonel in the National Guard) representing powerful landed oligarchies, often

2 Graham, *Patronage and Politics*, pp. 185–6, 200, 202.

3 In five of Brazil's 20 states (former provinces) during the First Republic, including São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, the chief executive was called president.

with what amounted to private armies, especially in the more backward states of the north-east and north.

During the First Republic elections were contested by state parties only and in each state the Republican party – the Partido Republicano Paulista (PRP), Partido Republicano Mineiro (PRM), Partido Republicano Riograndense (PRR) and so forth – was dominant. The outcome of elections for president of the republic was pre-determined by prior agreement between state governors [*a política dos governadores*]. No ‘official’ candidate backed by the governors and Republican political machines of at least one (and it was usually both) of the two states with the largest electorates (Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais) and two or three of the largest second rank states (Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Pernambuco) ever lost, and no ‘opposition’ candidate ever won a presidential election during the First Republic. One of the first decrees of the provisional government in November 1889, four days after the fall of the empire and establishment of a republic, reaffirmed that the only criterion for adult male voter registration was now literacy. The regulations for the election of a Constituent Assembly in 1890 reduced the minimum voting age from 25 to 21. By continuing to deny the vote to women and illiterate men, the republican Constitution of 1891 excluded from politics two thirds of Brazilians of voting age. (In the Constituent Assembly a greater effort was made to extend the suffrage to women than to illiterates: it failed.) Such was the neglect of public primary and secondary education during the First Republic, responsibility for which was devolved to the municípios and the states, that over 75 per cent of the population remained illiterate as late as 1920.

Nevertheless, the presidential and congressional elections of the early republic did represent a substantial advance in direct popular political participation compared with the late empire. There was an electorate of around one million, including sections of the emerging urban middle class and even some urban workers in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Porto Alegre and elsewhere, and half to three quarters of a million voted.⁴ However, even in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the capital of the federal republic, with a population of over half a million in the first decade of the 20th century, only some 120,000 people (60 per cent of the adult male population) were literate and therefore had the right to vote, only 15–20 per cent of these registered to vote in national elections, and only 10 per cent actually voted.⁵ In the country as a whole, in

4 See B. Lamounier and J. Muszynski, ‘Brasil’, in Dieter Nohlen (ed.), *Enciclopedia electoral latinoamericana y del Caribe* (San José, 1993), pp. 93–134, especially Table 2.1 ‘Evolucion del electorado 1933–1990 [in fact 1894–1990]’ and Table 2.9 ‘Ecciones presidenciales 1894–1989’ (pp. 125–30) for statistical information on elections in Brazil after 1889. See also J. Nicolau, *Eleições no Brasil*, an indispensable guide.

5 J.M. de Carvalho, *Os bestializados: o Rio de Janeiro e a república que não foi* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1987), ch. 3 ‘Cidadãos inativos: a abstenção eleitoral’; Nicolau, *Eleições no Brasil*, p. 60.

even the most competitive presidential elections with the greatest degree of political mobilisation – for example, the elections of 1910 and 1919 in which Rui Barbosa, the great liberal jurist, stood as an opposition candidate (and lost) – less than 5 per cent of the adult population voted.⁶ It was not until 1930 that more than 10 per cent of the adult population voted in a presidential election. What has been called oligarchical democracy (surely an oxymoron) is, as a description of the political system of the Old Republic, as hard to swallow as is crowned democracy for the empire.

The revolution of 1930 which brought an end to the First Republic and the hegemony of the São Paulo coffee oligarchy was in no real sense a revolution at all. Getúlio Vargas, governor of Rio Grande do Sul and the defeated candidate in the elections in March, came to power in November as a result of an armed rebellion led by dissident members of the political elite, especially in Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais but also São Paulo, and disaffected military officers, which triggered intervention by the federal army to remove President Washington Luis from office. It represented yet another shift in the balance of power between landed regional elites more than the emergence of new social forces and brought the military to the centre of power, where it remained for next 60 years.⁷ The provisional government dissolved Congress, state legislatures and municipal câmaras. State presidents/governors and municipal prefeitos were replaced by *interventores* nominated by the provisional president and state *interventores* respectively. For the first time since the implementation of the 1824 Constitution Brazil had no elected politicians in either the executive or legislative branches of government.

However, elections were promised for a new Constituent Assembly. A commission set up by the provisional government in 1932 recommended the introduction of the secret ballot and a system of electoral supervision [*justiça eleitoral*]. A *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* [Supreme Electoral Court] and regional tribunals would be responsible for the registration of voters, parties and candidates, the vote itself and, crucially, the count. (In practice, however, the new electoral legislation was not fully implemented until the establishment of the Liberal Republic after the Second World War.) An electoral law in 1932 lowered the voting age to 18 and, more importantly, for the first time gave women the vote (provided they were literate).⁸ Registration remained

6 Lamounier and Muszynski, 'Brasil', in Nohlen (ed.), *Encyclopedia electoral*, pp. 99, 128.

7 The best book on the revolution of 1930 remains B. Fausto, *A revolução de 1930. História e historiografia* (1977; 16th, rev. edn, São Paulo, 1997).

8 J. Hahner, *Emancipating the Female Sex: the Struggle for Women's Rights in Brazil, 1850–1940* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 171–3. The suffrage had first been extended to women in New Zealand in 1893, followed by Australia in 1902, some West

the responsibility of the individual, but *alistamento ex-officio*, automatic voter registration for lists of employees, male and female, in government employment and larger public and private companies was now permitted (and actually enabled some illiterates to be registered). Voting was now obligatory for men up to the age of 70, with sanctions for failure to vote. There was, however, no immediate significant expansion in the number of Brazilians registering to vote. Women in particular were slow to register; only 15 per cent of those eligible to vote in the elections for the Constituent Assembly in May 1933 did so, and only one woman, Carlota Pereira de Queiróz from São Paulo, was elected.

The Constituent Assembly met for first time in November, and promulgated a new Constitution in July 1934. The Assembly elected Getúlio Vargas president for a further four years, and determined that elections for the Chamber of Deputies and for state constituent assemblies (which would eventually become state assemblies and elect state governors and state representatives in a federal Senate) would be held in October. Seven per cent of the population (2.66 million) were registered to vote in the October 1934 elections for the Chamber of Deputies, 7.1 per cent of the population (compared with 3.9 per cent in 1933), ranging from 2.4 per cent in Amazonas to 10.2 per cent in Rio de Janeiro and 11.2 per cent in Rio Grande do Sul.⁹

Under the Constitution of 1934 direct elections for president and state governors were due to be held in January 1938. But the emergence in 1935 of the radical Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL) and a failed attempt by the Communist party to seize power in November 1935 (see Essay 7) led to the imposition of a state of siege, which remained in force for two years. When elections threatened to produce a result unacceptable to Vargas and the military – either a victory for Armando Sales and a restoration of the 'liberal democracy' (*sic*) of the First Republic dominated by state oligarchies and especially the coffee interests of São Paulo or a victory for José Américo de Almeida and the establishment of a populist government committed to improving the lot of the poor, they were aborted by military coup in November 1937. Under the authoritarian *Estado Novo* that followed Congress, state assemblies and municipal câmaras were once again dissolved and the scheduled elections for president and state governors cancelled. Getúlio Vargas was to remain in power for another eight years.¹⁰ No elections were held during *Estado Novo* (1937–45).

European countries including Germany at the end of the First World War, though not until 1928 in the United Kingdom. In the western hemisphere women won the right to vote in Canada in 1918 and the United States in 1920, but among Latin American countries only in Ecuador in 1929 before Brazil. It was 1944 before women were given the vote in France, for example, 1946 in Italy, 1947 in Argentina, 1953 in Mexico and 1974 in Portugal.

9 Nicolau, *Eleições*, Gráfico 2, p. 79

10 On the background to the 1937 coup, see A. Camargo et al., *O golpe silencioso. As origens da república corporativa* (Rio de Janeiro: Rio Fundo, 1989).

For 120 years after Brazil became an independent state the dominant class had successfully excluded the vast majority of Brazilians from the political system and at the same time prevented any serious challenge to its power and wealth.

II

The Liberal Republic established under the Constitution of 1946 at the end of the Second World War is usually taken to represent Brazil's first 'experiment in democracy'.¹¹ During 1944–5, the Vargas dictatorship had come under considerable pressure to democratise or at least liberalise the political system of the Estado Novo. The pressure was both domestic and external. (Brazil was one of the closest allies of the United States in the struggle for democracy against fascism.) In February 1945 Vargas finally promised 'free' elections before the end of the year, confident that he had the means (through control of the state apparatus) and support (especially from the ranks of the organised working class and white collar public employees who were the main beneficiaries of the economic and social policies of the Estado Novo) to win them. The process of 'democratisation' was initiated and controlled *pelo alto*, from above. But between May and October 1945 Brazil's major cities experienced unprecedented mass political mobilisation, orchestrated in part by the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) and, more particularly, by the so-called *queremistas* (from the slogan 'Queremos Getulio', 'We want Getulio') in favour of Vargas remaining in power (see Essay 6). There were growing fears among those conservative sectors in Brazil newly committed to 'democracy' that popular forces were being dangerously radicalised by both communism and populism. It took a soft intervention by the United States and another military coup (this time to remove Vargas from power) to guarantee the elections as scheduled for December. The presidential election was won by General Dutra, Vargas's minister of war, the representative of the forces that had sustained the Estado Novo, not least because of the eleventh hour support offered by Vargas.

The presidential and congressional elections of December 1945 at the end of the Estado Novo were the first reasonably honest, competitive, relatively popular elections ever held in Brazil. Approximately 7.5 million Brazilian men and women aged 18 and over registered to vote (31 per cent of the adult population) and 6.2 million, 26 per cent of the adult population, voted. This was three times the number who had registered to vote and voted only 15 years earlier.¹² One explanation is that, although voter registration was generally by individual initiative, *alistamento ex-officio* through the workplace was more extensively used, not least now by *sindicatos* [labour unions], especially in the

11 See, for example, T.E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) for an early version of this claim.

12 Nohlen (ed.), *Encyclopedia electoral*, pp. 108, 113, 128.

capital cities. In the country as a whole 23 per cent were registered in this way, but in the Federal District (Rio de Janeiro) it was 54 per cent and in São Paulo 31 per cent.¹³ And voting was compulsory.

The Congress elected in December 1945 transformed itself into a constituent assembly. Under the Constitution of September 1946, there would be elections for all three levels of government, executive (president and vice president, elected separately, the governors of the 20 states and municipal prefeitos) and legislative (Senate, Chamber of Deputies, state assemblies and municipal councils). Elections to executive office and to the Senate were to be by direct majority vote, elections to legislative bodies by proportional representation. The vote would be secret, and elections closely supervised by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). Furthermore, elections would be competitive, and contested for the first time by national parties.

Before 1945 the only national political parties or political movements in Brazil were the PCB, founded in 1922 and immediately declared illegal, and the fascist Ação Integralista Brasileira (AIB), founded in 1932 and declared illegal along with all other political parties during the Estado Novo. The three major parties formed in 1945, the Partido Social Democrático (PSD), the União Democrática Nacional (UDN) and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), were obliged by law to have a national organisation, though the PSD and the UDN at least were essentially confederations of state based organisations. This was inevitable in a country the size of a continent (some of Brazil's states were the size of the larger European countries), which was still predominantly rural and small town, in which there had only been state-based parties under the First Republic and in which the embryonic national parties which had contested the Constituent Assembly and Congress elections of 1933–4 and the (eventually aborted) presidential election of 1938 had been abolished with the promulgation of the Estado Novo. In the end a dozen political parties, mostly lacking a clearly defined identity based on history, ideology, programme or social base and only notionally national, were formed in the period 1945–8. During the Liberal Republic all presidential and vice-presidential elections were, however, won by candidates belonging to or supported by one of the three major parties. Between them the PSD, UDN and PTB also secured 90 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 95 per cent of the Senate seats in December 1945, 75–80 per cent of the seats in the Chamber between 1950 and 1962, 80–95 per cent of the Senate seats between 1954 and 1962.

As a result of a dramatic growth in the population (from 40 million in 1940 to 70 million in 1960), rapid urbanisation (35 per cent of the population was classified as urban in 1940, 45 per cent in 1960), economic growth, some modest improvement in literacy and a higher level of voter registration, there

13 Nicolau, *Eleições*, p. 95.

was a significant expansion of the electorate in the post-war period. It reached 18.2 million in 1962, 49 per cent of the adult population.¹⁴ As the vote was obligatory turnout remained high (79.6 per cent in 1962). However, under the constitution of 1946, like the constitutions of 1889 and 1934, more than half the adult population of Brazil, most particularly in the north and north-east and in rural areas more generally, remained disenfranchised by their illiteracy. The 1940 census recorded 56 per cent of the population illiterate, the 1950 census 48 per cent and the 1960 census 39 per cent. Of the 27.1 million Brazilians of voting age in presidential and congressional elections in 1950, 15.2 million were illiterate. In 1950 Congress restored to the individual sole responsibility for voter registration – on the face of it a liberal measure but in the circumstances of Brazil at the time it was a blow aimed at the political participation of the urban working class.

Brazil's post war 'democracy' was limited in three other respects. Firstly, the PCB, the only significant party of the Left, which had been permitted to contest in both the presidential and congressional elections of December 1945 and gubernatorial, state assembly and municipal elections of January 1947 and had won around 10 per cent of the vote (half a million votes) in both, was in May 1947, at the beginning of the Cold War, once again declared illegal by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral after only 18 months of de facto legality. Its 14 federal deputies and one senator lost their seats in Congress (see Essay 7). The PCB, which was not for its part fully committed to legal strategies and the electoral road to power, was effectively excluded from democratic politics – and remained so for the next forty years. Secondly, the distribution of seats in Congress under the 1946 Constitution ensured that the less populated, less developed, more politically conservative (that is to say, clientelistic) states, especially in the north and north-east, remained over represented at expense of the states of the south and south-east, especially São Paulo. The problem here was not simply that, as in the United States, all of Brazil's states regardless of population had an equal number of seats in the Senate (three), but that representation in the Chamber of Deputies was also not proportional to population or electorate (one citizen, one vote, with more or less equal weight). The 1891 Constitution allocated each state one seat in the Chamber of Deputies per 70,000 people, with a minimum 'floor' of four seats per state. The 1934 Constitution allocated one seat per 150,000, one per 250,000 above 20 seats, and this was maintained under the 1946 Constitution. That is to say, states with populations over 3 million – three in 1934: Minas Gerais 6.5 million, São

14 Nicolau, *Eleições*, Grafico 3, p. 97. The electorate actually declined between the congressional elections of 1954 and 1958, from 15.1 million to 13.8 million, while the population grew by 11 per cent, as a result of a new voting register in 1956, the first for over a decade, aimed at reducing the number of the deceased on the electoral lists, double registrations, changes of residence and so forth.

Paulo 6.3 million and Bahia 3.7 million; four in 1946: São Paulo 8.1 million, Minas Gerais 7.3 million, Bahia 4.3 million and Rio Grande 3.7 million – were under-represented in the Chamber of Deputies. States with populations of less than 1.5 million, for example, Amazonas, Sergipe and Mato Grosso, were over-represented. And in 1950 the minimum number of seats per state was raised from four to seven. Finally, and most important, the military retained in the post-war period the independent political power it had exercised since 1930. It was an integral part of the political system. It could and did intervene in politics and it remained largely beyond civilian control. Without military support it was impossible for any democratically elected president to survive in power. Nevertheless, along with Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica, Brazil was one of only four 'democracies' in Latin America in the mid 1950s.

Brazil's limited 'democracy' survived several political crises, notably those surrounding the suicide in August 1954 of Getúlio Vargas (who had been elected to the presidency in the second post-war elections in 1950) and the resignation in August 1961 of President Jânio Quadros, after only eight months in office. In the early 1960s, however, a number of factors, principally a sharp economic downturn but also including the impact of the Cuban revolution and Vatican II, combined to radicalise the popular forces to a level not seen before in Brazil. The 'Right' (including by now large sections of the urban middle class) was prepared to support (indeed encourage) a military coup if this was the only way of preventing radical economic and social change. An imprudent attempt by President João Goulart (1961–4) to create an opening to the Left led to his overthrow by the military on 31 March 1964, bringing to an end Brazil's first 'experiment with democracy' (see Essay 6).¹⁵

III

The *golpe militar* [military coup] of 31 March – 1 April 1964 which overthrew the legally constituted government of President João Goulart made use of a good deal of democratic rhetoric: one of the proclaimed aims of the instigators of the 'Revolution' was the elimination of the threat, as they saw it, that the Goulart administration posed to Brazilian democracy. In the aftermath of the coup, however, by means of a series of *Atos Institucionais* [complementary acts] a new constitution in 1967, a revised constitution in 1969, constitutional amendments and various *pacotes* [packages of arbitrary measures] the military

15 On the collapse of post war democracy in 1964, see W.G. dos Santos, *Sessenta e quatro: Anatomia da crise* (São Paulo, 1986); A.M. Cheibub Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas? Alternativas democráticas a crise política, 1961–1964* (São Paulo, 1993); C. Navarro de Toledo, '1964: o golpe contra as reformas e a democracia', in D. Aarão Reis, M. Ridenti and R. Patto Sá Motta (eds.), *O golpe e a ditadura militar quarenta anos depois (1964–2004)* (Bauru, SP; EDUSC, 2004); C. Fico, *Além do Golpe. Versões e controvérsias sobre 1964 e a ditadura militar* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2004).

regime established in April 1964, while never entirely destroying them, radically remodelled and severely undermined the democratic institutions, albeit limited and flawed, established in Brazil at the end of the Second World War.

For 21 years, until the transition to civilian rule in March 1985, Brazilians lived under authoritarian military rule. A succession of five presidents, all of them senior (four star) generals, were first selected by the military high command and then indirectly 'elected' for a fixed term, the first three by Congress, the following two by an Electoral College consisting of senators, federal deputies and elected delegates from state assemblies, a majority of whose members were guaranteed (until 1984 at least) to support the military's chosen candidate. From 1966 to 1978 state governors were similarly appointed by the military and then indirectly 'elected' by state assemblies or state electoral colleges. Only in 1965 and 1982 were state governors directly elected, half of them (11) in 1965, all 22 in 1982. Mayors of state capitals and cities of importance to 'national security' – originally 68, eventually almost a hundred – were also appointed by the military. Both houses of Congress and state legislatures were directly elected on schedule every four years and continued to function under the military regime (apart from one or two brief closures), though with their powers much curtailed. Moreover, electoral rules were frequently manipulated in the most arbitrary and blatant way to guarantee majorities for the pro-military ruling party.

In October 1965, 18 months after the golpe that brought an end to Brazil's post-war Liberal Republic, all Brazil's political parties were abolished, as they had been in 1937 at the outset of the *Estado Novo*. Two parties only, a pro-government *Aliança Nacional Renovadora* (ARENA) and a minority opposition *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (MDB), formed from the parties in the 1963–6 Congress after significant purges had been carried out, were permitted to contest the congressional elections in November 1966. Only in December 1979 was a multi-party system restored. The 'reform' was aimed at splitting the opposition, thus preventing a potential victory for the MDB in the congressional elections in 1982, which would threaten the military regime's control of the presidential succession in 1985. While on the one hand, the *Partido Democrático Social* (PDS), the new government party, retained most of the old ARENA and therefore an absolute majority in both houses of Congress, the opposition found itself divided into four: the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PMDB), retaining the bulk of the old MDB; the *Partido Popular* (PP), dissident *arenistas* and some moderate members of the MDB; the right of centre *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* (PTB); the left of centre *Partido Democrático Trabalhista* (PDT). They were joined in 1980 by the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT, Workers' Party), the only party born outside Congress without ties to the traditional 'political class' (see Essay 7).

As a result of continued population growth (from 70 million in 1960 to 120 million in 1980), rapid urbanisation (45 per cent of the population was classified as urban in 1960, 70 per cent in 1980), and in the 1960s and 1970s for the first time real progress in direction of universal basic literacy, the electorate continued to grow steadily during the 21-year military dictatorship. By 1982 79 per cent of the Brazilian population of voting age was registered to vote (compared with 49 per cent in 1962). Illiterates (some 20 per cent of the adult population) were still excluded. Voting was obligatory, except for Brazilians over 70. In the elections of November 1982 for state governors (the first direct elections since October 1965), the Chamber of Deputies and one-third of the Senate, state assemblies, municipal councils and some prefeitos, 48 million Brazilians went to the polls.

The process that led to a transition to civilian rule in 1985, like the process that led to a limited form of democracy at the end of the *Estado Novo* in 1945, was initiated and controlled from above. It was not primarily a response by the military to opposition MDB/PMDB victories in the gubernatorial elections of 1982, nor the unexpectedly strong emergence of civil society in the form of new unionism in 1978–9 and the formation of the PT in 1980, nor even the extraordinary mass mobilisation in favour of *diretas já* (immediate direct presidential elections) in 1983–4¹⁶ – although these all played their part. Democracy was never the intended outcome. When it lost control of the presidential succession process, that is to say, when it was no longer able to count on a majority in the Electoral College, the military threw its weight behind a deal struck between PDS dissidents (who later formed the Partido da Frente Liberal, PFL) and the opposition PMDB under which the 75-year-old liberal-conservative opposition politician Tancredo Neves became the ‘official’ presidential candidate. Tancredo was duly indirectly ‘elected’, but never took office. He was taken ill on the eve of his inauguration and died a few weeks later. The presidency went to the Vice-President-Elect José Sarney, the former president of the PDS, the ruling party under the military regime, who therefore became the first civilian president of Brazil in more than two decades.¹⁷

16 See D. Leonelli and D. de Oliveira, *Diretas já. 15 meses que abalaram a ditadura* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2004).

17 See L. Martins, ‘The ‘liberalisation’ of authoritarian rule in Brazil’, in Guillermo O’Donnell, P.C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); T. Skidmore, ‘Brazil’s slow road to democratisation, 1974–85’, in A. Stepan (ed.), *Democratising Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989).

IV

15 March 1985 witnessed a peaceful transition from military to civilian rule (but not yet to a fully fledged democracy) in Brazil. However, a series of constitutional amendments passed by Congress during the first months of the Sarney administration led to a significant democratisation of the electoral process. Firstly, illiterates (26 per cent of the total population in the 1980 Census, the majority black or pardo) finally gained the right to vote, though for them registration and voting would not be obligatory.¹⁸ Secondly, direct presidential elections were re-established (although without at this stage a date being fixed for the next election). Thirdly, elections for some 200 mayors of state capitals and other cities prevented from holding elections during the military dictatorship were scheduled for November 1985. Fourthly, the Federal District (Brasília) was given representation in Congress (eight deputies and three senators). Finally, less demanding rules for the creation of political parties were introduced and, specifically, parties of the Left, principally Brazil's two communist parties – the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) and the Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB), which had split from the PCB in 1962 – could now be legally registered. Throughout 1985, joining the parties created after the party reform of 1979, no fewer than 22 new parties were registered with the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

The municipal elections of November 1985 and the elections for Congress (the Chamber of Deputies and two thirds of the Senate), state governors and state assemblies a year later were the first elections in Brazil based on universal suffrage, though only 65,000 *analfabetos* [illiterates] had had time to register to vote in the first and less than half the total registered to vote in the second.¹⁹ The number of registered voters had increased to 69.3 million, of whom ten per cent were illiterate. Not only were 26 women elected to Congress in 1986, a small number but more than had been elected in the entire period 1932–86, but also seven black members, including the first black, female deputy, Benedita da Silva (PT, Rio de Janeiro).

The Congress elected in November 1986 transformed itself into a constituent assembly which took 20 months to produce a new constitution (compared with three months to produce the 1891 Constitution, eight months the 1934 Constitution, seven months the 1946 Constitution – and only 45 days the constitution of 1967 imposed by the military). The constitution of 1988 was a

18 Brazil was the last country in Latin America to give illiterates the right to vote. Uruguay had done so in 1910, Venezuela in 1946, Bolivia in 1952, Chile in 1970, Ecuador in 1978 and Peru in 1980. In Europe Portugal was the last country to adopt universal suffrage – in 1974, following the overthrow of the dictatorship.

19 For an interesting analysis of the 'black vote' in the elections of 1985 and 1986, see E. Berquo and L. Felipe de Alencastro, 'A emergência do voto negro', *Estudos CEBRAP*, 33 (July, 1992).

long, detailed charter with 245 articles but the political system itself underwent few changes. The main features of the 1946 Constitution were maintained. New features included the election of the president, governors and mayors of cities with more than 200,000 voters in two rounds if necessary to achieve a majority of the valid vote; direct election of the governor of the Federal District; and the lowering of the voting age from 18 to 16, thus extending political rights to 16- and 17-year-olds.

On 15 November 1989, the first direct presidential elections for 30 years were the first ever based upon universal suffrage. They were held symbolically on the centenary of the Republic. The electorate now numbered 82 million (in a population of almost 150 million). With voting mandatory for those over 18 and under 70, the turnout was extremely high (over 80 per cent); 72.3 million voted, of whom 70 per cent were voting for a president for the first time. There were 21 candidates from across the political spectrum, from far Right to far Left, contesting the first round. The election was not won, however, as might have been expected, by the PMDB, the main opposition party for over 20 years and by far the biggest and broadest party in Brazil; nor by the PDT, the party of Leonel Brizola, the heir to Getúlio Vargas and João Goulart; nor by the PT, although its leader, Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva did reach the second round (narrowly ahead of Brizola). It was won by Fernando Collor de Mello – a virtually unknown politician from the poor north-east state of Alagoas with only the relatively insignificant, recently created Partido da Renovação Nacional (PRN) behind him. He proved attractive to the dominant class, which, after the 21-year military dictatorship, had no credible candidate of its own; to some sections of the middle class and intelligentsia; and, above all, to the poorest and least educated sectors of Brazilian society who were susceptible to his populist appeal.²⁰ (See Essay 6.)

Brazil's new democracy showed early signs of fragility against a background of severe economic recession, and from September to December 1992 Brazilians suffered the trauma of the impeachment (on corruption charges) of their first democratically elected president less than halfway through his term of office. In the end, however, the successful impeachment of Collor can perhaps be seen to have demonstrated more the maturity than the fragility of Brazilian democracy.²¹ For the first time in the history of the republic a president was removed from office – and replaced by the elected vice-president, Itamar Franco – by legal, constitutional means. Furthermore, the political crisis surrounding

20 In the first round Collor secured 30.5 per cent of the *votos válidos* (i.e. excluding the blank and spoiled ballots), Lula 17.2 per cent and Brizola 16.5 per cent. In the second round Collor had 53 per cent, Lula 47 per cent. Nohlen (ed.), *Enciclopédia eleitoral*, pp. 99, 130.

21 President Fernando Collor de Mello was impeached first in the Chamber of Deputies on 29 September (441 votes to 38) and then, definitively, in the Senate on 29 December 1992 (76 votes to 3 with two abstentions), a few hours after he had in fact resigned.

the impeachment of Collor was the first in which the military was not an active participant.

In 1994 and 1998 *eleições casadas* [presidential, gubernatorial, congressional, and state assembly elections] were held on the same day for the first time since 1950 and 95 per cent of the population of voting age was now registered to vote. In 1994 77.9 million went to the polls and 83.3 million in 1998. Both presidential elections were won outright in the first round by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a distinguished sociologist with an international reputation and a politician with impeccable democratic credentials and advanced social democratic ideas, the candidate of the small Center-Left Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), which had split from the PMDB in 1988, though on each occasion backed by the parties of the Center-Right, especially the PFL. Cardoso was only the third elected president in 70 years to serve a full term (the first since Juscelino Kubitschek, 1956–61) and, as a result of a highly contentious constitutional amendment in 1997, the first in the history of the republic to be re-elected for a second term. The defeated candidate in both elections, as in 1989, was Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva, the candidate of the PT.

The international environment in the 1990s was uniquely favourable to the survival and consolidation of democracy in Latin America. In particular, the United States made support for democracy a central feature of its policy towards the region, as it had done in the past but this time with rather better results. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War anti-communism was no longer available as the main justification for the overthrow of democratic (or semi-democratic) governments as it had been in Brazil in 1964. The traditional political class (rural and urban), the more powerful economic interest groups and not least the military were, it seemed, now committed to peaceful democratic politics, as they had not always been in the past. Of course, it could be argued that the 'propertied classes' (including broad sections of the middle class) were no more than fair weather democrats. When the costs of overthrowing democracy were high and the costs of tolerating democracy low, democracy was likely to survive. But when their interests were threatened by forces favouring a significant distribution of wealth and power, as they were, or were believed to be, in 1964, there was always a possibility that they would look to the military to overthrow democracy. We shall never know whether Brazil's new democracy would have passed its supreme test – the acceptance of victory by Lula and the PT in the presidential elections of 1989 or 1994. As Adam Przeworski once remarked, only where the Left lost the first elections following a process of democratisation was democracy truly safe.

It was a mark of the growing maturity and stability of Brazil's democracy that the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the presidency at the fourth attempt in October 2002 raised not the slightest doubt that he would assume power in

January 2003. Lula could not quite achieve what Cardoso had achieved in 1994 and 1998: outright victory in the first round. In the second round, however, he comfortably defeated José Serra, Cardoso's Minister of Planning and Minister of Health, the candidate of the PSDB. The election and transfer of power to a candidate of the Left (although the PT had abandoned the label 'socialist' before the election) represented an important landmark in the consolidation of democracy in Brazil.

After narrowly avoiding impeachment over the *mensalão* [big monthly payments to deputies in return for support] corruption scandal (2004–5), Lula recovered and, albeit with electoral support very different from that in 2002, went on to win re-election in October 2006 with a second round victory over Geraldo Alckmin, governor of São Paulo, the candidate of the PSDB. With his popularity at an all-time high (70–75 per cent approval), there was considerable discussion throughout 2009 about whether Lula would introduce an amendment to the 1988 Constitution which would allow him to run for a third term in 2010. In a number of subtle, and not so subtle, ways he indicated that he might indeed run. In the end, however, he declared 'Eu não brinco com a democracia' ['I don't play around with democracy']. Instead he actively promoted his personally chosen successor, Dilma Rousseff (see Essay 6). (More than one commentator compared Lula's imposition of Dilma to the famous *dedazo* (big finger), the way in which Mexican presidents nominated their successors during the period of PRI domination). Dilma won the 2010 presidential election, defeating José Serra (PSDB), the former mayor of São Paulo and governor of the state of São Paulo (and defeated candidate in 2002) in the second round to become Brazil's first female president. In 2014 Dilma Rousseff was re-elected, though this time only narrowly defeating the former governor of Minas Gerais, Aécio Neves (PSDB) in the second round. It was the seventh democratic presidential election since the transition from military to civilian rule in 1985 and the sixth time since 1994 that the election had come down in the end to a contest between the candidates of the PSDB and the PT.

V

In 2015, 30 years after the end of the military dictatorship, Brazil could unquestionably be counted a fully fledged, consolidated and apparently stable democracy – with an electorate of 140 million by far the largest democracy in Latin America and the fourth largest in the world after India, the United States and Indonesia. An electoral calendar had been established with regular, free and fair elections for both executive and legislative branches of government, at federal, state and municipal levels. (In the 29 years between the municipal elections of 1985 and the presidential and congressional elections of 2014 Brazilians went to the polls 17 times.) For the first time in the history of the

republic Brazil had a political system based on one person, one vote – and a voting age of 16. Elections were highly competitive, contested as they were by a large number of political parties, from Left to Right. The conduct of elections had been improved by the introduction of electronic ballot boxes in all elections in 1996. Brazilian democracy had survived its one institutional crisis – the impeachment of Collor de Mello in 1992 – and passed its ultimate test: the acceptance by the military (and the more reactionary elements in the political and business elite) of the victory of the candidate of the PT in the presidential election of 2002 (repeated in 2006, 2010 and 2014).

There is, of course, more to democracy than elections, however honestly conducted and freely contested and whatever the level and strength of popular participation: the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, a free press, the protection of civil liberties, etc. In 2015 Brazil scored relatively well here and there remained no ‘authoritarian enclaves’, that is to say, remnants of the power apparatus of the military dictatorship not accountable to democratically elected civilian governments. The military itself had steadfastly remained out of politics. Finally, Brazil is a country with remarkably few of the regional, national, racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious divisions, tensions and conflicts that pose a threat to democracies, old and new, throughout most of the world. In this respect it is uniquely fortunate.

And yet Brazilian democracy, like all democracies, is not without its flaws and challenges.²² Some political scientists would go so far as to claim that in Brazil, as in the rest of Latin America, the presidential system itself is a major obstacle to the proper functioning of representative democracy. However poor their performance, however weak their support in Congress, however low their standing in the country, presidents can only be removed in advance of the next scheduled elections by extreme measures: for example, in the case of Brazil, suicide (Vargas, 1954), resignation (Quadros, 1961), military coup (Goulart, 1964) or impeachment by Congress (Collor, 1992). Brazil had two opportunities to change its system of government during the process of democratisation: in March 1988, after prolonged debate on the issue, the Constituent Assembly voted 344 to 212 in favour of a presidential rather than a parliamentary system; and five years later (April 1993), in the plebiscite required under the 1988 Constitution, 55 per cent of the electorate voted for presidentialism, 25 per cent for a parliamentary system of government, with 20 per cent of the vote spoiled or blank. (In the same plebiscite Brazilians were

22 In the Economist Intelligence Unit's 'Democracy Index 2016', 167 countries are divided into full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. In Latin America only Uruguay is a full democracy. Brazil (at no. 51), behind Uruguay (19), Chile (34) and Argentina (49), is a flawed democracy with overall score of 6.9. Brazil scores well on electoral process and pluralism (9.55), civil liberties (8.82), less well on the functioning of government (6.79) and political participation (5.56), and poor on political culture (3.75).

also offered the opportunity to restore the monarchy: 12 per cent voted in favour compared with 66 per cent who supported the republic.)

But it is Brazil's electoral system that has come in for the greatest criticism. The most undemocratic feature of Brazilian democracy – and the most difficult to reform – is the distribution of seats in Congress under the federal system. Since the beginning of the republic the less populated, less developed, more politically conservative (that is to say, clientelistic) states, especially in the north and north-east, have been over-represented in Congress, and since 1934 the more populated, more developed states, especially São Paulo, under-represented. All 26 of Brazil's states (and the Federal District) have an equal number of seats in the Senate (three). However, representation in the Chamber of Deputies has also not been proportional to population or electorate (one citizen, one vote, with more or less equal weight), as we have seen. The 1988 Constitution fixed a maximum of 60 (raised to 70 in 1994) and a minimum of eight seats per state. This distortion was aggravated by the creation of three new states with small populations: Tocantins, separated from the state of Goiás, Roraima and Acre, upgraded from their status as territories. Moreover, the Federal District (Brasília), also with a small population, was given representation in Congress for first time. No provision was made for periodic revision to account for demographic changes between states.

Thus in 2014, São Paulo (population 43.6 million, electorate 22 million) had 70 seats (the maximum); Minas Gerais (20.5 million), 53 seats; Rio de Janeiro (16.9 million), 46 seats; Bahia (14.5 million), 39 seats, etc. But seven states and the Federal District with populations of less than 3 million, including Roraima with only 500,000, Amapá and Acre each with 800,000, all had eight seats. If seats were distributed proportionally to population or electorate São Paulo would have 111 seats, Roraima only one. São Paulo has one seat per 622,000 people, Roraima one per 66,000. Thus, a vote in Roraima is worth nine times a vote in São Paulo.²³ Brazil's seven smallest states (by population, not size), which together account for only five per cent of Brazil's population, elect 25 per cent of the Senate and over 10 per cent of the Chamber.

There can be no democracy without elections, and in a modern mass democracy no elections without parties. Brazilian parties, however, not only lack historical roots – most were formed after 1985 – and, except for the PT, ideological or programmatic identity, but there are an unusually large number of them. It is generally agreed that Brazil has the most 'underdeveloped', fragmented party systems in the world.²⁴ There have been no constitutional

23 J. Nicolau, *Representantes de quem? Os (des)caminhos do seu voto da urna à Câmara dos Deputados* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2017), pp. 100–4.

24 On the Brazilian party system, see in particular the work of S.P. Mainwaring: 'Brazilian party underdevelopment', *Political Science Quarterly*, 107 (1992); 'Brazil: weak parties, feckless democracy', in S.P. Mainwaring and T.R. Scully (eds.), *Building Democratic Institutions*:

barriers to the registration of new parties. In the nine elections between 1982 and 1996 76 parties put up candidates, though 39 of them only once. Five parties contested the elections in 1982, the last during the military regime after the two party system had been scrapped, 18 in 1998, 35 in 2014. Admittedly, many were very small: in 2014 13 parties received less than 1 per cent of the vote (together only 6 per cent). But even the number of what political scientists classify as 'effective parties' grew from 7.7–8.2 in the years 1995–2002 to 10.5–11.4 in the years 2007–10 and 13.4 in 2015. Brazil has more parties than any other democracy. In a study of 1,167 elections in 137 countries between 1919 and 2015 by Michael Gallagher, three of the four elections contested by most parties were held in Brazil (2014, 2010, 2006), the other in Poland (1991).²⁵ Moreover, at each election a bewildering number of party coalitions are formed, and different coalitions for federal, state and municipal election. For example, in 2014 the 46 seats in the state of Rio de Janeiro were contested by 865 candidates belonging to 32 different parties, 23 of them in eight coalitions.²⁶

In elections for the Chamber of Deputies (and the Senate) the electoral district, the constituency, in Brazil is the state. Three states have more than 10 million voters (São Paulo 22 million, electing 70 deputies), another eight have over five million. Federal deputies (and senators) thus have minimal identification with, and accountability to, the voters who elected them. Since 1945, and maintained in two Constituent Assemblies (1946 and 1987–8), in elections for the Chamber of Deputies (and state assemblies) Brazil has had a system of proportional representation, together with 'open' lists of candidates for election. Since party membership in Brazil is low, and only a minority of voters even have a clear preference for a particular party (half of them for the PT), most Brazilian vote for individuals rather than parties. In the larger states, as we have seen, they have to choose between hundreds of candidates. In 2014 two weeks before the election whereas 93 per cent of voters had decided which candidate they would support for president, only 30 per cent had decided their candidate for federal deputy. Forty-five days after the election less than half could remember the name of the candidate they had voted for!²⁷

Since voting is obligatory for voters over 18 and under 70, in recent elections between 10 and 20 per cent of the electorate have voted either *em branco* [blank ballot] or *nulo* [spoiled ballot] – practices common (and understandable) during the period of military rule but disturbing in a democracy and extraordinarily high by the standards of any democracy in the world. In the election for the

Parties and Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); and *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratisation: the Case of Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

25 Cited in Nicolau, *Representantes*, p. 90.

26 *Ibid.* p. 37.

27 *Ibid.* p. 62.

Chamber in 2014 more than 15 per cent of the electorate voted *em branco* (10 million) and *nulo* (7.5 million). In the state of Rio de Janeiro the figure was more than 21 per cent.²⁸ A *nulo* was always a wasted vote, and a vote *em branco* also after 1997, because they are not counted as *votos válidos* [valid votes] for candidate or party in the distribution of seats under proportional representation.

Other problems affecting the freedom and fairness of elections in Brazil – the influence of the media, especially television, and the financing of election campaigns – are common to all modern democracies. However, even when compared with elections in richer countries (the United States, for example), Brazilian elections are exorbitantly expensive. And illicit, unregistered funding by private companies and individuals to both political parties and politicians [known as *caixa dois*] is a generalised phenomenon, as the corruption scandals that have dominated Brazilian politics since March 2014 have demonstrated (see below).

Brazil's electoral system also creates major problems for democratic governability. The largest party in Congress has never had more than around 20 per cent of the seats in Congress, and the largest party was not always the party of the president: for example, the PMDB after the 1990 election when President Collor's PRN had only 7 per cent of the seats, the PFL after 1998 when President Cardoso's PSDB had 15 per cent, the PMDB after 2014 when President Dilma Rousseff's PT had 13 per cent. The result is what has been called 'permanent minority presidentialism' which in practice becomes *presidencialismo de coalisão* [coalition presidentialism]. The president, elected by national majority vote, in two rounds if necessary, is obliged to conduct intense negotiations with party leaders, with individual politicians and even with state governors, who have a measure of influence over the deputies (of all parties) elected in their states, before and especially after elections, in order to guarantee the Executive a solid, sustainable base in the Legislature. In the 2011–14 Congress, 23 parties had seats in the Chamber of Deputies (15 in the Senate), and in the Chamber elected in 2014 there were 28 parties – more than in any other democracy. Italy, for example, had 15 after the election in 2013, Belgium 13 in 2013, Israel 10 in 2015. Fernando Henrique Cardoso built a coalition of six or eight parties, Lula eight or nine, Dilma 13. This inevitably produces extreme forms of *fisiologismo* [pork-barrel politics] and corruption. Many of the medium-sized and smaller parties simply become *partidos de aluguel* [parties for rent]. When the *mensalão* scandal came to light in 2004–5, individual deputies were discovered to have been bought. Positions in government have to be created to accommodate all parties in a coalition: for example, at the start of Dilma's second administration Brazil had 39 ministries.

28 Ibid, p. 25.

To complicate the situation of the Executive even more, Brazilian parties notoriously lack not only ideological and programmatic consistency (except for the PT) but also cohesion and discipline: party-switching is common. In the seven legislatures elected since the end of military rule (1986–2010) no less than 27 per cent of federal deputies abandoned the party for which they were elected during their mandates.²⁹ And this underestimates the extent of party switching because some deputies switched more than once – in some cases several times! – during the same legislature. Only a small proportion of these changes were the result of the creation of new parties (for example, 27 deputies joined the PSDB in 1986, 48 the PSD in 2011). Party switching was initially considered a question of the natural re-alignment of the political class after 21 years of military dictatorship. It was expected to diminish as democracy was consolidated. But this clearly did not happen and 18 months into the legislature elected in 2014 97 deputies (19 per cent) had switched parties. Among democracies throughout the world, only Italy has a similar level of party infidelity.

Political reform has been an issue of heated debate within the political class and in academic circles in Brazil since the mid 1990s. The issue of presidentialism versus parliamentarism was no longer on the agenda, it seemed. The distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies between states was rarely mentioned. An end to re-election for executive office – president, governor and mayor – came up for discussion from time to time, as did an end to obligatory voting. Campaign finance was a constant theme. But the focus was on simplifying for the voter the system for the election of deputies (federal and state), making deputies more accountable to those who elected them (and incidentally improving their quality), and reducing the number of political parties. Reforms proposed have included, for example: dividing states into smaller, single member constituencies with majority voting; adopting ‘closed’ party lists of candidates, if state-wide elections based on proportional representation continue to be preferred; banning party coalitions in elections based on proportional representation; tightening the rules introduced in 2007 for the removal from Congress of deputies who switch parties during the legislature to which they were elected; above all, erecting constitutional barriers to the registration of parties³⁰ and access to the Fundo Partidário and to media time during elections.

There were several congressional commissions on political reform, and many reform proposals put to the Chamber of Deputies – most of them defeated. There was no consensus on political reform in Brazil – between parties or

29 Ibid, p. 80.

30 A threshold of two per cent of the national vote in the previous election for a party to register for the next would *potentially* reduce the number of Brazilian political parties to 13, a threshold of 3 per cent to 9 parties, a threshold of 5 per cent to 7 parties.

within parties (politicians rarely vote to change the system under which they were elected), and the general public, the electorate, showed little interest.

Beyond the debate about the fairness and effectiveness of Brazil's electoral system there was the more fundamental concern that Brazil's relatively new democracy had not been broadly or deeply legitimated. Brazilian public opinion polls and the Latinobarómetro research institute in Santiago de Chile have consistently provided evidence not only of a widespread ignorance of political issues in Brazil³¹ but also, more disturbingly, a lack of trust in politicians, political parties and political institutions – and therefore a lack of confidence in democracy itself.³² Some would argue that democracy is merely 'formal', rather than 'substantive', if it does not protect the economic and social 'rights' of citizens. Despite the economic and social advances made during the previous two decades, especially during the PT administrations (2003–10) (see Essay 7) Brazilians also perceived democracy as having failed to promote a significant reduction of poverty, inequality and social exclusion (which despite Brazil's claim to be a racial democracy have a clear racial dimension).

Nevertheless, in 2015, despite their many flaws, and the evident low esteem in which they were held by, if not a majority, a substantial minority of the Brazilian electorate, Brazil's democratic institutions appeared to be fully consolidated and fundamentally stable. Brazilian democracy, however, was about to face its greatest test in the political and institutional crisis arising from the controversial impeachment of a democratically elected and (albeit narrowly) democratically re-elected president, Dilma Rousseff of the PT, and her replacement by vice-president Michel Temer of the PMDB.

Epilogue

Within six months of the start of President Dilma Rousseff's second mandate in January 2015 there was speculation that she might be impeached and impeachment was the subject of intense debate throughout the rest of the year. The background to this was, first, a petition to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for the annulment of Dilma's narrow victory in the 2014 presidential

31 The Brazilian electorate is not only overwhelmingly poor but also illiterate, semi-literate or at best poorly educated. 'We must educate our masters', famously declared Robert Lowe in the House of Commons on the passage of the Reform Act of 1867. (What he actually said was, 'I believe it will be necessary that you should prevail on our future masters to learn their letters'.) Almost a century later Anísio Teixeira, one of Brazil's greatest educators, declared, 'There will only be democracy in Brazil the day the machine (*máquina*) that prepares people for democracy – the public school – is assembled in Brazil'. Public education in Brazil, both primary and secondary, remains woefully inadequate.

32 In 2016 the Latinobarómetro found that only 32 per cent of Brazilians identified democracy as the 'preferable' form of government, a dramatic fall from the already low figure (54 per cent) of the previous year. Brazil was next to bottom in Latin America, above only Guatemala.

election on the grounds that she had seriously misinformed the country on the state of the Brazilian economy and that her electoral campaign had been financed illegally. Secondly, one of the deepest and most persistent economic recessions in Brazilian history. The rate of economic growth had been in steady decline since 2011. The economy grew only 0.4 per cent in 2014. In 2015 it contracted by 3.8 per cent (and a further 3.6 per cent in 2016). Inflation rose, living standards fell and unemployment increased (see Essay 7). Thirdly, a corruption scandal without precedent in Brazil, indeed in any modern democracy. Corruption, most recently concerning the preparations for the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016, was already an issue in Brazilian politics. Beginning in March 2014 and gathering strength throughout 2015 the so-called *Lava-Jato* [Car Wash] investigation revealed a major scandal involving the government-appointed directors of Petrobras (the state-owned oil company), a cartel of private construction companies (of which Odebrecht was by far the largest) and government ministers and politicians belonging mainly to the PT, but also its principal allies in government, the PMDB and the PP.³³ By October Dilma's approval rate had collapsed to single figures, the lowest for any president since the end of military rule in 1985. An Ibope poll in November showed that 87 per cent of those interviewed found the government *ruim* or *péssimo* [bad or very bad], and 67 per cent declared themselves in favour of the impeachment of the president.

President Dilma had begun her second term with the support of 69 per cent of the Chamber of Deputies and 72 per cent of the Senate, although only 16 per cent of deputies and 17 per cent of senators belonged to the PT. Her government was a coalition of 12 parties (eight of which had ministerial posts) in which the PT was in a minority. With no end in sight either to the economic recession (and its social impact) or Operation Lava-Jato – and in view of her own limited experience in dealing with Congress – Dilma found it increasingly difficult to maintain and manage her multi-party coalition government. In October the PMDB, the largest party in Congress, withdrew its support, making effective government virtually impossible.

In December the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB), a political enemy of the president, and himself under investigation for corruption, accepted a petition for the impeachment of Dilma from three

33 By the beginning of 2018 more than 100 prominent politicians and businessmen who had previously regarded themselves as above the law and had enjoyed an extraordinary level of impunity had been arrested and condemned to long prison sentences under Operation Lava-Jato. And many more were under investigation. Brazil now had 'accountability institutions' – the Federal Audit Tribunal (TCU), the Office of the Federal Public Prosecutor, the federal police and, above all, the federal judiciary – equal to those of any democracy in the world. Of course, this brought with it a potential new danger to democracy: the so-called judicialisation of politics, the increasingly important role played in politics by unelected judges.

prominent lawyers in São Paulo. The grounds for impeachment were not, as in the case of Collor de Mello in 1992, personal corruption, nor any involvement the president might have had in the various corruption scandals involving Petrobras. She was accused of crimes of fiscal and administrative responsibility in violation of the constitution and the law: the improper manipulation of the public accounts in 2014 by transferring funds from the state banks to cover up a huge fiscal deficit and mounting public debt (what became known as *pedeladas fiscais*).

After securing the blessing of the Supreme Court (nine of whose 11 judges had been appointed by PT presidents), the petition for impeachment went in March to a commission of the Chamber of Deputies where on 11 April it was approved by majority vote (38 votes to 27), and then to the full Chamber where on 17 April it was approved by the necessary two thirds of the deputies (367 votes to 137). On 12 May the Senate voted (55 votes to 22, with four senators absent) to suspend Dilma from office pending a full trial. Vice-president Michel Temer (PMDB), Dilma's running mate in both 2010 and 2014, became interim president. On 31 August the Senate voted in favour of the impeachment of Dilma by more than the required two thirds majority (60 votes to 21) and Temer was confirmed as president of Brazil. The impeachment process spread over almost nine months was thus entirely constitutional and legal.

However, the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff was also, perhaps like most impeachments primarily, political: the removal of a failed president who had lost the support of both the Congress and the people ('the street'). It was fiercely contested by the PT which, together with its allies, the smaller parties on the Left, had the support of 25–30 per cent of Congress, and which could mobilise not insignificant support from party members, the unions, especially the public sector unions, and important sectors of civil society, not least university teachers and students. For the PT the impeachment of Dilma was a conspiracy by 'elite' politicians of the Centre-Right, especially the PMDB, many of them themselves deeply corrupt, big business (domestic and foreign), the judiciary and the media to bring the political hegemony of the PT to an end, and in particular to prevent the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as president once again in 2018. It was a *golpe*, a coup, albeit a parliamentary coup, and thus a frontal assault on Brazilian democracy. Militant *petistas* were (and still are) for the most part in denial about the corruption associated with the PT governments and the economic mismanagement and political incompetence of the Dilma administration which brought Brazil to the sorry state it was in at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016.

The Temer government, which the Opposition insisted was illegitimate, was indeed a government of the Centre-Right, full of politicians (including

President Temer himself) under investigation for receiving bribes and illegal campaign contributions, out of touch with the majority of Brazilians and equally as unpopular as its predecessor. It survived a turbulent first twelve months, despite the loss of several ministers charged with corruption. And it began to appear that it might at least muddle through to the end of Dilma's original mandate (December 2018), if only because the alternative would be political chaos. However, in April 2017 the publication of the 'end of the world' list of all those accused of corruption by the directors of Odebrecht appeared implicating eight ministers, 24 senators, 39 deputies, the presidents of both houses of Congress and three state governors – and indirectly Lula, who was already being investigated under Operation Lava-Jato, Dilma and Temer. A month later, on 17 May, came the JBS bombshell. In plea bargaining testimony the owners of Brazil's (and one of the world's) largest food producing companies, implicated President Temer himself, Aécio Neves, the national president of the PSDB (and defeated candidate in the 2014 presidential election), and hundreds of politicians of all parties in the biggest corruption scandal thus far, which threatened to bring down the Temer government.

Temer refused to resign. In June, in spite of overwhelming evidence of illicit campaign funding, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (more than two and a half years after the event) finally voted, by four votes to three, not to annul the 2014 presidential election, which would have led to the immediate removal of Temer from office. The decision was made in the interests of political stability and passage of the reforms necessary for the urgently needed fiscal adjustment and the restoration of economic growth. (Technically, Brazil came out of recession in the second quarter of 2017. And with the solid majority in Congress that had voted to impeach president Dilma, the government appeared to be making modest progress on labour reform and on reform of the pension system, which previous governments, both PSDB and PT, had ignored and which was the main reason for Brazil's fiscal 'emergency'.) Temer now faced a series of criminal charges for corruption, money laundering and obstruction of justice to be brought before the Federal Supreme Court. However, this required the approval of two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies. Temer survived a first vote on 2 August, and a second on 25 October, with 263 deputies (of 513) and 251 deputies respectively voting against sending the case to the STF. There was unlikely to be a third, although further charges continued to be made against him. Temer's continuation in office until 1 January 2019, once no means certain, seemed secure.

Elections – for president, two-thirds of the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, state governors and state assemblies – were due to be held in October 2018. The PT, the only significant party of the Left, was now discredited with broad sectors of the electorate, as the results of the municipal elections in October

2016 had demonstrated (see Essay 7). And given the levels of poverty and inequality in Brazilian society Brazilian democracy needs a party of the Left. Also discredited was the main party of the Centre-Right, the PMDB, as were to a greater or lesser degree all the parties in the Temer coalition government, including the PSDB.³⁴ None of the so-called pre-candidates for president had a convincing plan for dealing with Brazil's economic, social, political – and ethical – crisis. More than 60 per cent of Brazilians polled wanted a president from outside the three main parties (PMDB, PT and PSDB), but no credible 'outsider' had emerged. Former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the pre-candidate of the PT, remained by far the most popular politician in Brazil and early opinion polls put him well ahead of the field, with 30–35 per cent of the vote in the first round, despite the fact that he had been sentenced to several years in prison for money laundering and active and passive corruption.³⁵ If in the end, as expected, Lula were to be declared ineligible to run for president,³⁶ his supporters, who argue that his prosecution was entirely political, an extension of the golpe which had brought down Dilma and precisely aimed at preventing him from being re-elected president, would inevitably challenge the democratic legitimacy of whoever was elected. In any event, in the absence of any profound change in the electoral system, and especially the party system, despite the fact that, following Dilma's impeachment, political reform had continued to be debated as a matter of urgency, both inside and outside Congress,³⁷ the new president in January 2019 would face the same problems of democratic governability as his or her immediate predecessors. There were no grounds for complacency about the future stability of liberal representative democracy in Brazil.

34 A DataFolha poll in July 2017 showed only two per cent of those interviewed had complete confidence in Brazil's political parties, 28 per cent a little and 69 per cent none. The October 2016 municipal elections had produced the greatest percentage of spoiled and blank votes since the introduction of electronic voting in 1996. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, abstentions, nulos and em brancos totalled 42.5 per cent of the electorate. Political scientists were forecasting a tsunami of protest votes in 2018.

35 On 12 July 2017 in Curitiba Judge Sérgio Moro, who was responsible for cases brought to justice under Operation Lava-Jato, sentenced Lula to nine years and four months in prison. On 24 January 2018 the regional court of appeal in Porto Alegre upheld the original conviction and increased the sentence to 12 years and one month. On 7 April, after the failure of a last-ditch attempt to persuade the Federal Supreme Court to grant him habeas corpus and despite ongoing attempts to persuade the Court to reverse its decision, Lula began to serve his prison sentence, initially in the federal police headquarters in Curitiba.

36 The *Lei de Ficha Limpia* (Clean Slate) of 2010 prohibits candidates with certain criminal records from running for public office for eight years.

37 The only reforms enacted were an end to corporate financing of election campaigns and the imposition of a modest threshold of 1.5 per cent of the national vote for a party to be able to claim financial support from an enhanced state-financed Party Fund and TV/radio time during elections. The latter, however, would only come into effect in 2020. Thirty-five parties were expected to contest the Congressional elections in October 2018.

6. Populism in Brazil*

At a conference ‘To define populism’ held at the London School of Economics in 1967, 50 years ago, the distinguished American political scientist Richard Hofstadter, author of *The American Political Tradition* [1948], *The Age of Reform* [1955] (on populism in the United States during the Progressive Era) and *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* [1964], gave a paper entitled ‘Everyone is talking about populism, but no-one can define it’. There have been hundreds books, articles and lectures on populism since then – by historians, political scientists, sociologists, even economists as well as journalists and political commentators. Almost all of them open with a declaration that there is no agreed definition of populism, not least because populism has had different connotations at different times over the past 100 years and in many different parts of the world, notably in the United States, Latin America and Europe. In the study of both political history and contemporary politics, populism has been, and continues to be, an elusive concept notoriously difficult to define.

Populism is perhaps best and most simply understood as a political phenomenon encompassing those movements and parties, often but not always with ‘charismatic’ leaders, which aspire to power, reach power (usually, though not always, through elections), exercise power and retain power by claiming some kind of direct or quasi-direct, unmediated relationship and identification with ‘the people’, especially those sections of the population previously excluded from politics, which are mobilised, often for the first time, against the established structures of power (political, economic, social, intellectual and cultural), dominated by the ‘elite’. Populist discourse or rhetoric is built, simplistically, around a fundamental antagonism, what the Ecuadorean sociologist Carlos de la Torre refers to as ‘a Manichean confrontation’, between the ‘people’, loosely defined, and the ‘elite’, equally loosely defined. Populism is a political practice, a political strategy, a political language, not a political ideology like liberalism or socialism, even nationalism. Ideologically, populism has always been eclectic, vague, confused – and not to be taken too

* This essay is a revised version of ‘Populism, neo-populism and the Left in Brazil: from Getúlio to Lula’, in C. Arnsen and C. de la Torre (eds.), *Latin American Populism of the Twenty-First Century* (Washington D.C.: Wilson Center Press/Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013) ch. 7, pp. 179–20.

seriously, despite the heroic efforts of post-Marxist intellectuals, notably the late Argentine political scientist Ernesto Laclau and his wife (now widow) the Belgian political scientist Chantal Mouffe.¹

In Latin America,² for the so-called 'classical populists' or first generation populists, from the 1930s to the 1960s, a period which witnessed rapid economic and social change and the beginnings of mass politics, it was the new, and newly enfranchised, urban working class and public sector white-collar urban lower middle class that were available for political mobilisation. (The mass of the rural poor were largely ignored since they had no vote or their votes were delivered to local landowners and political bosses.) Elected or otherwise, populist leaders were invariably authoritarian and at best ambivalent toward such liberal democratic institutions as existed. At the same time, they fostered political inclusion (though not empowerment), and delivered some measure of social justice through a (mostly limited) distribution of wealth and welfare provision to their social base.

Only Chile and Argentina (before the Second World War) had Socialist parties which achieved a measure of electoral success. The Latin American Communist parties, except for one brief period between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, were small, isolated, illegal – and heavily repressed. Thus, the political space occupied in western Europe by parties of the Communist and Socialist/Social Democratic Left – and in the United States by New Deal Democrats – was occupied in Latin America by populist politicians and parties. They were, however, at best modestly reformist, rather than committed to social, much less socialist, transformation. They were mostly hostile to the traditional parties of the Left, and the Left was hostile to them – the non-Communist Left at least. Latin American Communist parties were often ambivalent towards populism.

The so-called 'neo-populists' emerged from the late 1980s, after many political scientists and sociologists had announced the end of populism in Latin America. Taking advantage of the persistence of extreme poverty and inequality – indeed their worsening during the 1980s and 1990s – and the 'third

1 See E. Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (1977); E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985); E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso, 2005); E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, 'Populism. What's in a Name?', in F. Panizza (ed.), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (London: Verso, 2005); I. Errejon and C. Mouffe, *Construir Pueblo. Hegemonía y radicalización de la democracia* (2015) (Eng. trans. *Podemos. In the Name of the People* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2016).

2 On populism in Latin America, see M.L. Conniff (ed.), *Populism in Latin America* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1999); C. de la Torre and E. Peruzzotti, *El retorno del pueblo. El populismo y nuevas democracias en America Latina* (Quito: Flaco, 2008); C. de la Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010); C. de la Torre and C.J. Arson (eds.), *Latin American Populism in the Twentieth Century* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

wave' of democratisation, they were able to mobilise the previously politically unorganised and excluded low income and ill-educated marginal sectors of the population, both the new urban poor, resulting from unprecedented rural-urban migration since the 1950s, and the rural poor, including in many countries the indigenous populations, thus significantly extending the social base of 'classical' populism. Bypassing established political parties which had proved ineffective in articulating or responding to the economic and social demands of the 'people' they created new social and political movements and successfully contested democratic elections.

In power, 'neo-populist' parties and politicians have been, like the 'classical' populists, for the most part authoritarian, impatient with democratic constitutional and institutional constraints on the 'will of the people'. Their opponents were 'enemies of the people'. The 'neo-populists of the Right', like, for example, Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Peru, opportunistically used popular discontents to reach power, but then failed to challenge entrenched elites. They implemented 'neo-liberal' agendas that did little to improve the condition of the poor who had elected them. The 'neo-populists of the Left', for example, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia, adopted radical anti-poverty programmes and other social policies to effect a significant distribution of wealth. While for the most part, like the 'classical' populists, the 'neo-populists of the Left' have been generally opposed to, and opposed by, the traditional parties of the Left, which were even weaker now than in the middle decades of the 20th century, some describe themselves as '21st century socialists'. In some cases they fostered radical experiments in direct, participatory forms of democracy – but at the cost, it could be argued, of weakening, even destroying, liberal representative democracy. And they invariably pursued 'irresponsible' macro-economic policies. In *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America* (1991) Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards famously defined economic populism as 'the short-term pursuit of growth and income distribution at the cost of inflation and large fiscal deficits'.

In the historical literature on 'classical' populism in Latin America, Getúlio Vargas, president of Brazil 1930–45 and 1951–4, is always given a prominent place alongside, for example, Juan Perón in Argentina, José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Colombia and even, unhelpfully, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico. But was Vargas a populist? And, if so, when? And were there not other Brazilian politicians, at both the national and the sub-national level, equally or even more deserving of the epithet 'populist'? Fernando Collor de Mello, president of Brazil 1990–2, is usually included in the category of 'neo-populists of the Right'. The extent to which Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, leader of Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers' Party) founded

in 1980, president of Brazil from 2003 to 2010, and potential candidate for re-election in 2018, can be regarded as a 'neo-populist of the Left' is the final question to be addressed in this essay.

I

Getúlio Vargas first came to power in Brazil in 1930. Landowner, lawyer and governor of Rio Grande do Sul, aged 48, Vargas was the defeated 'opposition' candidate in the presidential elections in March (in which only ten per cent of the adult population voted). An armed rebellion six months later, led by dissident members of the political oligarchy and disaffected junior army officers, triggered a *golpe* [military coup] by senior army generals and the transfer of power to Vargas in November. Although there was a certain amount of popular discontent at the time, particularly as the first effects of the world depression began to be felt, and some enthusiasm for regime change in the Federal District (Rio de Janeiro) at least, popular forces played only a minor role in the 'Revolution' of 1930. What Louis Couty, a French resident in Rio de Janeiro, had famously written almost 50 years earlier remained essentially true: 'O Brasil não tem povo' [Brazil has no people], that is to say, no popular forces that could be effectively mobilised for political ends.³ At this stage in his career Vargas saw little potential in popular political mobilisation. *O povo* [the people] were political spectators, not political actors.

Vargas was head of a provisional government until July 1934. Under a new Constitution he was then elected president by Congress for a fixed four-year term (although from November 1935 he governed under a state of siege). During this period he first advanced and then destroyed the political careers of the first two politicians in Brazil who might be called 'populist': Pedro Ernesto Baptista and José Américo de Almeida.

A distinguished medical doctor and political protégé of Vargas, Pedro Ernesto Baptista became prefeito (mayor) of the Federal District by indirect election in April 1935, but immediately began to appeal directly to the urban poor with populist rhetoric and a program of poverty alleviation, health and education reform and state ownership of basic utilities. He was sympathetic to the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL), a popular front organisation supported by the Partido Comunista Brasileira (PCB), illegal, apart from a few months, since its foundation in 1922. Pedro Ernesto became a victim of the repression that followed an attempted communist putsch in Natal, Recife and Rio de Janeiro in November 1935 (see Essay 7). In April 1936 he was removed from office and sentenced to three years in jail. He was released in September

3 Quoted in J.M. de Carvalho, *Os bestializados: o Rio de Janeiro e a república que não foi* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1987), p. 10.

1937, but was now in poor health. He died of cancer aged 58 in August 1942. Huge crowds occupied the streets for his funeral.⁴

José Américo de Almeida, a well-known writer (author of the classic novel of the north-east, *A bagaçoira*, 1928) and one of the leaders of the 'Revolution' of 1930, became in 1937 the 'official candidate' in the presidential elections scheduled for January 1938. During the election campaign, he attacked the opposition candidate Armando Sales as conservative and elitist, the representative of the *paulista* [from the state of São Paulo] plutocracy and foreign capital. He presented himself as the candidate of the poor and forgotten, denouncing the conditions under which most Brazilians lived and promising to break up the large landed estates, extend social welfare provision and distribute wealth [*a política dos pobres*]. Like Pedro Ernesto, José Américo was eventually accused of having communist sympathies, and he had already been forced to withdraw his candidacy when the elections were in any case aborted by the golpe of November 1937 which established Vargas as dictator under the Estado Novo (1937–45).⁵

An important feature of the Estado Novo was the creation of a new relationship between the state and organised labour – both for workers in the manufacturing industry and white-collar public employees, heavily concentrated in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. By 1945 a quarter of Brazil's urban labour force – half a million workers – was unionised. Repression was replaced by co-optation. On the one hand, unions lacked autonomy and were subordinate to the state; workers were not permitted to engage in political activity, nor to strike. On the other hand, unions were legally recognised, union leaders had some (limited) political influence, and wage increases and social welfare benefits (pensions, medical care, etc.) were extended to increasing numbers of industrial workers, civil servants and their dependents. As pressure for political 'democratisation' increased towards the end of the Second World War the Estado Novo moved from co-optation to mobilisation. *Trabalhismo* [from trabalho, labour] was invented by a regime that began to recognise the future political potential of organised labour. State propaganda increasingly emphasised the economic and social gains made by workers under the Estado Novo and projected Vargas as 'o pai dos pobres' [the father of the poor].⁶ There was nothing in his past, or indeed in his personality, to suggest that Vargas

4 M.L. Conniff, *Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism 1925–1945* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981) is, above all, a study of the political career of Dr Pedro Ernesto.

5 There is no scholarly study of J. Américo de Almeida. But see A. Camargo et al., *O golpe silencioso: as origens da república corporativa* (Rio de Janeiro: Rio Fundo Editora, 1989).

6 See the classic work by A. de Castro Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo* (São Paulo: Edições Vértice/IUPERJ, 1988).

could become a charismatic populist political leader, but the ground was being prepared for a dramatic change of direction in 1945.

In the presidential and congressional elections finally scheduled for the end of 1945 all literate men and women over 18 had the right to vote; the vote was obligatory; and the electorate had expanded from less than 10 per cent (in 1930) to more than 30 per cent of the adult population (see Essay 5). It is not clear whether Vargas, who had been president continuously since 1930 but never directly elected, intended or hoped to offer himself for election in 1945. He controlled the state apparatus. He could count on considerable political support from the non-export-orientated sectors of the rural oligarchy and from industrialists, but also, he now believed, with justifiable confidence, from the urban lower middle class, especially in the public sector, and, above all, organised labour. Vargas founded the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) and urged Brazilian workers to join it.⁷ The two 'conservative' parties established in 1945 nominated candidates for the presidency, the Partido Social Democrático (PSD) an army general, the União Democrática Nacional (UDN) an air force brigadier, but the PTB did not. Vargas, however, encouraged public debate of the idea of a third candidate, a 'civilian candidate of the people'. João Batista Luzardo, who had reason to know, later argued that 'Vargas had only one third candidate in mind: himself'.

The six months from May to October 1945 witnessed an unprecedented level of political mobilisation in Brazil's major cities orchestrated in part by the Communist party (PCB), which was now legal, but more particularly by a new political movement Queremismo, formed around the slogan 'Queremos Getúlio' [We want Getúlio]. Behind the movement were the propaganda machine of the Estado Novo, government ministers, leading officials of the Ministry of Labour and the social welfare institutions, government approved union leaders (the so-called *pelegos*), national and state leaders of the PTB, and some 'progressive' businessmen – the 'fascist gang', as the British embassy liked to call them. Mass demonstrations on a scale never seen before in Brazil were organised in Rio de Janeiro during August, September and October.⁸ It is scarcely credible, as is sometimes claimed, that Vargas knew nothing of

7 There is a rich literature on the PTB and populism. See, in particular, Lucília de Almeida Neves, *PTB: do getulismo ao reformismo (1945–1964)* (São Paulo: Marco Zero, 1983); Maria Celina D'Araújo, *Sindicatos, carisma e poder. O PTB de 1945–1965* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1996); and Jorge Ferreira, *O imaginário trabalhista: getulismo, PTB e cultura política popular 1945–1964* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2005).

8 See Leslie Bethell, 'Brazil', in Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (eds.), *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 33–65. Also John French, 'The populist gamble of Getúlio Vargas in 1945: political and ideological transitions in Brazil', in David Rock (ed.), *Latin America in the 1940s: War and Post War Transitions* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994).

the Queremista movement. Did he actually promote or merely tolerate it? Certainly he did nothing to stop it. Was Vargas's nomination as presidential candidate – and subsequent electoral victory – the aim? Or were they (was he) preparing the ground for a populist coup?

In the end, Vargas did not become a candidate, whatever the temptation. To ensure that the elections scheduled for December were not aborted, as in 1937, the military removed him from power in October 1945. In the presidential elections, the late, and somewhat reluctant, support offered by Vargas was crucial for the victory of the former Minister of War, General Dutra, the candidate of the PSD and the PTB. In the congressional elections (in which candidates were allowed to run in more than one state), Vargas was elected senator in Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo and federal deputy in the Federal District and six other states, accumulating a total of 1.3 million votes. Over one fifth of the Brazilian electorate voted for him. He chose to serve as senator for his home state, Rio Grande do Sul.

Under the post-war Liberal Republic (1945–64), there were regular elections for president and Congress, state governor and state assembly, mayor and municipal council and the electorate grew from 7.5 million in 1945 to 18.2 million, half of the adult population, in 1962. Since voting continued to be obligatory, the turn out in elections was high (see Essay 5). New possibilities were opened up for populist politicians, especially since the principal, virtually the only, party of the Left, the PCB, was once again illegal from May 1947.

In February 1949, in an interview with the journalist Samuel Wainer in *O Jornal*, Vargas was reported as looking ahead to the presidential election of October 1950 and saying: 'Yes, I will return, but not as a political leader, as leader of the masses'. The PTB had electoral strength in Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, but this was not enough to win the presidency. Together with Governor Ademar de Barros, who had, as we shall see, built up a powerful political machine in the state of São Paulo (which accounted for 20 per cent of the electorate), Vargas formed a Frente Popular [Popular Front] against the PSD and UND and the 'elite' and won the election with 48 per cent of the vote in a three-way contest, no less than a quarter of his votes coming from São Paulo. But he had in the end campaigned for the most part above parties and he owed his victory to his direct, personal appeal to unionised workers and the people in general (at least those who had the vote) based on his record as president/dictator under the *Estado Novo* and his project for further economic development and social reform.

The Vargas administration (1951–4) was all-party and essentially conservative. The decision to create a state company, Petrobras, with a monopoly over oil reserves and their extraction, however, and the nationalist campaign launched under the slogan 'O petróleo é nosso' [The oil is ours] to

guarantee its passage through Congress, generated possibly the greatest level of urban popular mobilisation seen thus far in Brazil. In the second half of his mandate Vargas attempted to strengthen his links to organised labour with the appointment of João (Jango) Goulart as Minister of Labour. Goulart, a young (34-year-old) rancher and politician from Rio Grande do Sul, had been since 1952 national president of the PTB and personally close to Vargas. He had the reputation, largely unwarranted, of being a radical *trabalhista*, an admirer of Perón in Argentina, and in favour of establishing a *república sindicalista* [a republic based on labour unions] in Brazil.

In February 1954 Vargas implemented a 100 per cent increase in the minimum wage, together with improvements in social welfare provision and pensions, and announced that he would extend existing labour legislation to rural workers, ending his speech with this provocative statement: 'You [the workers of Brazil] constitute a majority. Today you are with the government. Tomorrow you will be the government'. The pressure mounted, however, for his resignation. It was alleged by his enemies that he had dictatorial ambitions. Under the Constitution of 1946 he could not be re-elected in 1955, but they recalled the political events of November 1937 and October 1945. To avoid being removed from office by the military a second time, Vargas committed suicide on 24 August, and by this act ensured that *getulismo* would remain a powerful force in Brazilian politics long after his death.

Whatever the element of personal tragedy, Vargas's suicide was, and was intended to be, a political bombshell. Vargas left a *carta-testamento* [final testament in the form of a letter], one of the most famous documents in Brazilian history. He had always been, he said, 'a slave of the people'. He had returned to power in 1950–1 'nos braços do povo' [in the arms of the people] and had sought to defend the people and particularly the very poor against the powerful interests, domestic and foreign, impeding his efforts to govern the country in the national interest and the interests of the people. Now, old and tired, he was 'serenely' taking the first step on the road to eternity, 'leaving life to enter History'.⁹ If ever there was a populist document, this was it. Vargas's letter, which was immediately broadcast on national radio and published in all the newspapers, had an enormous popular impact. Hundreds of thousands of Brazilians went onto the streets of Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Recife and other cities. There were scenes of extreme emotion (and some violence). In Rio huge crowds accompanied Vargas's body to Santos Dumont airport for transportation to Rio Grande do Sul and burial at São Borja.

9 See J.M. de Carvalho, 'As duas mortes de Getúlio Vargas', in *Pontos e bordados* (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 1998). Modern biographies of Getúlio Vargas include B. Fausto, *Getúlio Vargas* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2006) and Lira Neto, *Getúlio* (3 vols. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012–14).

At the sub-national level, both state and municipal, there are several examples of populist politicians in Brazil during the Liberal Republic: for example, Leonel Brizola (PTB), who was elected mayor of Porto Alegre in 1955, governor of Rio Grande do Sul in 1958 and, with a huge popular vote, federal deputy for Guanabara (the city of Rio de Janeiro) in 1962;¹⁰ Miguel Arraes (PST – Partido Social Trabalhista), elected governor of Pernambuco in 1963; and in São Paulo, Brazil's most populous and economically developed state, Ademar de Barros and Jânio Quadros, who in 1960 was elected president.¹¹

Ademar de Barros, coffee *fazendeiro* and industrialist, who had governed São Paulo during the Estado Novo, formed in July 1946 the Partido Social Progressista (PSP) as a political vehicle for himself in a state where interestingly (and significantly) all three major parties, PSD, UDN and PTB, were relatively weak. Projecting a 'man of the people' populist image, with a powerful anti-elite message to a mass lower class following, and spending on a massive scale, Ademar became in January 1947 São Paulo's first popularly elected governor. *Ademarismo* was born.¹² In office he made liberal use of public funds to maintain his popular political base and was not ashamed to use the slogan 'ele rouba, mas faz' [he steals, but he gets things done]. He helped elect Getúlio president in 1950, as we have seen. But in 1954, in a second attempt to become governor, Ademar lost narrowly to another populist, Jânio Quadros. In 1955 he ran for president, coming third with 26 per cent of the vote, but winning in both São Paulo and the Federal District. In 1957 he was elected *prefeito* of São Paulo city and, after failing in a second attempt to become president in 1960, was elected state governor again in 1962. Two years later, however, now with the overwhelming support of the *paulista* middle-class, Ademar de Barros provided civilian backing for the 1964 anti-populist golpe.

10 When the national capital was moved from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília in 1960 and Brasília became the new Federal District, the city of Rio became the state of Guanabara. It was merged with the state of Rio de Janeiro (and replaced Niterói as the state capital) in 1975.

11 G. Grin Debert, *Ideologia e populism* (São Paulo: T. A. Queiroz Editora, 1979) is a study of four Brazilian 'populists': Adhemar de Barros, Miguel Arraes, Leonel Brizola and Carlos Lacerda, governor of Guanabara 1960–5. M.L. Conniff, 'Brazil's Populist Republic and beyond', in M. L. Conniff (ed.), *Populism in Latin America* (Tuscaloosa AL: University of Alabama Press, 1999) examines the politics of eight populists: Getúlio Vargas, Pedro Ernesto, Adhemar de Barros, Jânio Quadros, Juscelino Kubitschek, Leonel Brizola, Miguel Arraes and Fernando Collor de Mello, president 1990–2 (see below). If Juscelino Kubitschek, president 1956–61, is treated as a populist, we are in danger of further devaluing an already slippery concept. On Brizola in this period, see A. Freire and J. Ferreira (eds.), *A razão indignada. Leonel Brizola em dois tempos (1961–64 e 1979–2004)* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2016), Part I *Leonel Brizola e o tempo do nacionalismo-revolucionário (1961–4)*.

12 See J.D. French, 'Workers and the rise of Adhemarista populism in São Paulo, Brazil 1945–47', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 68 (1988), 2–43; and R. Sampaio, *Adhemar de Barros e o PSP* (São Paulo: Global Editora, 1982).

Jânio Quadros, a provincial *matogrossense* (from the state of Mato Grosso) turned paulista outsider, began a meteoric political career when he stood for *vereador* in the municipal council of São Paulo at the age of 30 in 1947. In 1950 he became a state deputy, with the most votes of any candidate. In March 1953, he won a famous victory against the candidate backed by all three major parties to become *prefeito* of São Paulo, the first state capital to elect a mayor by direct popular vote – after eight nominated mayors since 1945. Finally, in October 1954, after only eight years in politics and 18 months as mayor, Quadros was elected governor of the state, again without the formal support of any of the three major parties, narrowly defeating Ademar de Barros, his main rival for the popular vote. In these two elections Quadros, who never had the full support of organised urban labour, successfully mobilised the poor of the peripheries of the city of São Paulo and other major cities in the state of São Paulo. Janismo was Brazil's first taste of mass populism based on the support of the urban poor for a charismatic politician with a strong ethical (anti-corruption) as well as an anti-elite message.

In the presidential election of October 1960, Jânio Quadros became the candidate of a Centre-Right coalition of five parties led by the conservative UDN, his earlier radical populism apparently abandoned. His campaign for president was remarkable, even by his own standards, for its ideological confusion. A contradictory and enigmatic personality, Jânio was supported by many *empresários*, especially those linked to foreign capital, and the urban middle class, but also the 160 sindicatos [unions] affiliated to the Movimento Renovação Sindical and the 'people' more generally to whom he offered (for example, in his speech to a crowd of 100,000 in Recife in September) nationalist-populist *reformas de base* [basic reforms], including the extension of social legislation to rural workers. He won the election with 5.6 million votes (48.3 per cent of the vote, slightly better than Vargas in 1950), more than half provided by the state of São Paulo.

Jânio Quadros had built a political career, which had taken him from municipal councilman in São Paulo to President of the Republic in 14 years, on the margins of the party system, without an ideology or program or even much of an organisation. He had a mandate for change, although apart from cleaning up politics and administration it was not clear what kind of change. He had raised great hopes for the future, but it was not clear what kind of future. In the presidency, he was arrogant and authoritarian. He largely ignored the rules of the political game and he believed he could govern without Congress since 'the people are with me'. He did not negotiate with, nor try to co-opt, his opponents and even his allies were uncomfortable with his more 'populist' or 'progressive' policies which included anti-trust legislation, controls on the remittances of profits abroad, agrarian reform, political reform to give illiterates

the vote, and an independent, anti-imperialist Third World foreign policy which included restoring diplomatic relations with Soviet Union, establishing commercial relations with East Germany and the Eastern bloc and, above all, closer relations with post-revolutionary Cuba.

In August 1961, after only seven months in power, Jânio Quadros astonished the country by resigning, apparently believing that he would return, like Getúlio in January 1951 (or De Gaulle in France in December 1958), 'nos braços do povo' [in the arms of the people]. The military and Congress moved quickly to appoint an interim successor. And no popular support materialised. The povo were apparently in shock, perplexed, to Jânio's disappointment 'very passive'. 'The people, where are the people?', he is said to have exclaimed forlornly when he arrived from Brasília at Cumbica airport in São Paulo, prepared for exile.¹³ Quadros was eventually succeeded as president in September by Vice-President João Goulart.¹⁴

Whether João Goulart as president (1961–4) should be regarded as a populist is debatable.¹⁵ He was a leading politician in the PTB, a protégé of Getúlio Vargas, as we have seen. At the time of Jânio's *renúncia* [resignation] so widespread was the concern on the Right, military and civil, about Goulart's supposed radical *trabalhismo* that before being allowed to take office he was forced to accept a parliamentary system of government under which his powers were severely reduced. After winning a plebiscite in January 1963 to restore the presidential system, Goulart pursued an agenda for political and social reform which was certainly more radical than that of Getúlio Vargas, but which he regarded as moderate. His *reformas de base* included improvements in the standard of living of non-unionised as well as unionised urban workers, the extension of labour and social welfare legislation to rural workers, the concession of the right to vote to illiterates and, most controversial, moderate agrarian reform: the distribution of unproductive land with compensation in government bonds.

Goulart's principal political base was organised urban labour linked to the PTB, together with the so-called 'national bourgeoisie' and nationalist elements in the military. There was now the possibility of extending his base

13 For an excellent account of Quadros' political career, though more journalistic than academic, see R. Arnt, *Jânio Quadros. O prometeu de Vila Maria* (Rio de Janeiro: Ediouro Publicações, 2004). See also V. Chaia, *A liderança política de Jânio Quadros (1947–1990)* (São Paulo: Editora Humanidades, 1991).

14 Under the Liberal Republic presidents and vice-presidents were elected separately. Goulart was twice elected vice-president, in 1955 with Juscelino Kubitschek and in 1960 with Jânio Quadros.

15 João Goulart is not included in either Guita Grin Debert's study of four Brazilian populists or Michael L. Conniff's study of eight Brazilian populists. See above, n. 8. A recent biography of Goulart based on extensive research is J. Ferreira, *João Goulart: uma biografia* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2011).

to include peasants and rural workers. He lacked, however, a strong base in Congress. Without it the passage of basic reform legislation, especially that needing a constitutional amendment and therefore a two-thirds majority, was impossible. After the congressional elections of October 1962 the PTB had become the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies (but with only 27 per cent of the seats). With the support of the smaller parties of the Centre-Left/Left (PDC-PSB-PTN-PRT-PST-MRT) and some reform-minded deputies in the PSD (and even the UDN) Goulart could count on perhaps 40 per cent of the deputies to support his reforms. The PSD and the UDN together had, however, what amounted to a permanent veto on reform.

Aware of a growing civil and military conspiracy, backed by the United States, to destabilise his government, Goulart persisted for more than a year with an attempt to negotiate with the Centre-Right in Congress and move a moderate reform agenda forward gradually by stages. Each time, however, he was rebuffed by the conservative forces entrenched there. These failures served to radicalise many of Goulart's own supporters in Congress (and in his government). The so-called nationalist-revolutionary ideológicos (as compared with the more moderate and pragmatic fisiológicos) became the dominant faction in the PTB. A key figure was Goulart's brother-in-law Leonel Brizola, populist federal deputy for Guanabara, who at the beginning of 1963 founded and led the Frente de Mobilização Popular (FMP) and, in November, organised 'Grupos de Onze Companheiros' or 'Comandos Nacionalistas' to take the struggle for reform, and reform more radical than that proposed by Goulart, outside Congress where there was already, by Brazilian standards, an unusually high degree of popular politicisation and mobilisation – against a background of severe economic recession.¹⁶ The Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT), formed in July 1962 and controlling three of the six national confederations of labour which together accounted for 70 per cent of Brazil's 1,800 sindicatos, had already shown itself capable of organising general strikes with strong political overtones. In November 1963 a Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores Rurais (CONTAG) was created, affiliated with the CGT, and immediately organised a strike of 200,000 Pernambuco sugar cane workers. The União Nacional de Estudantes (UNE) was promoting a level of student militancy not seen before in Brazil. A variety of New Left groups had appeared, influenced by the Cuban Revolution and/or progressive Catholic doctrine.

Thus, for a variety of reasons and from a variety of sources, Goulart came under increasing pressure throughout 1963 to mobilise urban and rural

¹⁶ In 1963 the Brazilian economy entered a period of recession after 20 years of almost continuous growth since Brazil entered the Second World War in 1942. Growth in 1963 was only 0.6 per cent. For the first time since the Second World War per capita income fell (by 2.3 per cent). Inflation was 75 per cent and was approaching an annual rate of almost 100 per cent by the first quarter of 1964.

workers in favour of more radical reforms than he wished or could possibly deliver – pressure he could not ignore if he was to maintain, or rather recover, his leadership of Brazil's 'popular classes', his principal political 'base'. On Friday 13 March 1964 at a *comício* [open air mass meeting] in downtown Rio de Janeiro he appeared on a platform with PTB ministers and the leaders of the CGT, the UNE – and the Brazilian Communist party (PCB), before a crowd of 150,000 – 250,000, many of them waving red flags. The dominant discourse of the meeting was revolutionary ('all power to the people'). Congress was denounced as 'arcáico' ('não mais correspondia as aspirações do povo' [no longer in tune with the aspirations of the people]) and radical constitutional changes were promised either by means of a new Constituent Assembly or a Popular Congress of workers, peasants and soldiers. Two days later, on 15 March, in his annual message to Congress, the president again emphasised the need for agrarian reform, the extension of the right to vote to illiterates (and to sergeants and enlisted men in the armed forces) – and regular plebiscites.

What Goulart had in mind has never been satisfactorily explained. Simply to increase the pressure on Congress to pass basic reforms? Or to prepare the ground for a golpe and a populist dictatorship of the Left, as the Right later alleged? In the event, Goulart's actions produced a decisive reaction from the opposition, civilian and military, supported by the US government which was kept informed about political developments in Brazil by a network of CIA agents, politicians, businessmen and journalists who spoke to the US ambassador Lincoln Gordon and by the generals close to the US military attaché Vernon Walters. Goulart was removed from power by a military coup two weeks later. The first list of over 100 people who were punished by losing their political rights for ten years included Jânio Quadros and João Goulart, key figures in the Goulart administration, and politicians and labour leaders identified by the military as belonging to the populist-nationalist Left. During the 21-year military dictatorship that followed (1964–85) populism (that is to say, *getulismo* and *trabalhismo* in its various manifestations) would be eliminated once and for all from Brazilian politics.¹⁷

All in all, politicians to whom the label 'populist' has been attached did not meet with much success in Brazil in the period 1930–64 – at the national

17 Octavio Ianni's well-known study of the 1964 golpe was entitled *O colapso do populism no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1968; Eng. trans., *Crisis in Brazil*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). An early, influential study of populist politics in the period 1945–64, especially the role of the PTB (and the illegal PCB), as manipulators of the workers, corrupt and authoritarian, was Francisco Weffort, *O populismo no Brasil* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1978). D. Aarão Reis Filho, 'O colapso do colapso do populismo ou a propósito de uma herança maldita', in J. Ferreira (ed.), *O populismo e sua história: debate e crítica* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2001) provides a critique of both Ianni and Weffort and a defence of the social reformism of the PTB (and the PCB) and the economic and political benefits delivered to Brazilian workers by 'populist' politicians.

level at least. Getúlio Vargas, who only adopted a populist strategy after he had already been in power for almost 15 years, was forced by the military within a few months to leave office in October 1945 and, after his re-election in 1950, was driven to suicide in August 1954. Ademar de Barros lost as many elections as he won in São Paulo and never reached the presidency. His nemesis Jânio Quadros was elected president but resigned after only seven months in power in August 1961. Finally, João Goulart survived as president for two and a half years but was overthrown by the military immediately after adopting a populist discourse and strategy in March 1964.

II

The beginning of the process of democratisation in Brazil in the early 1980s and the transition to civilian rule in 1985, after 21 years of military dictatorship, brought the return to state and municipal politics of many of the old 'populists': for example, Leonel Brizola of the Partido Democrático Brasileiro (PDT), successor to the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), was elected governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro in the first relatively free elections permitted by the military in 1982 (and again in 1990)¹⁸ and former president Jânio Quadros was elected mayor of São Paulo in 1985.

The presidential election in November 1989 was the first direct presidential election since 1960, the first ever presidential election based on universal suffrage (see Essay 5). The Brazilian electorate now numbered 82 million, including illiterates and 16–17 year olds – compared with only 15 million in 1960. The election was won by a politician usually bracketed with Latin America's 'neo-populists of the Right': Fernando Collor de Mello.¹⁹ Collor won the first round of the election with 30.5 per cent of the valid vote, and the second round with 53 per cent (35.1 million votes).

Fernando Collor de Mello, the grandson of Lindolfo Collor, Vargas's first labour minister, was the 37-year-old governor of the north-eastern state of Alagoas, the second smallest and second poorest state in Brazil. A member of a traditional oligarchical family with interests in the media, he was virtually unknown outside Alagoas and he had none of the more important parties behind him. The Partido da Reconstrução Nacional (PRN) was created only months before the election. His programme was rudimentary to say the least, but at hundreds of rallies throughout Brazil and on television he made populist

18 See Freire and Ferreira (eds.), *A Razão Indignada*, Part II *Leonel Brizola e o tempo do trabalhismo democrático (1979–2004)*.

19 On the Collor de Mello phenomenon, see M.S. Conti, *Notícias do Planalto: A imprensa e Fernando Collor* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1999) and M.A. Villa, *Collor Presidente. Trinta meses de turbulências, reformas, intrigas e corrupção* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2016).

speeches denouncing corruption in public and private life (which is ironic in view of what was to come) and attacking the 'traditional' politicians representing the Brazilian 'elite'. Collor received the strong support of the population with the lowest income and education: 49 per cent of voters with a family income of up to one monthly minimum salary, 55 per cent of voters with a low level of education and 49 per cent of the inhabitants of small towns (up to 20,000 inhabitants).²⁰ With no credible candidate of its own and fearing a victory for the Left, especially its bête noir on the populist-nationalist Left, Leonel Brizola, the political and economic elite in general supported Collor de Mello.

Collor de Mello's base in Congress, however, was weak. Even after the November 1990 elections the PRN together with some allies on the Right had only 30 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 40 per cent in the Senate. Collor introduced a series of 'neo-liberal' economic reforms, but two stabilisation plans failed miserably. Carlos Menem in Argentina, elected in 1989, and Alberto Fujimori in Peru, elected in 1990, each governed for ten years, but Collor lasted only two and a half. In 1992 he was engulfed in a corruption scandal involving extortion, kickbacks for favours, bribery, electoral fraud and tax evasion. The popular demonstrations in the big cities demanding his removal from office represented the most significant mass political mobilisation in Brazil since the movement for direct presidential elections [*diretas já*] in 1983–4 at the end of the military dictatorship. Collor de Mello was successfully impeached by Congress under the Constitution of 1988 and removed for office, provisionally in September 1992, definitively in December.

The candidate Collor had defeated in the second round of the 1989 presidential election was Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, leader of a new party of the Left, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers' Party), founded in February 1980 towards the end of the military dictatorship and, uniquely in Brazilian political history, built from below (see Essay 7). Its main base was the industrial working class in São Paulo, together with progressive sections of the urban middle class and the progressive wing of the Catholic church. Lula himself, born into poverty in rural Pernambuco and moving to São Paulo as a child, was a former metal worker, leader of the metalworkers' union of São Bernardo do Campos in the metropolitan region of São Paulo. Lula had narrowly defeated Leonel Brizola in the first round before losing to Collor de Mello in the second round. He then lost to Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the first round of the presidential elections of 1994 and 1998. In these three elections Lula did not seek the support of the poorest and least educated Brazilians, heavily concentrated in the north and north-east. Their votes went for the most part

20 S.P. Mainwaring, *Sistemas partidários em novas democracias: O caso do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2001), p. 44.

to Collor and, to a lesser extent, Cardoso. Neither Lula nor the PT could be accused of populism in this period.

Lula won the presidency in 2002, at the fourth attempt, primarily because the PT moved to the political centre ground (see Essay 7). Lula's *Carta ao Povo Brasileiro* [Open Letter to the Brazilian People] (June 2002), while emphasising the need for social policies to reduce poverty and inequality, dropped socialism, confirmed the PT's commitment to democracy and committed a future PT government to orthodox economic policies. Lula received the support of a major party of the Centre-Right, the Partido Liberal (PL), which was offered the vice-presidency. It is true that for the first time the PT developed a public relations/media campaign around the personal history and charismatic personality of its leader, with a strong emotional appeal to Brazilians who had not previously identified with the party ('Lula, paz e amor' [Lula, peace and love]). But the poorest and least educated voters, especially in the north and the north-east, were still not yet the party's main target. It would be difficult to argue that the PT in 2002 adopted a 'populist' electoral strategy and campaign.

In government Lula maintained the 'responsible' economic policies of the previous Cardoso administrations (1995–2002), but was more committed to poverty reduction and modest distribution of income through compensatory social policies. At the same time, while encouraging some early experiments with participatory democracy in states and municípios controlled by the PT, most famously in Porto Alegre, Lula appeared committed to the consolidation of Brazil's existing democratic institutions, practices and culture: free and fair elections for both the executive and legislative branches of government, federal, state and municipal; separation of powers; an independent judiciary; and a free press. Despite the mensalão corruption scandal, which undermined the credibility of the PT as an 'ethical' party and severely dented his own popularity, Lula was comfortably re-elected in October 2006.

In 2006, unlike 2002, Lula was elected overwhelmingly by the poor and uneducated, mainly in the north and north-east. (In the more developed municípios of the south and south-east, where the middle class, certainly the professional middle class, had turned against him largely because of corruption and his association with some of the worst elements in the old political oligarchy, he actually lost the election.) Lula's success was not, however, the result of a typically polarising anti-elite, anti-globalisation, anti-American populist discourse. Personal identification was, of course, an important factor: Lula as 'one of us'. But it can be largely explained as the political dividend of four years of improved economic growth, higher levels of employment in the formal sector, low inflation, regular increases in the minimum wage above the rate of inflation, easier access to credit and, above all, the significant reduction of extreme poverty resulting from the comprehensive, but modest and relatively

cheap, conditional cash transfer program, the *bolsa família*, from which 11.4 million households (35 million Brazilians, mostly in the north-east and north) were benefitting (see *Essay 7*). It remained difficult therefore to describe Lula as a ‘neo-populist of the Left’ – although he was remarkably tolerant towards those politicians and governments in South America for whom this description was more appropriate.

Why with its high levels of poverty and inequality, its low levels of education, and the continued existence of second-class and even third-class citizens, had Brazil been generally more resistant to neo-populism of the Left than many other Latin American countries? The size and complexity of the country and, in particular, its federal system, have been offered by way of explanation. However, the United States, for example, has had a long and distinctive history of populism, beginning with the People’s Party in the 1890s, then governor Huey Long of Louisiana in the 1920s, Father Charles Coughlin in the 1930s, governor George Wallace of Alabama in the 1960s, Ross Perot in 1992, and finally Bernie Sanders on the Left and Donald Trump on the Right in the 2016 presidential election. The conservative nature of the Brazilian people, especially the poor, their tolerance of social injustice, their limited demands, their resistance historically to political mobilisation, is also put forward as an explanation. More immediately relevant for the period since the 1980s is the fact that, despite the need for political reform, especially electoral reform, in the interests of more effective governability, greater accountability and a reduction in the disturbing level of political corruption, Brazil has had, for the first time in its history, a reasonably well-functioning representative democracy and, not least, a relatively strong and active civil society.

Furthermore, two of the three dominant political parties, the PT and the PSDB, which had been the principal contestants in every presidential election since 1994, are well-established social democratic parties, though the PSDB had been gradually moving to the neo-liberal Centre-Right and the strength of PT’s commitment to democratic practice is questioned by some. The biggest party in Brazil (in number of federal deputies, senators, governors, state deputies, mayors and local councillors) is the solidly centrist and clientelistic PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro). It has not fielded a candidate for the presidency since 1994, but it plays a decisive role in elections – and in government. There are parties of the Centre-Right, like the PFL/DEM, but no strong parties of the Right which clearly represent the ‘elite’, the ‘oligarchy’, and therefore provide an easy target for politicians with populist tendencies. And US imperialism is not in Brazil the target for populists that, for historic reasons, it is in many Spanish American republics.

The first two years of Lula’s second administration (2007–8) were notable for a continuation of the moderate, ‘progressive’ social policies pursued during

the first administration within a framework of 'responsible', orthodox macro-economic policies and consolidated democratic institutions. In the first half of 2009, however, with his popularity at an all-time high (70–75 per cent approval), especially with the poorest sections of Brazilian society and the rapidly expanding lower middle class (now almost 50 per cent of the population), his principal political base, and at the same time growing international recognition and admiration ('the most popular politician on Earth' as President Obama called him), there was increasing evidence of Lula's populist inclinations which, if they had existed in the past, had been successfully constrained or repressed. Former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso articulated the concerns of many Brazilians when in November, in his monthly newspaper column, which is widely syndicated throughout Brazil, he referred to what he regarded as Lula's increasingly undemocratic behavior, lack of respect for the constitution and the law, and populist authoritarianism, which was in his view heading in the direction of 'subperonismo-lulismo'.²¹ Social scientists had already begun to identify a new political phenomenon: *lulismo*.²²

Lula was clearly tempted to try to amend the Constitution of 1988 in order to run for a third term in 2010. Although almost certain to win if he did so, and some popular demonstrations in favor of 'mais quatro' [four more years] (sometimes using the slogan 'Queremos [We want] Lula', with its echoes of Getúlio in 1945), Lula finally resisted the temptation. He confirmed his total commitment to Brazil's democratic institutions. He was popular, he liked to say, but not populist.²³ The election would be the first in which Lula was not a candidate since the end of the military dictatorship 25 years earlier.

Lula, however, went to unprecedented lengths actively to transfer his immense popularity to his personally chosen successor, Dilma Rousseff. As it proved more difficult than expected – for Dilma, a 62-year-old technocrat lacking charisma who had never before contested an election, was, it has to be said, a very problematic candidate – Lula's strategy and his discourse became increasingly populist. Government expenditure was significantly increased (to the level of fiscal irresponsibility, in the view of some economists) and, with full media exposure, Dilma was linked on every possible occasion to the PAC (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento [Program of Accelerated Economic Growth] for massive public investment, mainly in infrastructure),

21 F.H. Cardoso, 'Para onde vamos?', *O Estado de São Paulo*, 1 November 2009.

22 See A. Singer, 'Raízes sociais e ideológicas do lulismo', *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* (November 2009), 82–103. See also R. Ricci, *Lulismo: da era dos movimentos sociais à ascensão da nova classe média brasileira* (Brasília: Fundação Astrojildo Pereira and Contraponto, 2010); A. Singer, *Os Sentidos de Lulismo* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012); A. Singer and I. Loureiro (eds.), *As Contradições do Lulismo. A que ponto chegamos?* (São Paulo: Boitempo, 2016).

23 E.g. speeches reported in *O Globo*, 3 June, 6 June 2009.

to the government's social programs, especially the *bolsa família*, conditional cash transfers to the poorest sectors of society, and the 'Minha casa, minha vida' housing policy, to the nationalist sentiments surrounding the discovery of off-shore 'pré-sal' oil (Brazil's 'passport to the future') – and most of all to the president himself. Lula did everything in his power to make the 2010 election a plebiscitary election: for or against him (and his chosen candidate); for or against his record compared with that of his predecessor FHC; for or against 'nosso projeto' [our project]; ultimately, for or against the people [*o povo*]. The election was not essentially about Dilma, nor the PT; it was about Lula and his extraordinary empathy with the mass of the Brazilian people, especially the poor in the north and north-east.

In a speech in Porto Alegre at the end of July 2010 that could hardly have been more 'populist', Lula declared, to great applause, that *a direita* [the Right] had devoted itself 24 hours a day to trying to hold back as *forças democráticas* in Brazil. He had suffered eight years of *ataques, provocações e infâmias*. But he had made it clear to the elite, which he claimed had driven Getúlio to suicide and forced Jânio Quadros and Joao Goulart to resign, that if they wanted to confront him they would find him on the streets with *o povo brasileiro*. In Joinville, Santa Catarina, in September he argued that a *direita* had failed in its attempt to drive him out of power in 2005 (a reference to the *mensalão* crisis) because he had the one *ingrediente* his predecessors did not have – *vocês* [you, the people]. In October he boasted that he would always win on the street because he had established *uma relação real e direto com o povo*. When things get *feia* [ugly], he advised 'Dilminha', in November, *vai para perto do povo*; [when you do not know what to do], *pergunte ao povo*; [in doubt], *o povo é a solução*; [the people will never disappoint you].²⁴

Dilma Rousseff, who had been entirely invented by Lula, won the election in October in the second round – with broadly the popular support Lula had in 2006. A Dilma presidency had been frequently referred to as 'um terceiro mandato de Lula' [Lula's third mandate]. Hugo Chávez was not alone in comparing – in his case, favourably – Lula and Dilma to the Kirchners in Argentina. There remained the strong suspicion that Lula was planning to contest the 2014 presidential election as was permitted under the Constitution of 1988 or, if as the incumbent Dilma insisted on standing for re-election, perhaps the 2018 election (when he would be 73 years old). Either way, he would return to power, like Getúlio in 1950, 'nos braços do povo' [in the arms of the people].

In the event, Dilma was again the candidate of the PT in 2014 and was re-elected president. Whatever plans for 2018 Lula might have had were overshadowed by the impeachment of Dilma in August 2016 and her

24 *O Globo*, 30 July, 14 September, 4 October, 26 November 2010.

replacement by vice-president Michel Temer of the PMDB and a government of the Centre-Right (see Essay 5), the resulting decline in popular support for the PT (as was clearly shown in the municipal elections in October 2016, see Essay 7), and the several, ongoing investigations into his role in various corruption scandals which threatened to make him ineligible to run for office again.²⁵ Lula nevertheless insisted that he would be the PT's candidate for the presidency in October 2018. Early opinion polls put him some distance ahead in a crowded field with a potential 35 per cent of the vote in the first round. The 2018 election, he believed, would be another confrontation between the elite and the people. And he alone truly represented the people.²⁶

The conditions for the success of populism in Brazil certainly existed: firstly, the crisis of liberal representative democracy resulting from the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, the corruption scandals which had brought not only the PT but all the mainstream parties in Congress into disrepute, and popular disenchantment with the political system and the entire political class (see Essay 5); secondly, several years of economic crisis, with zero or minus rates of growth, falling living standards, rising unemployment, severe cuts in public services, and the persistence of poverty and extreme inequality (see Essay 7); thirdly, increasing urban violence and citizen insecurity. A populist challenge to the established political order was highly probable in the 2018 presidential election. However, it was just as likely, perhaps more likely in view of Lula's expected ineligibility, to come from a populist politician of the Right as from a populist politician of the Left.²⁷

25 In July 2017 Lula was sentenced to nine years and four months in prison for money laundering and passive corruption. On appeal in January 2018 the sentence was increased to 12 years and one month. The 2010 *Lei da Ficha Limpa* (Clean Record) prohibits candidates with criminal records from running for public office for eight years.

26 On 7 April in a emotional hour-long speech delivered to his more militant supporters at the headquarters of the Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos do ABC in São Bernardo do Campo, immediately before handing himself over to the federal police to begin his term in prison, Lula declared that he had devoted his life to defending the interests of vocês (you), os pobres (the poor), os humildes (the humble), o povo (the people). And he would continue to do so. Lula was, he said, referring to himself in the third person, no longer a human being. He was an idea. ('Eu não pararei porque eu não sou um ser humano. Eu sou uma ideia'.)

27 In opinion polls taken at the end of 2017, nine months before the elections during which much could and undoubtedly would change, the only candidate among the early presidential front runners posing any kind of threat to Lula was the populist, far-right Jair Messias (sic) Bolsonaro of the tiny Social Christian Party (PSC). Sixty-three years old, a former army captain, seven-term federal deputy for the state of Rio de Janeiro (with the highest number of votes – almost half a million – and a huge following on social media), Bolsonaro is a notorious apologist for Brazil's military dictatorship (1964–85).

7. The failure of the Left in Brazil*

The Left can broadly be defined as those social movements and political parties, and those individuals (both intellectuals and political activists), engaged in a struggle for a significant transformation of society through a radical re-distribution of wealth and power, an end to poverty and social exclusion and a reduction in inequality, with the capture and use of the state as the principal instrument not only for economic growth and development but also for redistributive social policies. In its more utopian form, the Left envisages the end of capitalism and the establishment of a socialist or a communist society.

The dominant party of the Left in Brazil in the middle decades of the 20th century, and therefore the principal focus of the first part of this essay, was the Brazilian Communist party (Partido Comunista do Brasil, PCB, also known as, and in 1960 officially renamed, Partido Comunista Brasileiro with the same acronym), founded in March 1922. Except for a brief period immediately after the Second World War (1945–7), its existence was illegal until 1985.¹

Unlike Argentina and Chile, there was no significant Socialist party in Brazil before the Second World War, not least because popular political participation through the vote was severely restricted (see Essay 5). In November 1932 the remnants of the movement of *tenentes* [junior army officers] opposed to the oligarchical political system of the First Republic (1889–1930), a declining force after the failure to institutionalise the Revolution of 1930 through the creation of a Partido Revolucionário Nacional, promoted a Congresso Nacional Revolucionário which led to the establishment of a Partido Socialista Brasileiro. It was, however, extremely short lived. With the ‘democratisation’ of Brazil in 1945 elements on the non-communist Left formed in July a União Democrática Socialista which in August, renamed Esquerda Democrática, became the left wing of the recently established liberal-conservative political party, the União Democrática Nacional (UDN). In August 1947 it broke away from the UDN to become the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB). Small and

* This is a new essay based in part on ‘Politics in Brazil under Vargas 1930–1945’ and ‘Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic 1945–1964’, in *Cambridge History of Latin America Vol. IX Brazil since 1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), for the history of the Brazilian Communist Party, and a lecture ‘The failure of the Left: a Brazilian tragedy’, delivered at the Brazil Institute, King’s College London, 8 March 2016.

1 With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PCB changed its name to Partido Popular Socialista (PPS).

limited for the most part to intellectuals, however, it never played a leading role in the politics of the Liberal Republic (1946–64) and in 1965, following the 1964 golpe, it was closed down by the military dictatorship.²

For some historians, the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), a populist party linked to organised labour created by Getúlio Vargas in 1945, was sufficiently reformist (and nationalist) to be considered part of the Left, broadly defined. Brazil was for many years represented in the Socialist International by the PTB, not the PSB. Like other populist parties in Latin America in the period of 'classic' or first generation populism from the 1930s to the 1960s, the PTB was, however, except perhaps in the period 1961–4, at best modestly reformist, rather than committed to social, much less socialist, transformation, and for the most part hostile to the traditional parties of the Left. The PTB will, therefore, receive only marginal treatment in this discussion of the Left in Brazil.³

In the late 1960s and early 1970s a number of movements emerged on the revolutionary Left committed to armed struggle against the military dictatorship (1964–85), but they were all relatively small and relatively easily, if brutally, repressed. The military then began the process of gradually opening up the political system and in 1979 permitted the formation of new opposition parties. The Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers' Party), a socialist party based on organised labour, was founded in February 1980. It grew steadily with the establishment of democracy under the Constitution of 1988, contested all federal, state and municipal elections, won the presidency for the first time in 2002 (albeit after a significant move to the political centre ground), and governed Brazil from 2003 to 2016. The PT will therefore be the principal focus of the second part of this essay on the Left in Brazil.

In view of the extent to which economic (and political) power is concentrated in the hands of Brazil's dominant elite and the extreme inequality, social (and racial) exclusion and poverty which persist in Brazil on the eve of the bi-centenary of its independence (and the centenary of the founding of the Brazilian Communist party) in 2022, the Left has to be considered to have failed in its principal objective – to bring about a radical transformation of Brazilian society. Social change in Brazil during the past century has been more the result of economic growth, population growth, urbanisation and industrialisation, especially in the period 1940–80, and the policies of both populist and military governments than pressure from the Left in opposition

2 With the transition from military to civilian rule in 1985 the PSB was re-constituted and has been one of several parties playing an active, but relatively minor, role in the politics of Brazil's new democracy.

3 Like the PSB and the other parties of the Liberal Republic, the PTB was closed down by the military in 1965. It re-emerged in the party reform of 1979 as the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT) and has played an active role in Brazilian politics since then.

or, despite the achievements of the first two PT administrations 2003–6 and 2007–10, the policies of governments of the Left.

I

Nineteenth-century European Socialism, utopian (Fournier, Proudhon) or 'scientific' (Marx, Engels), had little impact on Brazil, except in the case of a few isolated intellectuals. Anarchism – the idea that the bourgeois order and the state that supported it could be overthrown by the direct action of individuals or group insurrection leading to the creation of a libertarian, state-less society – was introduced into Brazil through Italian and Spanish (especially Galician) immigrants at the end of the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century. Through newspapers and pamphlets many leaders of the small, emerging urban working class in early manufacturing industry (textiles, shoes, etc.), railways and urban public utilities, civil construction and, in particular, ports (Rio de Janeiro and Santos) were influenced by anarcho-syndicalism. This adaptation of anarchism to late 19th-century industrialisation in Europe, especially France, promoted the general strike as the principal weapon of labour unions for the overthrow of the bourgeois state. From 1906 there was some union organisation, always of uncertain legality, and some illegal strike activity in Brazil. And there were significant general strikes during and immediately after the First World War: notably in July 1917 in São Paulo, involving 50,000 workers, the biggest strike of the First Republic; in November 1918 in Rio de Janeiro; and in May 1919 in São Paulo, the second biggest strike. These were all repressed by the police and the military. Dozens of 'foreign subversives' were imprisoned or deported. (Labour leaders, especially strike leaders, were always assumed to be foreigners who had imported class war into Brazil.) Furthermore, the repression of anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists in the labour movement continued throughout the 1920s.⁴

Under the influence of the Russian Revolution a Communist party was formed in Rio de Janeiro in June 1919, mainly by anarchists distancing themselves from the failures of anarcho-syndicalism but it was short-lived. Former anarchists were among the nine founders of the Partido Comunista do

4 On anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism in Brazil in the period 1900–20, see J.W.F. Dulles, *Anarchists and Communists in Brazil, 1900–1935* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973), ch. 1 'Background, 1900–1917', ch. 2 'The Anarchist Strike Movement, 1917–1919'; B. Fausto, *Trabalho urbano e conflito social 1890–1920* (São Paulo: Difel, 1976; 2nd edn São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2016); P.S. Pinheiro and M.M. Hall (eds.), *A classe operária no Brasil. Documentos 1890–1930* Vol. 1 *O movimento operário* (São Paulo: Alfa Omega, 1979); S.L. Maram, *Anarquistas, imigrantes e o movimento operário brasileiro, 1890–1920* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1979); S.L. Magnani, *O movimento anarquista em São Paulo (1906–1917)* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1982); C.A. Addor, *A insurreição anarquista no Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Dois Pontos, 1986); L. Medeiros de Menezes, Os Indesejáveis. Protesto, crime e expulsão na Capital Federal (1890–1930)* (Rio de Janeiro: Edurj, 1997).

Brasil (PCB) in March 1922. These included Astrojildo Pereira, its secretary-general (until 1930). Based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and linked to the Communist International – Pereira was a delegate to the Fifth Congress in Moscow in 1924 and was elected to the executive committee at the Sixth Congress in 1928 – it was a party mainly of intellectuals, journalists, teachers, doctors, lawyers and some tenentes. At the outset it had an active membership of only around 70, and no more than 1,000 at the end of the decade. It appealed to the urban middle class more than the industrial proletariat or the peasantry. Nevertheless, it was almost immediately declared illegal.⁵

The PCB failed to persuade Luís Carlos Prestes, the leader of the tenente rebellion in Rio Grande do Sul in July 1924 and one of the two leaders of the 'Long March' through the interior of Brazil, the so-called 'Prestes Column' (1925–7), who was in exile in Buenos Aires, to join the party. A front organisation, the Bloco Operário Camponês (BOC), fielded a candidate in the presidential elections of March 1930: Minervino Oliveira, a worker in a marble factory and general secretary of Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Brasileiros (CGTB), organised by the PCB in April 1928. However, alone among the 'progressive' forces of the time, including the tenentes (though not Prestes), the PCB opposed the Revolution of October 1930 that brought to power Getúlio Vargas, the defeated candidate of the Liberal Alliance in the election.

Denied registration in the 1933 elections for a Constituent Assembly, the PCB took advantage of the liberal opening, the sense among many disaffected tenentes of a *revolução traída* [revolution betrayed] and the challenge presented by the rise of fascism, both international and domestic (the Ação Integralista Brasileira was founded in 1932), to increase its level of activity and widen its base. An Anti-Fascist Front which included socialists, anarchists, Trotskyists as well as Communists had been established as early as June 1933, and there were some violent clashes with the *Integralistas*, notably the so-called *Batalha da Praça da Sá* in São Paulo on 7 October 1934.

On 23 March 1935 an Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL), a broad Popular Front of progressive forces – communist, socialist, tenente, and even liberal democrat – against capitalism, fascism and imperialism was launched. The PCB itself did not formally join the ANL, but it was from the beginning the dominant organisation in it. At its first rally on 30 March in the Teatro

5 On the formation and early years of the PCB, see A. Pereira, *Formação do PCB* (Rio de Janeiro, 1962) and *Construindo o PCB (1922–1924)* (São Paulo, 1980). See also M. Zaidan Filho, *O PCB e a Internacional Comunista (1922–1929)* (São Paulo, 1988); and Dulles, *Anarchists and Communists*. There are a number of general histories of the PCB. See, for example, R.H. Chilcote, *The Brazilian Communist Party: Conflict and Integration, 1922–1972* (New York, 1974); M. Vinhas, *O Partidão: uma luta por um partido de massas, 1922–1974* (São Paulo, 1982); D. Pandolfi, *Camaradas e companheiros. História e memória do PCB* (Rio de Janeiro, 1995).

João Caetano in Rio de Janeiro Luís Carlos Prestes was nominated Honorary President in absentia. Prestes had finally been recruited to the cause of world revolution. In October 1931 he had moved to Moscow where he lived for the following three years, working as an engineer. Although still not a party member (he finally joined PCB only in August 1934), he was a member of the Comintern's Executive Committee. Prestes left Moscow in December 1934 with his companion Olga Benário, a young German Jewish communist. They arrived in Rio the following April and Prestes joined the ANL in June.⁶

By this time the ANL had hundreds of *núcleos* [centres], especially in Rio de Janeiro, probably 70,000–100,000 members (it claimed 400,000), and its influence was growing rapidly. It advocated land redistribution, the nationalisation of foreign enterprises and an end to Brazil's unequal ties with the United States and Britain, state support for the 'productive forces of the nation', extensive social welfare legislation, universal and free primary education – and universal suffrage. It appealed mostly to the urban middle class. Its links to organised labour were weak, and the rural population remained indifferent. Nevertheless, on 5 July the ANL issued a Manifesto calling for a nationwide uprising and the creation of a popular revolutionary government. Within a week, on 11 July, invoking its powers under a wide-ranging *Lei de Segurança Nacional* [National Security Law], the Vargas government closed it down. Troops raided the offices of the ANL, confiscated its literature, and arrested its leaders, who were subjected to summary trial and jailed.

Driven underground after only four months, the ANL (and the PCB) continued to plan for revolution. The Soviet Union soon became involved. The Comintern had 'discovered' Latin America at its Buenos Aires meeting in June 1929, but it was never high on the agenda until a meeting of Latin American communists in Moscow in October 1934. They debated the tactics for achieving power: through the formation of anti-imperialist, anti-fascist Popular Fronts to contest elections or through armed revolution? The General Secretary of the PCB, Antônio Maciel Bonfim ('Miranda'), painted an exaggerated picture of a revolutionary situation in Brazil. In the end, the Seventh Comintern Congress in July 1935 approved anti-fascist Popular Fronts of the kind adopted in France and Spain (alliances with other working class, and middle class, parties) for Chile and armed revolution for Brazil. In the meantime, at the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935 not only Prestes but a number of Soviet agents, including the German Arthur Ernst Ewert (Harry Berger on his American

6 See L.M.G. Hernandez, *Aliança Nacional Libertadora: ideologia e ação* (Porto Alegre, 1985) and A. Leocadia Prestes, *Luís Carlos Prestes, e a Aliança Nacional Libertadora: Os caminhos da luta anti-fascista no Brasil, 1934–5* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1998). D.A.Reis, *Luís Carlos Prestes. Um revolucionário entre dois mundos* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2014) is an excellent biography of Prestes.

passport) and the Argentine Rodolfo Ghioldi, had been sent to Brazil to coordinate a possible Communist revolution there.⁷

What the Brazilian military has ever since called the Communist *intentona*, the attempted putsch of November 1935, was essentially a series of minor, poorly coordinated military insurrections, influenced as much if not more by tenentista than by Communist ideology and sympathies. Luís Carlos Prestes, fundamentally still more tenente than Communist, had always believed it would be easier to carry out a 'true social revolution' leading to a soviet-based government of workers and peasants in Brazil from the barracks than from the factories or the fields. There was little involvement by industrial workers, and none by peasants, in the insurrections that took place over four days (23–27 November) in Natal, Recife and Rio de Janeiro. And, except to some extent in Rio, they were not essentially conceived, masterminded or even coordinated by the ANL, the PCB, Prestes or Comintern agents.⁸

In the final analysis the insurrections of November 1935 proved to be more important for the use made of them by the military and the Vargas government than in themselves. For the military it provided another opportunity to carry out a purge of young officers attracted to the ANL and the Communist party. On 25 November, proclaiming a national emergency, Vargas requested, and Congress approved, the imposition of a 30-day state of siege, which was then renewed for a further 90 days. On its expiry in March 1936 a state of war was decreed, and successfully extended until June 1937. During the first half of 1936 thousands on the Left broadly defined – intellectuals, journalists, writers, even federal deputies – were arrested, imprisoned, in some cases tortured for alleged communist activities or sympathies by the Comissão de Repressão do Comunismo under its zealous first president, Adalberto Correia. Graciliano Ramos wrote his classic *Memórias do cárcere*, published posthumously in 1953, about the experience. In March 1936 Luís Carlos Prestes and Olga Benário were detained in Meier, Rio de Janeiro, having been betrayed by Rodolfo Ghioldi, and brought before the Tribunal de Segurança Nacional. Prestes was jailed, Olga, seven months' pregnant at the time, was deported to Nazi Germany and a prison in Berlin. (She was later transferred first to Ravensbrück and then to Bernburg concentration camp where in April 1942, aged 33, she died in the gas

7 M. Caballero, *Latin America and the Comintern, 1919–1943* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 109–20. See also P.S. Pinheiro, *Estratégias da Ilusão. A revolução mundial e o Brasil, 1922–1935* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1991).

8 There is an extensive literature on the insurrections of November 1935. See, for example, H. Silva, 1935. *A revolta vermelha* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1969); D. Canale, F. Vianna and J. Nilo Tavares (eds.), *Novembro de 1935. Meio século depois* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1985); Pinheiro, *Estratégias da Ilusão*; M. de Almeida Gomes Vianna, *Revolucionários de 35. Sonho e realidade* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1992); W. Waack, *Camaradas. Nos arquivos de Moscou. A história secreta da revolução brasileira de 1935* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1993); and Reis, *Luís Carlos Prestes*.

chamber.) Communists and those believed to be sympathetic to communism continued to be persecuted and repressed during the authoritarian *Estado Novo* (1937–45) established by Vargas in November 1937, with the support of the military, after the cancellation of the presidential elections scheduled for January 1938.

Brazil's entry into the Second World War on the side of the Allies in August 1942 served to deepen existing divisions in the Brazilian Communist Party, which might have been expected to join the liberal opposition to the Vargas dictatorship. Two broad groups can be identified. In the first place, those who favoured *união nacional democrática contra nazi-fascismo*, that is to say, the need for national unity in support of the struggle of the Allies (which now included the Soviet Union) against the Axis powers before immediate political change in Brazil. The group's self-styled *Comissão Nacional de Organização Provisória* (CNOP) took the initiative in convoking the Second National Conference of the PCB at Barra do Piraí near the Mantiqueira mountains in the state of Rio de Janeiro at the end of August 1943. A provisional party organisation was formally reestablished and Prestes was elected Secretary General (a post he was to hold for almost 40 years) in absentia.

A second group put the emphasis on *união democrática nacional* and the struggle for democracy in Brazil. Towards the end of 1943 they formed their own organisation, the so-called *Comité de Ação*. But many left the *Comité* for the CNOP/PCB when first in March and then in June 1944 Prestes (from prison), while demanding amnesty, the legalisation of the party and the restoration of individual liberties, defended the Mantiqueira line that Communists should support Vargas unconditionally in the war against fascism. Prestes rejected both liquidationism (a reference to those who favoured the dissolution of the party in view of the dissolution of the Comintern itself in May 1943 – a variation of what was called Browderism in the United States) and the leftist sectarianism of those who attacked Vargas. Some Communists, however, continued to play a role in the broad opposition front. The first Brazilian Writers' Congress held in São Paulo in January 1945 – a key event in the mobilisation of the opposition to Vargas in favour of democracy in Brazil at the end of the Second World War – was attended not only by prominent figures on the non-Communist left but by two of the nine founders of the PCB in 1922: Astrojildo Pereira and Cristiano Cordeiro.⁹

Under pressure, both domestic and foreign, to democratise Brazil at the end of the Second World War, Vargas in February 1945 agreed that presidential and congressional elections would be held at the end of the year. New political

9 On the PCB during the Second World War, see J.W.F. Dulles, *Brazilian Communism 1935–1945: Repression During World Upheaval* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983); A. Leocadia Prestes, *Da insurreição armada (1935) a União Nacional (1938–1945): a virada tática na política do PCB* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2001).

parties began to be formed: notably the Partido Social Democrático (PSD), the União Nacional Democrática (UDN) and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB). On 18 April an amnesty was proclaimed: all political prisoners (including Luís Carlos Prestes after nine years in prison) were released and political exiles began to return. The Brazilian labour movement emerged from a decade of relative passivity to display a militancy unequalled since the end of the First World War. In São Paulo alone 300–400 strikes involving 150,000 workers were estimated to have taken place in less than one week in May. The climate there was described as that of a general strike.

Emerging from a decade of repression and isolation and, though strictly speaking still illegal, the PCB was permitted to organise openly from mid April, and it was quick to seize the opportunities offered, even though it had no previous experience of mass organisation. The PCB soon had *sedes* [headquarters] in every city in every state. It claimed a membership of over 50,000. It extended its influence over neighbourhood *Comités Democráticos Populares* or *Progresistas* which sprang up all over Brazil. Above all, it penetrated the official corporate union structure, although how far simply to take control of it, how far to reform it, and how far to replace it with an independent parallel structure remains a matter of some dispute. The Communists were always ambivalent about 'spontaneous', 'irresponsible' working class action, and especially strikes, committed as they still were to class collaboration and national unity and concerned to ensure an orderly transition to democracy which would guarantee the legal status and survival of the party.

The six months from May to October witnessed an unprecedented level of political mobilisation in Brazil's major cities primarily orchestrated by the so-called *Queremistas* in favour of Getúlio's election (from the slogan 'Queremos Getúlio'), but also in part by the PCB. Prestes drew huge crowds at two *comícios* (political meetings) held in football stadiums: 50–70,000 in Rio de Janeiro and over 100,000 in São Paulo. The PCB, at first disturbed by the rise of *Queremismo* and fundamentally antagonistic towards it, decided on a policy of *aproximação* or *frente comum* with what it regarded as 'a força menos reacionária'. For this further 'betrayal' of the working class, following the curbing of labour militancy earlier in the year, the PCB has been bitterly criticised by the non-Communist Left down the years. Prestes's decision was based on the following 'realities': the relative weakness of the PCB, only recently semi-legalised; the relative weakness of the labour movement controlled for so long by the 'fascist' state; the strength (and profound anti-Communism) of the forces of reaction (represented by both the UDN and the PSD); and the evident popularity of Vargas – and his economic and social project – with broad sectors of the working class.

The presidential and congressional elections in December 1945, after Vargas had been removed by a military coup, were the first more or less democratic elections held in Brazil, though on a very limited suffrage, since illiterates, half the adult population, were still excluded (see Essay 5). The PCB, formally registered and permitted to contest all elections, chose as its presidential candidate not Luís Carlos Prestes (that would have been too provocative) but Yedo Fiuza, a non-Communist engineer, former mayor of Petrópolis and director of the National Department of Highways. He came third with a little under 10 per cent of the vote (570,000 votes – a third of them in São Paulo). The election was won by General Eurico Dutra (PDS), Vargas's Minister of War, with the decisive eleventh-hour support of Vargas and the PTB. In the congressional elections the PCB secured nine per cent of the vote and elected 14 deputies and one senator (Prestes). Under the election rules at the time, candidates were allowed to run for more than one post. Prestes was not only elected senator for the Federal District (Rio de Janeiro) but federal deputy for the DF, Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul and *suplente* (alternate deputy) in three other states.

After its strong showing in the December elections, the PCB maintained its growth in all regions of Brazil. By the middle of 1946 the party claimed 180,000 members, making it by far the largest communist party in Latin America. In a top secret document which offered an exaggerated and somewhat hysterical 'complete picture' of Communist activities in Brazil the US ambassador William D. Pawley reported: 'Hardly a town of over 1,000 inhabitants does not have a Communist office openly displaying the hammer and sickle ... [and] actively engaged in trying to poison the minds of the peasants and workers against the United States principally and the Brazilian government to a lesser degree'.¹⁰ Big business had no doubt that the Communists were behind the post-war surge of labour unrest throughout Brazil. But in fact the role of the PCB remains unclear. It seems to have begun by opposing many of the strikes as 'adventurist'; they were then tolerated; finally, after some hesitation, the Communist-led Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores (MUT), a central inter-union front originally formed in April 1945 by 300 communist labour leaders from 13 states, decided that it could not afford not to lead them. Local groups of union leaders, Communist or at least sympathetic to the PCB, were organised into 'permanent commissions' in the main industrial centres (over 40 of them in the state of São Paulo alone).

By September the Dutra government felt sufficiently confident that the government appointed labour leaders (the so-called *pelegos*) and the PTB

10 16 August 1946. Quoted in L. Bethell, 'Brazil', in L. Bethell and I. Roxborough (eds.), *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 61. This section of the essay on the PCB immediately after the Second World War draws heavily on this chapter.

retained control of the majority of the unions to sanction national labour confederations and state labour federations and Brazil's first National Labour Congress. It was held, under the presidency of the Minister of Labour, Octacílio Negrão de Lima (PTB), in Rio de Janeiro at the Vasco da Gama football stadium. Of the 1,500–1,700 delegates, some 200–300 were members of the PCB or fellow travellers, who had a strong presence in around 150 of Brazil's 800 or so *sindicatos* [unions]. However, in defiance of the known government position an overwhelming majority of the delegates supported the main objectives of the MUT: union autonomy; the unrestricted right to strike; free collective bargaining; the foundation of a 'horizontal' national confederation of labour; and international affiliation to the *Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina* (CTAL) and the World Federation of Free Trades Unions (WFTU). Nevertheless, the fragile unity of the Congress was shattered when, at the third plenary session on 21 September, a dissident 'ministerial' group of 200 or so withdrew, alleging Communist domination of the proceedings. But before the minister closed the Congress the delegates voted to establish for the first time a *Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil* (CTB), with the Communist leader Roberto Morena as its General Secretary.

The Ministry of Labour refused to accept the validity of any of the resolutions of the National Labour Congress, never recognised the CTB (which therefore from the beginning operated outside the law) and withdrew official recognition from any union that affiliated to it. The new constitution promulgated in September incorporated most of the Labour Code (CLT) of the *Estado Novo* with all the restrictions it imposed on the autonomy of unions, on the right of workers to strike (especially in essential services and 'basic industries'), and on the right of unions to form a national confederation of labour and to affiliate with international labour organisations. Intervention in union affairs by ministry officials, by the military and by the police significantly increased. Communists, in particular, were systematically purged not only from the leadership of labour unions but also from federal and state bureaucracies.

In January 1947 elections were held for 20 state governors and state legislative assemblies. As in December 1945 the PCB polled around 9 per cent of the vote (though, on a lower turnout, only 460,000 votes). The Communists captured a total of 64 seats in 15 state legislatures, electing 18 out of 50 in the Federal District (the city of Rio de Janeiro), which made it the largest single party, 11 including Brazil's leading Marxist historian, Caio Prado Júnior, in São Paulo, nine in Pernambuco. They did not win any of the governorships, but Communist support was decisive in the election of Ademar de Barros in São Paulo. Instead of putting up its own candidate, the PCB, which was particularly strong in the industrial cities and suburbs of greater São Paulo (it had 60,000 members and had secured 180,000 votes there in 1945), had endorsed Ademar

de Barros two weeks before the election. In a contest in São Paulo for the Senate seat left vacant when Getúlio Vargas chose to represent Rio Grande do Sul instead (he had been elected in both), the industrialist Roberto Simonsen (PSD) narrowly defeated the Communist candidate, Cândido Portinari, the great Brazilian painter, by a margin of less than 4,000 votes.

There had been rumours as early as March 1946 that Dutra, always intransigently anti-Communist, was preparing a decree outlawing the PCB. During the early months of 1947, with the elections safely out of the way and with the Cold War reinforcing domestic anti-communism (the Truman Doctrine had been unveiled in March 1947), the Dutra administration brought intense pressure to bear on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal which under article 114 of the 1946 Constitution could cancel the registration of any political party whose programme was deemed to be contrary to democratic principles or whose political orientation and funding could be said to be drawn from outside the country. On 7 May the TSE voted (though narrowly, by three votes to two) to cancel the legal registration of a party that in two successive democratic elections had polled half a million votes and established itself as Brazil's fourth largest party. The PCB, which was not for its part always fully committed to legal strategies and the electoral road to power, was now effectively excluded from 'formal' democratic politics (and remained so for the next 40 years). There followed a wave of anti-Communist repression, with the authorities in São Paulo under instructions from Governor Ademar de Barros (who himself came under direct pressure from President Dutra) especially zealous to their efforts to put a stop to the activities of the Communist party. Hundreds of Communist cells in São Paulo were closed down, as were hundreds more in Rio de Janeiro.

On the day the TSE pronounced the PCB illegal the Dutra administration promulgated Decree 23.046 under which the Confederação dos Trabalhadores do Brasil (CTB), always illegal, was finally closed down. Its elected leaders and officials of unions affiliated to it were removed. By the end of July perhaps as many as 800–1,000 Communists, Communist sympathisers and 'independents' (including some 'independent' leaders belonging to the Queremista wing of the PTB) had been purged from 170 unions representing 300,000 workers. Intervention on this scale to guarantee complete state control of Brazil's labour unions was unprecedented – even during the *Estado Novo*.¹¹ In October 1947 Congress approved the dismissal of all *funcionários públicos* [civil servants] suspected of belonging to the PCB.

11 At a private meeting in Rio in September Serafino Romualdi, the roving ambassador of the American Federation of Labour (AFL) and scourge of Communist labour leaders in Latin America, told Clifford German, the British labour attaché, that he had it on good authority that if free elections had been permitted (as redefined, for example, by the International Labour Organisation in 1947) Communists would have won control of 80 per cent of Brazil's unions. Bethell, 'Brazil', in Bethell and Roxborough (eds), *Latin America*, p. 64.

There remained, however, the problem of the Communists who had been elected to public office in December 1945 and January 1947. From September 1947 the Dutra government pressed Congress to revoke their mandates. Finally, on 7 January 1948, with the support of half the UDN deputies and some deputies from the smaller parties, the PSD pushed through the *cassação* [removal, banning] of the one Communist senator (Luís Carlos Prestes) and the 14 Communist federal deputies together with all Communist state deputies and municipal councillors. The PTB, half the UDN and the recently formed Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) (see above) voted against the measure. Gregório Bezerra, PCB federal deputy for Recife and a participant in the attempted Communist putsch in November 1935, was chosen to speak for the *cassados* a week later in the last session of the Chamber of Deputies attended by elected representatives of the PCB for 40 years.

Although illegal once again after May 1947, the PCB put up candidates in federal, state and municipal elections through other parties, in particular the PTB, in return for the votes they could mobilise, especially in São Paulo and the Federal District. The PCB remained ambivalent in its attitude to Vargas who became president again in 1951 – until his suicide in August 1954 – because of his economic nationalism and the further economic and social gains made by organised labour during his presidency. In 1955 a Movimento Nacional Popular Trabalhista (MNPT), thought to be 80 per cent Communist, appeared on the scene and grew rapidly, working jointly with the Confederação Nacional de Trabalhadores da Indústria (CNTI), with its two million members. In August the MNPT officially declared its support for Juscelino Kubitschek (PSD) and João Goulart (PTB) in the forthcoming presidential and vice-presidential elections. (Under the Constitution of 1946 presidents and vice-presidents were elected separately.) Furthermore, from exile Prestes reinforced communist support for the JK-Jango ticket. The suspicion on the Right was that a deal had been struck to legalise the PCB, but nothing materialised. And the MNPT was eventually declared illegal by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. In the 1960 presidential election Prestes and the PCB gave their support to General Henrique Teixeira Lott (PSD), Kubitschek's Minister of War, a well-known anti-Communist but a nationalist, a developmentalist and, above all, popular. Lott lost to Jânio Quadros but Lott's running mate vice-president João Goulart (PTB) won again, and after Quadros's resignation in August 1961 succeeded him as president.

Goulart was not, as some in the military and on the political Right believed or feared, a man of the revolutionary Left, nor even a radical Left nationalist (except in the sense that the privileged classes in Brazil saw any programme for even moderate economic and social change as radical). He regarded himself

as reformist, a moderniser of Brazil's capitalist economy and society. He subscribed to what had become by the early 1960s a broadly accepted agenda for *reformas de base* [basic social reforms] (see Essay 6). These did, however, include the extension of labour and social welfare legislation to the rural population, the distribution of unproductive land – and the legalisation of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB).

The rights of rural workers and agrarian reform had hardly figured as an issue in Brazilian politics until the late 1950s, except in the programme of the PCB. They forced their way onto the political agenda and became, more even than the issue of foreign capital, the principal divide between Left and Right – as a consequence of the first stirrings at this time of popular political mobilisation in the Brazilian countryside among the 'forgotten half' of Brazil's population. (In 1960 55 per cent of economically active Brazilians were engaged in agriculture, cattle raising and rural industries).

The movement of so-called *Ligas Camponesas* [Peasant Leagues] that spread rapidly throughout the north-east, Brazil's poorest region, indeed one of the poorest regions of South America, in the late 1950s and early 1960s traced its origins to conflicts on the Engenho Galiléia in Pernambuco, 50 kilometres from Recife, in 1954–5. It came to be led by Francisco Julião, a middle-class lawyer and member of the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) who was elected federal deputy for Pernambuco in 1954 and 1958. The *Ligas* were organisations of subsistence peasants, sharecroppers and small tenant farmers who were resisting eviction (and therefore proletarianisation) resulting from land concentration (in a country with an already excessively high level of concentration) and agricultural 'modernisation' and demanding greater access to land. At the same time, the church-sponsored Movimento de Educação de Base (MEB), founded in 1961, mounted a major rural literacy programme with an emphasis on *concientização* [increased awareness of civil and political rights]. By 1962 some 200–250,000 peasants had been mobilised: there were 35,000 activists in 65 *Ligas* in Pernambuco alone. By this time, however, the *Ligas* were somewhat in decline and had been overtaken in importance by unions of semi-peasants and agricultural wage labourers, that is to say, the rural proletariat, especially on the capital-intensive sugar estates, which were being organised by the Communists and progressive Catholic priests. By the end of 1963 270 unions of rural workers, with half a million members, had been legally recognised and another 500 awaited recognition.

The PCB's involvement in the organisation of rural unions was openly tolerated by the Goulart administration, as was its support for the general strikes of urban workers led by the Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT), formed in July 1962. At the same time the PCB – and the PCdoB, which

had split from the PCB in February 1962¹² – joined the radical wing of the PTB led by Goulart's brother-in-law Leonel Brizola, which had become the dominant faction in an increasingly fragmented party, and a variety of New Left groups, influenced either by Marxism/Castroism in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution or progressive Catholic doctrine under the impact of Pope John XXIII's encyclicals, *Mater et Magistra* (May 1961) and *Pacem in Terris* (April 1963), in campaigning for more radical basic reforms than Goulart was thus far prepared to support.

When Goulart finally gave way to the intense pressure for radical reform throughout 1963, the PCB featured prominently at the famous *comício* in Rio de Janeiro on 13 March 1964 at which he in effect announced his decisive shift to the Left (see Essay 6). In Goulart, wrote the journalist and Socialist deputy Barbosa Lima Sobrinho in *O Semanário*, 'As Esquerdas têm um novo Comandante' [The Left has a new Leader].¹³ But Goulart had disastrously miscalculated the relative strength of political forces in Brazil. His actions led directly to a military coup two weeks later. The coup of 31 March, which was encouraged by the United States and had broad middle class support, was justified on the grounds that Goulart was allegedly preparing the way for a Communist dictatorship, turning Brazil into another Cuba, even another China. Communist politicians, intellectuals and labour leaders, and those believed to be sympathetic to communism, were among the first to be arrested, imprisoned, and in some cases seriously mistreated by the military regime which was to last 21 years.

II

A number of individuals and groups on the Left opted for armed struggle as the only viable strategy for overthrowing the military regime.¹⁴ Cuba was now

12 Following Khruschev's denunciation of Stalin in the Soviet Union in 1956, some leaders of the Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCB), including Diogenes Arruda, João Amazonas and Maurício Grabois, distanced themselves from the central committee of the party and subsequently opposed 'revisionism' in the PCB, in particular the abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the revolutionary struggle, and the Declaration of March (1958) in which the PCB admitted for the first time the validity of the electoral road to socialism. In September 1960 the PCB changed its name to Partido Comunista Brasileiro. The 'Stalinists' were eventually expelled or left the PCB and in February 1962 formed a separate Communist party, adopting the name Partido Comunista do Brasil with the acronym PCdoB.

13 *O Semanário* 19/3-1/4 1964, quoted in A. Cheibub Figueiredo, *Democracia ou reformas? Alternativas democráticas à crise política: 1961–1964* (São Paulo, 1993), p. 159.

14 On the revolutionary Left and the armed guerrilla struggle, see J. Gorender, *Combate nas trevas: a esquerda brasileira das ilusões perdidas a luta armada* (São Paulo, 1987; 6th edn., 2003); L. Mir, *A revolução impossível. A esquerda a a luta armada no Brasil* (São Paulo, 1994); M. Ridenti, *O fantasma da revolução brasileira* (São Paulo, 1993); D.A. Reis Filho, *Ditadura militar, esquerda e sociedade* (Rio de Janeiro, 2000); D. Rollemburg, *O apoio de Cuba a luta*

offering assistance with military training and some financial support for the revolutionary struggle in Brazil. In October 1966 – the month in which Che Guevara left Cuba for Bolivia, his final battleground – a group of 14 Brazilian militants reached Serra do Caparaó (at the border dividing the states of Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo) with the purpose of establishing a guerrilla *foco*. They were captured by the police in April 1967 before their operations began. In July and August 1967, a conference of the Organisation of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS), dedicated to the export of revolution to Latin America, met in Cuba. Present at the meeting was the former Communist deputy Carlos Marighella, who was seen by the Cuban leadership as a key figure for the advancement of the revolution in Brazil.¹⁵ Towards the end of 1967 and in the course of the following year a number of senior members of the PCB followed Marighella and broke with the party to form urban-based guerilla movements. Most notable were Ação Libertadora Nacional (ALN) led by Marighella and Joaquim Câmara Ferreira, Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR), Comando de Libertação Nacional (COLINA) and Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionário (PCBR) led by Mário Alves, Apolônio de Carvalho and Jacob Gorender. Some militants joined the Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB). The only ‘success’ of these armed movements in 1968 was the assassination of a US army captain Charles Chandler, a veteran of Vietnam, accused of belonging to the CIA, in October by members of VPR and ALN in São Paulo.

The emergence of armed revolutionary groups was one factor, but not the only factor, which triggered the definitive shift to the Right within the military regime at the end of 1968. Institutional Act number 5 (AI-5), issued on 13 December 1968, the ‘coup within the coup’, conferred almost absolute powers on the President of the Republic and, among other things, suspended constitutional guarantees for the judiciary and the right of habeas corpus (that is to say, the rule of law), and established military tribunals to judge crimes committed by ordinary citizens against national security. However historians choose to characterise the military regime from April 1964 to December 1968, Brazil was now unquestionably and uncompromisingly a military dictatorship. Brazil entered ‘os anos de chumbo’ (literally, the years of lead), whose salient features included the imprisonment, torture and ‘disappearance’ of political prisoners.

Against this background of increased repression, a good part of the opposition became ever more radicalised. It would be wrong to suggest that

armada no Brasil: o treinamento guerrilheiro (Rio de Janeiro, 2001). On the role of women in the resistance to the dictatorship, see L. Maklouf Carvalho, *Mulheres que foram a luta armada* (São Paulo, 1998).

15 M. Magalhães, *Marighella. O guerrilheiro que incendiou o mundo* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012) is an excellent biography.

armed opposition emerged *only* in reaction to the hardening of the regime. As we have seen, some groups on the Left had already chosen this path. But after the publication of AI-5, the ALN, the PCBR, the VPR, now led by Carlos Lamarca, a captain in the 4th Infantry Regiment in São Paulo who deserted in January 1969, and COLINA, which in September 1969 merged with the VPR as the Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária (VAR-Palmares), became more firmly committed to a strategy of armed revolutionary struggle against the military dictatorship, mainly through urban guerrilla actions. As Marighella wrote in his *Mini-manual do guerrilheiro urbano* (1969): 'Today, to engage in acts of violence, to be a 'terrorist', enables any decent person because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary engaged in the armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and its atrocities.'

Elio Gaspari estimates that at the beginning of 1969 there were probably a total of some 800 people attached to the various movements of the revolutionary Left, which had ideological differences but agreed on the need for armed struggle.¹⁶ A large percentage were students or recent graduates, young, urban middle class, and male (although perhaps 20–25 per cent were women). Most of them had not experienced the intense political mobilisation in the period immediately before the 1964 coup. For this generation, the PCB was seen as incompetent and 'reformist', no longer 'revolutionary'.

On 4 September 1969 there took place one of the most spectacular actions in the armed struggle against the military dictatorship: the kidnapping of the US ambassador Charles Burke Elbrick. This was a joint activity by the ALN and the Dissidência Comunista da Guanabara, a group made up of students who had left the PCB in 1966 and who after the kidnapping adopted the name of *Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro* (MR-8), a reference to the date of the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967.¹⁷ It was an action that made headlines around the world and made a deep impression on the military. Eventually the ambassador was released in exchange for 15 political prisoners who were flown to Mexico. In 1970 three other foreign diplomats (the Japanese consul-general and the ambassadors of West Germany and Switzerland) were kidnapped by armed revolutionary groups, and exchanged for a total of 115 political prisoners, who were also transferred abroad. These high-profile urban guerrilla initiatives led to the adoption of even tougher repressive measures by the military government. For example, on the day Ambassador Elbrick was released (9 September 1969), the regime issued Institutional Act number 14

16 E. Gaspari, *A ditadura envergonhada* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), p. 352.

The Director of the CIA, Richard Helms, in May 1970, claimed the number of 'terrorists' was never more than 1,000. Colonel Alberto Brilhante Ustra, the head of the repressive apparatus in São Paulo, put the number involved in the armed struggle at 1,650.

17 8 October 1967 was in fact the date of Guevara's imprisonment. He died the following day.

(AI-14), which established life sentences and death penalties for those involved in 'revolutionary or subversive warfare' as defined by the National Security Law.

By the end of 1971 all urban guerrilla groups had been destroyed or disbanded. The most important guerrilla leaders were dead. Marighella of the ANL was killed in a police ambush in São Paulo in November 1969. Lamarca, who had left the VPR to join the MR-8, was killed in the *sertão* [backlands] of Bahia in September 1971. Of those who were not killed, many were imprisoned and tortured; some managed to escape into exile. Despite the violence of the repression used against the organisations of the Left engaged in armed struggle, their defeat should not be put down solely to the repressive methods used by the dictatorship, and especially torture. The fact that the political positions adopted by these vanguard movements was far removed from the real revolutionary possibilities at the time was also a decisive factor in their defeat. They had, of course, no confidence in representative liberal democracy, and their links to the non-armed Left (mainly the PCB), to the one opposition political party permitted by the military, the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), and to liberal-conservative elements opposed to the dictatorship were always weak. And they never secured broad popular support. Politically isolated, they soon reached a dead end from which there was no obvious way out. Their activities became increasingly limited to desperate attempts to save their 'quadros' from physical destruction by the much superior force of the repressive apparatus mounted to combat them.

The urban armed revolutionary struggle was always regarded as a preparation for revolution in the countryside, though only the Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB) led by João Amazonas and Maurício Grabois gave the rural struggle its primary attention. With the urban guerrillas facing defeat, the PCdoB made a desperate attempt to establish a rural guerrilla *foco* in a sparsely populated area in the Araguaia River region, the 'Bico do Papagaio', in the south of Pará and Maranhão (today the state of Tocantins), 1,400 kilometres from Brasília. Planned since 1967, it was in 1971–2 that some 60 PCdoB militants, many of them middle class students and young professionals, began to infiltrate the region, posing as rural workers with a view to winning the loyalty of the local population. However, they failed to attract more than a handful to the cause. After the failure of several initial efforts to crush the *foco* due to poor intelligence and logistical problems, the military eventually mobilised 12,000 troops based at Xambioá, the largest military mobilisation of the military period. However, it took three campaigns before the guerrilla activity was finally brought to an end in January 1975, leaving dozens of deaths and 'disappeared' guerrilla fighters.¹⁸

18 On the rural guerrilla movement in Araguaia, see P. Correia Cabral, *Xamboiá. Guerrilha no Araguaia* (Rio de Janeiro, 1993), R. Pessoa Campos Filho, *Guerrilha do Araguaia. A esquerda*

III

In August 1979, as part of the military's strategy of slow and gradual liberalisation, an amnesty law was passed and prominent exiles, including Luís Carlos Prestes, began to return to Brazil. In November the creation of new political parties was permitted (indeed encouraged). This 'reform' was aimed at splitting the opposition, thus preventing a potential victory for the MDB in the 1982 elections which would threaten the regime's control of the presidential succession in 1985. The opposition found itself divided into four parties, one of which was the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), a new name for the old PTB, led by Leonel Brizola. In February 1980 a fifth opposition party was created, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers' Party), the only party born outside Congress without ties to the traditional 'political class'. After the transition from military to civilian government in March 1985, the two Communist parties – the PCB, which changed its name to the Partido Popular Socialist (PPS) in 1991 at the end of the Cold War, and the PCdoB – were legalised and the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) was re-established. But for the next 30 years the PT would be the dominant party of the Left in Brazil.

The PT had been created by the leaders of organised labour, particularly in São Paulo, the heart of the Brazilian industry, together with progressive Catholic activists from the *comunidades eclesiais de base*, former urban and rural guerrillas, and socialist, Trotskyist (but not for the most part Communist) intellectuals.¹⁹ It was an avowedly socialist party. Its leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the seventh of eight surviving children of a poverty-stricken rural family in the interior of Pernambuco in the north-east, Brazil's poorest region, with only four years of primary school education, was a *metalúrgico* [metal worker] and head of the metalworkers' union of São Bernardo do Campos in the metropolitan region of São Paulo (with no previous links to the traditional parties of the Left in Brazil). The historian Eric Hobsbawm recognised the PT as a classic socialist party based on organised labour such as had emerged in Europe before the First World War, but uniquely in Latin America, and almost everywhere else in the world, a socialist party based on organised labour

em armas (Goiânia, 1997) and Tais Morais and Eumano Silva, *Operação Araguaia. Os arquivos secretos da guerrilha* (São Paulo, 2005).

19 On the formation of the Partido dos Trabalhadores, see Rachel Meneguello, *PT: A formação de um partido, 1979–1982* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1989) and Margaret E. Keck, *The Workers Party and Democratization in Brazil* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992). On the organisation of the party, see David Samuels, 'From socialism to social democracy: party organisation and the transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil', *Comparative Political Studies*, 37/9 (2004) and Pedro Floriano Ribeiro, *Dos sindicatos ao governo. A organização nacional do PT de 1980 à 2005* (São Carlos, SP: EduFscar, 2010). For a history of the party (to 2009–10), see Wendy Hunter, *The transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil, 1989–2009* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and Lincoln Secco, *História do PT 1978–2010* (Cotia, SP: Atelie Editorial, 2011).

established since the Second World War – and with an industrial worker as its leader.²⁰

The PT grew steadily during its first two decades. In the relatively free elections permitted by the military dictatorship in 1982 it secured only 3.5 per cent of the national vote, but elected its first eight federal deputies from three different states, six of them in São Paulo which provided 72 per cent of the PT vote. In 1986, in the first congressional elections after the end of military rule, it elected 16 deputies from eight different states, including Lula himself in São Paulo. (The PCB and the PCdoB each elected three deputies, the PSB one, but even if the PDT's 25 deputies are included the Left/Centre-Left held less than 10 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.)

In the 1988 municipal elections, the PT had 30 per cent of the vote in the 100 largest cities in Brazil, electing the mayor of São Paulo, and the mayors of several other municipalities in Greater São Paulo and the state of São Paulo, together with the cities of Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul) and Vitória (Espírito Santo). In many of these municipalities, notably in Porto Alegre and São Paulo, PT administrations encouraged citizen participation in matters of finance, health, education, urban planning and environment as well as generally promoting women's rights.²¹

The PT increased the number of seats it held in the Chamber of Deputies in each of the congressional elections of the 1990s: 35 in 1990, 49 in 1994 (the first time the PT had more seats than the PDT), 58 in 1998. (The PCB/PPS won two, two and three seats in 1990, 1994 and 1998 respectively, the PCdoB five, ten and seven, the PSB 11, 16 and 19.) The PT also elected its first senator in 1990, four in 1994 and three in 1998. In 1994 the PT captured governorship of the Federal District (Brasília), and in 1998 the governorship of Rio Grande do Sul. In the October 2000 municipal elections, the PT won in six state capitals, including São Paulo (for the second time), Porto Alegre (for the fourth time), and half of the 60 cities with populations of over 200,000. In 2000 the PT was the largest and most successful party of the Left in Latin America, which was remarkable in the light of Brazil's political history and political culture.

The presidency, however, remained elusive. In 1989 Lula contested the first fully democratic presidential elections in Brazilian history. In the first round he narrowly defeated Leonel Brizola (PDT) by less than half a million votes to secure second place. In the second round he won 47 per cent of the vote, 31.1 million votes, but lost to Fernando Collor de Mello. In both 1994 and 1998 Lula lost in the first round to Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the PSDB, the

20 See Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Viva la Revolución. Eric Hobsbawm on Latin America* (London: Little, Brown, 2016), p. 18.

21 See, for example, Wendy Hunter, *Transformation of the Workers' Party*, ch. 4. 'The PT in municipal governments: the pragmatic face of the party'.

Brazilian Social Democratic party, despite having in 1998 the support of the smaller parties of the Left – and the PDT. (Brizola was his running-mate in 1998.) He did, however, increase his first round vote from 17 per cent in 1989 to 27 per cent in 1994 and 32 per cent in 1998.

In October 2002, at the fourth consecutive attempt, Lula was elected president of Brazil with 39.4 million votes in the first round (46.4 per cent of the *votos válidos* [valid votes]) and 52.8 million (61.3 per cent) in the second. The PT also became the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies (with 91 seats, though less than 20 per cent of the total) and the third largest in the Senate (electing ten senators, including five women, and doubling its representation from seven to 14). The PT also made gains in the elections for state assemblies throughout Brazil (although it failed to win the governorships of any of the eight largest states). It was overall the most important victory for the Left in Latin America since the election of Allende in Chile in September 1970.

A number of factors explain why Lula was able to secure the support of those sections of the urban middle class and lower middle class (as well as the urban poor) who had voted for Collor in 1989 and for Cardoso in 1994 and 1998. (The PT did not at this stage target the poorest and least educated sectors of the Brazilian electorate, especially in the north and north-east.) There was a general perception that the failures of the Cardoso administrations, especially the second administration, outweighed the achievements. The party coalition that had sustained the Cardoso administrations had broken down and José Serra was a less than convincing PSD candidate. There was a sense that it was time for a change and, after three failed presidential attempts, it was Lula's time. The PT had also by now built a national structure which was the envy of the other political parties. And for the first time the PT developed a public relations/media campaign around the background (both in the north-east and in São Paulo), personal history and charismatic personality of its leader, Lula, with a strong emotional appeal to Brazilians who had not previously identified with the party.

Most important of all, the PT itself had moved to the centre ground. During the 1990s, the so-called *Articulação* (later *Campo Majoritário*) came to have a majority in the party and to adopt more moderate policies. After the expulsion of the *Convergência Socialista* in 1992, the other groups on the Marxist, Trotskyist and Socialist left of the party were increasingly outmaneuvered and, at least in decision making at the top, somewhat marginalised. Lula's *Carta ao Povo Brasileiro* [Open Letter to the Brazilian People] (June 2002), while emphasising the need for social policies to reduce poverty and inequality, abandoned the original PT project for the radical social transformation of Brazil (even the use of the word socialism) and committed a future PT government to the market economy and orthodox economic policies: macroeconomic stability,

the control of inflation and fiscal equilibrium, that is to say, to a continuation of the economic policies of the Cardoso administrations. Moreover, political alliances were broadened. For the first time, Lula secured the support of a major party of the Centre/Right, the Partido Liberal (PL), which was offered the vice-presidency. In other words, to win the election, to capture the presidency and to govern, the PT came to terms with economic, social and political realities, both domestic and global. There would be no conflict with the remnants of the traditional political oligarchy, the conservative middle class and the domestic economic elite in agribusiness, construction, mining, oil and gas, banking, etc. – and nothing to alarm international finance. The question arose: was the PT still a party of the Left?²²

Once in power the PT lost more elements on the left of the party, especially intellectuals, who felt that the party had become too centralised and too many compromises had been made. The most significant breakaway came in 2004 with the creation of the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL). Francisco de Oliveira, the leading intellectual of the PSOL, said once that the PT under Lula was 'a esquerda que a direita sonha' (The Left that the Right dreamt about). The economist Delfim Netto, Minister of Finance and Minister of Planning during the military dictatorship, later argued, not entirely mischievously, that Lula had saved capitalism in Brazil!²³

Having finally captured the presidency in 2002, and significantly increased its strength in Congress, the aim of José Dirceu, the PT's chief strategist who was appointed Lula's chief of staff, was to make the PT a permanent party of government (as the PRI had been in Mexico for over 70 years until 2000). It would, he claimed, take at least 20 years to transform Brazil, in particular to eradicate poverty and remedy Brazil's grave economic and social inequalities. The problem, however, was that the Brazilian electoral system made it difficult for any party, and the PT was no exception, to secure more than 20 per cent of the seats in Congress and therefore to govern alone impossible. This led inevitably to *presidencialismo de coalisão* [coalition presidentialism]. In order to govern Lula had to form a coalition with the PL and the smaller parties with some claim to be part of the Left: the PPS (ex-PCB), the PCdoB, the PSB, Partido Verde (PV), even the PDT. However, this was not enough. Throughout 2004 there were rumours that the PT was not only offering positions in government and state agencies and making most of the 20,000 or so patronage appointments on political grounds (this was normal practice) but using, or rather misusing, public funds in a widespread and organised scheme to buy votes in Congress. Dozens of deputies were receiving monthly cash

22 See, for example, W. Hunter, 'The Partido dos Trabalhadores: still a party of the Left?', in P.R. Kingstone and T.J. Power (eds.), *Democratic Brazil Revisited* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).

23 *O Globo*, 20 September 2009.

payments in return for switching to a party in the government coalition or at least supporting government legislation.

When it finally broke in June 2005 the *mensalão* [big monthly allowance] cash-for-votes scandal shook the government to its foundations. José Dirceu was forced to resign (he was replaced by Dilma Rousseff, Minister of Mines and Energy) as were many of Lula's top advisers and senior figures in the PT (including the party's president and treasurer).²⁴ There were calls for Lula's resignation or impeachment. He survived mainly because the main Opposition party, the PSDB, feared serious social disturbances if Lula were removed from office and because it was convinced, wrongly, that it would win back the presidency in the 2006 election. For Lula and the PT the political price of survival was the integration of the PMDB, the major, classic clientelist party of the Centre-Right, into its multi-party governing coalition, which had until then been avoided. The PMDB would be offered the presidents of both houses of Congress and three ministries in the second PT administration – and the vice-presidency in 2010.

Lula went on to win re-election in 2006, defeating Geraldo Alckmin of the PSDB in the second round with 60.1 per cent of the vote (58.3 million votes). In the south Lula lost to Alckmin 35–55 per cent; in the south-east he drew 44–44 per cent but lost in São Paulo 37–54 per cent. The middle class, certainly the professional middle class, had turned against Lula largely because of corruption and his association with some of the worst elements in the old political oligarchy. The PT had, after all, presented itself as an ethical party, determined to change Brazil's political culture. However, Lula won in the north-east 67–23 per cent, in the north 57–35 per cent, and in the centre-west 51–35 per cent. In the less developed 50 per cent of Brazil's 5,500 *municípios*, especially in the north-east and north where the poorest and least educated Brazilians were concentrated, Lula secured 66 per cent of the vote in the first round (74 per cent in the second round). The social and political base of the PT had been dramatically transformed since 2002.²⁵

In the 2010 presidential election, Lula successfully transferred his huge popular support – he ended his second term with approval rates as high as 75 per cent – to his personally chosen successor, Dilma Rousseff, whom the PT

24 It was seven years before the Federal Supreme Court, in August 2012, condemned and sentenced to imprisonment several leading figures in the PT, including Lula's chief of staff, José Dirceu, for their involvement in the *mensalão* corruption scandal during Lula's first administration.

25 See J. Nicolau and V. Peixoto, *As bases municipais da votação de Lula em 2006*, http://www.forumnacional.org.br/forum/pforum6_2a.asp; César Zucco, 'The President's "new" constituency: Lula and the pragmatic vote in Brazil's 2006 presidential elections', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 40 (2008), pp. 29–49; W. Hunter and T. Power, 'Rewarding Lula: executive power, social policy and the Brazilian elections of 2006', *Latin American Politics and Society*, 49 (2007), pp. 1–30.

had accepted as its candidate with some reluctance and some dissent. An ex-urban guerrilla during the military dictatorship, Dilma had been for 20 years an active member of Brizola's populist PDT in Rio Grande do Sul, and only joined the PT in 2000, becoming first Lula's Minister of Mines and Energy and then his Chief of Staff. Dilma (and her running mate Michel Temer of the PMDB) won the election with 47 per cent of the votes in the first round and 56 per cent in the second round – broadly the electoral support secured by Lula in 2006.

In addition to the not inconsiderable factors of Lula's personal popularity, the support of the PMDB and other parties in the government coalition and, as we now know, huge amounts of so-called *caixa dois* [illegal] campaign finance, the PT victories in the presidential elections of 2006 and 2010 can be explained as the political dividend of improved, if not spectacular, economic growth combined with some modest social progress under PT government.

Brazil's economy had grown faster than any economy in the world, except Japan's, in the four decades from 1940 to 1980, with average growth of 7 per cent per annum, and over 10 per cent per annum in two periods, 1956–61 and 1968–73. But since 1980 Brazil had had no equivalent period of sustained economic growth. The 1980s and 1990s were the so-called 'lost decades' with average annual growth was 1.6 per cent (a little higher on average, 2.2 per cent, during the Cardoso administrations 1995–2002). However, under the first two PT governments the economy grew 4.2 per cent on average during the years 2004–6, 6.1 per cent in 2007, 5.2 per cent in 2008, only 0.3 per cent in 2009 (largely because of the international financial crisis, although Brazil emerged relatively unscathed) but then 7.5 per cent in 2010. And the discovery of immense, offshore oil resources was considered Brazil's 'passport to the future'. On 14 November 2009 the *Economist* produced its famous cover with the statue of Christ on the Corcovado mountain which overlooks Rio de Janeiro taking off like a rocket and the caption 'Brazil takes off: a 14-page special on Latin America's big success story'.

This relatively strong economic performance was the result of, first, the PT government's acceptance (at least until late 2008) of the orthodox macro-economic policies of the Cardoso governments (fiscal discipline, primary surpluses to reduce the fiscal deficit and the ratio of public debt to GDP, inflation targets, etc.); secondly, an exceptionally favourable international environment for Brazil's agricultural and mineral exports as a result of the commodities boom driven by China; and, thirdly, an expanding domestic market as a result of full employment and higher wages, but also the anti-poverty social policies pursued by the PT government.

At the beginning of the 21st century Brazil was one of the most unequal societies in the world with close to a majority of the population poor and

a significant minority living in conditions of extreme poverty (*miséria*). And despite Brazil's claim to be a racial democracy social exclusion had a clear racial dimension. Poverty is a notoriously complex, contested and highly political concept. A great deal depends on where the poverty line is drawn. Let us accept that the Cardoso government's *Plano Real* (1994) for macroeconomic stability and the reduction of inflation brought down the level of poverty from, say, 40–45 per cent to 35 per cent of the population. The PT government was, however, the first government in Brazilian history to make the eradication of poverty and the reduction of inequality its main priority and there was undoubtedly a significant reduction in poverty in Brazil, from 35 per cent to 20 per cent of the population, during the years 2003–10. Real wages, which had been stagnant during the period 1979–1994 and increased at less than one per cent per annum in 1995–2003, rose 3.3 per cent per annum as a result of economic growth, increased employment in the formal sector and, above all, a policy of increasing the minimum wage well above the rate of inflation each year (although it was still less than US\$300 per month at the end of eight years of PT government and tens of millions of workers, the majority in the states of the north and north east, did not receive it). At same time the PT government eased access to credit – and therefore the consumption of durable and non-durable goods – for lower income families. Some 30 million Brazilians were taken out of poverty, though hardly into the much proclaimed 'new middle class'.²⁶

What is indisputable is that extreme poverty, especially in the north-east and north, was significantly reduced, mainly as a result of a comprehensive, conditional cash transfer programme, the *Bolsa Família*, a consolidation and considerable expansion of a number of existing social welfare programmes. Around 4.1 million households had been brought under this scheme by June 2004, 11.2 million (35 million people) by July 2006. In 2010 13 million families (45–50 million people – a quarter of Brazil's population) were benefitting from *Bolsa Família*. Individual beneficiaries received around R\$170 (US\$55) per month, close to the World Bank minimum of US\$1.90 per day.

Millions of Brazilians still lived in poverty, however, and many more millions were living barely above the poverty line, extremely vulnerable to any future economic downturn. And while they had seen a real increase in their income and in their private consumption, public goods had been seriously neglected. Almost half the population of Brazil was living without adequate sanitation, a large proportion without clean water, and for most Brazilians standards of education and health remained totally unsatisfactory. *Bolsa Família* had alleviated extreme poverty, but those receiving it still lived in poverty. (*Bolsa*

26 One of the best guides to the issue of poverty in Brazil is S. Rocha, *Transferencia de renda no Brasil. O fim da pobreza?* (Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2013).

Família absorbed less than one per cent of GDP. The Brazilian economist José Márcio Camargo has calculated that seven times more funds were allocated to the pensions of some one million federal *funcionários públicos* [civil servants] than to the more than 13 million *families* receiving Bolsa Família). At the same time the rich and the higher income groups generally had in no way suffered under a PT government. The *World Inequality Report 2018* showed income inequality in Brazil stable at an extremely high level since 1980. Along with South Africa and a handful of Middle East states Brazil remained the most unequal country in the world. The top 10 per cent received 55 per cent of total income (cf. an average of 37 per cent in Europe, for example), the top one per cent 30 per cent (cf. an average of 10 per cent in Europe). The Brazilian tax system remained highly regressive and tax avoidance was endemic. Inheritance tax, the single most important instrument for reducing wealth inequality, was never on the agenda. Moreover, Brazilian business, especially big business, 'national champions', received a variety of subsidies in the form of cheap credit, financial guarantees and financial aid, particularly through Brazil's development bank, the BNDES. Whether the Lula administration (2003–10) had presided over the promised social transformation of Brazil was open to question.

Under the administration of Dilma Rousseff (2011–14) the Brazilian economy began to slow down as the commodities boom eventually came to an end. There was also undoubtedly considerable macro-economic mismanagement. The rate of growth declined from 4 per cent in 2011 to 1.9 per cent in 2012 and 2 per cent in 2013, and turned negative in the second quarter of 2014. The economy grew only 0.4 per cent in 2014. The cover of the *Economist* on 28 September 2013 had the statue of Christ diving into Guanabara Bay with the caption 'Has Brazil blown it? A 14-page special report'. And with the economic downturn came the steady erosion of the social gains of the Lula years.

In June 2013 there were unprecedented and entirely unanticipated mass demonstrations throughout Brazil protesting about the threat to living standards, but mainly about the poor quality of public services – transport, health, education, housing, sanitation, security, etc. – and raising wider issues of democratic governance, not least corruption. Dilma's approval rate fell below 50 per cent for the first time and plummeted to 30 per cent a year later with the onset of the so-called *Operação Lava-Jato* [Operation Car Wash] investigation into a major corruption scandal involving Petrobras (the state-owned oil company), private construction companies, and government ministers and politicians belonging mainly to the PT (see Essay 5). Nevertheless, in October 2014, with Michel Temer of the PMDB once again her running mate, Dilma Rousseff was narrowly re-elected president.

The first year of Dilma's second administration, however, brought a dramatic deterioration in Brazil's fortunes. The economy contracted by 3.8 per cent (and would contract a further 3.6 per cent in 2016, thus making 11 quarters in succession of negative growth for the first time in Brazilian history). In Latin America only the Venezuelan economy performed worse. Brazil moved from annual primary surpluses (since the early 1990s except for 1997) to annual primary deficits. The public debt/GDP ratio, which had been 50 per cent in 2011 and 56 per cent in 2014, rose to 65.6 per cent in 2015 (and 69.9 per cent in 2016, 74.4 per cent in 2017, and rising steeply while pension reform in particular was postponed). Inflation, which had been maintained at 6–6.5 per cent in the years 2011–14, rose to 10.6 per cent in 2015. Average per capita income fell by more than 10 per cent from 2014 to 2016. Sixty million families were in debt (behind in their credit card payments or in default). Official unemployment, 6–7 per cent in the years 2011–14, rose to 8.5 per cent in 2015 (and would reach 11.8 per cent in 2016, 13.7 percent in the first quarter of 2017). Although always difficult to measure, the number of Brazilians living in poverty increased, perhaps by as much as 20 per cent.²⁷ At the same time, Operation Lava-Jato gathered momentum. Prominent PT politicians (two national presidents, a national secretary-general, two national treasurers, a president of the Chamber of Deputies and a leader of the party of the Senate) and politicians of other parties allied to the PT were arrested and jailed or put under house arrest. Former president Lula was himself under investigation. Dilma's approval rate collapsed to single figures. When in October the PMDB, the largest party in Congress, withdrew its support she was no longer able effectively to maintain her multi-party government. Her political career came to an ignominious end on 31 August 2016 with her impeachment for crimes of administrative and fiscal irresponsibility (the notorious *pedeladas fiscais*) (see Essay 5).

After more than 13 years the PT found itself out of power, discredited, demoralised and in some disarray. Its economic and social achievements, especially during the Lula years (2003–10), were overshadowed by the *petrolão* corruption scandal for which it was primarily responsible and the economic and political failures of the Dilma years (2011–16). In the municipal elections held in October 2016, two months after Dilma's impeachment, the PT failed to win a single one of the 93 state capitals and cities with populations of over

27 A World Bank study released in February 2017 predicted between 2.5 and 3.6 million 'new poor' in 2017. Depending on pessimistic or optimistic forecasts for the rate of economic growth (but on any calculation at the time less than 0.5 per cent), Brazil would then have between 19.8 and 20.9 million poor, of which between 8.5 and 9.4 million would be living in extreme poverty. (*O Estado de São Paulo*, 17 February 2017). The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) in its Synthesis of Social Indicators (December 2017) has 52 million Brazilians (25 per cent of the population) living below the poverty line, 13.3 million (6.5 per cent) in extreme poverty.

200,000. It lost 74 per cent of its municípios in the south-east, 57 per cent in the south, 87 per cent in the centre-west, 67 per cent in the north but only 40 per cent in the north-east (and 28 per cent in the municípios where half the electorate was in receipt of Bolsa Família). It was virtually wiped out in the state of São Paulo, including the city of São Paulo and even in the ABCD 'red belt' around São Paulo. In terms of public support the party was back to where it was before Lula's great victory in 2002.

Nevertheless, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party) remained the only significant party of the Left in Brazil.²⁸ It still had some 1.5 million members and a national organisation. Although it now controlled only 5 per cent of Brazil's 5,500 municípios, it had branches in 96 per cent of them. It had the support of the Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT), the largest and most important trade union federation in Brazil. The *metalúrgicos* [metal workers], *bancários* [bank workers], *funcionários públicos* [civil servants] and university teachers were strongly strongly *petista* as were many of Brazil's social movements, notably the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra (MST). Despite some party switching, the PT still had a solid base in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Above all, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, its leader for the past 36 years, remained Brazil's most popular politician. However, in July 2017 Lula was sentenced to a long term in prison for corruption and risked being unable to run for president in 2018 as he and the PT intended (see Essays 5 and 6). The sentence was confirmed (indeed increased) in January 2018. Lula's imprisonment on 7 April was a major blow to the PT already struggling to maintain its existing, albeit diminished, level of popular support in the upcoming general elections (October 2018).²⁹

28 In a review of the literature on the PT and the PT governments, 'The PT at 35: Revisiting scholarly interpretations of the Brazilian Workers' Party', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 48 (2016), pp. 147–71, Oswaldo Amaral and Timothy Power call for the study of the 'broader progressive family' of which the PT is a part'. They have in mind the PSOL (Partido Socialismo e Liberdade), the PCdoB (Partido Comunista do Brasil), the PPS (Partido Popular Socialista, ex-PCB, Partido Comunista Brasileiro), the PSB (Partido Socialista Brasileiro) and the PDT (Partido Democrático Trabalhista, ex-PTB, Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro). However, the PSOL, an independent party of the Left, is extremely small, consisting mostly of Trotskyist intellectuals, although it has attracted some popular support in recent years. The PCdoB is also small, no longer has anything to do with communism and is closely tied to the PT. The PPS has steadily moved to the centre ground since it ceased to be a Communist party. The PSB long ago abandoned its claim to be a socialist party. Whether the PDT, led by Leonel Brizola until his death in 2004, has ever had any serious claim to be a party of the Left, despite its affiliation to the Socialist International for many years, is open to debate. All five parties were expected to run candidates for the presidency in October 2018.

29 Lula remained the PT's pre-candidate for president in October 2018. If in the end, as expected, Lula were not permitted to contest the election the PT would have to find an alternative candidate unless, without Lula, it decided to join a *frente ampla* (broad front) of 'progressive' parties (PT, PCdoB, PSOL, possibly even the PDT) behind a single candidate of the Left not necessarily from the PT.

Given the persistence of poverty (and extreme poverty) and a level of inequality which remains one of the highest in the world, Brazil needs a party of the Left, if not in government, at least in effective opposition. If the Partido dos Trabalhadores is judged to have ultimately failed in government, and its electoral prospects in the presidential, congressional, state governorship and state assembly elections in October 2018 are generally poor, this is a tragedy for Brazil.



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